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ABSTRACT 
Degradation and Resegmentation: Social and 
Technological Change ~n the East Midlands Hosiery Industry 
Harriet Bradley 
This thesis investigates the usefulness of Braverman's general 
theory of the labour process in the explanation of social and techno-
logical developments in the hosiery industry. 
Critical accounts of Braverman's work are reviewed and used to 
construct a more adequate model of labour process change. In addition 
to the historical tendency to degradation, processes of re-skilling and 
retention of skills, referred to as 'resegrnentation', are integral to 
the restructuring of the labour process. Many other types of management 
strategy are utilised in the workplace, though they do not necessarily 
involve the physical transformation of the labour process; these, 
referred to as 'local' strategies, may be of a pacificatory or a repres-
sive kind. It is also necessary to consider gender relations as a 
determinant of the re-organisation of work and technological development. 
Finally, class relations at a macro level are also relevant to understand-
~ng changing workplace relations. All these aspects must be considered 
for a complete understanding of labour process change. 
The model is used to study the development of the hosiery labour 
process between 1800 and 1960. Long-term processes of degradation and 
resegmentation are discernible, in which the sexual division of labour 
has played a crucial part. A range of repressive strategies have been 
employed, while forms of paternalism and of joint consultation have been 
the dominant pacificatory strategies. Workplace relations over the period 
have moved from violent confrontation to peaceful collaboration, reflect-
ing national trends to class pacification; major causes of this include 
the adoption of pacificatory strategies by employers and changes in the 
local working-class culture, community life and family relations. The 
extended model of labour process change, thus, makes possible the tracing 
of the var~ous interlocking processes involved in social and technological 
change in industry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study is based on materials gathered in an investigation of 
changing industrial relations and work organisation 1n the East Midlands 
hosiery industry between 1800 and 1960. Its object 1s twofold: first, to 
explain why, during that period, the prevailing pattern of industrial 
relations changed from one of conflict and hostility to one of co-operation 
and harmony; secondly, to consider the usefulness of a model of changing 
work organisation derived from the work of Braverman (1974) and other 
contributors to the 'labour process debate' in understanding the develop-
ment of the hosiery labour process. 
The first two chapters consider the strengths and limitations of 
Braverman's analysis of the degradation of the labour process, and the 
need to integrate it with some broader-based account of class relations. 
The remaining chapters attempt to apply a reworked version of the Braverman 
thesis to the hosiery case. Chapter 3 presents an historical overview of 
change 1n the industry. Chapter 4 (the key chapter in the study) examines 
processes of degradation and Chapters 5 to 7 deal with other aspects of 
employer strategy in the industry. Chapters 8 and 9 are concerned with the 
response of workers to those strategies, while Chapter 10 looks at the 
salience of the analysis of gender relations in understanding labour process 
development. 
In more general terms, the focus of this study is on change and 
strategic choice. In investigating these, the major methodological assump-
tion has been that actors' own accounts of their choices and actions must 
be taken seriously. Although such accounts may well suffer from some 
distortion, both in formulation, as actors seek to order and justify their 
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experiences~ both to themselves and to their audiences, and in interpreta-
tion, as linguistic change and cultural transformation obscure the original 
meanings to the historian, nonetheless they provide the best starting-point 
for an understanding of action and choice. Distortions can be compensated 
for, in part, by accumulating a sufficient density of accounts of various 
phenomena, and it is also important to supplement such material with study 
of the resultant actions and their context. Distortion may also be reduced 
by balancing original accounts with the various second-order interpretations 
offered by observers and subsequently by historians and social scientists. 
In line with this assumption, a considerable amount of primary material 
is presented in this study. Two maJor sources have been extensively drawn 
on for this data. The first is the series of Parliamentary reports dealing 
either wholly or in part with the hosiery industry, which were produced 
throughout the nineteenth century. Fortunately for the historian, the 
notoriety achieved by the industry in the first half of the century ensured 
that at least one such survey was carried out in every decade; the researcher 
is thus able to use the reports to build up a fairly complete picture of 
change over the century. 
The limitations of Parliamentary papers as a source of data have been 
fairly well rehearsed. 1 Several factors may promote inaccuracies and dis-
tortions. Witnesses, being either selected by the interested parties, or 
self-selected on the base of commitment to a cause, may not be fully 
representative of the population under study. Some witnesses may have been 
intimidated or inhibited by the formality of the proceedings, resembling as 
they did a court or tribunal, while others were quite literally bribed or 
warned off. The questions asked were highly selective, reflecting the 
1 See, for example, Bythell (19?8), pp 22-24. 
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preoccupations of the investigators, and also middle-class preconceptions 
of what the working classes were like and should be like. Women were 
rarely interviewed, and if they were it was usually in connection with 
what were perceived as 'problems' of women's contemporary social roles 
(such as the effect of women's work on family life). Nevertheless, where 
the investigation was as comprehensive as that of the two great hosiery 
comm1ss1ons of 1845 and 1854-5, and where the commissioners had the 
sympathetic skills of a good sociological researcher, extremely rich and 
wide-ranging material was collected. The 1845 Royal Commission on the 
framework knitters' condition, for example, presents us with a total 
picture of daily life in a declining industrial village community which 
can compare well, in its revelatory nature and in frankness of individual 
response,with the data collected in a piece of modern sociological field 
research. 
The second major source was hosiery un1on records, which take over 
the narrative as the Parliamentary documents become sparser. Minute books 
of the Leicester Amalgamated Hosiery Union, dating from 1888 onwards, are 
held in the Leicester Records Office. These were consulted, along with 
records of the Hinckley Union from 1932 to 1944, and records of the 
National Union of Hosiery Workers and its Leicester district from 1945 to 
the present day. The early minute books in particular (from 1888-1926) 
provide very detailed accounts of many events, issues and disputes; their 
presentation of events contrasts markedly with the formal, bureaucratised 
style of the National Union's postwar records. 
The use of these two resources as the maJor source of data means that 
there is an undoubted bias in the material presented towards accounts g1ven 
by leaders, delegates and representatives on both workers' and employers' 
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sides. In terms of this study~ however, I would argue that this is not 
a major handicap, as its focus is on strategic choices and, on the workers' 
side particularly, it is leaders and representatives who actually make 
these choices. As Hobsbawm has argued, the "bourgeoisie" (in this case 
the capitalist employers) "can make things happen as individuals or in 
small numbers" but the working class are unable to make things happen 
except where they combine to act collectively (Hobsbawm, 1984, p 26). 
However, the scope of the Parliamentary papers is wide enough to offer 
some accounts from the 'rank and file' of ordinary workers in the industry, 
and something at least of their contributions can be inferred from these, 
and from the other sources which have also been used in the study. 
These other sources are varied, and include local histories and mem-
oirs, civic and commercial publications, biographies, novels and poems 
written by hosiery operatives, factory histories and publicity material, 
along with a miscellany of documents, ranging from pamphlets to press 
cuttings to union handbills, held in the Leicester Records Office. Factory 
histories are particularly useful as a source of information on employers' 
1 . . d "d 1 . 1 po ~c~es an ~ eo og~es. Some newspaper material is used, although there 
was not sufficient time available for a systematic newspaper search. 
1 Company records were another possible source of info~ation, but 
consultation of various hosiery firms' records in Leicester Records 
Office proved to be of little use. Data contained in them were all 
of a purely financial nature (accounts, wage sheets, inventories, 
oumership deeds, etc.) and threw no light on workplace relations. 
Undoubtedly some of the larger companies have interesting records, 
but these have already been worked through by the authors of the 
various factory or company histories referred to in this study. 
The expenditure of time and effort required to gain access to other 
such records would have been too great to make such an endeavour 
worthwhile, in view of the mass of more immediately illuminating 
material which was readily available. 
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Secondary sources have also provided invaluable material on many 
aspects of industrial relations. The problems faced by the hosiery 
industry between 1800 and 1850 have led many economic and social hist-
orians to study it. Among these works, I have found particularly useful 
the standard history of the industry by Wells (1935, 1972), the official 
history of the unions written by Gurnham (1976), and the excellent hist-
orical studies of Nottingham by Church (1966) and Thomis (1968, 1969) 
and of Leicester by Patterson (1954). The two contemporary histories of 
the hosiery industry by Henson, a union leader, and Felkin, a leading 
manufacturer, have, of course, been essential reading (Henson, 1831; 
Felkin, 1867). There is much less secondary material available for the 
twentieth century, but two sociological studies of contemporary hosiery 
factories by Westwood (1984) and Edwards and Scullion (1982) have been 
especially useful to me. To all these, and other, secondary accounts I 
am enormously indebted, even where I occasionally disagree with their 
interpretations. 
Finally, although this-study ends at 1960, I found it important to 
have some understanding and information concerning the contemporary 
situation in the industry, to provide comparisons with the past, and 
thereby to promote a fuller understanding of it. Various interviews and 
observations were carried out in the Leicester area. These included 
informal and formal talks with un1on officials, factory representatives, 
the union research officer and the secretary of the Employers' Association, 
attendance at the 1982 Annual Conference of the National Union of Hosiery 
and Knitwear Workerss and visits to a couple of factories. More systema-
tically, a ser1es of interviews with 16 employers was carried out between 
1982 and 1985. A sample of firms which could be traced back to at least 
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1960 was approached for interview. 1n order to provide some continuity 
of information: several of these were firms about which I had consider-
able information for the earlier period. Many of these firms had been 
established in the nineteenth century, and had records or documents 
dating from early in this century. 
Clearly, to provide a comprehensive and satisfactory account of the 
current situation, in addition to the wide range of historical inforrna-
tion provided here, would have been impossible within the scope of a 
single work. The interviews with employers, therefore, are not conceived 
of as an integral part of this study, but some material from them has been 
used here and there to point to some contrasts or continuities with the 
past, and to set the historical information in perspective. 1 
The methodology employed for this study, then, has been eclectic, 
possibly resembling that of the social historian more fully than that of 
the industrial sociologist as traditionally conceived. However, I believe 
that the use of material from such a wide range of sources provides a 
sufficiently valid and comprehensive base on which to ground a sociological 
account of industrial change. The case for historically-grounded pieces 
of sociological work, so eloquently argued by Abrams (1982), is, I believe, 
generally accepted as proven. I hope that this piece of research may 
provide a positive example of the fruitfulness of the method and practice 
of historical sociology. 
1 See Appendix 1 for fuZZ methodological details of this inteY'1.)iew 
schedule. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
BRAVEfu~ AND THE THEORY OF THE LABOUR PROCESS 
Introduction 
Part of the purpose of this thesis is to test the usefulness of the 
model of labour process development proposed by Harry Braverman (1974) 
in understanding technological change and work reorganisation in any 
concrete case. In succeeding chapters I seek to establish the relevance 
of his concept of 'degradation' of the labour process in explaining the 
changing organisation of production in the hosiery industry. This opening 
chapter is a brief examination of Braverman's work and that of some of 
his critics, and an account of the strengths, weaknesses and necessary 
limitations of Braverman's model. 
Section 1 The Braverman Thesis 
The impact of Braverman's 'Labor and Monopoly Capital' 1n the seven-
ties was strong and widespread. In part, this derives from his insistence 
that analysis of class relations 1n contemporary societies should be 
linked to an analysis of relationships at the point of production, where, 
in Marx's words, away from the "noisy sphere" of the market, in the "hidden 
abode of production" the key to understanding the whole system of capitalist 
production would be found (Marx, 1976, pp 279-280). This was a useful 
corrective to the increasingly abstract and ahistorical analysis of class 
relations at the macro-level which had characterised British Marxism 
following the widespread adoption of an Althusserian 'problematic' in the 
1960s. It enabled young Marxist researchers to turn their attention to 
empirical and historical studies of class relations at the point of 
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production in many industries. But the impact was also felt in non-
Marxist industrial sociology, where researchers were equally responsive 
to the Braverman thesis, seeking to test it in empirical studies. This 
may have been due to the lack of maJor theoretical frameworks within this 
field of sociology which had tended to become narrowly empirical and 
statistical, restricted to testing hypotheses of the middle range. Such 
researchers have used the Braverman thesis rather differently from the 
Marxists, seeing it as an heuristic tool or ideal-type model against 
which to measure empirical events, rather than accepting it as a model 
of an underlying structural generating mechanism. Their work, 1n fact, 
has often been geared towards disproving the degradation thesis. Never-
theless, shared interest in the concept of degradation or 'deskilling' 
has promoted an extraordinary volume both of research and of debate 
1 between the two camps, and others. 
The core of Braverman's 'rediscovery' of the concept of the labour 
process was a reformulation of Marx's original analysis, plus an attempt 
to make that analysis relevant to contemporary societies by considering 
developments since Marx's death. From Marx Braverman took three key 
ideas. The first was the analysis of the core elements of any human 
labour process: the instruments of labour, the object on which labour 1s 
performed (raw materials), purposeful human activity (the task) and, 
centrally, the preconception of the finished result, "What distinguishes 
the worst architect from the best of bees" (Marx, 1976, p 284). In Marx's 
words, 
1 For example~ an annual 'Labour Process Conference' ~s currently 
being organised by Aston University and UMIST. 
9 
In the labour process~ therefore~ man's activity, via the 
instruments of labour~ effects an alteration in the object 
of labour which was intended from the outset. 
(Marx~ 19?6, p 28?) 
The second key idea was that the special nature of the capitalist labour 
process, as a system of commodity production, was its duality in being 
simultaneously a labour process and a valorisation process. It produces 
both exchange and use values. Following from that, the third vital idea 
is the distinction between labour and labour power. The reason why 
capitalist production makes profit is because the commodity sold to the 
capitalist by the labourer is not a finite amount of labour but his or 
her capacity to perform labour, a commodity which ~s highly elastic. By 
maximising the amount of labour power contributed for a given sum, the 
capitalist increases profits: this is the mechanism of surplus value. 
However, at the same time an inevitable problem is posed for the capit-
alist as he endeavours to extract as much work as he can from a possibly 
reluctant worker. To rephrase this in the terminology of a later socio-
logist, the 'effort bargain' made between worker and employer, the amount 
of labour contributed for a g~ven reward, remains intrinsically indeter-
minate (Baldamus, 1961). Where the conditions of work are experienced as 
alienating and degrading there is especially likely to be resistance to 
the pressure of the capitalist. Again putting it in Baldamus' terms, 
where traditional notions of what constitutes 'a fair day's work' or a 
'fair day's pay' are infringed by demands for greater effort there is 
likely to be resistance. Thus the capitalist labour process inevitably 
presents to the capitalist a problem of control. 
The remainder of the Braverman thesis on the labour process is an 
historical account of methods employed to minimise that problem. In 
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early capitalism, a solution was sought through methods of direct control 
or supervision, either by the entrepreneur himself or his delegates, such 
as foremen or subcontractors. There was no attempt to alter the pre-
capitalist methods of organising production. In Marx's terminology, only 
'formal' not 'real' control of the labour process is achieved. Braverman 
argues that this solution was inherently unstable, and thus entrepreneurs 
sought more effective methods to tighten control, culminating in the 
successful imposition of the methods advocated by F.W. Taylor, 'scientific 
management'. These essentially led to the restructuring of the labour 
process, by subdividing it into routine, simple tasks, and by taking the 
function of planning or preconception (the fourth element of the labour 
process) away from the workforce and giving it to the delegates of manage-
ment: ~n Braverman's words, 'the separation of conception and execution' 
efficiently removed knowledge, and thus discretion and autonomy9 from the 
workers, forcing them into accepting degraded jobs. By destroying the 
subjective involvement of workers and removing initiative from them, 
Taylorite control reduces them to a state of near mindless habituation, 
resigned to powerlessness. This process of 'degradation' is seen by 
Braverman as an uneven but inexorable one, which is currently reducing 
the previously high-status, white-collar jobs to the same level of sub-
divided imbecility. In the end, labour under capitalism will be reduced 
to a homogenised mass of 'proletarianised' unskilled workers. 
The final sections of Braverman's book deal with the effects of this 
process on the class structure, both empirically and theoretically, and 
link it to the emergence of a new social formation, 'monopoly capitalism'. 
This need not concern us, since our focus is upon the process of degrada-
tion, that is the subdivision of work and the separation of conception 
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and execution, which together are usually referred to as 'deskilling'. 
This term, however, is not employed by Braverman. It 1s important to 
stress this, as it is a common misconception that Braverman is describing 
the taking away of skiZZs from peopZe; whereas in fact the core of his 
analysis is the degrading of jobs within the labour process. In line 
with his Marxist position, Braverman's concern is with structure rather 
than agency. 
Section 2 The Critique of Braverman 
Braverman's work has been submitted to a barrage of criticism. 
These criticisms have been well summarised by a number of commentators, 
and it would be repetitious to rehearse them all in full here. 1 However, 
it 1s worth briefly referring to some of the more trenchant criticisms, 
and also considering one or two alternative accounts of labour process 
development which have been offered as replacements. 
Cochrane has pointed out that many of these criticisms can be 
arranged under two headings; one group relates to the conception of class 
and in particular to 'consciousness' and the other to the conceptualisation 
of control (Cochrane, 1982). To these we might add a third group, those 
dealing with the concept of skill. 
Many of the criticisms concerning Braverman's conception of class 
arise from his own methodological assertion that his work will deal with 
the working class "as a class in itself, not as a class for itself" and 
that consequently there will be no discussion of it on "the level of its 
consciousness, organisation or activities" (Braverman, 1974, pp 26-7). As 
1 See~ for exa~le~ Littler (1982); Burawoy (19?8)~ and Thompson (1983). 
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Elger points out, this theoretical strategy is not a legitimate one, as 
objective and subjective dimensions of class are logically and historically 
interpenetrated (Elger, 1978). Braverman's device leads to an inadequ3te 
presentation of the working class as essentially passive, and thus there 
~s no version offered of working-class agency. From there, it is easy to 
slide into a parallel conception of the capitalist class as unrestrictedly 
active ~n the imposition of their will: ~n Stark's words, a v~ew of the 
"capitalist class as veritably omniscient and the working class as infin-
itely malleable" (Stark, 1980, p 92). Empirically, this leads to a near 
total neglect in Braverman's historical account of resistance by the 
working classes (and indeed by other groups), for example the resistance 
offered by trade un~ons both in Britain and America to Taylorism. This is 
undoubtedly a weakness ~n Braverman's work, s~nce labour process transform-
ation then becomes the one-sided imposition of capitalists and managers. 
As Stark correctly argues, the labour process, like any social structure, 
must be seen as the product of complex negotiations between the various 
parties involved. 
The conceptualisation of class ~s also criticised on the grounds that 
Braverman takes a one-sided v~ew of the labour/capital relationship, so 
crucial to his argument; correctly portraying it as antagonistic, he fails 
to see that it is also a relationship of mutual dependence. 1 A drive 
towards co-operation is thus structured into the labour process, as well 
as a drive towards conflict. The implications of this will be discussed 
more fully in the next section. 
1 See Friedman (19??a) and Cressey and Macinnes (1980). 
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The other set of important criticisms deal with Braverman's analysis 
of the struggle for control. His account has been read (perhaps a little 
unfairly) as a simple unilinear model of change: there is a movement away 
from an idealised state of craft autonomy to the successful imposition of 
capitalist control by means of Taylorist techniques. Many have argued 
that, on the contrary, Taylorism existed more ~n theory than practice, and 
was only successfully introduced ~n a handful of firms. 1 
Whether the Utopian state of craft control envisaged by Braverman 
ever really existed is still a matter for debate, as various historical 
researches have presented rather different findings. 2 This study will 
itself provide evidence of a kind of craft control grounded in the domestic 
system of production, although this operated within very strict limits and 
was constantly under pressure from the onset of capitalism. As for the 
importance of Taylorism, Littler is surely correct in seeing the contribu-
tion of Taylor himself as only one vers~on of many forms of work reorgan-
isation involving the fragmentation of tasks and concentration of technical 
knowledge in the hands of experts, which Littler describes as a general 
trend to 'rationalisation' (Littler, 1982). 3 Such developments predated 
Taylor, and the predominance of his version is due to the fact that he 
produced a more precisely formulated and recorded account of it than that 
1 For Edwards (19?9) Taylorism is a failed strategy. See also Elger 
(19?8) and Burawoy (1979). 
2 For example., the studies of More (1980); Montgomery (19?9); Clawson 
(1980) and Holbrook-Jones (1982) give different descriptions and 
interpretations of the extent a1ui role of craft control in the 
engineering industry in Britain and America. 
3 Exactly the sa~e trend is discerned by Friedman (1955). Littler 
insists that it is important to distinguish between Taylorite and 
other forms of rationalisation~ but in terms of a general trend I 
fail to see the need for this. 
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offered by other experimenters. Although they may go under other names, 
the principles elaborated by Taylor have been extensively applied through-
out much of modern industry. 
However, Littler's claim that Braverman overplays the role of 
scientific management, seeing it as a final solution to the problem of 
control, the 'ultimate panacea', 1s certainly legitimate. This leads 
Braverman to neglect other forms of management policy which seek to 
achieve the same end; much of the response to Braverman's work has taken 
the form of case studies investigating the role of other forms of manage-
1 
ment control strategy. Many of these other strategies work to tighten 
control by apparently loosening it: in other words, they are concerned 
with the winning of the workers' consent rather than the restricting of 
their autonomy. This follows from the point already made, that the 
capital/labour relationship is not only antagonistic but interdependent: 
capital relies on labour to produce goods of good quality and at the 
required time, while labour depends on capital for its means of subsist-
ence; thus a reasonable level of co-operation between the two may be 
expected and worked for (Cressey and Macinnes, 1979). 
This literature on alternative strategies 1s dealt with more fully 
1n Chapters 5 to 7. We may note here, however, one or two more theoretical 
aspects of this critique. Burawoy has argued that the economic determinism 
of Braverman's brand of }1arxism has led him to neglect the political and 
ideological dimensions of control, which, claims Burawoy, operate even at 
the point of production. Rather than a version of the base/superstructure 
model, Burawoy wishes to develop a form of ~arxism employing the notion of 
1 Po~ example~ Edwa~ds (19?9); F~iedman (19??a) and Go~don et al. (1982). 
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social totality, whereby at any given juncture economic, political and 
ideological aspects are complexly interrelated; thus, he argues, the 
role of trade unions and other grievance-settling institutions, along 
with the meaning systems through which people make sense of their jobs, 
have been neglected by Braverman (Burawoy, 1978, 1979). Littler and 
Salaman, on the other hand argue for consideration to be given to polit-
ical and cultural elements beyond the point of production; they argue 
that external factors may have as much bearing on the struggle for control 
as workplace relations (Littler and Salarnan, 1982). 
Finally, much of the criticism of Braverman has centred on what is 
seen as an uncritical acceptance of the notion of 'skill'. What exactly 
is skill? Can it be measured? Did craft workers really possess more of 
it, and has it observably declined over time? It ~s claimed that Braverman 
ignores the fact that skill, rather than relating to the actual possession 
of technical accomplishments and knowledge, can be socially constructed by 
groups of powerfully organised workers, and also that he ignores the 
considerable degree of reskilling involved in labour process reorganisation 
(Wood, 1982). 
Most of these criticisms seem to me ill-conceived since, as I have 
pointed out, Braverman does not himself use the term 'deskilling', so 
often used in the presentation of oversimplified, trivialised versions of 
his analysis; his work deals with the objective alteration of the constit-
uents of tasks, not of changes ~n the accomplishments (whether real or 
socially constructed) of those who fulfil them. The strongest of these 
criticisms is that Braverman has ignored the way in which labour process 
restructuring involves not simply the creation of numerous degraded jobs 
but also of a few jobs requiring considerable expertise: machine and 
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computer maintenance jobs are classic examples. This factor, along with 
processes of 'social construction' by which degraded jobs retain their 
'skilled' label, are issues investigated in Chapter 4; I shall refer to 
such processes as 'resegmentation', a tendency to which is consequent upon 
the process of degradation. 
Some of Braverman's more ambitious critics have sought to replace 
his historical account with alternative versions. These alternatives are 
more fully considered in Chapter 5, but we may discuss them briefly here: 
they fall into two groups. One group proceed by the 'broadening out' of 
Braverman's analysis, extending the concept of control so that it no longer 
relates specifically to the labour/labour power problem but to more general 
management dilemmas. These i~clude the securing of consent, and the 
1 
analysis is often extended to consider relationships beyond the workplace. 
The second group attempt to produce an alternative historical account of 
2 labour process change. The latter tend to run into the same difficulty 
as Braverman, that of presenting a unilinear account, in which one type of 
control strategy emerges as supreme. Such accounts, though drawing atten-
tion to other important dimensions of industrial relations, do not avoid 
the oversimplifications of Braverman's version, while failing, unlike 
Braverman, to root themselves sufficiently in any account of the structural 
weaknesses inherent in labour process relations (see Chapter 5 for an 
exposition of this point). 
1 See Gordon et al. (1982); Littler (1982). 
2 See Edwards (1979) and Burawoy (1979). Friedman's account~ consider-
ing a possible shift from management strategies of 'direct control' 
to ones of 'responsible autonomy' may refer similarly to an historical 
progression: if so this is a pity~ since it detracts from the sound-
ness of an otherwise admirable theoretical discussion (Friedman~ 
1977a). See Chapter 5. 
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In sum, both the criticisms of Braverman and the reformulations do 
one of two things. First, they involve a 'broadening out' of Braverman's 
original analysis, and by doing so tend to obscure and diminish the whole 
point of that original project. Braverman was not trying to provide either 
an exhaustive account of control strategies at work or an exhaustive account 
of all aspects of industrial relations in capitalist societies. His object-
~ve was both narrower and more precise: to construct a model of labour 
process change, demonstrating how, over time, the elements of the capitalist 
labour process have altered in one particular direction. In this way much 
of the critique simply misses the point, although the research produced as 
a result is, of course, entirely valid in its own right. Secondly, the 
critics seek to deny the validity of Braverman's attempt to construct a 
general theory of the labour process. In Littler's words, "there can be 
no study of the capitalist labour process" but only of distinct labour 
processes (Littler, 1972, p 37). 
In the next section of this chapter I shall argue that it is worth 
retaining the narrower problematic originally offered by Braverman, and 
that this will, ~n fact, provide us with a valid general theory of the 
labour process, although I shall also argue that, for a complete understand-
ing of empirical and historical events in any given labour process, it is 
also necessary to introduce some of the other elements presented by the 
critics as part of their broadening out of the Braverman thesis. 1 
Section 3 Reconstituting Braverman 
--------------~~~----------
In order to reconstitute what is valuable in Braverman's analysis, it 
~s necessary to return to his own source, Marx's writing ~n Capital Volume 1 
1 For an elaboration of this and the next section see also Bradley (1983). 
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on the labour process. Braverman has picked out one essential element in 
emphasising the labour/labour power distinction. But careful reading of 
Marx reveals that in his analysis the labour process has not just a dual 
but a triple nature: the capitalist's a~m 
is to p1•oduce not only a use-value3 but a commodity; not only 
use value but value; and not just value~ but also surplus 
value. 
(Marx~ 19?6~ p 293: my emphases) 
From this triple nature we can derive what I call the 'double indeter-
minacy of labour' (Bradley, 1983). The value/surplus value distinction 
corresponds to the labour/labour power distinction, from which stems, as 
Braverman has rightly emphasised, an inevitable source of tension. Within 
the basically antagonistic relations of capitalist production, conflict 
will continue to arise from the lack of specificity in the contract of 
exchange between employer and labourer. However, the other indeterminacy, 
that which arises from the use value/exchange value distinction is ignored 
by Braverman, while its significance is correctly grasped by Cressey and 
Macinnes (1980). While the capitalist seeks to reduce labour, in its 
exchange value capacity, to a mere 'factor of production:, lacking subject-
ivity, disposeable, interchangeable with other units, his need to produce 
goods which have a use value and which will therefore be able to enter the 
market on favourable.terms, pushes him into acknowledging the subjective 
needs of his workers and his dependence on them for the regular output of 
good-quality goods. To phrase this in a less abstract way, not only does 
the entrepreneur have a motive to continually press for more effort, so 
that the quantity of goods produced per worker, and thereby the profit, ~s 
increased, he also has a motive to ensure that the quality of the goods 
produced is high and that workers do not turn out substandard or faulty 
goods; to avoid time-loss, it is preferable to gain the workers' collabora-
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tion 1n ~his project, rather than resorting to punishment after the event. 
Furthermore, even to maintain a steady output of effort from each worker 
demands some degree of their consent; pushed too far, a worker can always 
simply down tools, walk out, or throw the proverbial spanner in the works. 
This second indeterminacy of labour, then, entails the need for a co-
operative element in an otherwise exploitative relationship. From 
Braverman's neglect of this aspect of Marx's analysis springs his neglect 
of consent-inducing strategies. 
Thus far, however, the analysis we have pursued 1s merely a static 
one: at any given moment in any given labour process two structural 
dilemmas pose themselves, which may be addressed by any number of possible 
strategic solutions. If we wish to progress to a dynamic account of labour 
process development, we need to employ another of Marx's distinctions, that 
between 'formal' and 'real' subsumption of labour. 
These concepts are much used in the critical literature, although they 
appear only by implication in Braverman's work 1 in the assertion that the 
capitalist at first only takes over the pre-capitalist labour process 
without altering it, and only later attempts to tighten his control by 
f . . 2 trans orm1ng 1 t. In the use of it by his critics, however, there is a 
departure from Marx's original meaning, signified by the tendency to refer 
to formal or real 'control' or 'subordination', rather than what seems a 
more satisfactory translation 'subsumption'. In this usage, the term is 
1 As far as I can judge, Braverman did not have access to 'Results of 
the Immeaiate Process of Production'., which has subsequently been 
published as Appendix to the Penguin edition of Capital I (Marx, 
19?6, pp 941-1084)., where these concepts receive extended treatment. 
2 The hosiery industry provides a classic example of this, as will be 
shown. 
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reduced to the vaguer notion of control (in all its ambiguity) or coercion 
over the workforce. It seems clear that Marx was actually referring to 
something much more specific, the taking over of the labour process or, 
more precisely, the taking up of labour into capital. Whereas 'formal 
subsumption' refers only to the legal possession of the means of production 
without alteration to pre-existing methods of work organisation, real 
subsumption refers to the "development of a specifically capitalist mode 
of production" which "revolutionises their actual mode of labour" (Marx, 
1976, p 1021); this implies the absorbing of labour into capital, so that 
it loses the sense of its own separateness and identity and forfeits its 
independence and autonomy. 
The essence of this conception was understood by Braverman, who de-
scribed it as follows: 
Not only is capital the property of the capitalist~ but labour 
itself has become part of capital. 
(Braverman~ 1974~ p 116) 
In this way, the danger of the workforce reasserting itself against capital 
and attempting to regain possession of the means of production recedes as 
Capital ... becomes a very mystic thing~ since all of labour's 
productive forces appear to be due to capital rather than labour 
as such~ and seem to issue from the work of capital itself. 
(Marx~ 1972~ p 827) 
Workers, both as individuals and as a group lose all sense of the labour 
process as arising out of their mvn productive power, so that 
The social character of his labour confronts the worker as some-
thing not only alien but hostile and antagonistic when it appears 
before him objectified and personified in capital. 
(Marx~ 1976~ p 1025) 
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The total achievement of real subsumption would entail the total 
obliteration of all space for the worker to exercise choice and initiative 
1n the work task, and a loss of all autonomy. Men and women would become 
1 
virtual automata, operated by the labour process. As Braverman recognised, 
this theoretical ideal is unlikely to be attained in practice: 
This displacement of 'labour as the subjective element of the 
process and its subordination as an objective element ~n a 
productive process now control-Zed by management is an ideal 
realised by capital only within definite 'limits. 
(Braverman, 1974, p 171) 
Attempts, like that of Holbrook-Jones (1982), to date the achievement of 
real control are thus misplaced. What we can do is to chart a slow but 
noticeable push in the historical development of labour processes towards 
this ultimate goal of real subsumption. This involves physical alterations 
in the elements of the labour process. The task (element one) becomes 
broken down and simplified, a process I call 'fragmentation'; the second 
and third elements, raw materials and instruments of labour, are transformed 
by mechanisation, automation and the increased application of science and 
technology; while the final element, the conception and planning, is removed 
from the worker and passed over to elite management or technical groups, a 
1 I ' ' I 2 process I ca 1 preconceptual1sat1on . These processes, fragmentation, 
automation and preconceptualisation, when put together constitute the process 
of degradation, in Braverman's term. As Marx put it, the achievement of real 
subsumption comes closer through "the co-operative division of labour within 
the workshop, the use of machinery, and in general the transformation of 
1 The fuZZy automated factory might be seen as the ultimate phase of 
real subsumption. 
2 I am indebted to the work of HaZes (1980) for this te.r>rn. 
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work by the conscLous use of the sciences'' (Marx, 1976, p 1024). Although 
this development must be seen as proceeding unevenly, over a long period 
of timP., and differently in each individual industry or occupation, it 
must also be seen as a general tendency, and thus the basis (the only one 
1 
so far discerned) for a general theory of labour process change. 
I wish, then, to retain from the analysis provided by Braverman (and 
by Marx) the key idea of degradation as a basis for theorisation of the 
labour process. I want, however, to detach this from the historical 
periodisation offered by Braverman, Ln particular from the link made be-
tween the shift from direct control to Taylorite control and the development 
of monopoly forms of capitalism in the late nineteenth century. Not only 
can this link not be sustained historically (as the hosiery case, like 
others, will suggest) but also there is no ZogicaZ or theoreticaZ basis 
for it Ln the analysis provided above. The most that can be said, I would 
argue, LS that empiricaZZy the advent of monopoly corporations and multi-
nationals may sometimes (but not inevitably) involve a move to tightened 
control and heightened labour process degradation. But, as I have argued 
above, the pace, path and timing of the degradation process varLes greatly 
between and within industries and occupations, as historical work shows. 
The most we can claim for this tendency, then, is that it has to be appre-
hended at a very general level. Nonetheless, I would argue strongly that 
if we look at any single occupation or industry we shall be able to observe 
the working out of that tendency, however slow and uneven its trajectory. 
1 AZthougn Burawoy (19?8) cZaims to offer an aZternative 'generaZ 
theory' within a Marxian framework~ his anaZysis~ I wouZd argue~ is 
confined to a static presentation of structural requirements. It 
is impossible logicaZZy to deduce a dynamic from his framework. See 
Chapter 5. 
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However, to avoid the one-sidedness of Braverman's account, the role 
of the workers as active agents must also be considered. Degradation does 
not proceed unchallenged and the imposition of the capitalist's will on 
the workforce is often resisted. This resistance leads to discernable 
counter-tendencies: the creation, and capture by powerful groups of workers, 
of new complex tasks (reskilling), the retention of old tasks and methods 
~n the teeth of threatened changes, and the claim that degraded tasks still 
retain their old skill, and therefore their status and rewards (social 
construction of skill). These processes, which are inseparable (empirically) 
from tho~e of degradation, I refer to as 'resegmentation', tending as they 
do to result in the formation of a hierarchy within the workforce. Chapter 
4 presents an account of these joint processes in the case of the hosiery 
industry. 
If the above provides a base for a general labour process theory, it 
~s nonetheless true that this alone will not provide us with a complete 
framework for depicting the history of any concrete labour process. If we 
want to move beyond this relatively narrow framework, which is limited to 
the examination of the physical transformation of work, we must draw in-
sights from the literature I have described as broadening out the Braverman 
thesis. In particular, there are three important respects in which the 
analysis of degradation and resegmentation must be supplemented with other 
material: 
A) Not all management strategies involve the physical change of the labour 
process. Many strategies involve change, on the other hand, in its institu-
tional surroundings (e.g. trade union procedures, welfare provisions, pay 
structures). Such strategies and the responses to them are of obvious 
interest and importance in influencing workplace relationships. Since they 
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involve the institutional context of work rather than the jobs themselves, 
and since in the main their effects are easily reversible, it is not 
possible to construct a general dynamic theory for these strategies which 
are best described as local rather than global. Their use will vary 
according to industry and locality. Many factors influence the choice of 
a particular strategy, for example the state of local labour markets, the 
composition of the workforce, or the political tradition in the industry 
or area. To find a way through the complexities which the empirical study 
of management strategies affords, it may be useful to categorise them in 
accordance with which of the two (static) structural dilemmas they address. 
What I call 'repressive' strategies address the labour/labour power indeter-
minacy; their a1m 1s the removal of space and autonomy from the workers and 
the restriction of their initiative. What I call 'pacificatory' strategies 
address the interdependence/antagonism indeterminacy; their aim 1s to pro-
cure the consent and co-operation of the workers by yielding space and 
1 
autonomy to them. These strategies are discussed 1n Chapters.S-7. 
B) As Littler and Salaman argue, class relations cannot be simply built 
up from the micro-analysis of workplace relations (Littler and Salaman, 
1982). Changes in class relations at the national level, or the level of 
the whole economy, affect relations at the point of production as much as 
point of production relations affect global class relations. The way this 
dialectic impacts upon face-to-face relations between employers and workers 
is dealt with in Chapters 8 and 9. Since this necessarily involves moving 
outside the theoretical framework offered by labour process analysis, use 
1 The repressive/pacificatory distinction echoes many similar distinc-
tions: see for example~ Pollard (1965); Burawoy (19?9) and Friedman 
(19??a). 
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has been made 1n this study of the historical literature on class relations 
in Britain 1n the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This literature 
1s briefly assessed in Chapter 2. 
C) Although this point has not hitherto been discussed 1n this chapter, 
another well-known hiatus in the original labour process literature is its 
inadequate treatment of gender issues. While Marxian theory presents labour 
as neutral, in any empirical case workplace relationships are strongly marked 
by gender differentiation. Rather than seeing this as merely part of the 
context of class relations, I shall argue that gender divisions have been 
an integral part of labour process development. The implications of this 
are discussed in Chapter 10. 
Finally, two objections may be raised to what I have argued so far. 
First, it may be objected that my 'reworking' of the Braverman thesis 
departs so far from the original, and incorporates so much of what has been 
said in criticism of the original, as to make it virtually unrecognisable. 
Why retain any mention of Braverman's work at all? Certainly, the model I 
am proposing is in many ways a call for a clearer restatement of some of 
Marx's concepts than that provided by Braverman. However, the debt to 
Braverman that has to be acknowledged is his assertion of degradation as 
the key feature of capitalist labour process development; the centrality of 
the concept emerges more firmly in his account than in Marx's more diffuse 
and complicated arguments in 'Capital'. Secondly, following both Marx and 
Braverman, I am arguing for the viability of a general theory of the labour 
process. Hany of Braverman's critics, whose work I am in other respects 
indebted to, reject the idea of a general labour process theory and indeed 
are highly sceptir.al of the existence of an empirically-observable process 
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f d . 1 o egradat1on. Finally, the strength of the work of Marx and Braverman 
1s that it grounds the analysis of change in the structural ambiguities 
inherent in capitalist work relations. This element is missing from the 
2 
work of most of the other contributors to the 'labour process debate' ; 
it is reasserted in my model through the concept of the 'double indeter-
minacy' of labour. 
Secondly, it may be argued that an alternative grounding for a 
general theory does exist. As many have pointed out, the capitalist 
economy is constructed on the base of a complex set of relationships, 
which cannot be reduced to those between capital and labour. The dynamic 
of capitalist development (or capital accumulation) proposed by Marx 
depends as much on competition between units of capital as on confrontation 
between capital and labour. As Littler has pointed out, surplus value has 
to be realised as well as appropriated; competition for markets and the 
manipulation of complex financial resources may play as much part in the 
decision-making processes of large enterprises as considerations of labour 
3 
control. For example, the introduction of microelectronic technology in 
the 1980s may be designed to cut long-term capital costs as well as labour 
costs; or firms may adopt new technology primarily to introduce a new product 
4 
on to the market. Does not the dynamic of competition, then, offer an 
alternative framework for investigating labour process change? 
1 Littler (1982); Wood (1982) and Penn (1985)~ for example. 
2 There are two important exceptions to this stricture; one &s the work 
of Cressey and Macinnes (1980) to which my reworked model owes an 
immense debt. Secondly~ it seems to me that~ although the framework 
and terminology of his work is so different~ Baldamus' analysis of 
reward~ effort and efficiency comes extraordinarily close in essence 
to the ideas of Marx and Braverman. 
3 See Littler (1982) and Thompson (1983) who both make this point. 
4 See also Bradley (1983). 
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The answer to this question could be a tentative yes: competition 
generates a drive for efficiency and cost-cutting as confrontation gener-
ates a drive for control and acquiescence. The problem is, however, that 
the dynamics of confrontation and of competition are so complexly inter-
woven that it is almost impossible to separate them and analyse or observe 
discretely their transformative effects. In the hosiery industry in the 
domestic period, for example, the framework of cut and thrust competition 
between a large number of small firms all providing for essentially the 
same market provided the context for the cutting of labour costs by means 
of task degradation. Yet the same task degradation was also explicitly 
addressed to solving the array of control problems faced by the employers. 1 
Imperatives of efficiency and control led to the same results; competition 
and confrontation, in other words, are the two faces on the same co1n. 
Nevertheless, it appears logically possible that demands of competitive 
efficiency might at times exercise a distinct determining influence. Thus, 
a watertight account of labour process development must also address this 
issue, giving us a fourth area of consideration as follows: 
D) The influence of competition between units of capital in the product 
market and shifts 1n the industrial structure of an industry may also have 
effects on labour process development. 
Having said this, some qualifications must be made with regard to the 
historical case study which follows. My focus in the study is on relation-
ships between employers and workers; although the industrial structure and 
competitive relations between the firms are touched upon in Chapter 3, which 
1 See Chapte~s 3 and 4 fo~ a full account. 
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provides a broad overv~ew of change in the industry, no separate chapter 
~s devoted to these issues. Constraints of time and space would have made 
it impossible to research them out and report on them in the same kind of 
detail which has been devoted to the study of workplace relations. 
However, there are some other reasons for my decision to concentrate 
on control. While employer/worker relations changed dramatically during 
the course of the period under study, the industrial structure and market 
divisions remained remarkably stable. Throughout the period the industry 
fell into two sectors: a small number of larger stable firms covered the 
quality end of the market, while a large number of small, unstable firms 
competed for the cheaper end. Both sectors had to be alive to shifts in 
the product market, owing to changes in fashion, but in an industry which, 
up to the 1950s, was still more labour-intensive than capital-intensive, 
most firms made flexibility of output a prime consideration. Adjusting 
machinery to produce different fabrics or garments was, from the beginning, 
an important part of the skilled knitter's craft. 1 Some firms chose to 
specialise in certain areas (fancy goods, children's wear), but again this 
pattern of specialisation remained stable over the period, with larger 
2 firms characteristically producing a wider range of goods. Only around 
1960 did any real change in the industrial structure occur, with the entry 
into the field of national conglomerates and a move towards concentration 
and mergers, with Courtaulds becoming the dominant pacemaker. The effects 
of this development, thus, lie outside the scope of this study. 
1 See Chapter 4. 
2 With regard to the local strategies discussed in Chapters 5-?~ there 
was a tendency for larger firms~ which were more concerned with quality 
goods~ to choose pacificatory strategies and for smaller ones~ more 
concerned with cutting prices~ to choose repressive ones. But there 
was no absolute correspondence. 
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Relations between firms, then, remained stable over the period of 
study and therefore must be seen as less important in understanding the 
changes that occurred over that period than the shifting patterns of 
capital/labour relations. This is not to deny the salience of competition 
and cost-cutting as motives for change and where these have been deeply 
implicated in events (as in the case of 'cut-ups') I have made that clear 
in the text. 1 However, these inputs have made no difference to the 
direction of change. The effects of competition were to confirm the trend 
to degradation and resegmentation. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that a reworked vers1on of Braverman's 
thesis, involving a more precise use of some of Marx's concepts, provides 
the basis of a general dynamic theory of labour process development. The 
focus of such a theory, however, 1s narrow. The strength of Braverman's 
work is that it provides us with a universal model with which to study 
labour process change. Its limitation is that it leaves out, 1n so doing, 
many essential features of workplace relationships, which in their turn 
are involved in broader processes of social change. The role of competi-
tion and of alterations in the product market must be considered. Attention 
must also be given to gender relations, to more generalised management 
behaviour and to broader macro-level class relations, if we are fully to 
understand change in any particular industry. It is to the last of these 
that I now turn, before starting to investigate the applicability of the 
model to the hosiery case. 
1 This &s fuZZy discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE ENGLISH WORK.IliG CLASS 1800-1914 
Introduction 
In studying worker resistance to employer strategies 1n the hosiery 
industry, I quickly became aware of a marked shift from a state of violent 
industrial confrontation in the early part of the nineteenth century to a 
mood of industrial harmony and co-operation in the latter half of the 
century. The similarities between this and the pattern of class activity 
at the national level could not be overlooked. In seeking to make sense 
of this change, therefore, I was led to consider the range of explanations 
of changes 1n class action and class consciousness offered by social 
historians of the nineteenth century. These appeared, on the whole, more 
relevant to my problem than the more static analysis of class positions 
d ff d b . 1 . 1 an the class structure o ere y soc1o og1sts. In Hobsbawm's words 
Classes are never made in the sense of being finished or having 
acquired their definitive shape. They keep on changing. 
(Hobsbawm3 1984 3 p 194) 
It was this fluid dimension of class action I wished to investigate, and 
on which the historians' work threw illumination. Some of the more import-
ant historical studies are briefly reviewed here. 
Section 1 The Making of the English Working Class 
In general, there 1s a fairly clear accepted v1ew of the development 
of the working classes 1n the nineteenth century. Between 1800 and 1850 
1 See Thompson3 1965 and 1968 (preface) 3 for discussion of the dynamic 
as opposed to static analysis of class. 
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the experience of the new social and economic relations evolving with the 
growth of industrial capitalism, and 1n particular of the reorganisation 
of work, engendered a sense of a common interest among various sections of 
the labouring classes. Thus a unified, if not homogeneous, working class 
with a distinct consciousness emerged, which was drawn into increasingly 
militant forms of action, culminating in Chartism: this was "the heroic 
age of the English proletariat" (Anderson, 1964, p 33). The immediate 
failure of Chartism, however, led to the slow decline of this sense of 
unity and of any radical challenge to the status quo. Although there were 
sporadic outbursts of protest and unrest, 1n the main the working classes 
settled into an acceptance of the new order, and those institutions and 
forms of action which they developed from then on (trade unions, co-
operatives, friendly societies, working men's clubs etc.) were content to 
work to provide a reasonable standard of living for working-class people 
within the system of industrial capitalism, rather than challenging the 
organisational premises of that system. 
It 1s possible to modify this argument slightly, by pointing to the 
upsurge of industrial unrest in the 1880s and 1890s and the renewed interest 
1 in socialism in the early twentieth century. Most, however, accept that 
some sort of significant shift occurred after 1850. In Nairn's words, 
after this period the working class "turned into an apparently docile 
class" which "embraced one species of reformism after another" (Nairn, 1972, 
p 188). 
Developments 1n the 1800 to 1850 period have been most comprehensively 
dealt with in E.P. Thompson's authoritative study 'The Making of the English 
1 This line emerges, for example, ~n the work of PelZing (1963) and 
Burgess (1980). 
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Working Class', which charts the emergence of a unified class identity 
and the vigour of the resulting class action. This is lent support by 
Foster's excellent local study of Oldham, which deals with the growth of 
a powerful radical class consc1ousness and politics in the area in the 
1830-1850 period, leading to a virtual control by the radicals of the key 
local institutions, which 1n turn drastically challenged the rule of the 
1 
authorities (Foster, 1974). 
These two powerful and persuasive accounts have firmly established 
the view of the rise of working-class militancy during the 1800 to 1850 
period as historical orthodoxy. Their view also receives support in the 
influential, if more schematic, sociological work of Anderson (1964) and 
Nairn (1972), although these writers apparently see no need to provide 
details of working-class political and industrial militancy during this 
period, taking it as read. For them, the later quiescence of the working 
class is, in terms of a Marxist problematic of capitalist development, the 
deviation from the norm, the phenomenon which needs to be explained. 
Recently, this kind of work has been challenged by a group of histor-
ians, Neale (1981), Stedman Jones (1983) and Joyce (1984a). These 
historians question the interpretation of the early period offered by 
Thompson and Foster, and also the Marxist assumption that it is militancy 
rather than quiescence that is the 'normal' state. All three are interested 
in the linguistic dimensions of political and industrial conflicts of this 
period, and Neale and Stedman Jones draw on them to challenge established 
versions of the significance of Chartism. Thus, Stedman Jones wishes to 
interpret it as a purely political movement, the expression of longstanding 
1 A aontemporary observer might~ perhaps~ note an intriguing paraZZeZ 
with Liverpool in 1985.' 
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political grievances, grievances which are expressed in political language 
using the traditional political concepts of 'justice', 'rights' and 'free-
dom', rather than in the language of class. Like Thompson, he links 
Chartism to earlier manifestations of British radicalism, but he departs 
from Thompson's argument in denying the link with economic experience; thus 
he refuses to see Chartism as a manifestation of any kind of emergent 
unified working-class consciousness in this period. In this, he echoes 
Neale who also refuses to accept the ideology of Owenism, Chartism and 
other working-class social and political movements as signs of a distinct 
working-class consciousness. This assertion of Neale's is based on the 
perhaps rather curious premise that unless class grievances are expressed 
1n the terminology of exploitation and surplus value they cannot be seen 
as representing class consciousness 1n the Marxian sense. For example, he 
argues that, as the class of oppressors expressly mentioned in Owenite 
writings is often identified as the 'rich', the aristocracy, or the 'idle', 
the movement must be seen as a political rather than a class-based one. 
This, it seems to me, is fay too limited a way to conceptualise class 
. 1 COnSC10USness. 
It is perhaps worth pointing out these historians are not in dispute 
with the historical and empirical findings of Thompson; their disagreement 
is with his interpretation of those findings, and springs from his attach-
ment to a Marxist framework (however loose and unorthodox) and to the 
implications of such a framework. While it is unlikely that any of these 
writers would wish to entirely banish the concept of class from their work, 
1 These issues are further discussed in Chapter 8~ which demonstrates 
that the 'oppressors' identified by the hosiery workers and East 
Midlands Chartists were in many cases the entrepreneurial class. 
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they would dispute the connotations of the Marxian use of the concept, 
for example, the v1ew of the working class as historic actor, the rooting 
of consciousness in the economic experience of exploitation, and the 
possible or inevitable advent of socialist revolution as a result of class 
conflict. It is these theoretical objections which lie at the root of 
their claim that the social unrest described by Thompson and Foster cannot 
be interpreted as evidence of class consciousness in the Marxian sense. 
From this point of view, too, the militancy of this period might be seen 
as the phenomenon 1n need of explaining rather than the later quiescence. 
This reinterpretation, then, still leaves the empirical findings of 
Thompson and Foster untouched. As for the validity of the Marxist and 
non-Marxist interpretations, it appears unlikely that any further evidence 
remains to be discovered which could settle the case one way or another, 
since the disagreement hinges so centrally on the link between action and 
consciousness; how can we ever penetrate into the minds of long-dead weavers, 
shoemakers and stockingers who formed the mass of support for the great 
Chartist strikes? This problem for the historian rema1ns intractable, and 
cannot, I believe, be solved by Stedman Jones' strategy of looking at written 
linguistic expressions in isolation from actions. In Chapter 8, however, I 
present some material on linguistic expressions offered by hosiery workers 
about their situation and the unrest it inspired which, taken together with 
accounts of their actions, will, I believe, lend support to the Thompson 
and Foster version rather than the reinterpretations. 
Section 2 The Remaking of the English Working Class? 
Although there may be disagreement as to whether it is the earlier 
militancy or the later quiescence which needs to be explained, there is no 
35 
dispute that some kind of significant change did take place after 1850. 
There is, however~ widespread disagreement as to why that change occurred. 
A considerable range of explanations is offered, and some or the more 
notable are reviewed here. 
One prevalent form of explanation is that which makes use of the 
concept of the 'labour aristocracy'. As classically formulated by Lenin, 
this involves the idea of an elite group of highly-paid, high-status 
workers who are isolated from the mass of the working-class, having been, 
as it were, 'bought off' by the capitalist class with some of the fruits 
of imperialist expansion. Many later historians and sociologists have 
argued for the existence of such a group, notably Hobsbawm (1964), Foster 
(1974) and Holbrook-Jones (1982): the latter two, in their studies of 
engineering, textiles and mining, basically endorse Lenin's line, and also 
make the point that these aristocratic groups were used by capital to 
discipline and control the rank and file in the workplace, acting as pace-
makers in a redesigned labour process. These same men, Foster argues, also 
led the rank-and-file into a moderate form of politics. 
Softer vers~ons of this thesis are presented by Gray (1976) and 
Crossick (1976), who provide evidence for the existence of such a group in 
Edinburgh and Kent respectively. Neither have much to say about workplace 
relationships, conceptualising the group in basically socio-cultural terms. 
Gray claims that the Edinburgh labour aristocrats, who took the lead ~n 
various working-class institutions such as clubs, co-operatives, trade 
unions and the Labour Party, shared the cultural values and aspirations of 
the lower-middle class, and in some cases intermarried with them. Their 
especial importance was in steering working-class politics into the direction 
of reformist and accommodative 'Labourism' rather than revolutionary socialism. 
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Crossick, on the other hand, sees the group as rejecting links with the 
middle classes and clinging strongly to a traditional, if sectarian, 
working-class culture; it is thus difficult to see how, in his interpret-
ation, the labour aristocracy could have acted as a pacificatory element 
1n quite the way described by Lenin. 
In fact, as Moorhouse's useful critical article shows, there are many 
problems with the labour aristocracy concept (Moorhouse, 1978). Despite 
the empirical evidence produced by Foster, Gray and Crossick, it is clear 
there were considerable local variations as to the nature and role of the 
labour aristocracy; indeed, in some places it may not have existed at all. 
More points to the lack of any clearly definable aristocratic group in 
several places, for example Birmingham, and I shall argue in Chapter 9 that 
the existence of such a group is dubious in the case of Leicester (More, 
1980, p 235). Even where such a group did demonstrably exist, its presence 
1s insufficient to account for the shift from militancy to quiescence, since, 
as Moorhouse argues, such groups of high-status and highly-skilled workers 
had existed long before 1860, and indeed before the industrial revolution. 
Nor is there any satisfactory evidence concerning the labour aristocrats' 
relationship with the mass of workers. The various versions either assume 
that the masses followed the aristocrats into moderacy, or that, bereft of 
a potentially radical leadership, they drifted into powerless apathy. No 
evidence .has been provided to demonstrate either of these possibilities. 
It is equally possible that the aristocracy may have followed the mass 
1 
rather than the other way round. As Moorhouse argues 
1 See discussion &n Chapter 9. 
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Is the labour aristocracy to be seen as a cause or as a conse-
quence of the lack of a true class consciousness in the 
nineteenth century? 
(Moorhouse, 1978, p 69) 
Whether or not the labour aristocracy existed, the concept has little 
explanatory value 1n terms of the shift from militancy after 1850. 
Rather than looking at the contribution of any social group, other 
commentators have concentrated, more fruitfully, on broader structural 
changes. One important group of explanations centre on the notion of 
'incorporation', or 'accommodation'. It may be worth making such a term-
inological distinction, as these explanations have two different sets of 
connotations. In one case, the process of 'incorporation' is seen to 
involve the transmuting of a 'normal' militancy into quiescence by means 
of more or less conscious strategic actions, by both capitalists and various 
agencies of social control, which build the working-class (artificially) 
into the system. In the other v1ew, which might be alternatively labelled 
as 'accommodation', quiescence is seen as normal, and the upsets of the 
1800 to 1850 period as a temporary state resulting from the upheavals of the 
transformation from agrarian society to industrial capitalism; in the 
succeeding period, a legitimate place was provided for the working classes 
1 
within the new system. 
Burawoy's work provides a fairly classic example of the first approach 
(Burawoy, 1979). This idea is also used by Foster in conjunction with his 
discussion of the role of the labour aristocracy; the emergence of the 
aristocratic groups he sees as linked with a policy of 'liberalisation' by 
the authorities, which allowed the working-classes to take a legitimate part 
1 The classic version of this vieu.J is Smelser's 'Social Change and the 
Industrial Re1-'olution 1 (1959). 
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~n the existing structure of politics and decision-making. At the same 
time far greater attention was paid to their material and social welfare 
needs. Thus the former radicals were coaxed into a new position of poli-
tical moderation. 
The incorporation/accommodation approach has been particularly popular 
with sociologists, rather than historians. The notion of the political and 
civic accommodation of the working class within capitalism is major strand 
in the work of Dahrendorf (1959), and, of course, of Marshall (1950). It 
finds perhaps its most persuasive exposition in the work of Bendix (1956) 
and Giddens (1973). Bendix's case is that unrest diminished once the dis-
possessed labouring classes had found a new role and social function within 
industrial capitalism, and Giddens argues that the unrest must be seen as a 
symptom of transition: once capitalism has matured, the working classes are 
securely integrated, socially and politically, into the system; the growth 
of citizen rights is seen as "a 'completion' or consolidation of capitalist 
development rather than an undermining of it" (Giddens, 1973, p 158). 
Historians, perhaps predictably, seem to prefer a variant of this 
thesis which emphasises cultural change. The classic exegesis of this ~s 
Anderson's 'Origins of the Present Crisis' paper (Anderson, 1964), ~n which 
he argues that after 1850 the ruling alliance of landowners and bourgeoisie 
established a firm cultural hegemony over the working classes, drawing both 
on the longstanding traditions of deference to 'one's betters' and of 
hierarchy within British society, and on a newly elaborated ethos of 
nation3lism which utilised a rhetoric of colonial expansion and British 
superiority; thus the working class became a 'corporate' class, unable to 
formulate an alternate social v~s~on for itself. 
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Though Anderson's work has been highly influential, it is, by his 
own admission, little more than a 'crude schema' for an overview of class 
development, which provides little in the way of satisfactory evidence for 
the historical scenario it presents. In addition, this is patently a view 
from the top downwards~ changes in ruling-class ideology are assessed, and 
the assumption made that they were successfully imposed on the working 
classes. Much more satisfactory accounts of cultural shifts over this 
period are provided by Hearn (1971) and Stedman Jones (1974), both of whom 
consider changes from the point of view of the working class. 
Hearn's ambitious project, which draws on numerous empirical and 
theoretical studies by both historians and sociologists, centres on the 
crushing by the ruling classes of the indigenous cultural traditions of the 
labouring classes, and their replacement by an artificial, homogenised mass 
culture. This particularly involved the suppression of what he calls 'play', 
the imaginative creation of social alternatives, often based on Utopian 
versions of the past. Thus the likelihood of the working class developing 
an alternative socialist vision is severely diminished as capitalism matures. 
More easily demonstrable, however, are the changes proposed in Stedman 
Jones' study of London; he looks at the emergence there of a distinct working-
class culture, isolated and hermetic and resistant to middle-class values, 
but essentially accommodative, defensive and politically moderate, 1n con-
1 
trast to its radical precursor. Stedman Jones links these changes to 
changes in the nature of work experience; the increased polarisation of work-
place Gnd home, and the movement of the working classes into suburban housing, 
often far from the workplace, broke up old leisure patterns which revolved 
1 This account is theoretically very close to Parkin's account of the 
formation of subordinate value systems (Parkin~ 19?2). 
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around workplace cultures, and decentred work experience. Work and 
leisure are no longer integrated, work assumes a marginal significance, 
and family life becomes the dominant preoccupation. 
Although Stedman Jones' study is limited to the London area, and 
although he makes no claim that its findings can be generalised, his 
argument seems to me to be powerful and well substantiated. His findings 
accord well with similar developments in the East Midlands area, and in 
Chapter 9 I shall hope to demonstrate the importance of the decline of 
work-based cultures in the example of the hosiery industry, and its 
influence on the decline in militancy of the hosiery workers. 
Finally, many studies, rather than offering a holistic explanation of 
working-class quiescence 1n this period, trace the role of particular 
institutions 1n bringing about class pacification. For example, changing 
institutions of leisure, and the growth of mass education, are analysed in 
terms of increased social control and the decline of working-class radical-
ism.1 Dahrendorf traces the influence of trade unions and procedures of 
'institutionalisation of conflict' in diminishing conflict (Dahrendorf, 
1959), while others might point to the role of the welfare state, or of the 
institutions of political democracy. Moorhouse suggests that study of the 
range of "agencies of political coercion and socialisation from family 
to the police force to compulsory education" would be more apt than a 
reliance on the concept of the labour aristocracy to explain the growing 
quiescence of the working classes (Moorhouse, 1978, p 73). 
In the face of so many competing explanations, it is hard to resist 
the conclusion that Moorhouse must be right, and that only some kind of 
1 See~ for example~ Clarke et al. (1979); McCann (1977). 
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multifactoral approach will suffice to explain the changes that are 
documented in the study which follows. Of all the single explanations, 
Stedman Jones' seems to me the most applicable to the hosiery case. In 
Chapter 9, I consider the relevance of his work in the East Midlands' 
example, but also try to isolate some of the other institutional changes 
which I feel were instrumental in achieving working-class pacification. 
Conclusion 
Interpretations of working-class action and consciousness 1n the 
nineteenth century are many and varied, and no final consensus on the 
shift from militancy emerges. In Chapters 8 and 9, I investigate how 
class relations unfolded in a specific local context, drawing on some of 
the literature discussed here. My findings will, I believe, add support 
to Thompson's proposition that a strong working-class identity emerged in 
the 1800 to 1850 period. Explanations of subsequent changes must be more 
tentative: in Chapter 9, I try to trace out some of the most important 
contributory factors. Whatever the explanation, the shift from militancy 
to quiescence remains a notable phenomenon, as I hope to show in the over-
view of the history of the hosiery industry presented 1n the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
"We are so undermined by one hand against the other~ and 
one manufacturer against the other." 
Henry Boam~ Derbyshire glove hand 
(PP 1845 XV II q 4456) 
"A weaver of 'Inckley sot in 'is frame~ 
'Is children stood mernfully by~ 
'Is wife pained with 'unger~ nearly naked with shame~ 
As she 'opelessly gazed on the sky. 
The tears rolling fast from 'er famishing eyes~ 
Proclaimed 'er from 'unger not free 
And these are the words she breathed with a sigh: 
1 I weep poor 1 Inckley for thee 1 ." 
Hinckley stockingers' song 
(Francis~ 1930~ p 129) 
"Why~ 0 ye rich~ the toiling poor oppress 
When all might prove such plenteous happiness? 
Cease ... Cease! ere rendering their condition worse 
Ye render Leicester's name a bye word and a curse!" 
From 'The Spirit' by William Jones~ 
Leicester glove hand 
(Jones~ 1849~ p 8) 
Introduction 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SOCIAL Cllill~GE IN THE HOSIERY INDUSTRY 
FROM CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of developments 
~n the East Midlands hosiery industry between 1800 and 1960, thus providing 
a general context for the more specialised discussion of particular aspects 
of change in the following chapters. The chapter provides essential back-
ground information for the remainder of the thesis. 
It is possible to discern three distinct stages in the development of 
the industry: the epoch of domestic production, the transition to factory 
production, and the period of modernisation. For narrative clarity, this 
chapter, and many subsequent ones, will be divided into sections dealing 
with each period separately. 
The domestic system of production was well established in the East 
Midlands in the eighteenth century, but the period under study here, 1800 
to 1850, was both the full flowering and the crisis of this particular 
system. Particularly after the Napoleonic Wars, slumps in demand, coupled 
with a chronic labour surplus, kept the majority of the workpeople in 
conditions of poverty and uncertainty, plagued by underemployment and 
periodic spells of unemployment. It was in this period that confrontative 
relations between employers and workpeople reached their peak. The 1845 
Royal Commission's report on the conditions of the framework knitters 
might serve as an epitaph for these grim decades, with its graphic portrayal 
of suffering, despair and struggle. 
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The first experiments ~n factory organisation ~n the East Midlands 
occurred ~n the 1830s and 40s, but were not successful. By 1845, at 
least two factories had been successfully established, and by 1855 they 
were more numerous, but it was not until after the patenting of an improved 
steam-powered frame in 1864 (Cotton's Patent) and the passing of an Act of 
Parliament abolishing frame rents 1 in 1874 that the factory system really 
took off. By the 1890s the production of hosiery was essentially steam-
powered and factory-based, but the hand-knitting and homeworking sections 
lingered on. An observer in 1900 was still able to say 
1'he system of working at home~ it will be seen3 dies hard. It 
can hardly be doubted, however, that it is doomed to extinc-
tion ... the building of the great factories is significant 
... of something like a social revolution. 
(Thomas 3 19003 p 23) 
There are still references to small groups of hand workers as late as 1938 
(LAHU A August lOth 1938). 2 
The transition period, then, was a long-drawn-out one. Dating its 
start must be somewhat arbitrary, but I have chosen to place it around 
1855: in that year industry leaders N. Corah & Sons and Hine & Mundella 
were expanding their power-driven operations, and the report of the Truck 
Commission revealed that the switch to power was coming to be seen as 
inevitable; two years later the first trade union specifically for factory 
operatives was formed. 
1 See pages SO, 69-?2. 
2 Two sets of Minute Books of the Leicester Amalgamated Hosiery Union 
are heZd in the Leicester Records Office, the Executive Committee 
Minutes~ and the Shop and Trade Minutes. These are referred to 
throughout the text as LAHU A and LAHU B respectively. 
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Dating the advent of the period of modernisation again presents 
problems, but I have taken the First World War to be of crucial signif-
~cance. The establishment of the National Joint Industrial Council (NJIC) 
in 1918 is a watershed for industrial development. Although this devel-
opment was retarded by the interwar recessions, experiments in modernising 
both production and industrial organisation continued to be made. The 
Second World War provided the necessary forward push, and the National 
1 Union of Hosiery Workers (NUHW) was formed in 1945 from an amalgamation 
of the local un~ons. By 1960, the point at which this study stops, the 
industry was fully modernised, efficient and prosperous, marked by 
unusually good industrial relations. 
The survey undertaken here, then, stops at a time of relative stab-
ility. The following decades were to see the introduction of computers 
into the industry2, the first ever general strike by the NUHKW, and the 
transformation of the industrial structure by processes of merger and 
takeover, commencing in the mid 60s3 , an indication of the never-ending 
process of change and restructuration. However, the purpose of this 
chapter is to chart the climb to the peaceful plateau of the late 1950s. 
Section 1 The Domestic System 1800-1855 
The knitting frame was invented by the Reverend William Lee ~n 1589, 
and for the next two and a half centuries this machine was to be the cause 
1 Later NationaL Union of Hosiery and Knitwear Workers (NUHKW). 
2 For example, WoZseys instaZZed a computer in 1965 (Guardian, Septem-
ber 8th 1965) and in 1969 Byfords had a computer room in action at 
their Maltby branch factory, with eZectronicaZZy-controZZed knitting 
machines producing men's sweaters, 16 at a time to totaL 30,000 a 
week (Byford, 1969). 
3 See Smith (1969). 
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of dispute and conflict: conflict over who had the right to operate it, 
whose property it was, and what rights its possession gave to the owner 
and the operator. 
In the early seventeenth century, the frames were mainly operated in 
London. Gravenor Henson, knitter and first chronicler of the industry, 
1 tells of the formation in the 1620s of a Trade Company by the London 
framework knitters to protect their craft, on the model of other guild 
societies (Henson, 1831, p 54). Attempts to get this Company ratified by 
Parliament at first failed, but finally a charter was granted in 1664, 
which, according to Henson gave the knitters "the most extraordinary 
powers". In this period, he calculates, there were altogether about 1250 
knitters and 650 frames (two men were required to work each frame ~n these 
early days). Approximately 4-500 of these frames were in London, 100 in 
Nottingham and 50 in Leicester (Henson, 1831, pp 59-60). 
The most crucial of the powers given to the Company were those relat-
ing to the control of entry and apprenticeship. The apprenticeship term 
was to be seven years, and only those who had served the term were entitled 
1 Exact dating of events in the earlier period (especially before l800) 
is hard3 as the sources are often inconsistent. This arises partly from the practice of early local historians3 who tended to repeat 
without verification what their predecessors had said3 sometimes 
quite literally word for word; for example3 Felkin relied heavily on 
Henson's account of the early history of the industry (Felkin~ 186?; 
Henson3 1831) 3 while Nichols in his history of Leicester quotes an 
earlier historian3 Throsby~ verbatim on the hosiery industry (Nichols~ 
1815; Throsby~ 1?92). In view of this3 I have tended to assume that 
the version written closest to the event is most accurate. rMere 
th~re is significant disagreement I have indicated it. 
For the early period~ the main sources I have used are as follows: on 
the hosiery industry Henson (1831) and the three accounts by Felkin 
(1845 3 186?~ 18?7); on Leicester, Nichols (1795-1815) and Thompson 
(1871); on Nottingham Blackner (1815)~ Orange (1840)~ Bailey (1853)~ 
Wylie (185?) and Sutton (1850); for Derby Hutton (181?) and Glover 
(1831). 
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to work a frame. All entrants to the trade must JO~n the Company or pay 
severe fines (£5 per week). Deputies elected by the officials were 
empowered with rights of search and seizure with regard to 'fraudulent' 
work, when they could "cut the same in pieces and fine the parties making 
1 
them". Another clause forbade the export of frames "the invention being 
purely English". Deputies were to be appointed to administer these rules 
in the outlying districts. Further by-laws, added in 1745, made clear 
that instruction was only to be given to "male children" or apprentices, 
although "widows, upon being admitted members, may exercise their trade 
during their widowhood". 2 
Unfortunately, despite this charter, the trade did not fall under 
the clauses of statute law; the Statute of the 5th Elizabeth 1563, which 
generally controlled the employment of apprentices, did not apply to frame-
work knitting, predating as it did the existence of the frame. Thus the 
status of the charter was dubious, and the Company was soon struggling to 
enforce its clauses, especially those relating to apprenticeship. The 
by-laws stated that there should be three apprentices to each journeyman, 
but masters were soon taking on far greater numbers. It was over this 
issue that the first bout of framebreaking in the industry occurred, 
around 1710. According to Henson, nearly 100 frames were destroyed over 
three nights, and at least one offending master was "soundly beaten" 
(Henson, 1831, p 95). 
It was this event which prompted the next crucial development, the 
shift to the East Midlands. Masters moved there to evade the power of the 
1 See Chapter 4 for the tradition of opposition to 'frauduZent' work. 
2 The fuZZ text of these charters is given in Henson~ 1831 3 pp 79-83~ 
176-179. 
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Company, which they correctly predicted would have difficulty in enforcing 
its regulations outside of London. In 1723 the company prosecuted two 
Nottingham masters, one of whom was employing 49 apprentices, the other 
23; the case was lost, and a final blow came in 1753 when a House of 
Commons Committee overrode the authority of the company, declaring its 
jurisdiction to be limited to 20 miles around London. From then on, the 
move to the East Midlands was precipitous. 1 
When frames first arrived in that area 1n the seventeenth century 
there had been some initial resistance by local people, as many of them 
were then engaged in handknitting. In 1674, fearing the erosion of their 
livelihood, the Leicester woolcombers petitioned the Mayor against the 
Company, claiming that their trade "kept constantly at work about 2,000 
poor people - men, women and children - of the town of Leicester and 
adjacent villages' (Thompson, 1849, p 431). When a man named Allsop 
started stocking manufacture in Leicester in 1680 
He was obliged to perform his task secretly~ and at night~ in 
consequence of the violent feeling existing among the populace 
against the application of machinery to the weaving of stock-
ings. 
(Thompson~ 1849~ p 436) 
However, a century later, the Leicester populace had accepted the 
new invention and framework knitting had become the town's staple industry. 
Throsby estimates that out of a population of 14,000, 6,000 were in some 
way involved in the industry: there were 70 hosiers and 3,000 frames 
(Throsby, 1792, pp 401-2). By the time Blackner carried out a census 1n 
1812 there were, according to his calculations, 11,183 frames in Leicester-
shire, 9,285 in Nottinghamshire and 4,700 in Derbyshire (Blackner, 1815, 
1 According to Felkin~ in 1?14 there were 600 frames in Leicester~ 400 
in Nottingham~ in 1?53 1~000 frames in Leicester and 1~500 in Notting-
ham and by 1?82 there were 1?~530 frames in the Midland counties 
(Felkin~ 1845~ p 4; 186?~ p 11?). 
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pp 238-240). In 1844 Felkin's similar survey recorded 20,861 frames in 
Leicestershire, 16,382 in Nottinghamshire and 6,797 1n Derbyshire, out 
of a national total (including Ireland) of 48,482. Felkin estimated 
that over 100,000 people were employed in the industry (Felkin, 1845, 
pp 7, 34). 
The production of hose in the new area was soon established on a 
'putting out' or domestic basis. Merchant hosiers gave out raw materials 
from their warehouses, and the knitters or 'stockingers' produced the 
goods in their homes, or in small workshops. Initially, at least, men 
worked the frames, while wives and children did the preparatory and 
finishing tasks (winding, sewing, seaming), although by the 1840s a large 
proportion of frames were worked by women and children. 1 In this way, 
the industry did not remain for long as a system of petty commodity pro-
duction, or a guild-type apprenticeship-based self-regulating system, but 
. kl b . d . 1' b . 2 qu1c y ecame organ1se on a cap1ta 1st asts. Certainly this was the 
case by 1800. The employers, or 'hosiers', invested considerable capital 
in warehouse space, raw materials and machinery; they not only controlled 
raw materials, the planning of production and marketing, but also the 
machinery, the frames, which were let out to the knitters in their homes, 
1 See Chapters 3 and 10. 
2 A comment of Blackner's seems to indicate that for a period produc-
tion continued to be organised on guild lines. Of 1?39 he says 
At this period we find none ranked in the profession of 
hosier; consequently we have a right to conclude that 
the business of hosier had not then asszvned a distinct 
shape; and also that every framework knitter disposed 
of his own goods 
(Blackner~ 1815~ p 215) 
Chambers~ however~ maintdins that the 50 'manufacturers of hosiery' 
recorded in that year were probably hosiers (Chambers~ 1966~ p 122). 
Certainly~ the apprenticeship system carried on through the eighteenth 
century~ but declined relatively to family-based production. 
so 
and for which they paid rent. In the early days, some knitters owned and 
worked their own frames (although being dependent on the hosiers for mater-
ials and marketing), but this group rapidly declined. By 1845 it was 
common for hosiers or their agents to charge 'rent' on frames which 
actually belonged to the workmen themselves! Thomas Vernon of Hinckley 
admitted to charging 4d a week in such cases, as was 'customary' (PP 1845 
XV I q 4424). l 
During the period under study, the institution of frame rent had be-
come the key to relations in the industry. Especially during the period 
of stagnation which followed the Napoleonic Wars, the total stock of frames 
was too great for the market to bear, and the hosiers, seeking to max~m~se 
profits, spread their work out thinly over as large a number of frames as 
possible to ensure the maximum amount of frame rent: this would be paid 
even if the worker was only partly employed, and sometimes if he was sick, 
or had no work at all. The situation also provided a spur to the employ-
ment of boys or women in the frames: their output was less, but they still 
2 had to pay rent. 
In short, a major part of the profitability of the industry was now 
derived from possession of machinery, rather than production, a position 
perhaps unique among British industries. In the words of John Biggs, a 
leading Leicester hosier, 
1 ThPoughout the text3 Parliamentary Papers are referred to as PP followed by their year3 volume number3 and part number where 
relevant. Page number (p) or number of minuted question (q) is 
given as appropriate. 
2 This system is much discussed in the Parliamentary Reports of 
1845 and 1854-S. See 3 for example3 the evidence of James Jarvis 
and John Biggs (PP 1845 xv I pp 215-63 PP 1854-5 xiv pp 22-23). 
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Profit is sought out of the tooL, instead of profit upon the 
manufacture; the profit upon the manufacture is a secondary 
consideration. 
(PP 1854-5 xiv q 379) 1 
To make matters worse, the profitability of the frames, and the ease 
of investment in them, attracted speculative ownership. As Patterson 
notes, "butchers, bakers, publicans, gentleman's servants, women of var-
ious classes" and all sorts of other people were drawn into speculation, 
especially as the price of frames slumped (Patterson, 1954, p 43). The 
first frame brought to Hinckley cost £60, but by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century they cost £8-10, and by 1840 £4-5 or less. Second-
hand frames were cheap, and they would last 100 to 150 years if serviced 
(Smith, 1965, p 5). The speculation in 'independent' frames, as they 
were called in the trade, aggravated the overstocking and competition 1n 
the industry. 
Frame rent, thus, became increasingly the focus of the knitters' 
grievance, and played an ever more central part 1n the series of appeals 
made to Parliament over this period. Witnesses to the 1845 Commission 
were particularly aggrieved about the practice of charging full rent for 
part-time work ('the stint') 2 , or when a frame was standing idle. There 
was considerable debate as to how widespread this practice was; while few 
hosiers would personally admit to it (John Cooke and William White were 
1 Estimates of the profitabiLity of frame rents are somewhat at 
variance. Smith estimates tlmt in mid-century the hosiers were 
making 60-80% profit on the originaL investment (Smith, 1965, 
? 22). Hosiers admitted to 5-10%, but this was aLmost certainLy 
an underestimate (BytheLl, 19?8, p 8?). Hosier Robert WaLker 
claimed that he would make £101 profit in a 20 year period on 
frwnes originally worth £3? lOs (PP 1854-5 xiv p 143). 
2 One Shepshed knitter spoke of being on 'the stint' (a quota system 
spreading work over all of a hosier's employees) for three fulL 
years (PP 1845 XV I q 560?). 
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two who did), many more were prepared to accuse others of it (PP 1845 xv 
l I qq 7887, 7931, 8062) . The justification offered was that, without 
steady income from the frames, profits would be so negligible that they 
were forced to charge to survive; in addition they claimed that, without 
frame rents, knitters might use their frames to make up work for other 
h . 2 os1.ers. Although many hosiers spoke against the practice, many others 
declared that the industry would collapse if it were made illegal. 
The complexities of the system had been increased since around 1810 
by the emergence of a tier of middlemen operating between hosiers and 
3 their employees. Few people now worked 'direct' to one of the merchant 
hosiers. These middlemen were of three types. The middleman pure merely 
acted to transport the yarn to the village knitters, and the finished 
goods back to the warehouses; they were essentially paid agents or mana-
gers of the hosiers, who claimed that without them the system was too 
inefficient, in view of the scattered locations in which the knitters 
worked. 4 Increasingly, however, middlemen became involved in production 
itself. Men who got yarn, orders and sometimes frames from the hosiers, 
and then actually th~mselves hired knitters to make up the goods, were 
known as 'undertakers'. Those described as 'bag hosiers' or 'bagmen' 
1 See evidence of Henry Dorman (PP 1845 xv II q 904) and of Henry 
Mead3 John Sketchley and Thomas Winters (PP 1854-5 xiv qq 36993 
46493 46753 4839) inter alia. 
2 See3 for example~ PP 1845 xv I qq 886~ 3677~ 8044 II qq 4803 4507 . 
Edward Allen3 chairman of Leicester Poor Law 
of middlemen from 1816 (PP 1845 xv I q 552). 
p1•eva lent by 1819 (VCH3 1958 3 p 306). 
Union 3 dated the advent 
They were apparently 
4 According to the Victoria County History of Leicester3 118 villages 
and settlements in Leicestershire were producing hosiery in the late 
eighteenth century~ and there were still 93 in the mid nineteenth 
century (VCH3 19553 p 3). 
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worked a similar system, but with more flexibility, in marketing to 
several warehouses from their own 'bag' of goods, and often using their 
own yarn, which was frequently embezzled yarn purchased from knitters. 1 
2 Both these systems were in essence forms of subcontract , and these 
became the dominant forms of organisation by the 1840s. By 1841 Felkin 
estimated that half of wrought hose and three quarters of cut-up work 
was mediated through bag hosiers (PP 1841 (i) v~~ 3 p 238). 
Middlemen, like frame rents, were objects of hatred among the work-
people. 33 out of the 183 Leicestershire knitter witnesses to the 1845 
Royal Commission made specific complaints against them, as opposed to 75 
against frame rent, but clearly middlemen were associated with rent and 
other types of charges, such as 'standing charges' or 'shop charges' 
(covering the overheads of workshops) and 'taking in' charges (for trans-
port costs), of which many complained. 4 The knitters, who also had to 
pay for their own needles, candles for lighting, heating, soap or oil to 
make the yarn workable, and the work of someone to do winding and sewing 
if family members were not available, felt themselves enmeshed in a web 
of charges, many of which they complained they could not understand. For 
1 See Chapter 4. 
2 See CZawson (1980) and LittZer (1982) for the prevaZence of various 
forms of subcontracting in the earZy industriaZ period. 
3 The two types of product are described on page 54. A Zower estimate 
of middZemen's invoZvement was given by John Biggs in 1954; he be-
Zieved that of 120 Leicester manufacturers onZy 40 used middZemen. 
However, these wiZZ inevitabZy have been the Larger businesses, 
which may expZain the apparent discrepancy. For exampZe, more than 
~ of the 2,700 frames owned by I. & R. MorZey were worked through 
bagmen (PP 1854-5 xiv q 388; BytheZZ, 1978, p 85). 
4 These figures are derived from a content anaZysis of the 183 inter-
views in the 1845 RoyaZ Commission report with framework knitters 
from Leicester and Leicestershire. Since the questions were not 
standardised, this does not represent 'hard' statisticaZ evidence, 
but it does provide a rough overaZZ picture of the knitters' exper-
~ence. See Appendix 2 for further detaiZs. 
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example, Henry Krause complained of an extra 3d weekly charge supposedly 
for tax, and Allen Tilley of a 9d charge referred to as 'compensation 
money' (PP 1845 xv I q 1246, II q 159 7) • 
In terms of technological development, there were few major changes 
between 1800 and 1850. Felkin pays tribute to the fertility of imagina-
tion and invention of both masters and workmen in the industry1; but most 
of these inventions were small adjustments or modifications, producing, 
for example, new stitches or utilising new types of raw material. 2 There 
was, however, one extremely significant change: this was the introduction 
of what were known as 'cutups 1 , 'spurious goods', 'scissors \vork' or 
'spider hose' (being purportedly full of holes!) These goods were prod-
uced on a wider type of frame; material was knitted up in a straight piece, 
not fashioned into a stocking shape or 'wrought' as on the traditional 
narrow frame. The hose were then cut out, stitched up and pulled into 
shape on a board. 
These products earned the scorn of masters and workpeople alike3 , 
but were, of course, the first step on the road to cheap mass production. 
They first began to appear in the 1790s, but do not seem to have become 
widespread until about 1812 (Patterson, 1954, p 57; Felkin, 1845, p 47). 
They were particularly popular in Leicestershire. They were quicker to 
make, requiring less skill, and 2-6 hose could be produced simultaneously. 
1 See FeZkin (18??) for a fuZZ account of patented inventions between 
1?50 and 1850. 
2 The industry then, as now, was noted for the wide variety of products 
and processes involved. For example~ in 1812 40 distinct fabrics 
were being knitted (Chapman~ 196?~ p 19). 
3 The 1819 petition of the Leicester framework knitters was a joint 
petition with the hosiers against cutups~ which they wanted made 
iUegaZ. 
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In this way, they undercut the price of wrought hose. Smaller masters 
and middlemen, who competed for the cheaper end of the market, were 
particularly likely to be involved in the production of cutups, whereas 
larger manufacturers, who relied more on quality goods and dealt with 
established customers, were more likely to take the side of the workpeople 
in the campaign against them. Since pay for this work was higher, the 
un~ons were unable to prevent their members taking up employment on the 
wide frames, deplore them as they might. 
The other important organisational change ~n this period was the 
tendency for workpeople to be gathered together in small workshops rather 
than in their homes. This was particularly true in towns. For example, 
of the 63 witnesses from Leicester ~n 1845, 40 worked in shops compared 
with 13 at home (11 gave no location). In the rest of the county only 
20 out of 119 mentioned that they worked in a shop. The size of the 
shops in which these 83 knitters worked varied from 5 to 118 frames. 
Although they were sometimes quite large they were not organised on a 
factory basis. There were no set hours or regulations, and the workpeople 
chose their times as they would in their own homes, but clearly there was 
some saving in overheads for the middlemen who ran the shops, and benefits 
f . d' . 1 o eas~er co-or ~nat~on. 
The organisation of the industry, then, meant that the labour of the 
producers had to support an unwieldy structure of profit-taking (hosiers, 
middlemen, independent investors). Ease of entry continued to generate 
unduly high levels of competition. The other side of the picture was the 
1 Conditions in the shops were often poor. According to one knitter 
The men are stived up in their frames ... It's actually 
dreadful. It smells really disgusting when you go into 
the shop. 
(PP 1845 XV I q 1625) 
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overstocking of the labour market. There had been a steady inflow of 
agricultural labour, released from the land. Nichols, writing at the 
turn of the century, estimated that only a third or even a quarter of 
the agricultural hands employed 20 years earlier were still required 
(Nichols, 1798, Vol II, p 639). In temporary boom periods, such as 
the Napoleonic Wars, when government contracts pushed up demand and 
enrolment in the armed forces created a labour shortage, new entrants 
were attracted to the industry by ease of entry. After 1815 the market 
was flooded with returning soldiers. Finally, the majority of village 
knitters continued to bring up their children into the trade, partly 
because of the lack of other employment in the area, partly because 
h • ld I 1 b h d f • 1 d • • 1 d 1 c 1 ren s a our pus e up am1 y pro uct1v1ty , an part y, no doubt, 
because of attachment to the traditional lifestyle. 2 
Unchecked competition, stagnating demand, surplus of frames and 
surplus of labour combined to produce intensely depressed conditions 
between 1810 and,l855. Older people looked back with nostalgia to rem-
embered 'Golden Ages', in the 1760s and between 1785 and 1810. In the 
former period it was claimed that "a flatness of trade was never known" 
and "surplus goods were laid by to meet the seasons" (Gardiner, 1838, 
Vol III, p 112). Knitters in those days combined agricultural work with 
production of hose, growing vegetables, brewing ale and keeping pigs and 
poultry (Jones, 1891, p 3). They were able to earn sufficient wages by 
working only three days a week in the frame. One witness in 1845 rue-
fully remembered the time when he earned as much himself in a week as 
four of his family now earned together (PP 1845 xv I q 3381). It was, 
1 See Chapter 10. 
2 See Patterson (1954~ pp 49-50) for amplification of this point. 
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of course, easy to put a Utopian gloss on this past~ one writer remembered 
Leicestershire as 
The abode of health and competence: a temperate and unstrained 
industry diffused pZenty through its towns and viZZages ... the 
advance of summer invited the peasant to a gratefuZ change of 
Zabour3 whiZe the viZZage poured forth its cheerfuZ popuZation 
to assist in preparing the tedded grass and reap the goZden 
harvest. 
(Humanus 3 18203 p 17) 
This is no doubt idealised. Nevertheless, there is no doubting the grim 
contrast presented by the period from 1810. In 1819 Nottingham knitters 
petitioning the Duke of Newcastle spoke of "pangs of hunger", of subsist-
ing on bread, potatoes and salt, and "putting our children supperless to 
bed" (Aspinall, 1949, p 324). Their plight was to typify the next decades, 
as pay slumped, hours of work lengthened, while many experienced long 
spells without work or on the 'stint'. 
It is hard to present an accurate picture of wages over the period 
as all payment was on a piece-rate basis, and there were great variations 
between branches and between individuals. The 183 (male) Leicestershire 
witnesses reported earnings in 1845 ranging between 3/- (net) and 20/-
1 per week. Deductions were also highly variable. Probably most paid 
between 1/- and 1/6 frame rent per week (ranges reported were from 9d to 
5/-). The range of full charges reported by the sample was 2/6 to 8/6 
2 
weekly. Women, old people and children usually earned less than adult 
males. Two hosiers reported in 1854 that wage-earners fell into three 
classes: hardworking skilled men (earning average £1), less responsible 
men (12/- to 15/-) and women, boys and old people (7/- to 10/-) (PP 1854-5 
1 Confusion is increased as it is often not made cZear whether figures 
given represent net (after deductions) or gross wages. 
2 Thomas AZZsop of Hinckley reported that his house rent was 9d while 
his frame rent was 1/-! (PP 1845 xv I q 3797). 
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x1v qq 7342, 7593). These were probably optimistic estimates. Some 
more precise figures. from individual wage-books, are lower. One hosier's 
book for the period 1794 to 1803 (a relatively prosperous time) recorded 
a gross average of 12/0~, and deductions of 1/11~, making clear earnings 
of 10/1 (PP 1812 ii, Appendix 4). It must be remembered, here, that 
women's wages could fall as low as 1/-. A survey done 1n 1843 by William 
Parkinson, a Derby knitter, of 759 frames (346 in use, 413 standing idle) 
revealed that individual's average weekly earnings varied from 15/- to 
1/- (PP 1845 xv II q 3933). In the Leicestershire village of Earl Shilton 
the average earnings of 185 hands was calculated at 3/2~ net, while 13 
hands working for Thomas Corah earned 5/7 net on average and 13 hands of 
the Biggs brothers 11/4 (PP 1845 xv I q 4964, PP 1854-5 xiv Appendix 2) 1. 
Hours were similarly variable. The 1845 witnesses tended to claim 
to work from 5, 6 or 7 in the morning till 11 at night, or up to 16 or 17 
hours daily. Lower estimates were 12-14 hours a day. Such hours might, 
however, be worked·only 4 or 5 days a week, not every day. 
With wages so low and erratic, the workpeople became used to diets 
lacking meat or cheese, consisting mainly of bread, potatoes and fat, with 
perhaps herrings or treacle, and tea. A Hinckley knitter described his 
"rice days" when the family consumed three pounds of boiled rice and 3d 
worth of bread (PP 1845 xv I q 3971). One family of six had not tasted 
meat more than three times 1n four years, while Thomas Brown reported 
living without cheese, butter and sugar for a year, with only chicory 
essence for breakfast (PP 1845 xv I 1343; Jones, 1891, p 6). Many at 
1 Average figures, like those provided by Thomis for 1?92 (1?/-) 
and 1829 (8/-) hide more than they reveal, in view of aU these 
variations (Thomis, 1968, p 1?9). 
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times came near starvation, as Thomas Cooper, the local Chartist leader 
recalled: mothers were so malnourished their milk dried up, and one man 
told Cooper 
I wish they would hang me! I have lived on cold potatoes 
that were given me these two days, and this morning I've 
eaten a raw potato for sheer hunger. 
(Cooper, 18?2, pp 1?2-3) 
Large sections of the populace were reduced to pauper status. 
Patterson calculates that in Leicester in 1847-8 1/4 to 1/3 of the town's 
population were on poor relief (Patterson, 1954, p 349). In country areas 
it could be worse: in Wigston, Leicestershire, in 1832 208 families were 
on permanent relief, and 150 more on intermittent relief, constituting 
nearly half the village (Hoskins, 1957, p 270). In 1841 in Hinckley one 
third of the framework knitters were unemployed, one third earning about 
7/- to 8/- a week, and a third on the stint, earning only 4/- a week 
(Biggs, LRO). As two knitters wrote to a Nottingham newspaper in 1827 
To give a picture of our real situation would stagger belief 
and were it possible to obtain a general knowledge of how many 
get on from day to day without money, credit, furniture, cloth-
ing etc. would be entirely astonishing and outrival the greatest 
romance. 
(Thomis, 1969, p 25) 
Poor diet, clothing and housing, combined with long hours of work in 
cramped conditions, took their toll on the health of the knitters, who 
were described as "an unhealthy and short-lived class" by one observer 
(Wylie, 1857, p 40). Felkin declared them to be "physically deteriorated 
... mentally depressed, and too often morally debased" (PP 1841 (i) vii 
p 238). Diseases to which they were particularly prone included indiges-
tion, spinal curvature, consumption, ruptures, debility and failing 
eyesight. The latter was particularly prevalent among glove hands, few 
of whom could continue in that branch after the age of 40 (PP 1843 xiv F 
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p 55-59). Pains in wrists, back, head and stomach were frequently com-
plained of: Harriet Holland, aged 18, told the Children's Employment 
Commission of "violent pains in the head and side". Her eyes were "very 
much strained" and she occasionally saw black specks (PP 1843 xiv F p 91). 
Thomas Kerry, a glove fingerer, reported 
Sometimes~ when I am at work~ especially on colours~ my head 
aches~ at the back of my head~ and I find that I can hardly 
bear myself. 
(PP 1845 xv II q 30?) 
In such circumstances, observers were apt to ask why the knitters 
stayed in the trade. However, alternative employment in the area was 
scarce. Where alternatives were available people did move, mainly into 
the collieries, or back into agriculture. The Derby workpeople were the 
most fortunate, as the industrial structure there was more diversified. 
Already in 1817 people were leaving for silk mills (Hutton, 1817, p 157). 
In 1845 and 1854 it was reported that entrants into hosiery were fast 
dwindling as young people entered factories, collieries, brickyards, 
foundries and railway yards (PP 1845 xv II qq 3845, 3902; PP 1854-5 xiv 
qq 7527, 8052). William Mason, who had himself quitted knitting to work 
1n a paint factory before ending as a scripture reader, reported that many 
were joining the police force (PP 1854-5 xiv q 9695). In Nottingham 1n 
the 1840s a short-lived boom 1n lace, 'twist-net fever', provided an open-
ing of which many, including Gravenor Henson, took advantage. However 
opportunities were few, and the poor physique of the knitters disadvantaged 
them for other work. For example, it was claimed that when they \vere set 
to stonebreaking in the workhouse "their hands bled dreadfully", while if 
their hands became toughened they were unable to operate the frame succes-
sfully (PP 1845 xv I q 3679). 
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Many moved around the area seeking work. Thomas Greaves of Derby 
had travelled to Belper, Hinckley and Leicester to work, and Richard 
Harris, successful Leicester manufacturer, had worked in Nottingham when 
he was a knitter (PP 1854-5 xiv pp 471, 475; Lomas, 1855, p 16). John 
Rogers, a Nottingham manufacturer, described the stockingers as a "very 
migratory set ... they go from here to Leicestershire and from here to 
Derbyshire" (PP 1845 xv II q 1125). The other possibility was long-range 
migration. In 1824 it was noted that Nottingham people were going to 
France into the lace trade, and as late as 1863 a group of Nottingham 
knitters had an Emigration Association; 150 sailed to New Zealand under 
this scheme (PP 1824 v p 370; Church, 1966, p 155). Two Leicester Chartist 
leaders, blacklisted for their union activities, emigrated to the United 
States, as others had done before them (Patterson, 1954, p 387). Less 
dramatically, Redford documents a drift over the period from Nottingham 
to the Yorkshire textile areas, from Leicester to the coal and iron indust-
ries of the West Midlands. Such migration was not substantial, however, 
a phenomenon which Redford ascribes to the "mental obtuseness of the Eng-
lish peasantry" (Redford, 19 64, pp 52, 95). 
In times of severe hardship, appeals to the community might be the 
only hope. Samuel Hayfield of Mansfield explained "They must go to the 
parish, or begging or stealing or anything they can do". Others spoke of 
poaching, or travelling around begging for odd jobs to do. Friends and 
relatives might offer monetary support, and local ladies and gentlemen 
made charitable provision, sometimes of money and food, sometimes of work 
(PP 1845 xv I qq 3090, 7338, 7342; II qq 3135, 4440). Daniel Herrick, 
Leicester stockingers' leader, described poor families' struggles to sur-
vive ~n his fictionalised account of his experiences in the trade 'The 
Warp of Life'; ''For clothing they were greatly dependent upon charitable 
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gifts from ladies and gentlemen in the neighbourhood", while used tea-
leaves donated by the landlady of the local pub were a lifesaver (Merrick, 
1876, p 7). One hosier confessed, "We never knew how they lived ... they 
must have been in pretty good credit in the villages" (PP 1845 xv I q 383). 
As a last resort, there was the hated workhouse; one man commented 
The Bastille is not the worst place3 bad as it is3 that I have 
alighted on. There is some kind of meal there3 but at home 
very often there is none. 
(PP 1845 xv II q 3508) 
Ultimately, though, there was little left for many but despair, Amos Faxon 
of Hinckley told the Commissioners 
We are so helpless and so reduced that it is impossible for us 
to extricate ourselves from the thraldom; we have no means of 
helping ourselves; we are as fast as a fly in a spider's web. 
(PP 1845 XV I q 4048) 
Equally graphically, one village knitter described how 
I have known the time when I could have stripped myself naked 
and commanded my own children to eat my flesh3 they have been 
so hungry. 
(PP 1845 XV I q 8313) 
One man, stricken by debt, told how he went into the fields and attempted 
to eat grass: 
But when I had got it into my mouth I could not get it down ... 
I got a cup of tea at one place3 and a cup of tea at another. 
(PP 1845 XV I q 6259) 
In v~ew of such distress, the framework knitters' early attempts at 
collective organisation should not surpr~se us. As early as 1752, journey-
man knitters advertised ~n the Nottingham Journal, calling on their fellows 
"to form themselves into a community, and not to listen to their employers 
who pretended to be the workmen's friends to be of one mind for the 
general good" (Nottingham Journal, October 14th, 1752). Walton, in his 
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account of hosiery trade organisations, ascribes this to the reaction of 
discontented journeymen as capitalism tightened its grasp (Walton, 1952). 
The first more permanent association was the 'Stockingers' Association for 
Mutual Protection', founded around 1776 or 1777. It was successful enough 
to organise the first of many petitions to Parliament ~n 1778 and another 
in 1779, and was particularly effective ~n Nottingham (Henson, 1831, p 383-
395). 
Ad hoc meetings of knitters' societies and committees were common ~n 
the towns over the next thirty years, while village stockingers were more 
likely to form themselves into friendly societies. The next notable 
organisation, however, was the union instituted by Henson in Nottingham 
in 1813, which spread quickly to Derbyshire, and by 1814 was making 
progress ~n Leicester (Gurnharn, 1976, p 7). Henson, whom Thornis describes 
as possibly the first full-time paid un~on official, was a man of notable 
ability and resource, but his un~on faced fierce opposition from the 
hosiers, leading to prosecutions under the Combinations Acts. 1 Two members 
were gaoled in Nottingham, along with four or five in Leicester. Despite 
this setback, organisation of the knitters continued, especially in Notting-
ham, often taking a complex and subterranean form, as various Horne Office 
documents, reproduced in Aspinall's useful collection, show (Aspinall, 1949, 
Sections v, vi). In 1819 organisation returned to a more legitimate form, 
in the shape of the Leicester 'Seven Years' Union', established by a middle-
class syrnpathiser, the radical Baptist minister, Robert Hall. Taking the 
outward form of a friendly society, it was financially supported by some of 
the Liberal Nonconformist hosiers. A similar association was formed ~n 
Nottingham in 1820. 
1 See Thomis~ 1968~ p 181. Henson was paid 3 guineas a week. He had 
already run another short-lived union~ in 1811-12. 
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These organisations were especially orientated towards appeals for 
legislative protection~ manifesting, ~n Walton's view, "a nostalgic 
desire for the paternal protection of Parliament" (Walton, 1952, p 32): 
Henson's 1813 union was named the 'Society for Obtaining Parliamentary 
Relief and the Encouragement of Mechanics'. However, they also used the 
methods which were to be associated with the evolving trade unions: 
demonstrations, wage claims and strikes. Many strikes occurred in the 
three hosiery towns, Nottingham, Leicester and Derby, between 1813 and 
1825. 1 A major general strike followed the repeal of the Combinations 
Acts in 1824, and lasted 18 weeks. This, along with another strike in 
1825, exhausted un~on funds, and led to an eventual collapse in 1826. 2 
New attempts at organisation continued to be made, but the period 
between 1826 and 1855 was marked by the forming and reforming of temporary 
un~ons, often organising merely one branch or sector of the trade~ The 
Sock and Top Branch, founded in 1830, was one of the strongest of these: 
the Glove Branch and the Drawer and Pantaloon Branch were also well 
organised (Gurnham, 1976, p 15; Wells, 1972, p 113). These fragmented 
unions were often formed for one specific objective (drawing up a petition, 
initiating a strike); despite the apparent lack of central organisation, 
strikes continued to be common (Felkin, 1877, p 32; Thomis, 1969, Chapter 
1 See details in Chapter 8. 
2 It had already survived one virtual collapse~ and change of leader-
ship in 1824. 
See Chapter 8 for details. 
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To stress the sectional and transitory nature of the organisation 
1 ~n this period, as some have done is in fact somewhat misleading. All 
through it, there were centripetal forces acting as strongly as centri-
fugal ones. Henson had been involved in 1829 in an early attempt to 
institute a locally-based general 'union of trades' (Thomis, 1969, p 69), 
and throughout the period there was a tendency for loose federations of 
the small local unions to meet together as the 'Three Counties Union'. 2 
The high peak of these unifying drives was the involvement in the General 
Union movement of the early 30s. There were Leicester, Nottingham and 
Derby branches of the National Association for the Protection of Labour 
(NAPL) in 1831 and considerable involvement in the Grand National Consol-
idated Trades Union (GNCTU) in 1833, especially in Derby and Leicester. 3 
After the collapse of the GNCTU, it was the turn of Chartism to act 
as a unifying force. Working Men's Associations for the Charter were 
formed in Leicester in 1836 and Nottingham in 1838. Knitters were active 
among Chartist groups in Leicester, Nottingham and Loughborough, and 
Chartist activities continued intermittently until 1849; the movement 
provided a second organising focus for stockingers' leaders who were also 
involved in various industrial activities, including the campaigns which 
led to the 1845 Royal Commission enquiry into the industry and the 1854-5 
Truck Commission's investigations. Study of these various forms of activ-
ity reveals that the same names perpetually reoccur: Gravenor Henson, 
1 See Gurnham~ 19?6~ pp 12-1?; Wells, 19?2, pp 104-5. Leicester 
knitters' leader William Jackson described the 1826-33 period as 
one of bad organisation, but this view is no doubt coloured by his 
own fall from grace (under suspicion of malpractice) at this time 
(Jackson, 1833, pp 10-12). 
2 For exan~le in 1833, 1834, 1838, 1842 and 1843. 
3 There were 61 GNCTU lodges in Leicester (Patterson~ 1954~ p 28?). 
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George Kendall, Jonathan Barber in Nottingham, William Jackson, George 
Buckby and Thomas Winters in Leicester. Xen of determination and resource, 
they threw themselves into each new working-class initiative as it emerged. 
It might be possible to dismiss all this activity as a series of 
failed attempts to establish a permanent union. If, however, rather than 
taking the Webbs' definition of a trade union as "a continuous association 
of wage-earners" as the definitive one (Webb and Webb, 1894, p 1), we view 
early trade unionism as based in the spontaneous collectivism of people 
with shared work experience, 1.n what Turner calls "the habit of association", 
it l.S clear that this habit was found in an extremely active form among 
1 this particular group of working people (Turner, 1962, p 86). 
Predictably, employers' associations had a similar 'ad hoc' character. 
They were usually formed for a single purpose. Among the earliest must 
have been the committee formed 1.n 1727 to combat embezzlement (Chambers, 
1966, p 122). A Nottingham group active in 1772 had 70 members and in 
1778 they quickly formed a counter-association in response to the knitters' 
union (Chapman, 1967, p 52; Henson, 1831, p 386). In 1792 there was a 
Leicester organisation against embezzlement which, according to the Victoria 
County History, had regular meetings (VCH, 1958, p 173). Similar combina-
tions were later formed against Luddism (1811), legislative interference 
(1812), machinebreaking (1814) and wage demands (1825) (Thomis, 1969, p 42). 
As Thomis says, these associations had no continuous existence. They 
inevitably failed once the task for which they had been constituted was 
complete, particularly in view of the climate of competition amongst the 
hosiers. Their attempts to get Parliamentary backing were more successful 
1 This issue is more fully discussed in Chapter 8. See also Price, 
1980. 
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than those of the knitters, for dur~ng the early period a number of 
measures were passed pos~ng severe penalties for framebreaking and other 
f . . 1 acts o oppos~t~on. However, not all their activities were in opposition 
to the workpeople. In 1819 masters and workpeople from Leicester organised 
a joint petition against cut-ups. In 1841 a meeting of the three counties' 
hosiers in Derby, to prepare for the visit of the Royal Commission, was 
given a sympathetic account by John Biggs, Leicester's leading hosier, of 
the sufferings of the Leicestershire hands. On the other hand, a committee 
of smaller masters managed to act together to defeat the Ticket Act, passed 
~n 1846 after the Royal Commission report, which was designed to protect 
standards and prices by the marking of goods, and which larger owners might 
have supported. 
On the whole, it can be stated that employers' organisations ~n this 
period took a defensive form. Offers from Leicester knitters to form a 
joint union in 1838 were completely disregarded. 2 It was claimed, moreover, 
that the hosiers were too divided among themselves to combine with any 
permanency. Attempts to maintain 'statements' (lists of prices mutually 
agreed by both sides) were perpetually jeopardised by the undercutting 
activities of the smaller hosiers. 3 Competition continually acted to block 
concerted action by the hosiers. 
1 The 1?88 Act for Protecting Stocking Frames~ Machinery etc. decreed 
that people refusing to yield up a rented frame should be fined~ 
people stealing a frame gaoled~ and people destroying a frame trans-
ported. During the Luddite period in 1812 the Act for Protecting 
Stocking and Lace Frames commuted the latter to the death penalty~ 
but this ~as repealed in 1813. 
2 See discussion in Chapter ?. 
3 Statements ~ere dra~ up~ for example~ ~n 1?8?~ 1?90~ 181?~ 1819 and 
1830 (Gurnham~ 19?6~ Chapter 1; Patterson, 1954~ Chapter VII). 
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Such were the organisations which were ranged against each other in 
this period. Evidence to the Parliamentary enquiries from 1812 to 1854 
reveals a steadily mounting feeling of hostility and anger on both sides. 
Employers resented what they saw as attempts to erode their individual 
rights and freedoms, were antagonised by the workpeople's defence of trade 
traditions, and blamed political agitators for the climate of unrest; 
while the workpeople and their leaders bitte.rly resented what they saw as 
the oppression of their masters and fiercely opposed what they saw as trade 
1 . 1 rna practLces. 
This opposition was active as well as verbal. Throughout this 55 
year period, the workpeople used every means available to them to fight to 
better their condition. Petitions, demonstrations and strikes have been 
mentioned. Knitters were also involved in all the protest movements of 
the time: Luddism, Owenism, the Reform Movement, Chartism. Less dramatic 
means, such as experiments in co-operative production and appeals for bodies 
2 
of arbitration were also employed. But by none of these means could they 
remedy the two major ailments from which the industry was suffering: the 
competition between employers and the surplus of labour. Drastic change 
was needed to remove these ills. 
Section 2 The Transition to Factory Production 1855-1914 
The next thirty years were to bring the transformation of the old 
system, and the growth of a new factory industry with new machines; they 
also heralded changes in the industrial climate, which brought prosperity 
1 Evidence for these feelings &s presented in Chapters 4 and B. 
2 See Chapter 8. 
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to the towns of Leicester and Nottingham, and a vast improvement 1n the 
living and working conditions of the populace. Yet what strikes comment-
ators now, as it did the contemporary observers, is the slow pace of that 
change. 
A circular frame worked by steam power had been invented by Brunel 
as early as 1816, and in 1829 Warners of Loughborough were experimenting 
1 
with a rotary steam-powered frame (Wells, 1972, pp 116-7). Factory 
experiments had been tried in the East Midlands before 1845. 2 Yet in 1862 
only 4,063 out of around 120,000 hosiery workers were covered by the Factory 
Acts, and in 1871 there were still only 74 factories in Leicester and 
Leicestershire (Gurnham, 1976, p 23; VCH, 1955, p 16). The factory system 
did not become fully established until the 1890s: in 1870 there had been 
129 hosiery factories 1n Britain, employing 9,692 workers; by 1890 there 
were 24,858 employees 1n 257 factories, and by 1901 there were 38,549 
workers in hosiery factories (Church, 1966, p 265). 
Contemporary explanations for the continuation of the domestic system 
had tended to stress the difficulty of developing steam-powered machinery 
in an industry in which there was so much variety 1n process, product and 
material, and where adaptations dictated by changing fashions were so 
frequent. Many manufacturers believed mechanisation to be impossible. 
"Power cannot be applied" stated John Biggs in 1833 (PP 1833 xx Cl p 25). 
In 1845 the manager of a Belper firm reiterated 
1 See pages 72.-73 for explanation of the two types of frame. 
2 According to Barnes~ Haddens of Aberdeen had an experimental factory 
in 1811~ with 20 steam-powered machines producing "aU sorts of 
hosiery". Labour relations in the small Scottish sector of the 
industry were more cordial~ so less resistance to change might be 
expected (Barnes~ 1977~ p 84). 
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Stockings cannot be made by power~ and I believe 
will be .•• A stocking is not merely a texture. 
ment~ and therefore you may as reasonably expect 
coat by steam. 
they never 
It is a gar-
to weave a 
(PP 1845 xv II q 4831) 
In 1854 hosiers declared that only inferior goods could be made on the 
circular frames, now becoming common; all better classes of good must 
still be knitted on the handframe (PP 1845-5 xiv q 132). Even in 1871 
the same idea was being aired by the manager of Hine and Mundella's 
factory in Nottingham, who claimed that power machinery made "much 
inferior work to the wrought hose" though he conceded that improvements 
were being made "almost daily" (PP 1871 xxxvi qq 41419, 41421). 
The hosiers' other maJor problem was overcoming the workpeople's 
resistance to factory conditions. It was believed that they would not 
be prepared "to work by the bell and leave off by the bell" according to 
hosier Arthur Morley, who claimed the typical response was "No, I should 
not like that; it would break in upon my habits" (PP 1845 xv II q 6721). 
Another hosier explained to the Commissioners in 1845 how experiments in 
factory organisation had proved "a perfect failure" because the men would 
not submit to any restraint (PP 1845 xv II q 490). It was also believed 
that concentration of men in factories would increase industrial and 
political unrest. Workshops were described as "hotbeds of discontent" 
(PP 1845 xv II q 4831), and one hosier described how 
One man leads another astray; many before entering large shops 
are very different men to what they are after they have been 
in a while3 by reading bad books~ inculcating bad principles. 
(PP 1845 XV II q 1331) 
More prosaically, another, John Rogers, complained of the expense involved 
in paying for large premises and for overseers (PP 1845 xv II q 1146). On 
the other hand, manufacturers spoke lyrically of the domestic system, 
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claiming that it increased the workpeople's "welfare and happiness" while 
the factory system threatened their "physical and moral welfare". Arthur 
Morley firmly declared that "the beauty of the stocking trade" was its 
domestic character (PP 1854-5 xiv qq 2345-6, 6567). 1 
If all this was true, we must still concur with Chambers (1966), 
Gurnham (1976) and Bythell (1978) that the major obstacle to change was 
the profit still to be made out of the domestic system. Labour costs were 
cheap, labour was freely available, and too much was invested in frame-
rent for the system to be easily dislodged. It is significant that not 
until after the abolition of frame-rent in 1874 did the factory system 
2 
really begin to take off. 
As was indicated, the first factory experiments were spectacular 
failures. The Jarvis Brothers of Hinckley tried to run one containing 50 
to 60 wide frames, with regular meal-times, twelve hours' work a day, and 
no ingress or egress during working hours. Dinner was provided, and the 
hosiers joined the workpeople in eating it. Men were allowed to employ 
their children as winders. However, the employees refused to keep regular 
hours; turnover was drastic, with men working a couple of days and then 
quitting, and the work was of poor quality. The knitters were unhappy 
1 See Chapter 4 for substantiation of the hosiers' claims. 
2 See Chambers~ 1966~ p 133; Gurnham~ 19?6~ p 24; Bythell~ 19?8~ Chap-
ter 4 for fuller discussion of this. In addition to the abolition 
of rent~ the continuing profitability of the system was also threat-
ened by the Factory Acts of 186? and 18?8~ and the Education Act of 
18?0~ which promised to put limits on the use of child and female 
labour in the future. The significance of this can be gauged from 
the fact that~ according to the Factory Commissioners~ in 1843~ 
12~924 out of the approximate total of 28~000 employees in the 
industry were under 18 (PP 1843 xiv F p 13). 
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Because they cou~d not go in and out as they p~eased and have 
what ho~idays they p~eased and go on just as they had been 
used to do~ and were a~so subject~ during after hours~ to the 
il~-natured observations of the other workmen. 
If not constantly under surveillance, they would "fill their p1pes and 
Jugs and all sorts of things" (PP 1845 xv I 'qq 3683-5). 
Such early experiments, however, were not likely to succeed, for as 
the percipient manufacturer, Robert Walker, observed "in a factory where 
they do not use steam power you cannot enforce industry" (PP 1854-5 x1v 
q 2364). Only the use of power would force the workforce to accept the 
exigencies of continuous production. 
The first successful factories opened 1n the 1840s. Thomas Collins' 
Leicester factory had 55 rotary machines, operated chiefly by girls aged 
13 to 17, and employment there was sought after (PP 1845 xv I pp 76-8). 
John Cartwright in Loughborough operated his power factory successfully 
with "good picked men" (PP 1845 xv I q 8028). By 1854, Thomas Corah, 
whose firm had first invested in a steam engine sometime after 1845 (Jopp, 
1965, pp 9, 11), was enthusing about his factory experiment: "Mr. Walker 
stated that he thought the system could not be carried out in the factories, 
but I know better". The machines cost f.lOO each, but "they work beautifully", 
and the hands had "nothing to do but to look at them". He agreed that, as 
yet, the machines could not be used for more intricate jobs, but as far as 
straightforward items were concerned "the circular machinery has completely 
undermined the wide machinery, and it will undermine it". The expense of 
the machinery and the necessity for it to be carefully looked after would, 
however, ensure that the new system was only slowly adopted, in his op1n1on 
(PP 1854-5 xiv pp 202-39). He was right! 
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Nonetheless, resistance was gradually wearing down. Hine and Mundella 
opened their first factory, a five-storey building, in 1851, and in 1855 
Thomas Payne started up a steam-powered factory in Hinckley (Pickering, 
1940, p 49). By 1863, five Leicester hosiery firms had opened factories, 
including the Biggs Brothers (Gurnham, 1976, p 22). By 1866, even the 
Morleys had a factory, despite Arthur Morley's earlier avowal that "anything 
that is old is likely to be more respectable than that which is new" 
(Chambers, 1966, p 124; Gurnham, 1976, p 23). These men were the leaders 
of the industry. Wherever they led, eventually the smaller firms must 
follow. 
The perfection of what was to be the industry's staple machine, Cotton's 
Patent rotary machine, two years before the Morleys opened their factory, 
is significant. It was a notable advance on previous machines. The circular 
machines were essentially a modernised version of the wide frames: they 
produced tubes of fabric which were then ironed into shape. The earlier 
rotary machines, known also as 'flats', produced pieces of fabric which 
could be cut up and stitched, and thus also replaced wide frame production. 
As Corah had explained, these types of machines satisfactorily superceded 
the wide frames. Cotton's Patent was the first machine to produce fully-
fashioned goods satisfactorily, thus replacing the old narrow or 'wrought' 
frames. 
For the next period of its history, the industry assumed a dual 
structure. While factories proliferated, narrow frame production continued, 
especially in the country areas. In Nottingham in 1868 there were 12,000 
rotaries, 15,000 circulars but still 40,000 narrow frames. Rotaries were 
operated by men only, but women worked with men on circulars (Felkin, 1877, 
p 43). Rotary operatives in this year earned 20/- to 35/-, but narrow frame 
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wages were much lower, ranging from 6/- to 24/-. Despite this incentive 
to switch to power, many older workpeople found it hard to adapt. In 
1890 there were still 5,000 male handframe knitters in the Midland 
counties, as their representatives told the 1892 Labour Commission (PP 
1892 xxxvi Pt 2 p 77). 1 Many of these men earned only 10/- to 12/- a 
week. Their comments to an observer, W.G. Jones, make pitiful reading. 
One lamented 
We are superannuated men without a pension Zeft to fight out 
a bitter existence. 
Another explained "It's no use us old men going by steam", while a third 
wrote 
I found myseZf geting (sic) oZd and frames geting new ... 
Hope now to finish my Zife without the papur's bage which ~s 
the fatie of so many of my feZZows. 
(Jones~ 1891~ pp 12-13) 
A major change in this period was the increasing proportion of women 
employed in the industry (see Fig. 3.1). As the figure shows, this femin-
isation was substantial. In Leicester in 1851 there were 4,188 men 
recorded as working in hosiery and 1,979 women. By 1881 women had over-
taken men, and by 1911 there were 12,117 women working in hosiery and only 
3,610 men (Simmons, 1974, II, p 151). In 1897 women formed 75% of the 
total factory workforce (Church, 1966, p 278). They also continued to work 
in large numbers as outworkers. No accurate figures are available, but 
Wells estimates that in 1907 there were 25,000 women outworkers (Wells, 
1972, p 157). 
1 They cZaimed to know nothing about numbers of women. 
1851 
1861 
1871 
1881 
1891 
1901 
1911 
1921 
1931 
1951 
Source: 
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Figure 3.1 
Proportions of men and women employed ~n hosiery 
in the three East Midland counties 1851-1951 
Women as 
ivfen Women TotaZ p_ercentage 
of the totaZ 
32,818 23,547 56,365 41.8 
23,878 19,810 42,688 46.3 
21,908 17,825 39,733 44.5 
18,492 19,532 38,024 51.3 
17,395 25,296 42,691 59.4 
13,192 28.079 41,171 68.0 
14,163 35,316 49,479 71.4 
16,593 46,078 62' 671 73.3 
21,217 55,349 76,566 72.2 
23,064 52,583 75,647 69.6 
D. Smith., The East MidZands IndustriaZ Area., unpubZished 
Ph.D. 1961 p 224 TabZe 32. 
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Two factors were involved in this development. First, as mechanisa-
tion increased the output of the individual knitter 1 , the proportion of 
seamers, menders and other workers needed to finish the work (whose own 
technology altered little) was increased. In addition, factory expansion 
involved new finishing jobs, such as packaging, pressing, cutting, sorting 
and examining, which were taken on by females. The second factor was the 
attempt by manufacturers, especially in the country areas, to use female 
1 b h k . . h. 2 a our on t e new n1tt1ng mac 1nes. The fight against female substitution 
became the major preoccupation of male unionists in this period. 
At the same time as the factory system was being developed, Nottingham 
and Leicester were both experiencing periods of boom and expansion. In 
Nottingham, from 1850 onwards, this centred on coalmining, engineering and 
brickmaking, while lace and hosiery were also attracting new investment. 3 
Later in the century new industries emerged, notable enterprises being 
Boots' chemicals, Players' tobacco and Raleigh cycles. In Leicester, 
expansion was on a narrower front, but the development of the elastic web 
and boot and shoe trades put an end to the town's dangerous dependency on 
hosiery as the single industry. Light engineering was a later development, 
in the 1890s. By 1871 footwear had outstripped hosiery as the town's 
major employer, and remained so till World War One. In both towns, growth 
and prosperity brought a corresponding expans1on 1n the construction industry. 
These were quite literally boom towns. Between 1871 and 1901 the population 
of Leicester more than doubled. As Simmons says, "one may doubt if, in the 
1 In 1871 rotary machines were producing 10 stockings at once. 
2 This is fuZZy elaborated in Chapters 4 and 10. 
3 One factory manager stated in 1871 "we are as busy as we can weU be 
in the factories" (PP 1871 xxxvi q 41416). 
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years 1860 to 1914, any large town ~n England grew and throve more" 
(Simmons, 1974, II, pp 61, 151). 
Increased general prosperity, plus greater opportunities for alter-
native employment, brought an improvement in the hosiery workers' (as 
they now came to be called) lot. As Felkin said 
Their physicaL appearance is proportionaLLy improved~ and 
they are Jar better cLothed ... They are now generaLLy weLL 
favoured~ stout and of respectabLe appearance. 
(FeZkin~ 186?~ p 555) 
Another local historian, Read, describing Leicester in 1881 commented 
The streets are crowded with thousands of bustling operatives~ 
comfortabLy cLad~ cheerfuL of face~ and not Lean of figure~ 
being in the enjoyment of remunerative wages. 
(Read~ 1881~ p 269) 
In 1887 the Nottingham Express described the local working classes as 
better fed and better housed; ''Their wages are higher, they work fewer 
hours" (University of Nottingham Adult Education Dept, 1971, p 9). 
In 1871 Mundella, leading Nottingham manufacturer, claimed that his 
rotary operatives could earn 5/- to 10/- per day, wages as good as ~n 
any trade in England (PP 1871 xxxvi q 4248). In 1880 average wages for 
male power operatives in Leicester were 30/- to 34/-, for Nottingham 35/-
to 40/-. Lowest paid males were winders, averaging 8/-. In Leicester 
the highest female wages were 17/- to 19/- (for women knitters) while 
makers-up, seamers and menders earned 14/- to 16/-; in Nottingham women 
on the circulars earned 20/-, and up to 17/- was earned by the makers-up 
(PP 1887 lxxxix pp 131-133). The Royal Commission on Labour in 1893 
reported that in Leicester female machinists were earning 14/- to 27/-, 
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linkers 15/- to 22/- and female knitters 10/- to 28/-. Lowest paid were 
cutters (4/- to 14/-) and seamers (11/- to 16/-) 1 (PP 1893-4 xxxvii p 160). 
Women's lot was certainly improved by a wider choice of job and better 
wages. George Kendall, Nottingham union leader, spoke of their increased 
self-respect: "they would not do the work now which they used to do formerly". 
He considered their morals and education to have improved, while they had 
better wages and increased free time in the evenings (PP 1876 xxx p 400). 
They soon built up a reputation for appearance. A Nottingham manufacturer 
commented 
Warehouse girls, either hosiery or lace, may generally be dist-
inguished from others by their showy dress. 
(PP 1863 xviii p 270) 
A later observer described Leicester girls as 
Beautifully clothed in quiet colours, their dresses simply and 
tastefully made, and their millinery expensive but not gaudy. 
(Cooperative Congress, 1915, p 121) 
The introduction of powered machinery introduced a new dimension to 
union organisation. The first power operatives' union was formed 1n 
Nottingham in 1857, the Circular Framework Knitters' Society. In 1865 
the rotary operatives formed their own unton. Mansfield knitters' unton 
was started in 1861, and these all joined in a federation of 1866, the 
United Framework Knitters' Society. Leicester only sent one delegate to 
this federation, however, and continued its own organisation on a branch 
1 A definite pecking order had developed among female occupations. 
William Biggs told the Children's Employment Commission that "fe-
males in warehouses are considered superior to those who work in 
factories", while winding and seaming were considered "the two 
least respectable occupations in the town" (PP 1863 xviii p 290). 
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basis until 1872, when the branch un~ons amalgamated to form the Leicester 
and Leicestershire Framework Knitters' Union. A growing problem was the 
split of interests between hand and power operatives. In 1871 the 
Nottingham hand workers found their own organisation, while in 1884 the 
Leicester power workers split off to form, in 1885, what was to be the 
most durable of the unions in the next 40 years, the Leicester Amalgamated 
Hosiery Union (LAHU). Four years later the unions carne together to form 
the Midlands Counties Hosiery Federation, which, later changing its name 
to the National Hosiery Federation (NHF), remained as a loose alliance 
functioning right up to the formation of the National Union in 1945. 
Hinckley and Loughborough, which had some tradition of separate organisa-
tion, formed their own unions: Hinckley split off from Leicester in 1897. 
By the end of the period there were five maJor unions ~n the NHF: Leicester, 
Nottingham, Hinckley, Loughborough and Ilkeston. 
The hand frame workers formed their own federation in 1889, with 
headquarters in Sutton, but this organisation slowly faded out. Two small 
women's unions, formed with assistance from the Women's Trade Union League 
(WTUL), the Searners and Stitchers (1874) and the Menders (1875), flourished 
briefly, but declined in the 1880s. An attempt to reorganise a 'Women's 
1 Hosiery Union' in 1890 was not successful. 
These new un~ons were far from being unions of the 'new model' type, 
like the Engineering Workers' Union, and further still from displaying 
the spirit of 'new unionism' associated with the general unions. Subscrip-
tions were low, bureaucracy minimal, and local autonomy paramount. 
Essentially they clung to the old conservative craft ethos: their main 
1 For fuller details on all these unions see Gurnham (1976) Chapters 
2 and 3. 
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objectives were to monopolise skills and restrict entry. Such backward-
looking policies were to hamper their progress in the prewar period. 1 
Predictably~ manufacturers' organisations lagged behind. In 1899 
the Midland Counties Hosiery Manufacturers' Association was formed, but 
it had a shaky existence~ and collapsed some time before the Second World 
War. In the early part of the century~ only Leicester and Hinckley had 
functioning Manufacturers' Associations. However, some time earlier one 
of the most notable developments of the century in industry's history 
occurred, when union and employers' representatives came together in 1860 
to form the Nottingham Board of Arbitration (NAB), one of the earliest of 
its kind, which functioned, at first successfully, then with growing 
difficulty as the unions quarrelled among themselves, until 1884, when it 
collapsed. The NAB represented the first major attempt to develop joint 
negotiation and bargaining procedures 1n the industry; it was spearheaded 
by the more progressive employers, whose ideas were perhaps too far ahead 
of those of the mass to prevail generally. A similar board was established 
at Leicester in 1866, but met with limited support from either side. 2 
Despite this joint venture, hostility between the two sides was not 
at an end. The climate of prosperity described above did not on its own 
bring peace to the industry. Indeed, the v1ew painted by the civic chron-
iclers was somewhat too roseate. Whatever the general improvement in 
conditions, for individual working-class people problems remained. There 
were still many slums in Leicester in the 1890s (Barclay, 1934, p 124). 
Workers still had to work long hours, there was still the fear of losing 
1 See Chapte~ 4. 
2 A fuZZ discussion of the a~bit~ation boa~ds can be found in Chapte~ 
7. 
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one's job, or of experiencing short-time working when the trade was 
suffering from one of its periodic recessions. 1 Despite the general 
expansion of trade and favourable state of the market, the industry 
remained highly competitive, with small firms still likely to operate 
price-cutting tendencies and push down wages. County knitters suffered 
particularly from this. 
A knitter also faced the prospect of coming into work and finding 
2 
'his' frame gone , for there were three major problems faced by the 
unions in this period. First, there was a persistent anti-union feeling 
among employers, which led to many individual cases of victimisation. 
Secondly, many employers decided to move their frames and factories out 
to rural areas, where labour was cheaper and union control weaker. Allied 
to this was the already mentioned trend for manufacturers to employ more 
women, whose labour, once again, was cheaper. Struggles against these 
"d. ld h h h ·d 3 moves preoccup1e un1on ea ers t roug out t e per1o . 
The general picture, then, was still one of struggle, but there were 
some signs of shifts mvay from the confrontations of the past. Some 
progressive employers were beginning to appreciate the value of encouraging 
union organisation, and of co-operation with unions to increase the effie-
. f d . 4 1ency o pro uct1on. Others, more old-fashioned and still resistant to 
unions, did, however, show a genuine concern for the well-being of their 
1 For instance~ in 1897 the union Secretary went to Newcastle to 
investigate job possibilities there for his members, and in 1905 
there were reports of many members in "straitened circwnstances". 
One man with 8 children was living on 14/- a week (LAHU A f.1arch 
17th 1897, August 25th 1905). 
2 See, for example, LAHU A January 22nd 1896. 
3 See Chapter 5. 
4 See Chapter 7. 
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workpeople~ a strong tradition of factory paternalism was developed in 
this period. 1 Union leaders~ too, began to display a more accommodative 
approach. Just as their predecessors espoused Chartism and Owenism, the 
new leaders espoused the Labour Party and the co-operative movement, but 
rarely did their visions of the future produce the violent verbal and 
physical confrontations that had characterised the domestic period. 2 
Section 3 Modernisation 1914-1960 
While the preceding period was one of considerable change, the story 
of the industry during the modernisation period is one of consolidation 
rather than transformation. Having so late experienced its first, the 
industry was not yet ready for a 'second industrial revolution'. 3 This 
marks it out from earlier mechanised industries, such as engineering and 
cotton textiles, which underwent considerable technical change during 
this period. Holbrook-Jones' study is one of many which deal with the 
imposition of Taylorist techniques and other forms of rationalisation Ln 
these industries from the 1880s onward (Holbrook-Jones, 1982). 4 This LS 
not to say that there were no changes at all Ln hosiery production, but 
they were both gradual and minimal in impact compared with the changes 
of the preceding period. Arguably, it is only in the 1980s, with the 
introduction of electronic technology into the industry, that a 'second 
industrial revolution' is being experienced. 
1 See Chapter 6. 
2 There ~ere exceptions to this~ notabLy the vioLent hosiery strike 
in Leicester in 1886. See Chapter 9 for proLonged discussion. 
3 See Friedmann~ 1955. 
4 See aLso Friedmann~ 1955; LittLer~ 1982. 
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What technological development there was in the period chiefly 
involved modification or improvement of existing machines and processes. 
There were still two major types of machine, the flat or fully-fashioned, 
and the circular, producing tubes of material. A third type of knitting 
machine, the warp machine, was developed in the 1930s, but this is used 
mainly in the production of synthetic fabrics, and forms a fairly discrete 
branch of the industry. Improvements were basically of three kinds: 
machines got faster, more automated and more versatile, while remaining, 
as Anderson says, basically the same as the nineteenth century machines 
(Anderson, 1978, p 73). For example, flat machines used to manufacture 
stockings were improved as follows: finer gauges were developed, 28 
stocking legs could be made at once on machines developed in the 1950s, 
and the machines were much faster (Wells, 1972, p 172). These improvements 
were all concerned with increasing output. Smith provides some interesting 
comparisons: a skilled handknitter could produce 60 loops a minute, a 
skilled framework knitter 54,000 loops a minute and a girl in charge of 8 
automatic hose machines in 1929 435,000 loops a minute (Smith, 1965, p 31). 
As the machines became more efficient and automated, workpeople would be 
required to supervise a greater number of machines. In the 1890s unions 
fought to retain the rule of one machine per operative, but by 1946 one 
man was expected to tend 12 seamless hose machines (Board of Trade, 1946, 
p 18). 1 
New fabrics were developed in this period (rayon 1n the 1920s, nylon 
from 1938) which boosted the industry's output level, and led to new 
products. 1907 to 1924 saw an expansion in the fancy goods sector, and 
1 Sock knitters today oversee 18 or more machines. 
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1n the 1950s knitwear was the growth area. But none of these developments 
led to maJor upheavals 1n work organisation. 
Historians of the industry have paid less attention to technological 
development in the subsidiary 'female' jobs. Many of these, however, 
changed little since the introduction of the sewing machine in the 1850s. 
Two other specialist machines had also been introduced in the nineteenth 
century, the linking machine in 1858 and the overlocker in 1887: linking 
involves closing toes by joining loops together and, in the case of nylon 
stockings, is a highly demanding and skilled job; overlocking is trimming 
and sewing over a raw edge to prevent fraying, and was necessary to obtain 
a satisfactory seam on garments cut from fabric produced on circulars. 
These jobs are thus extensions of the old hand jobs of seaming and stitch-
ing. They remained fairly stable after the introduction of the machines, 
and the finishing sector overall remained highly labour-intensive by 
comparison with the knitting sector. 
In terms of work organisation, too, the period saw continuation of 
existing trends rather than changes. The continuing feminisation of the 
industry was perhaps the most notable feature. Before 1914 women 1n 
Leicest~r had worked on most machines, apart from Cotton's Patents; 
during the war they were taken on to all machines, but under strict 
regulations. Many operatives continued to be anxious to preserve the 
monopoly of men in certain jobs. There were protests throughout the war 
over this 1ssue. For example, at Walker's factory in the village of 
Fleckney, men consistently opposed women's employment on Cotton's Patents, 
arguing in favour of the practice of 'coupling' (one man to two machines), 
a practice which the unions, however, regarded as much more potentially 
dangerous as a precedent (LAHU A October 23rd 1915). Agreements with 
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employers offered the un1ons protection for established practices: women 
were to be employed only where men were unavailable, had to be "physically 
fit" to operate the machines, were to be paid male rates and would only be 
1 
employed for the duration of the war (LAHU A December 8th 1915). 
However, in the interwar period many employers returned to their 
policy of attempting more permanent female substitution, although this 
practice was perhaps less widespread than formerly. The Second World War 
essentially brought an end to this. Tight rules on labour substitution 
were approved by the NJIC, and put into practice by local committees. For 
example, the 1939 agreement between the Hinckley Union and the local Manu-
facturers' Association read as follows: 
The substitution of femaZe for maZe Zabour (if such becomes 
necessary) onZy to be made through the committee. In aZZ 
such cases of substitution3 the same to be for the duration 
of the war onZy.2 
After the war, women were to be found performing knitting operations 
on some of the smaller machines, but the continuation after the war of a 
three-shift system meant that they were effectively debarred from operating 
machines in certain sectors, such as fully fashioned. 3 Growing numbers of 
women, however, were needed for finishing operations 4 and shortage of female 
labour characterised the industry from 1945 to 1960. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
These matters are explored in detaiZ in Chapters 4 and 10. 
Text from Hinckley Union Minute Books in Leicester Records Office. 
The roZes of the shift system and of other factors which heZped 
dissuade the employers from their femaZe substitution policies are 
fuZZy discussed in Chapter 4. 
"Seventy different peopZe have some smaU part to pZay in making 
one pair of Montfort HaZf Hose" 
(Newby~ Groves and Makin~ 1938) 
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The national upheavals of this period affected conditions 1n the 
industry, and this was a time of greater fluctuations than the preceding 
period. One notable change, however, was that, after the formation of 
the NJIC in 1918, pay and conditions 1n the industry became much more 
inextricably linked with the success of union organisation. These two 
facets will thus be considered together 1n the next few pages. 
Despite the disruptions and shortages caused by the First World War, 
on balance the experience was a positive one for the hosiery operatives. 
The war boosted production as Government contracts multiplied. Strength-
ened by the demand for their labour, the unions succeeded in obtaining a 
Cost of Living (COL) bonus for their members. The first bonus agreements 
were made by individual local unions with their employers, Hinckley and 
Leicester being the first to gain them in 1915 (Gurnham, 1976, p 76). 
Subsequently the unions worked jointly as a federation to negotiate further 
bonuses on the basis of the Munitions of War legislation of 1915. Three 
bonus awards were obtained through arbitration, and a fourth was added in 
December 1918, soon after the formation of the NJIC. This body was also 
used by the unions to secure overtime pay agreements and a 48-hour week, 
although attempts to establish a holiday-with-pay scheme failed. 
The war was thus a beneficial time for union organisation, and there 
were dramatic rises 1n membership, especially among women, as Fig. 3.2 
shows. In 1914 the membership of the five unions was 5,917, with Notting-
ham crumbling to only 505. By 1919 the figure was 21,444. Nottingham 
had increased membership nearly tenfold, though LAHU remained the largest 
un1on. 
The increases in membership can be explained partly by the improved 
bargaining position of the unions, partly by the growing respectability of 
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Figure 3.2 
Membership of local unions, 1914 to 1939 
Leicester Loughborough Hinckley Ilkeston Nottingham Total 
1914 3,400 160 950 902 505 5,917 
1915 3,418 174 1,050 1,402 592 6,636 
1916 4,239 180 1,400 2,012 1,025 8,856 
1917 4,000 270 1,410 2, llO 1,025 8,815 
1918 5,800 1,010 2,020 5,500 3,465 17,795 
1919 6,800 1,304 2,200 6,040 5,100 21,444 
1921 12,000 1,500 3,100 7,600 7,400 31,600 
1927 8,000 600 3,400 3,200 
1933 7,000 500 3,400 3,000 2,000 15,900 
1939 8,000 400 6,000 4,000 2,000 20,400 
Source: R. Gurnham3 The Hosiery Unions 1??6-19763 19?63 pp 743 103 
Figures are from the records of the General Federation of Trade Unions, 
and are only approximations. Comparison with figures in the LAHU minutes 
(unfortunately not offered on a regular basis) indicates .that they are 
probably underestimates. They should be used only as a guide to relative 
changes over the period. 
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unionism, as unions became directly involved 1n negotiation with the 
Government in matters of national welfare. 1 Above all, the attraction of 
the COL bonus was crucial. As Jabez Chaplin, LAHU secretary, explained: 
Many of our members were not trade unionists~ but bonus 
members - our membership went up as the bonus rose~ and 
fell as the bonus fell. 
(LAHU B February 16th 1922) 
The most important long-term effect of the war, however, was the 
stimulus given to collective bargaining procedures. Although the Govern-
ment had taken the lead, the attitude of employers was becoming much more 
favourable to trade unionism. By 1929, Horace Moulden, Chaplin's successor, 
was able to say: 
We have reached the stage where it is being more universally 
recognised that organised labour not only has the right to 
regulate for better conditions and wages~ but also it has a 
legitimate claim to a voice in the making of the policy of 
industry. 
(LAHU B July 2nd 1929) 
In Nottingham, too, the Chamber of Commerce acknowledged the rights of 
organised labour and it was reported that "real co-operation" was being 
shown between the two sides (Walton, 1962, p 76). This attitudinal shift 
was best exemplified by the successful establishment of the NJIC in August 
1918, on the lines of Whitley Council recommendations; this body has been 
continuously active from that time to the present day, even surviving the 
troubled period of the 1930s depression. 2 
In fact, the post-war slump was not felt as severely in the East 
Midlands as elsewhere. 3 Nevertheless it provided considerable problems 
1 The increases reflect national patterns of increased membership 
during the war. 
2 See Chapter 7 for a full account of the NJIC. 
3 See Gurnham~ 1976~ p 100~ for figures comparing unemployment in 
hosiery with that in other industries. It was consistently lower~ 
though it peaked in 1931 at 18.8%. 
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for the industry. From 1920 onwards trade fell away, with rising unemploy-
ment and cuts ~n the COL bonus, and the unions' financial resources were 
severely stretched. From 1923 to 1926 unemployment ~n hosiery averaged 
8.4% a year (Walton, 1962, p 92). Most unions were forced to suspend 
their newly-established unemployment benefits. For example, LAHU did so 
in April 1921, with 4-500 members having been reported out of work the 
previous December (LAHU A April 20th 1921). 
As a result, membership slumped dramatically ~n the first postwar 
years, and continued to fall through the interwar period (see Fig. 3.2), 
although employment in the industry actually continued to rise, from 
90,000 ~n the early 20s to 120,000 in 1939. Only the Hinckley Union, 
helped by the development of the seamless rayon hose industry which was 
centred on the town, grew during the period, nearly doubling in size 
between 1921 and 1939 (Gurnham, 1976, pp 99, 103). 
Employers responded to declining un~on strength by reverting to their 
old policies, such as female substitution and victimisation. "A number 
of manufacturers were dismissing people for very trivial things'' it was 
noted by LAHU on April 20th 1921. Employers quickly found excuses for 
prun~ng down on surplus labour and it seemed that the old competitive 
climate would re-emerge. However, NJIC agreements served to keep wages 
reasonably stable for those who retained their jobs. Average wages (for 
both sexes) were 35/- in 1924 and 37/10 in 1935, sinking little below these 
levels in the intervening years (Gurnham, 1976, p 104). It was reported 
in the 1930s that male knitters were averaging 80/- for a 48-hour week, 
while their Japanese counterparts earned 11/7 for 78 hours' work (Walton, 
1962, p 111). Wages of different groups still varied greatly, as figures 
given by Wells for Nottingham in 1934 show. Male knitters were earning 
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from £2 8s to £8, according to type of machine and product. Women on 
automatic seamless hose earned from £2 lOs to £3, while women machinists 
earned £1 15s to £3 and menders £1 lOs to £2. Rates in the villages and 
even in Leicester could be lower (Wells, 1935, p 236). Despite these 
variations, it is clear that unemployment or short working were greater 
problems than wage levels at this time. 
The Second World War once again brought disruption to the industry. 
As Towles of Loughborough recorded in their 50-year Souvenir: 
Employees left the firm in their hundreds to go into munitions 
and war work~ and the business was completely disorganised. 
The worst hit division of all was the finishing department. 
Young girls could not be employed~ as they went either into 
the forces or the munitions factories. 
(Towles~ 1956) 
The industry was among the first to be subjected to the policy of 
concentration, to free both labour and factory space for war production. 
In 1941 400 factories were either closed down or reallocated, and produc-
tion was packed into the remaining buildings, where the evicted firms had 
to share space with the selected 'nucleus' firms (Gurnham, 1976, p 129). 
Even so, the labour shortage worsened and by 1942, as production of utility 
goods was running into problems, the Board of Trade scheduled the industry 
under the Essential Works Order (making it illegal for workers to leave the 
industry without official permission, but at the same time establishing a 
guaranteed minimum wage). 
In all these arrangements there was close co-operation between un~ons 
and employers. Employers struggling to maintain production levels needed 
the unions' help, and once again the unions experienced an upsurge ~n their 
prestige and bargaining power. They took advantage of this to reopen the 
holiday-with-pay campaign in 1942. Meanwhile, with COL bonuses renegotiated, 
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wages were rising; Gurnham suggests this represented a r~se ~n reaL earn-
ings~ the average male rate rose 35.1% between 1939 and 1944, the female 
rate 55.9%, and the juvenile rate a staggering 75%, as demand for young 
people to replace leavers grew (Gurnham, 1976, pp 135-6). Finally in 
1945 the first minimum wage agreement in the industry was made with NJIC, 
after an appeal to the National Arbitration Tribunal (NAT). 
This time round, the end of the war brought no eros~on of the unions' 
improved position. First, their ability to maintain the gains they had 
made was strengthened by the amalgamation of the five NHF unions to form 
the National Union of Hosiery Workers (NUHW) in 1945. Previously this 
move had been strongly resisted by the Hinckley and Nottingham Unions, 
although ~1oulden of LAHU had always campaigned for it. The reluctant 
unions changed their minds during the war, in the face of twin threats: 
the expressed intention of the general unions to step up efforts to organ-
~se hosiery workers (especially women), and the expansion of the 'new' 
hosiery areas ~n the South and North, where labour was largely unorganised. 
Attempts to organise these new entrants before the war had led to two fierce 
and prolonged strikes, one at Elstree in 1936 and one at Bear Brand, Liver-
pool, in 1939. The latter, lasting nearly a year and ending in defeat, had 
cost the un~ons dearly. Obviously local unions were ill-equipped for such 
struggles; only a nationally-based un~on would have sufficient resources 
to tackle them. 
The union's position was also favoured by the continuation of the 
labour shortage after the war. In 1946 a Working Party set up by the Board 
of Trade reported chronic shortages in all branches, especially among women. 
It was estimated that male labour would return to its pre-war level by 
March 1947, but female labour would not do so until December 1952. Over 
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SO% of operatives had quit during the war, especially in Leicester and 
Nottingham, because of the "counter attractions offered by other forms 
of employment 11 , especially, among women, the lure of non-manual jobs 
(Board of Trade, 1946, pp 94, 98). 
A Leicester Corporation handbook of about the same date gives a 
fuller account of why female employment in the town had dropped by 42% 
while in light engineering female labour had expanded by 325%. Women 
had grown accustomed to the 11highly-organised welfare systems of the 
munitions factories 11 and found life in the engineering works 11more con-
genial11 than hosiery work, which was 11highly concentrated and involved 
considerable strain11 (Leicester Corporation, undated, circa 1946, pp 35-
6). 
Various strategies were adopted in response. The Board of Trade 
report recommended the espousal of 'human relations' type policies, 
personnel and welfare services, joint committees, canteen facilities and 
so forth. Many companies, however, saw the need for more direct action. 
They built new factories in areas where there was an untapped pool of 
female labour, especially in mining or agricultural areas. Towles moved 
their factory from Loughborough to Coalville in 1946. Picks built fact-
or1es in the Leicestershire villages of Huncote and Hugglescote. Others 
moved further afield: Corahs started several branches outside Leicestershire, 
Byfords started branches in Maltby, Yorkshire and Immingham, Lincolnshire, 
while Johnson and Barnes reported that their Barnsley factory attracted 
mainly miners' daughters, 11 a keen and willing source of labour 11 • 1 Another 
option was to increase outwork operations. Picks described how in 1947 one 
1 This information is taken from the factory histories and souvenirs 
issued by the firms concerned. 
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of their ex-employees suggested "gathering Coalville girls to do hand-
stitching"; the suggestion was taken up, and the woman acted as agent, 
distributing work to the girls' homes (Pick, 1956, p 37). Finally, the 
larger and more progressive firms such as Corahs initiated training 
schemes, aimed at procuring the right type of female labour. Linkers, 
for example, were desperately needed, and it was estimated that only 1 
in 10 would return to her job after the war (Scott and Lynton, 1952; 
King, 1948). 
The labour shortages benefited the workpeople, especially as indus-
trial reconstruction and consumer expansion got under way. The Leicester 
Corporation handbook referred to above recorded the comments of a Daily 
Mail reporter in 1946: Leicester was "probably the most consistently 
lucky town in Europe"; during the preceding month, there had not been 
one woman on the unemployment register, and only 200 men out of a popula-
tion of 263,000. In the past month, 250,000 people had visited the 30 
cinemas, 4 theatres and 20 dancehalls in the city and spent £16,000 on 
the tote at the greyhound stadium: 
You walk through Leicester and sense the spirit of a town that 
is quietly doing well. Shops and markets are crowded with 
neatly-dressed people; queues wait to put their money in the 
Post Office and the banks are busy. 
(Leicester Corporation, undated, pp 33, 3?) 
The boom and demand for labour continued through the 40s and 50s. 
Between 1946 and 1951 average wages ~n hosiery rose 50%, to £8 17s 8d 
for men, £4 13s 6d for women (Gurnham, 1976, p 158). 1 By 1955 they had 
reached £12 6s 3d for men, £5 18s lld for women (Wells, 1972, p 214). 
1 Respectively lOth and 13th in the wages 'league table'. 
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Temporarily, at least, competition 1n the industry had been brought under 
control, and workers and employers prospered alike. 
The story of organisation through this period, then, 1s one of con-
solidation and stabilisation; despite the setbacks of the interwar period 
the unions, apart from the Nottingham Union which came to the brink of 
collapse, kept themselves afloat. The co-operative links manufactured by 
the NHF and strengthened by the formation of the NJIC in the First World 
War helped to secure their stability. The 1945 amalgamation established 
permanent and modern union organisation in the industry; in the next SlX 
years union membership nearly doubled, rising from 22,430 to 40,539 
(Gurnham, 1976, p 161). Similarly, the existence of the NJIC at least 
served to keep employers liaising, even where local manufacturers' organ-
isations were not vigorous. 
The establishment of the NJIC as a permanent negotiating body marked 
a substantial improvement in industrial relations in the industry, espec-
ially after 1946. Already by 1937 the President of the Nottingham Chamber 
of Commerce was saying 
In the East Midlands~ employers and employed had a far better 
working relationship than in practically any other part of the 
country. 
(Walton~ 1962~ p 90) 
The progress of this co-operative mood is nicely symbolised in an account 
given of the changing position of the leading union activist in a large 
Leicester company: 
At the start of the war~ she led an increasingly militant 
struggle between workers and management~ with hardly a week 
in which she was not directly involved in some conflict. 
Three years later she was also a training instructress and 
had been elected to one of the highest positions in the 
national trade union. As she herself put it~ 'Some union 
people don't seem to realise that there is an alternative to 
continued conflict between management and workers in industry~ 
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that one can Look at problems without thinking of two sides 
aZZ the time'. 
(Scott and Lynton, 1952, p 143) 
In those three years, after an initially aggressive confrontation 
with the employers over the first National Agreement and the promise of 
what would have been the first national strike for over a century, the 
union, under pressure from the NAT, had settled into an accommodative 
relationship within the NJIC; in the 1950s it was often held up as a 
model of industrial harmony, good sense and 'responsible unionism'. When 
the secretary of the NUHKW's Leicester District wrote to an employer ~n 
1967 
I should teZZ you that my union is a non-militant organisa-
tion, and we have written into our agreement for the Hosiery 
and Knitwear trade an understanding to refer any differences 
that we may have to arbitration. 
(NUHKW NEC Minutes, October 20th 1967) 
this was not merely window-dressing. Things had come a long way since 
1845. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to present a reasonably full 
account of 'the facts' concerning technological and organisational change 
in the industry, the resulting conditions faced by the workpeople, and the 
accompanying changes in union and employer organisation. As far as possible, 
I have attempted to document these changes through using the accounts of 
those involved as well as by use of statistical and other information 
provided by secondary commentators. This reflects a belief that 'facts' 
are not unproblematic: witness, for example, the debates over such issues 
as pay levels and the profitability of frame rents, the disagreements, to 
be discussed in later chapters, about skill levels and the extent of female 
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employment. Although inevitably the 'facts' I have presented here have 
been selected, I hope to have provided the reader with sufficient material 
to allow him or her to begin to formulate a personal interpretation of the 
events recorded. This has been particularly necessary in this chapter 
(although the other chapters will likewise draw heavily on participants' 
accounts) since the succeeding chapters represent, in effect, a series of 
interpretative glosses on some of the key aspects of the social developments 
which have been outlined in this chapter. 
1 See discussion &n Chapters 4 and 10. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
"Let us support our trade a:nd keep out others that wouLd it 
invade." 
Banner at Derby strikers' demonstration 
(Pioneer~ February 22nd 1834) 
"Six Minutes onLy Late each day 
Throws three whoLe days a year away!" 
Notice on door of PasoLds Hosiery Factory 
(PasoLd~ 1977~ p 15) 
"To secure compLete organisation of aU workpeopLe in the hosiery 
industry~ to reguLate the reLationships between empLoyee a:nd 
employer in respect of rates a:nd conditions of employment ... " 
Objectives of NVHW~ Rulebook 1946 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DEGRADATION _AND RESEGMENTATION IN THE HOSIERY LABOUR.PROCESS 
Introduction 
According to Marx, the labour process, as we have seen, has four 
discrete elements: the task, instruments of labour, raw materials and 
preconception. Under the domestic system of production 1n hosiery the 
merchant hosiers had legal or formal control over elements two and three, 
but minimal control over the task, and thus essentially over the precon-
ception of the task (planning). This obviously impeded their attempts to 
plan production adequately. Since raw materials and instruments of labour 
had to be handed over to the knitters, their actual possession and control, 
in their own home environments, of these items, posed limitations to the 
ZegaZ possession and control of them by the hosiers. The structure of 
control relationships under the domestic system was, therefore, deeply 
flawed; there was no correspondence between legal and real control. The 
scene was set, then, for a struggle between the two sides, as hosiers 
attempted to tighten up these loopholes, and knitters sought to gain 
advantage from their strategic position of possession. 
The story of the industry's development is one of tightening control 
by employers, both formal and real, although, as has been argued in Chapter 
1, real control can never be complete. In this chapter I shall trace the 
development of those types of control strategies I have characterised as 
the core of the 'degradation' process: fragmentation, automation and pre-
conceptualisation. The variety of other contingent control strategies 
practised by the manufacturers will be considered in the subsequent 
chapters. 
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As Marglin has argued, formal control is only really secured when 
production moves into the factory (Marglin, 1974). This was certainly 
the case here, but even before the move into the factory, processes of 
degradation had been instituted. As these tended to involve the sub-
stitution of female for male labour, resistance to them was marked, and 
eventually resulted in processes of resegmentation. Although I am 
arguing that it is useful to look at the hosiery labour process ~n terms 
of degradation, it must be noted that the timing and order of these events 
~s different from that described by Braverman, Clawson and others. There 
was no crucial period of Taylorisation in the 1880s; an attempt to intro-
duce the Bedaux system in the 1930s met with limited success, and other 
rationalisation schemes were introduced ~n a piecemeal way between 1930 
and 1960. In sum, processes of degradation were implemented slowly. They 
coincided, crucially, with the switch to factory production, and thus 
occurred simultaneously with a deepening of 'direct control'. In part, 
this illustrates the point made in Chapter 1, that degradation must be 
viewed as a long-term dynamic, and that we cannot use the concept to 
construct an invariable historical typology of control strategies. In 
part, it points to the existence of a process of dualisation, which has 
been noted, for example, by Edwards (1979), but the significance of which 
has, I suggest, been underplayed: in the hosiery case, this dualisation 
involved the handling of different types of labour, male and female, in 
different ways. This is one of the ways ~n which gender issues are deeply 
implicated in the analysis of labour process development. 
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Section l The Domestic System 
When the Framework Knitters' Company lost its tenuous hold over the 
industry in the eighteenth century, hosiery production became, as it were, 
'up for grabs'. The actions of the merchant hosiers rapidly forced out 
the smaller artisan-producers and debased the apprenticeship system, but 
in gaining a virtual monopoly over the instruments of labour they laid 
the basis for an institutionalised struggle for control. 
The weakness of the system was that stocking frames and yarn were 
taken into the privacy of the operatives' homes. Hosiers expressed the 
problem bluntly. "As long as the frames are lent out we have no control 
over the workmen" said one, while another spoke of having no control 
Either as to time or whether the produce is brought to me 
or sent to another3 the workmen being totally wide of our 
influence in those matters. 
(PP 1854-5 xiv qq 180?3 4128) 
In 1845 Joseph Biggs complained about the impossibility of controlling 
the supplies of yarn, and, thence, the output of goods: 
Workmen have such ingenious ways of tormenting you into a 
larger supply of yarn. There is scarcely a hand that does 
not retain more in his hands than he really wants. He 
alleges that work remains behind; that it is in some pro-
cess of finishing3 or that there is some reason or other 
why he cannot bring it. 
(PP 1845 XV I q 899) 
There were complaints that knitters would leave a master's service without 
notice, that they would only perform certain types of work. John Rogers, 
a hosicr whose evidence in 1845 constituted a particularly virulent attack 
on the operatives, grumbled that, although it was "vain" for a knitter to 
refuse to produce anything but white cotton goods, "that runs through all 
their maxims": he elaborated 
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They are so perfectly independent of you that you have no 
control over them ... when they have got your work they can 
do just as they like with it ... They work at home~ and work 
when they like~ and do what they like~ and come in when they 
like. 
(PP 1845 xv II q 1123) 
Habits, he claimed, were learned young, and teenagers soon began to 
appreciate the pleasure of being one's own master. 
Above all, it was the irregularity of working hours that irritated 
the hosiers. Patterns of work activity among the stockingers were those 
described by E.P. Thompson in his work on pre-industrial labour rhythms, 
"alternate bouts of intense labour and of idleness" (Thompson, 196 7, p 73). 
The knitters kept not only 'St. Monday', but also St. Tuesday and bits of 
St. Wednesday and St. Saturday as well, so the hosiers claimed. Another 
habit was to spend a week in 'play' or drinking, and then to "work till 
they almost kill themselves for a week". Similarly, it was reported, they 
"will work all night sometimes and play all the day" (PP 1845 xv I qq 289, 
3731). Holidays, wakes and local races produced slack periods in both 
preceding and succeeding weeks. The knitters would also break off work 
whenever they felt like it, at dinnertime perhaps, or if anything exciting 
happened in the neighbourhood. Hosier James Allen complained that they 
Will not work if there is anything going on; they will be 
off to cricket or to a footrace or anything rather than work. 
and Thomas Payne of Hinckley confirmed 
If hounds come through the village or anything of that sort 
occurs~ he can run after them. 
(PP 1854-5 xiv qq 5844~ 7057) 
Finally. it was still common, especially in the villages, to retain the 
eighteenth-century practice of taking off time during harvest, or for 
other agricultural chores. As John Rogers commented, "they are stockingers 
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today, and labourers tomorrow, and something else another day" (PP 1845 
XV II q 1130) . 
There was disagreement as to how widespread these patterns of beha-
viour were, and also as to their cause. Knitter Edward Sansome claimed 
to the Factory Commission in 1833 that Monday and Saturday holidays were 
kept by necessity not choice, as in slack times hosiers deliberately 
created delays in giving out yarn and taking in the finished goods. 
Another union leader, Thomas Winters, reiterated the point in 1854; the 
habit had originated in the lack of work available on Mondays and had 
then become institutionalised (PP 1833 xx C2 p 10, PP 1854-5 xiv q 4851). 
However John Biggs' response to Sansome's claim, that the habit was 
voluntary and was "an old custom" in the trade, must carry more weight, 
in view of the extensive evidence provided by Thompson and others of the 
nationwide prevalence of the St. Monday habit (PP 1833 xx C2 p 11). 1 One 
hosier claimed that only half his hands appeared on Mondays, and many 
others spoke of there being two classes of hands, the "steady and indust-
rious" and the ';idle and dissolute". 2 
Framework knitters themselves admitted to the habit (PP 1845 xv I 
q 1567 II q 4015). An interesting comment, however, came from Edward 
Nicholson, a witness called by hosier Thomas Corah to represent the 
"respectable" hands. He believed that the reports of irregularity were 
much exaggerated: 
1 See Thompson~ 196?; Pollard~ 1965; Brown~ 19??. Interestingly, 
Joseph Biggs reported exactly the same behaviour among Saxon 
knitters in Chemnitz; "I think it is the case with the handloom 
weaving always; there is an impatience of regular labour" (PP 
1845 XV I q 949). 
2 See~ for example~ PP 1845 xv I q 2884~ II qq 1649, 1656. 
103 
The framework knitters have got the reputation of pLaying on 
Mondays and Tuesdays> but that is a great mistake, it is only 
what people Like to say of them ... they are as industrious 
a class of men as there is in the country ... but they have 
got a bad name. 
The knitters themselves, he added, had helped to foster this distorted 
view (PP 1854-5 x~v qq 8788-91). 
An interesting aspect of the dispute is the easy equation made by 
the hosiers and others (clerical gentlemen well to the fore) between 
irregular working hours and "idle or dissolute" behaviour, such as drink-
ing. Irregular hours obviously presented the hosiers with a production 
problem, but their objections were frequently couched ~n terms which moved 
the debate to a moral plane: at stake, it seems, was not just a local 
difficulty of work organisation, but a global issue, the attempt by one 
social stratum to impose a new set of norms and values, a new moral order, 
1 
on another. What is strange is how little explicit moral defence of the 
old customs came from the stockingers. Edward Nicholson was an exception 
when he explained 
Framework knitting is a caged thing •.. A man is not an idLe 
man because he looks out of doors a little. 
(PP 1854-5 xiv q 8?93)2 
Yet it is clear that irregular working was the very kernel of the spirit 
of independence which was so vital a component of the knitters' culture: 
We work> however> when we please; each man has fuZZ liberty 
to earn what he likes> and how he likes> and when he likes; 
we have no factory-bell; it is our only blessing 
1 See Thompson, 196?; Bauman> 1982. 
2 The same point was echoed by a local historian writing much later 
about the life of knitter poet> Robert Millhouse, who refused not 
only to work but even to read on Mondays: "These idle Mondays spent 
in sauntering were in fac~physical necessity to a man confined 
for so many hours daily in a crcunped position" (MiUhouse> 1881, 
p xi). 
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said Edward Sansome, confirming the ironic verdict of hosiery manager 
J.W. Hancock: 
Their notions of liberty and equality have nothing in com-
mon ~ith regular hours of ~ork~ and the freedom to quit 
their trade or to obey the bell. 
(PP 1833 xx C2 p 1~ PP 1845 XV II q 4831) 
As was indicated in Chapter 3, this tradition of independence was a 
major impediment to early attempts at imposing factory discipline. At 
the Jarvis Brothers' factory 
They ~ouZd laugh at us~ and say they did not like being 
obliged to ~ork and being shut up so that they could not 
see anything that occurred in the course of the day; they 
preferred ~orking at a less price at home ... They preferred 
their liberty. 
(PP 1845 XV I q 3?36) 
The organisation of the domestic system, then, made it difficult 
for the employers to control quantity and quality of output. However, 
despite their complaints, most of the time the boot was on the other foot. 
While irregular working was a nuisance when demand was high, in the more 
frequent periods of slump, it was not much of a problem for the hosiers, 
who always tended to overstocking; while, on the other hand, the fragment-
ation of the workforce implied in the system meant that the hosier could 
negotiate (or tried to do so) a separate contract with each household. 
Indeed, the 'right' to do this was a matter of strong commitment on their 
part; hosiers in 1812 opposed the principle of 'statements' (publicly 
agreed price lists) on these grounds. One considered it "a violation of 
the right which every man possesses of preserving the secrecy of his 
contracts in business" and another declared that hosiers were "entitled 
to make a private agreement with our workmen". John Nixon, a hosier 
particularly opposed to trade unions, even announced that if statements 
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were made legally binding it would be tantamount to putting him 
Completely into the power of my workmen~ to put a penalty 
upon me every day of my life. 
(PP 1812 II pp 68~ 87~ 93) 
The knitters' vulnerability to the lowering of prices and loss of 
1 
employment was, therefore, extreme. The only way to protect themselves 
was by developing collectively-based forms of resistance. These charac-
teristically had three objectives, the control of entry and apprenticeship, 
the monopolisation of skill and the collective enforcement of trade rules 
and practices, the former strategies being deeply rooted in the remembered 
guild organisation of the past, the latter looking forward to the modern 
activities of trade unions. 
An apprenticeship system continued in the industry, but it was 
2 
essentially ineffective in controlling entry. Figures given by Nichols 
of hosiery employment in Hinckley show the effect of a boom period (the 
1780s). In 1778 there were 864 frames, with 194 apprentices and 137 
knitters' sons and daughters operating in the trade. By 1791 there were 
1,023 frames, 251 apprentices and 160 knitters' children (Nichols, 1811, 
p 679). At such times masters were motivated to take on recruits in 
greater numbers than the trade could eventually support, and apparently 
there was no lack of people wishing to be taken on. Knitter Thomas Large 
reported in 1812 that young men such as gentlemen's servants would pay 
five to ten guineas to gain quick access to the less skilled types of work, 
1 This is, of course, one reason why the masters opposed men owning 
and worki~g their own machines. 
2 Originally the trade had had its own tradition of apprenticeship 
rituals, like those in other trades. Bailey describes the practice 
of 'mainspring ringing' on expiry of apprenticeship~ although it 
had fallen into extinction by the 1850s (Bailey, 1853, p 56). 
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being then able to invest their savings 1.n purchase of frames (PP 1812 
II p 19). Later in the century it was considerably cheaper to be 'put 
on', costing about £1 as opposed to apprenticeship fees of £5-20 in 
other trades (PP 1845 xv II q 1837). 
There were some attempts early in the century to control the system, 
notably the prosecution in 1807 of a hosier, Payne, under the old Company 
apprenticeship regulations. The knitters were led in this by Gravenor 
Henson, who also tried to revive the Company at this time. Journeymen 
were charged £1 13s 6d for admission (Thompson, 1968, p 582). Henson 
had a strong nostalgic leaning towards Guild organisation. He saw the 
existence of trade companies as guaranteeing "the two inestimable bles-
sings, moderate wages and regular employment", while also acting as 
watchdogs against fraud and moderators of competition (Henson, 1831, pp 
232-3). He was swimming against the growing tide of laissez-faire, 
however, and this campaign failed dismally, as had an attempt 1.n the 1790s 
to check the use of non-indentured labour by offering rewards to informers 
(Patterson, 1954, p 512). By 1812 it was estimated that 2/3 of those 
currently working in the trade were 'colts' (improperly trained entrants), 
or had themselves been trained by colts. It was claimed that such workmen 
were incompetent to do good quality work, and passed on imperfect skills 
to others (PP 1812 II p 33). With the growth of 'cut-ups' the lower skill 
levels of these people did not, however, prevent them getting jobs. 
The knitters regretted their inability to protect themselves by res-
tricting entry, although their habit of employing their own children was 
a large part of the problem. Benjamin Humphries, secretary of the 
Nottingham Glove Branch, spoke of their failure to emulate other trades 
in regulating apprenticeship, and Samuel Winters believed 
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Provided we were constituted as a trade with proper regula-
tions and enactments that we could protect ourselves and 
get the price for our labour. 
(PP 1845 XV II qq 362, 1394) 
This failure would have been less significant if it had been clear that 
they had specific scarce skills to protect. But the extent of those 
skills was debatable. While knitters claimed it to be a "genius" and 
one hosier noted "there LS a great deal of art in qualifying a man to 
work" (PP 1818 v p 33), many hosiers believed that skill was negligible 
and easily-acquired. Thomas Corah claimed that "anyone" could work a 
narrow frame, and that children could make stockings effectively after 
three or four weeks, while John Rogers believed a child of ten could 
knit as well as a man (PP 1854-5 xiv qq 3119-21, PP 1845 xv II q 1131). 
More considered judgement was that teenagers could learn to knit in 3 to 
6 months, on which basis Chapman has declared that the work should be 
classed as semi-skilled (Chapman, Introduction to Henson, 1970 edition 
p xix). However, Henson, among others, maintained that it took at least 
two years to learn the job properly (PP 1812 II pp 37-9). "A man cannot 
be considered to have learned his trade sufficiently until he is 22 or 
23," said Samuel Parr of the fancy silk branch (PP 1845 xv II q 1526). 
These disagreements stem from a distinction, not always clearly 
grasped, between being a competent operator and being a 'good' workman, 
a distinction reflected in the great differences in earnings and output 
between the workpeople. To do good, not just adequate, work, strength 
was needed, plus a good eye, careful attention to work, and, above all, 
experience. Felkin noted that the "art" was not difficult to acquire, 
but "the best fashioned work and all fancy work requ1re a quick sight, a 
ready hand and retentive faculties" (PP 1845 xv II p 3). Glove branch 
witnesses pointed out that the strain on the eyes was such that men over 
108 
40 could not continue ~n this type of delicate work. Speed, too, was 
crucial. Felkin maintained that whereas Saxon hands only averaged 12-24 
courses a minute, English hands averaged 24-42 (PP 1845 xv II p 3). 
Henson supported this view, and his discussion of the superiority of 
British workmen points to another aspect of the knitters' craft, which 
was, in fact, the crucial element: the ability to maintain the frame 
which, he claimed, Saxon operatives lacked (PP 1812 II p 44). 
Only skilled workmen were fully competent in this respect; they 
knew how to keep a frame in good order, repair it, make alterations 
demanded by specific tasks and ensure its output was top quality. Each 
machine when new was different, and might require as much as a week to 
get into good working order. "It ~s rough, and does not work correctly 
~n every point," said one knitter, explaining that it must be adjusted 
to avoid the production of flawed goods (PP 1854-5 x~v q 9742). Once 
set up, it needed cleaning and servicing. One hosier commented 
There be some little things that the men have put into them, 
that I cannot describe, to prevent cutting; they make the 
work a little safer and sounder by the machine. 
(PP 1845 xv II q 1110) 
J.T. Gent, in his fictional work on the hosiery trade, described the 
familiarity of each workman with his own frame, his ability to repair 
and alter it: "he is clever at expedients, and schemes many contrivances 
to assist in his work" (Gent, 1893, p 5). At the highest level, this led 
to the invention by the knitters of new techniques, processes and garments, 
which. claims Chapman, continually emanated from a ''coterie of framesmiths 
and knitters'' in intimate daily contact with each other (Chapman, 1967. 
p 187). 
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It was, then, the mechanic's skills, as opposed to the operative's, 
which really distinguished the accomplished knitter from the rest: women, 
young people and colts did not have these skills. Where women, for example, 
were employed in workshops, an overseer would be employed to keep their 
frames in trim. It was reported, too, that women, young people and old 
people caused more wear and tear to the frames than skilled men: Felkin 
described how one village knitter avoided this. In 50 years' work on a 
second-hand frame, this man had only paid £3 for repairs to it 
Which he attributes to keeping it clean, working it steadily 
and not by fits and starts, finding repairs, and not being 
forced by the pressure of poverty to work it too rapidly. 
(PP 1841 (I) vii p 232) 
Such a competent mechanic, it might seem, would have something to 
bargain with, especially where these skills were combined with a steady 
character: "a good workman is a very good thing to an employer" admitted 
one hosier (PP 1845 xv II q 1656). That this was not the case indicates 
that, as will shortly be argued, a gradual degrading of tasks was already 
1n progress. As Henson said, it only took a youth a few weeks to learn 
to make 'pieces' or cut-ups (PP 1812 II p 39). The skills that the best 
knitters undoubtedly possessed were, unfortunately for them, becoming 
obsolete and unwanted. 
Their vulnerability 1n these areas meant that the most successful 
campaigns waged by the stockingers were those centred on the third possible 
basis of control, collective organisation. This largely revolved around 
the attempt to get agreed 'statements' and to ensure that nobody worked 
for less. Statements were drawn up, for example. in 1817, 1819 and 1825, 
and in each case met with initial success, but the logic of capitalist 
competition soon acted to undermine them. The smaller hosiers had to push 
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down wages to stay 1n business, and the knitters' organisation was not 
solid enough, especially outside the towns, to ensure that men desperate 
for employment would not accept lowered rates. Belgrave knitter William 
Appleton described vividly what happened: 
Other men who have been determined not to endure the suffer-
ing~ have gone in a sneakish manner across the fields to 
Leicester~ with a bag over their shoulder to fetch out a bit 
of work~ and do it at an under price ... and kept it a 
profound secret. People have heard them at work in their 
shops and said 'So and So is at work~ I believe they are 
working under price'. 
(PP 1845 XV I q 3090) 
The tight community control at play here might deter some, but the push 
of poverty was too great for others to resist. 
This attempt to participate in controlling the industry was done in 
a weaker spirit than that described by Price in his account of control 
1 
struggles in the building trade. In the ma1n, the knitters appear to 
have had little aspiration to establish a system of unilateral control, 
along the lines of guild regulation, as did the building operatives. 
From the 1820s on, their ambition seems to have been limited to developing 
a system of joint regulation, achieved through regular meetings and nego-
. . . h 2 t1at1ons w1t masters. John Columbell of Derby, for example, described 
how local knitters and hosiers were co-operating in seeking ways of 
regulating the trade and moderating competition (PP 1812 II p 34). 
1 See Price~ 1980~ Chapter 2. A local contrast is provided by the 
allied trade of bleaching. In 1822 Basford bleachers proposed not 
just a statement~ but rules regulating hours~ overtime~ holidays, 
unemployment pay and apprentices. Thomis comments that this repres-
ented the most ambitious programme advocated by a local group~ since 
it demanded the right to regulate the employer in ways others had 
not dreamed of (Thomis~ 1969~ pp 5?-8). 
2 This spirit is exemplified by Henson~ who switched (perhaps reluct-
antly) from advocating restoration of the Company to supporting 
arbitration bodies on the lines of Durkheimian 'corporations'. 
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Similarly, the 1819 Leicester petition against cut-ups was a joint 
venture, and the objective of the operatives, according to their leader 
William Jackson, was "the peace and harmony of all classes of society" 
(PP 1819 v p 41). In 1833, Edward Sansome of the Sock Branch reported 
that, after initial conflicts, 
By means of our organisation we stop the spirit of competi-
tion of capitaZists in our branch~ and are thought none the 
worse of by our empZoyers for doing so. 
(PP 1833 XX C2 p 9) 
However, the hostility generated by competition could at times push 
the workpeople into a tougher line, closer to the spirit of unilateral 
control. Thomas Winters, glove branch secretary in 1845, told the Royal 
Commission that the branch was seeking to maintain a statement, not one 
jointly negotiated, but one established by the workmen (PP 1845 xv I qq 
97-8). This kind of defensive aggression reached its peak 1n the General 
Union period of the 1830s. Felkin gives this analysis of the famous Derby 
lock-out: 
Both sides stated unhesitatingly in the first instance that 
it was a question to what extent the master shouZd dictate~ 
and the men submit to him~ with regard to trade reguZations; 
the men considered that they had a right to expect that some 
measure of consuZtation should be had with them in the generaZ 
arrangements of the pZace~ and the arrangements with regard 
to their position. 
(PP 1856 xiii q 1095) 
The masters' defence of their own perceived right to 'dictate' was 
vehement. James Rawson of Leicester, for example, writing to the Home 
Secret~ry in 1817 deplored the current 'statement' as an unwarrantable 
attempt at regulation by the operatives: "There was a rule presented by 
which every article was to be regulated and no workman was to make any 
goods but what was specified in this statement". This he interpreted as 
"making the hands completely masters of their employers" (Aspinall, 1949, 
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pp 241-2). When the hosiers repudiated the statement on these grounds, 
the warehouses were besieged by furious operatives. Such clashes were 
instrumental in prolonging the hostile struggle between the two sides. 
When all else failed, the knitters had a final way to assert some 
degree of self-control, through individual acts of deceit or 'embezzle-
ment'. Hosiers reported the range of available ruses. People might take 
yarn from one firm, work it up, and sell it to another firm offering 
better prices (PP 1845 xv II q 467). Yarn might simply be stolen, although 
this was dangerous unless done anonymously: "I have things constantly 
stolen out of my warehouse if my young men turn their backs" said hosier 
John Nixon (PP 1812 II p 92). More commonly, yarn was acquired as part 
of the 'wastage' involved in production. Goods might be handed in damp 
to the hosiers, appearing heavier than they really were, although knitters 
claimed this was only fair as yarn was often delivered to them damp. 1 
Yarn might be adulterated with substances like fat, wax, soap or oil, 
which were anyway used to make it workable. Pickering describes the 
practice known as 'scotchmisting': 
It was said that passing by a fPamewoPk knitteP's cottage~ 
the familiaP sound of 'sheet-y-boom-boom' of the fPame was 
often accompanied by the sound of wateP being spPayed by 
the mouth oveP the finished goods~ followed by a slatting 
on a chaiP back ... The suPpluses of yaPn pPocuPed by this 
simple if questionable device wePe known as 'pups'. 
(Pickering~ 1940~ pp 41~ 67) 
Another ruse was to make up stockings on fewer needles and then stretch 
them. 
Hosiers claimed that the resulting losses of yarn were substantial. 
Thomas Collins, for example, stated that over four years 3,400 lb. of his 
1 YaPn was allocated~ and stockings might be paid foP~ by weight. 
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yarn had been embezzled; although he had brought several successful 
prosecutions, this had involved him in unnecessary time-loss and expense 
(PP 1845 xv I q 893). Another problem was that the existence of large 
amounts of 'Turkey stuff' or 'cabbage', as the illegal yarn was called, 
was another factor serving to depress prices. Bag hosiers in particular 
1 
were said to rely heavily on purchases of embezzled yarn. 
No doubt William Rogers was right when he asserted that the stock-
~ngers were "trained up" to such fraudulent practices (PP 1845 xv II q 
1142). But a poem reproduced in Sutton's 'Nottingham Datebook' demon-
strates the pressures that pushed people into such illegality. Richard, 
the hero, kept waiting by his master Pennypoint, and with an empty larder 
at home, is told by "his haughtiness" that the stockings he has brought 
are "six nicks too slack" as well as being "dank as the devil" and marred 
by "splicing". Deduction or 'abatement' of 2/- for such faults, as 
Pennypoint demanded, was common practice. To fill the larder and appease 
Richard's wife 
There was but one way in the world to be taken: 
A bundle of super by Madge was convey'd 
To a jobbing retailer, well skill'd in the trade, 
Who bought it; - but then what vexation appears 
When old Pennypoint finds I've embezzled his wares.' 
To keep up my credit, and give him the bam, 
We must e'en make it up with some remnants of sham; 
'Tis but to repay, if you censure the trick, 
Not a tenth of the injury done to poor Dick 
And the maxim conjoins, upon equity's plan, 
To return what is given, as far as we can: 
Then where is the crime, on the nicest decision, 
In bilking these coxcombs, these imps of derision? 
(Sutton, 1852 pp 93-4) 
1 See PP 1845 xv I qq 3195, ?1?8, PP 1854-5 xiv q 8009. 
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The domestic system, then, set parameters for such guerilla warfare 
between masters and workpeople. The hosiers' first resort was to use the 
law, both as individuals and collectively, against embezzlement and irreg-
ularities of output (see Chapter 3). But over the period they also 
attempted, more radically, to change the system of work organisation in 
order to tighten up control. There were two main strands to these efforts: 
the introduction of forms of direct control into the system, and the init-
iation of processes of task restructuring which would reduce dependency on 
those types of labour (i.e. skilled adult males) most likely to offer 
sustained resistance. It is interesting, in terms of the Braverman thesis, 
to see that these strategic options were being experimented with concur-
rently, although, as we shall see, it was not until the end of the period 
that the effective combination of the two brought a marked alteration of 
work organisation. 
To try and regulate the quantity and quality of output, the hosiers 
saw the desirability of having some form of close supervision of work. 
This was done in two ways, although they notably overlapped. The first 
was to use middlemen as agents of control, and the second was to gather 
workpeople together under one roof. This, as indicated in Chapter 3, was 
done, with some success, through developing small workshops, or alternat-
ively, with much less success, by adopting a factory-type system based 
on standardised hours. 
As argued in the preceding chapter, the middleman system was essen-
tially a form of subcontract, which the work of Littler and Clawson has 
shown to have been a very common substitute, in both Britain and America, 
for forms of direct control administered by the employer himself, or by 
foremen standing in for him; by shifting the focus of confrontation away 
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from the employer~ the system lS potentially less disruptive (Clawson, 
1980; Littler, 1982). Thus. in hosiery, the large masters frequently 
disclaimed all knowledge of the practices and malpractices of the middle-
men, and made it clear that they did not consider these their business. 
Such a system overcame the problem of co-ordinating the work of a very 
large number of workmen, with whom it was impossible to maintain face-
f 1 . h' 1 to- ace re at1ons 1ps. In 1845 only Wards and Brettles, the two giant 
Belper firms, employed managers in the modern sense of departmental heads 
(Chambers, 1966, p 132). Others used middlemen to the same effect, as 
hosier T. Macullum revealed in describing how in his factory he used a 
manager as 
A kind of middleman ... He is responsible~ just the same as 
a middleman ... he superintends the factory the same as he 
would do a large shop. 
(PP 1854-5 xiv q 9993) 
Hosiers sought out suitable workmen and promoted them for this job; as 
John Rogers explained, when they found "a steady man, and punctual" they 
increased the number of his frames, starting him on a middleman's career 
(PP 1845 xv II q 1126). Joseph Biggs declared that the middleman was 
selected as a 
Man of character~ whom we can trust with a larger amount of 
material. He is also a man of superior knowledge and skill 
and selected as such. 
(PP 1845 XV I q 929) 2 
1 In 1854 Wards of Belper possessed 11~000 frames~ the Biggs had in 
the past had 2-4~000 employees~ though this was diminishing~ Thomas 
Corah owned 2~000 frames and the Morleys 1~700 (PP 1854-5 xiv; 
Bythell~ 1978~ p 84). 
2 Chambers~ rightly I believe~ sees the middleman system as a debased 
version of the master stockinger system (Chambers~ 1966~ p 126). 
However~ witnesses in 1854 were firm in seeing a clear distinction 
between middlemen and a continuing class of master stockingers, 
employing 5 or 6 family members with perhaps a couple of journeymen 
(PP 1854-5 xiv qq 7812~ 7827). 
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The system was open to much abuse. Clawson claims that ~n America 
the subcontract system was abolished because of the tendency of middle-
men to milk too great a proportion of profits from it, to the detriment 
of both other parties (Clawson, 1980). In hosiery middlemen often paid 
lower prices to the men than the masters were paying and pocketed the 
remainder; William Elliott, for example, unashamedly admitted paying 
under list prices: "I make my own bargain" (PP 1845 xv I q 2868). They 
also tended to impose all sorts of extra charges and to demand 'abate-
ments' for all sorts of minor impairments to the hose: dropped stitches, 
soiling, dampness, stockings being too small or too slack, and even for 
late delivery. The latter perhaps indicates that 'abatements' were ~n 
fact the equivalent to a disciplinary fine. Knitters told stories about 
the deliberate creation of reasons for such deductions; "They pull them 
and tousle them, till, in fact, I have had my work torn" said one, while 
another described how his master dropped ink accidentally on a pair of 
stockings and then "after a minute examination for ten minutes perhaps" 
found a tiny snare and made a deduction (PP 1845 xv I q 7736, PP 1812 II 
q 23). Most heartrending of all was the report by a local vicar of a 
desperately poor old man whose flawed stockings were "cut to pieces" 
before his eyes (PP 1860 xxii q 378). 
Thus the system, while it may have eased the hosier's burden of 
quantity and quality control, served to increase hostility and ill-
feeling. Less counterproductive was the workshop system which the 
operatives did not regard unfavourably, as long as they were allowed to 
come 'in their own time'. Hosier Henry Rawson believed that the shop 
system "makes a person's business more systematic and more easily managed". 
The master could keep an eye on the men's output, or employ a "curry-
favour" to do so (PP 1845 xv I qq 306, 2938). According to William 
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Cummings, the resultant products were more uniform in quantity, more 
reliable in quality, and the system fostered a more efficient distribu-
tion of raw material (PP 1845 xv I qq 2380-l). However, the efficiency 
of the shop system was disputed. Some believed that workshops contributed 
to industrial unrest and were indeed 11hotbeds of discontent11 (PP 1845 xv 
II q 4831). Hosier Benjamin Elliott believed that if one man was dis-
affected it would spread to all the others~ and many defenders of the 
domestic system felt that men were better motivated to do good work at 
home~ identifying it with family interests: 11When they are in a shop they 
care not one atom11 (PP 1845 xv I q 2743 ~ II 5377). 
Although shops did help control the regularity of output, they did 
not solve the problem of irregular working hours. As described in Chapter 
3~ the attempts to impose regular hours through factory arrangements met 
at first with complete resistance from the operatives. This was apparently 
a sticking-point~ and they were not to be budged. When the first successful 
factory experiments were reported, it is significant that they utilised the 
labour of women and young people, rather than adult males. Thomas Collins 
in 1845 spoke of employing mainly young women aged between 13 and 17 on his 
rotary machines. In this way he solved his control problems to his satis-
faction~ and clearly they had been considerable: he described his male 
outworkers as 11 so insolent and so saucy~ no one knows how to deal with 
them; they have no gratitude about them11 • Formerly he had been unable to 
predict output whereas now 11 1 can depend upon what goods I make. I know 
about what I shall have made every week 11 • He felt less liable to being 
robbed of yarn~ and the work produced was more uniform: 11 lt 1s all done 
under my own eye and goes through my own hands 11 (PP 1845 xv I pp 76-8). 
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The use of female labour was encouraged by the fact that the 
machines used represented a new stage in task degradation. With such 
a machine, which made 3 to 6 stockings at once, a girl could produce 
13 to 14 dozen a week, whereas a skilled man using a convention3l frame 
could produce only ll dozen. Collins claimed that a child of three 
would have sufficient strength to operate one: 
You have nothing to do but to turn the treadle by the hand~ 
and any boy or girl can turn these frames~ if there is any-
one to look after them to see that they work. 
(VCH~ 1955~ p 15) 
The advent of the factory system, then, should be seen as involving 
both a more successful application of direct control, and a further stage 
in task degradation, which had, in fact been under way for some time. The 
use of untrained labour, 'colts' and women, was in itself a form of degrad-
ation, involving both fragmentation of task and preconceptualisation, as 
these people were not capable of carrying out maintenance tasks, and would 
have to rely on a middleman or overlooker who monopolised the mechanic's 
functions within the knitting task. Colts and women, then, could never 
attain the same degree of autonomy and 'independence' as the skilled males, 
although within the domestic system husbands and parents supplied the 
requisite expertise and knowledge, thus retaining total control of the 
knitting task within the family unit. However, in general, the deliberate 
employment of such labour reduced the status of the work and weakened the 
bargaining power of the skilled operatives. This was recognised explicitly 
by hosier Nathan Hurst: 
So many women and children work in these frames that it has 
a tendency to keep the price low. If it was a trade in which 
men only could work~ and which required some apprenticeship 
and peculiar skill~ like a carpenter or a joiner and so on~ 
the price would be kept up better. 
(PP 1845 XV II q 1082) 
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The introduction of cut-ups was also a move towards degradation. 
The task was simpler and more fragmented (cut-up stockings were often 
made in separate pieces on 2 or 3 separate machines). Although they 
were fiercely opposed, it is curious that the operatives failed to 
appreciate the real significance of this innovation: cut-ups were lower-
quality goods, produced in greater bulk, by less skilled operatives. 
They represented intensification of output, degradation of the labour 
process, and the first move towards the techniques of mass production. 
Yet they were opposed not so much on those grounds, but because they were 
seen as 'spurious' or 'false'. "These stockings are complete rubbish; it 
is a mere deception on the public," Sansome told the 1833 commissioners 
(PP 1833 xx p 10). One knitter described them as "a disgrace to the 
makers, and a disgrace to the seller and upon the British Government", 
while another dismissed them as "not fit for hook rags" (PP 1845 xv I qq 
6965, 7545). These attitudes clearly hark back to the early Company 
control of 'spurious' goods and production1 , and show how nostalgic were 
the ideals of the knitters, rooted in the values of a vanished (if ever 
really existent) producers' Utopia. 
The key role of cut-ups was to undermine the necessity for technical 
expertise involved in the production of high-quality goods on the narrow-
gauge frames. Manufacturers speaking in 1812 admitted their own lack of 
competence in these matters. John Parker confessed his inability to set 
up a frame, and explained that, as each machine was different, "I do not 
know the number of needles my workmen put in" (PP 1812 ii p 69). Thomas 
Nelson made even more explicit the element of discretion left to expert 
workmen:. 
1 See Chapter 3. 
120 
I am frequently obliged to leave.it to the workmen how to make 
the thing I want~ and cannot describe it to him perfectly. 
(PP 1812 ii p 88) 
Such comments confirm Braverman's view that lack of knowledge of produc-
tion methods made masters dependent on their operatives' expertise. 
Cut-ups would put an end to all this. 'Alterations' and 'contrivances' 
were unnecessary for work on the 'spider' frames. 
The machines in the factories extended the cut-up principle1 and 
took degradation on a further step. By 1854 Collins was running his 
factory by steam, and was still employing "active girls and women" (PP 
1854-5 xiv q 1410). John Biggs claimed that "one strong boy or girl" 
could do as much work on his rotary frames as six men on the old frames 
(Biggs, LRO). Thomas Corah was also using "young hands", including girls, 
in his factory. Two or three together tended each machine. He claimed 
that no "physical force" was required to operate them, and the operatives 
had merely to ensure that "the thing is going on rightly". He was also 
planning to get one of the new sewing machines, in order to get the seaming 
tasks done "wholesale". If his hands failed to keep regular hours they were 
fined {PP 1854-5 xiv pp 189, 201-2). The successful implementation of the 
factory system, then, involved not just tightened direct control, but was 
founded on a degraded version of the original knitting task. 
The move to the factory, especially where it 1s linked with both 
increased direct control and task degradation, is integrally linked with 
the process of intensification. that is the compelling or inducing of 
workers to produce greater output for unchanged pay, thus readjusting the 
effort/reward bargain in favour of capital. Prior to the development of 
1 See Chapter 3. 
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the factory system, the organisation of hosiery production had meant that 
the employers had only been able to achieve intensification by crude and 
explicit means: either by lowering piece rates, which usually promoted 
conflict and strikes, or by a disguised version of this, involving the 
fiddling of rates and tasks. Workers might be asked to do little 'extras', 
such as 'doubling' of feet or insertion of gussets, for no extra pay; they 
might be asked to make, say, 36 gauge work on 38 gauge frames, or hose 
described as 22 inch which actually measured 24 inches, practices known as 
'working up the hill' or adding 'bump weight' (PP 1845 xv II qq 858, 1874). 
As one knitter succinctly explained, "We have been dropped, 1n an indirect 
way, many times, through changing the s1ze and calling them by different 
names". This attempt to bamboozle the operatives by using "all the letters 
in the alphabet till we do not know what it is ... they have only named them 
in those ways to get the money" caused violent resentment, especially in 
Nottinghamshire (PP 1845 xv I q 6226, II q 4404). It was considered to be 
'fraudulent' or dishonest behaviour, going against notions of fairness and 
justice. Acts such as these were particularly likely to inflame the feelings 
of the operatives, and resulted in bitter industrial and political struggles. 
The hostility and struggles which marked this period are dealt with in Chap-
ter 8. In the meantime, it should be borne in mind that such conflicts 
inevitably slowed down the pace of development (and of degradation) in the 
industry, ensuring that each new move was seen as a threat and contested. 
To summarise, the organisation of hosiery production in the domestic 
system was marked by structural weaknesses, and hosiers were unable to take 
a sufficiently firm hold of the system to ensure that it was carried on 
efficiently and profitably. The long struggle for control that ensued 
involved experiments with two types of control strategy by the hosiers, 
the implementation of direct control, largely through subcontract, and the 
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degradation of the productive task. The fact that the struggle was 
carried out on so many fronts may have inhibited the transformation of 
the labour process, as indeed did the very fact of those struggles, 
although we must remember that the alternative base for profit 1n the 
system (frame-rents) both increased the problem of competition 1n the 
industry and acted to retard change. When transformation of the labour 
process did finally occur, it was through the fusion of the two strategic 
impulses, heightened direct control and task degradation, as work was 
reorganised on a factory basis with new machinery. But the logic of the 
domestic system, by now deeply embedded and reflected in the values and 
ideas of both sides, was still working itself out, to such an extent that 
it was another forty years before the factory system completely superseded 
the domestic system. The story of that period and of the succeeding era, 
however, is of the logic of the new system, in its turn, working itself 
out and imposing itself on the lives of the participants. 
Section 2 The transitional period 
The factory system brought solutions to many of the problems exper-
ienced by hosiers under the domestic system, but did not, of course, solve 
all problems of control. As argued in Chapter 1, control 1s never ultimate, 
and the workplace rema1ns a 'contested terrain'. During this period, in 
their attempts to tighten control, manufacturers proceeded along the same 
strategic lines. Rather than dramatic organisational change, this period 
was marked by the slow decline of the domestic system, accompanied by a 
gradual deepening of the degradation process, while at the same time direct 
control 1n the factory was pursued through the strict supervision exercised 
by foremen and forewomen. 
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In the hosiery case, there was no historical movement from direct 
control to degradation, along the lines proposed by Braverman, since 
both types of control strategy were jointly deployed in each period. 
In part this resulted from the fact that two different work environments 
evolved in the industry over the transitional period: that of the skilled 
male workers, who were largely machine-paced, and that of the 'semi-
skilled' female workers, in which control was maintained by tight piece-
rates and strict supervision. 
Also in this period, processes of degradation were balanced by proc-
esses of resegmentation. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, adult males at 
first avoided the factories, and many older men never made the move into 
the new environment. However, high wages and improved conditions event-
ually attracted male workers to the factories. Once there, the men set 
about capturing the more important and highly paid jobs, although at 
first their efforts were hampered by the mass of employers who espoused 
combined policies of degradation and feminisation. 
Within the factories, discipline was achieved much as elsewhere, 
through systems of fines and supervision by foremen and overlookers. 1 
A report on women's employment carried out in the 1890s found that 18 
hosiery firms fined late attenders, while 23 did not. In one factory, 
operatives were fined one penny for each five minutes late. Some fines 
were donated to charity (PP 1893-4 xxxvii Pt I pp 160-1, 168-9). The 
lack of fines in so many factories may indicate that discipline had been 
firmly established by this date. An indication of why may be found 1n 
an earlier statement by the large Derbyshire firm, Brettles, which in the 
1860s had so many applicants for factory work that they could select 11 only 
those known to be respectable11 (PP 1863 xviii p 281). A visitor to 
1 See Pollard~ 1965~ Chapter 5; Brown~ 1977~ Chapter 4. 
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Morleys' factories in 1900 noted the firm discipline there, and commented 
"nor does this supervision seem irksome to the workers" (Thomas, 1900, 
p 24). In addition, fines were resented, and managements may have pre-
ferred not to antagonise the workforce by their use. For example, when 
a man at Picks factory was fined 3/6 for refusing to redo slack work, the 
whole workforce downed tools (LAHU A February 23rd 1897). 
Several cases of resistance to supervision by foremen are recorded 
~n the LAHU minutes. 1 In one interesting case women protested when their 
forewoman was dismissed, as they preferred her supervision to "the manager 
being over them" (LAHU A June 27th 1913). Reasons for struggle over dis-
cipline were quite wide-ranging. One firm, Ravens, locked out the whole 
of their seaming department for "noise and disorder". People ·were dis-
missed (though sometimes reinstated) for offences including lateness, 
refusal to work on Saturdays, presenting dirty work, stealing, singing 
d d . k. 2 an r~n ~ng. The classic cause of dismissal was union membership, and 
LAHU minutes of this period deal with two notable cases, the dismissal of 
three young women from Buchlers' factory in 1910, and a dramatic struggle 
3 
at Skevingtons in 1914, when the whole workforce was sacked. 
Although these examples concern the use of direct control over both 
sexes, the employment of foremen related particularly to the conditions 
of women's work. As before mentioned, where women were employed as 
knitters, supervisors were needed for machine maintenance; where, more 
1 For example~ see LAHU A July 18th 1900~ May lOth 1905. 
2 LAHU A December 12th 1895~ March 4th~ July 3rd 1896~ May 5th 189?~ 
March 21st~ December 21st 1900~ July 6th 1910. 
3 See LAHU October 19th 1910~ March 12th 1914. Puller details can be 
found in Chapter 5. 
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characteristically~ women were involved in finishing tasks, these were 
not, like knitting, machine-paced. In addition, many of these tasks 
were paid on day or 'set' rates rather than piece-rates (mending, cut-
ting and folding, for example). In such jobs, therefore, supervision 
was needed to ensure work rates were maintained. A vivid account of 
how this was carried out is given in Picks' factory history, based on 
descriptions provided by old employees of the factory in the 1880s. 
Male workers knitted on the ground floor while girls "treadled sewing-
machines and hand-sewed pockets" on the floor above. They worked from 
8 till 7, cooking meals on a cast-iron stove in the middle of the floor: 
Chatter helped them to forget if the gruel was thin. In 
working hours the 'Old Master' sat heavily by the stove~ 
keeping them under the dominion of his eye3 calling them 
to order if they whispered3 yawned or dreamed of better 
things - or if their hair was straggling or ill-kept. He 
was a stickler for tidy hair. 
(Pick3 19563 pp 10-1) 
It was close, paternalistic supervision of this kind which led James 
Holmes, LAHU secretary, to declare in 1892 that overseers terrorised 
women to such an extent that they were unwilling to join the union (PP 
1892 xxxvi Pt 2 p 60). The evidence of Osmond Tabberer to the same 
Royal Commission served to confirm Holmes' contention. His firm had 
moved out of Leicester, taken on women knitters instead of men, forbidden 
them to join the union and employed overlookers and managers to serv~ce 
the machines and to "look after the workpeople to see that they do their 
work" (PP 1892 xxxvi Pt 2 pp 95-7). Such women were presumably less 
likely than the men to develop the kind of resistant work culture des-
cribed by Leicester knitter Thomas Barclay in his memoirs, in which 
joking, smoking, shouting and frequent rest breaks were allowed by the 
management, and where "manager. and men talk to and chaff one another" 
(Barclay, 1934, pp 58-9). 
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In the meantime, the knitting task was still being subject to a 
process of degradation? although, as stated in Chapter 3, there were no 
drastic organisational and technological innovations subsequent to the 
move to the factory. Automation 9 fragmentation and preconceptualisation 
have occurred since then in a slow, piecemeal fashion. The new machines 
permitted two ways of organising the knitting task. One was to teach 
knitters the new mechanical skills and knowledge associated with the 
machines, and keep both task aspects integrated. The other was to split 
the task into.two separate jobs, operative and mechanic, thus creating 
one semi-skilled and one highly-skilled job. Many manufacturers were 
attracted by the latter option, using women as operators and a few trusty 
males as mechanics. Typical of these was the firm of Pool, Lorrimer and 
Tabberer, referred to above. Their reason for moving out to the country 
was 
They wouUi not allow us to put a woman on~ although a woman 
can work the machines by power just as well as a man; but of 
course when we moved to Foleshill we put women on to the 
machines and employed men to overlook them. 
(PP 1892 xxxvi Pt 2 q 13771) 
Samuel Bower, secretary of Nottingham Rotary Union, described the 
effect of such policies. The numbers of women on circular frames was 
increasing, he claimed, and many even operated Cotton's Patents, the 
heaviest machines. Asked whether women could satisfactorily work the 
latter, Bower replied 
She can manage for the manufacturer's purpose~ and that is to 
run down wages. They use her as a pretext. Of course~ they 
have to have men to overlook the women. 
(PP 1892 xxxvi Pt 2 qq 13012-14) 
As indicated here, this period was one in which the final organ1sa-
tion of the knitting task remained indeterminate, as men struggled to 
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keep the two task aspects integrated and resist degradation. This 1s 
the process I have called 'resegmentation'. Despite men's initial res-
istance, they were drawn into factory work by good wages. As manufacturer 
A.J. Mundella explained 
The young and the strong and the active men have got into 
rotary frames and better class rames and they are getting 
as good wages as in almost any tra e in England. 
(PP 1871 xxxvi q 425423 my emphasis) 
In entering the factory sector the men were indeed determined to get the 
'better class' jobs. Their policies were twofold, to try and maintain 
old skills (even if this meant a certain level of deception as to how 
much real 'skill' was needed) and to capture new ones. The attempt to 
retain monopoly of the old expertise, through claiming use of the 'better' 
frames was apparently more successful in Nottingham than in Leicester; 
there the men struggled throughout the period against feminisation and 
the related shift into the country villages. By 1913, LAHU secretary 
Jabez Chaplin lamented, 
Men have nothing left now but Cotton's Patents and if the 
women are to.have them3 then the men are done. 
(LAHU A November 12th 1913) 
An interesting example of the way men created and captured new skills 
1s the job called 'countering'. This consists of processing stockings 
after they have returned from the dyers: sorting them, folding them and 
packing them. 1 These warehouse jobs were originally done by women , but 
a report by Joseph Morley in 1863 indicates the way things were to dev-
elop: 
1 See3 for example3 CasseZl3 18733 p 63, 
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Part of the work often done by young females, as sorting and 
folding, is entrusted only to men who have had long training 
and have acquired a more accurate eye. 
(PP 1863 xviii p 269) 
It was claimed this was because the firm dealt only with the finest and 
best hosiery, but the practice was soon extended to all forms of counter-
ing. The skill was declared to reside in the ability to match pairs of 
stockings exactly. This, along with Cotton's Patents, became the most 
jealously guarded male skill up to 1960. 
It may well be asked exactly how the men managed to resist the drive 
to feminisation, since it was clearly ~n capital's interest to cheapen 
labour costs in this way, and when so many employers favoured this policy. 
The answer seems to lie partly 1n the men's ability to organise collect-
ively, and partly in a process of trade-off with the more enlightened 
employers, who ceased to practise this strategy. In the towns, the men 
fought hard against the employment of women. In 1871 there was a general 
strike at Nottingham over this issue. In Leicester, LAHU tried to operate 
a union shop policy, whereby factories using female labour on Cotton's 
Patents were blacklisted. Members were not allowed to work there, nor to 
work with any 'blacklegs' who had ever been employed in these factories. 
A particular struggle, for example, centred round the firm of Strettons, 
which persistently used women at lowered rates; their defaulting employees 
h . 1 were blacked by t e un1on. 
However, these efforts might have come to nothing, if some employers 
had not been prepared to enter into some kind of alliance. This was part-
icularly true of Nottingham, where unions and leading employers had 
negotiated a truce during the period when the NAB was functioning (1866-
1 See, for example, LAHU A June 21st 1918. 
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1884). A.J. Mundella, t~e prime mover 1n establishing the Board, had 
clearly a cultural sympathy with the men (perhaps because he himself had 
started out as a stockinger) and stated in 1868 "It would be an awful 
thing to have only women and boys employed 1.n a trade" (PP 1867-8 xxxix 
q 19477). The situation in Nottingham seems to have been easier than 
the Leicester situation during these decades, although it was not until 
such alliances became more permanently established, 1n the following 
period, that feminisation as a strategy died out. 1 
2 As many have argued , 'skill' is an essentially problematic notion. 
Skill, it is argued, is as much a matter of social definition, as of the 
possession of expertise and technical knowledge. Conversely, if one 
accepts that there may be some technical base to the possession of a 
defined 'skill', it is clear that some skills are unacknowledged or down-
graded. Thus Phillips and Taylor argue in their discussion of feminisation, 
"A new category of work was created which was classified as 'inferior' not 
merely by virtue of the skills required for it, but by virtue of the 
'inferior' status of the women who came to perform it" (Phillips and Taylor, 
1980, p 54). The hosiery case certainly confirms that, if not wholly 
socially constructed, 'skill' is clearly socially manipulated. The men 
were determined to retain their traditional craft status (though, as we 
have seen, that status had often been questioned in the domestic period) 
by affirming that the new machine jobs were as 'skilled' as the old. For 
example, Thomas Blandford~ a union activist who became the manager of the 
1 Work being done at Loughborough University by Ian Henry indicates 
that working hours may also have been a factor. In Nottingham a 
split-shift system~ inconvenient for women~ was instituted. 
2 See~ for example~ Wood~ 1982~ Introduction; Littler~ 1982, Chapter 
2; Phillips and Taylor~ 1980. 
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Leicester Co-operative Hosiery Society, claimed that in the old frames 
men used "their muscles more and their minds less" whereas new machinery 
was more complicated and "the pace more rapid, and the strain upon the 
1 
worker's mind consequently greater and more constant". Thus, he claimed, 
"The worker's calling still calls for ingenuity and individual effort" 
(Blandford and Newell, 1898, p 60). The 'still' perhaps gives away the 
defensive slant of his claim, although his verdict was confirmed by 
E.O. Greening, when he visited Wigston Hosiers, another producers' co-
operative: 
Some of the machines were very ingenious ... They required a 
high degree of skill in the workers who had care of them ... 
Some of the workers had quite mastered the principles on which 
the machines had been constructed to imitate human handiwork. 
(Greening~ 1921~ p 101) 
Greening's latter comment points to the importance of knowledge as 
a central facet of skill; these workers, perhaps, were anxious to keep 
integrated the operators' and the mechanics' skills. Littler, 1n his 
discussion of skill, emphasises the importance of this: skill has, he 
argues, three components: 'job knowledge', 'job autonomy' and an element 
of social construction (Littler, 1982, pp 8-9). Where the male knitters 
did succeed in acquiring knowledge of the working of powered machines, 
while maintaining some degree of autonomy through collective organisation, 
it could be argued that they had preserved some degree of real skill. In 
the context of degradation, whether the operator's required skills (dexter-
ity, speed, concentration) are diminished or not is less signi~icant than 
1 Observers habitually remarked on the speed of the machines. In 1921 
it was reported "The size~ speed and complicated character of the 
machines in use are calculated to bewilder one who looks upon them 
for the first time" (Leicester Corporation~ 1921 3 p 41). There is a 
danger here~ though~ of simply equating speed and skill (see Westwood~ 
1984~ p 46). 
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whether important amounts of technical and practical knowledge are there-
1 by removed from the workers. 
Equally complex processes were at play where women's work was con-
cerned. The majority of women, of course, were not employed as knitters, 
but as "auxiliary" workers, and sometimes "assisting a man with a machine 
to run on for him when he transfers to the frame" (PP 1892 xxxvi Pt 2 
qq 13678-9). These definitions, given by hosier William Tyler, are 
important, as they show how in this period, as in the domestic system, 
women's work was contextualised as subsidiary and auxiliary to men's: 
they were viewed as men's assistants, and in line with this 'inferior 
status', following Phillips and Taylor's account, it was easy for their 
skills to be downgraded, an issue which will be discussed more fully in 
the next section. 
During this period, then, the unionised men fought with some success 
to retain a position of privilege within the labour process. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the tactics they used to retain some measure of control 
bore evidence of being rooted in the struggles of earlier days. The main 
devices by which they tried to maintain their position were limitation of 
entry, safeguarding of 'custom and practice' (many of these customs show-
ing traces of their domestic system origins) and the retention of some 
measure of joint control via the union shop policy. 
There is considerable confusion surrounding the role of apprenticeship 
~n this period, and events recorded in the LAHU minutes provide somewhat 
contradictory information. Evidently some sort of 'helper' system prevailed 
in the 1880s and 1890s. As Tyler indicated, 'helpers' might be women, 
1 See Cockburn~ 1983~ Chapter 4. 
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performing subsidiary jobs on the machines. In some cases these jobs 
appear to have been labelled 'women's jobs', for a dispute ~s recorded 
at Peggs factory over a man using his son as helper, when the rules 
stated that helpers must be girls (LAHU A December 18th 1915). On the 
other hand, Thomas Barclay recorded how in the 1860s he "managed to 
learn something of the hosiery trade through becoming a Rotary Hand's 
helper" (Barclay, 1934, p 15). Helpers appear to have been paid by the 
knitter so that this may be considered as yet another form of the sub-
contract relationship. However, a great row broke out in 1910 at the 
large Corah factory when men on pant and shirt 'eight at once' machines 
tried to bring in helpers, on the grounds that it made their job easier, 
and increased output. The union firmly opposed this, as "it is not a 
custom, neither will it pay both the man and the firm". The secretary 
claimed that there was already "a sufficient number of youths and young 
men in the trade to supply all the demands for a long time to come" (LAHU 
A September 2nd, 16th, 21st, October 9th 1910). Although concessions 
were made to allow the men to employ sons (and in one case a daughter), 
provided the practice was confined to this type of machine and was not 
considered an established 'custom', the men continued to use non-family 
assistants, and were eventually expelled from LAHU. 
Helpers, then, were evidently considered a threat to the trade, 
unless their employment was properly regulated. However, clearly some 
young men were being allowed in as apprentices. In 1914 LAHU minutes 
recorded a dispute over 'learners'' pay at Wills and Hutchinson. This 
firm wanted to start them at 7/- for a month; they would not move to 
full pay for six months, which the union argued was too long a period 
(LAHU A April 3rd 1914). What seems to have been happening over this 
period was that the union was trying to control entry by laying down 
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specific requirements for taking on new recruits, and that these varied 
from job to job. As we shall see, information on the third period sup-
ports this view. For example, the Board of Trade 1946 report states 
clearly that the only way into employment on Cotton's Patents is through 
an apprenticeship scheme (Board of Trade, 1946, p 43). 
In a more general way, the men sought to retain some degree of con-
trol over the conditions in the industry by a defence of longstanding 
'trade customs', what we should today refer to as 'custom and practice'. 
One interesting feature of this was the sense, which seems to have 
survived from the domestic period, that certain machines, and even certain 
tasks, were the property of individual workpeople. For example, a dispute 
arose at Morleys in 1896 when the workers claimed that when one man was 
absent another was employed in 'his' frame, and in the following year 
there was trouble at one firm over a foreman using a man's frame after he 
refused a particular job, while at another a girl was sacked for refusing 
to do "another's work" (LAHU A November 18th 1896, April 4th, December 8th 
1897). In the same year, there was trouble when two men were asked to 
swap jobs. The minutes comment "If such a system as that was allowed, 
none of them would be safe" (LAHU A March 24th 1897). Presumably, such 
attitudes helped the workpeople to retain a sense of being in control of 
machines and tasks; they also reflect the fact that the capitalist labour 
process involves the ceding of 'actual possession' of the instruments of 
1 labour to the workforce. But of course this is also a harking back to 
the domestic system: Johnson and Barnes' factory history refers to the 
1 According to Westwood3 women in a contenporary hosiery factory demon-
strated a comparable attachment to "my n:achine" West7..:ood., 1984., p 
19). 
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practice prevalent in the early twentieth century of allowing a workman 
to rent floor space in a factory to run his own frames, commenting that 
this was 
A concession perhaps to the hard-dying days of apparent indep-
endence when a knitter worked in his home and was a slave only 
to his own hours. 
(Johnson and Barnes, 1951) 
A similar move was the defence of piece-rates against 'set' wages. 
Since modern commentators on the industry have argued that piece-rates 
are a major way of maintaining management control (BroWn, 1964; Edwards 
and Scullion, 1982), this may now seem strange, but to the knitters this 
was an important way to retain a degree of their own control over the 
task: how much and how hard to work. As the Victoria County History 
comments, "presumably the old independence of the industry remained in 
this preference for piecework" (VCH, 1958, p 311). This is reflected in 
the terminology used by LAHU, referring to set wages as working on 'the 
firm's time' while the pieceworker was on his or her 'own time'. 1 Firms 
especially attempted to introduce set wages for female workers, and in 
1896 there was unanimous agreement that such attempts should be resisted 
as "if the set wage system is allowed, the others might as well look out 
for other jobs", while in 1914 a resolution affirmed support for members 
refusing to work with people brought in on set wages (LAHU A September 2nd 
1896, October lOth 1914). 
Finally, the union fought against changes in the allocation of work, 
and especially against intensification through increased workloads (res-
ponsibility for more machines). In 1892 Bower reported that men were 
1 For example~ see LAHU A October 12th 1910. See also the analysis in 
Thompson~ 196?, where similar terminology is noted. 
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being asked to work two or three machines, although in Leicester the 
union had managed to cling on to the 'one man, one machine' rule (PP 
1892 xxxvi Pt 2 pp 52, 63). In 1896 there was a dispute at Ravens in 
Leicester when the manager declared that unless he was allowed to alloc-
ate two frames per woman he would stop two men on that type of work; 
the women had stuck to their single loads, and one man had indeed been 
sacked (LAHU A May 6th 1896). Allied to this, was the refusal to allow 
job content to be altered contrary to custom. For example in 1897 at 
one firm knitters were in dispute over their refusal to mend the sweaters 
they produced, and at another men objected at being asked to work "bord-
iers" (LAHU A January 6th, May 12th 1897). 
To defend such 'customs' was to defend one's right to control over 
the work task: successful defence depended on the maintenance of union 
shop agreements 1n many firms. Thus, a central policy of LAHU throughout 
this period was to prevent members working with non-members. "Before a 
new hand starts to work, the collector must ask to see his card", the 
union declared (LAHU A May 4th 1910). Various disputes are recorded over 
the employment of non-members or over members falling into arrears and 
. d' . l'd . 1 Jeopar 1s1ng so 1 ar1ty. 
Although in some respects these policies must be seen as retrogressive, 
trying to cling to old forms of organisation 1n a new and inappropriate 
setting, it can be argued they had important effects in maintaining unity 
and keeping up the ideal and spirit of craft organisation, however illusory 
this may have been. People were extremely anxious to avoid the stigma of 
1 For example~ LAHU A September 8th 1897~ July 20th 1900, September 17th 
1913. 
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being labelled a 'scab'. 1 Although the picture presented by the LAHU 
records of this period is of defensive rather than offensive actions, 
it was these activities which laid the basis for a bargaining relation-
ship with the employer in the succeeding period. Undoubtedly the local 
unions would have been more fruitfully employed in trying to build a 
modernised nationally-based single union; nevertheless, defence of the 
old customs kept craft identity alive, and may well have prevented the 
total feminisation of the industry. 
Section 3 Modernisation 
From 1914 on, the development of joint consultation procedures ~n 
the industry afforded un~on leaders a degree of joint control, and it 
was in this period that the processes of resegmentation were consolid-
ated. While change and reorganisation continued to proceed gradually, 
there were some attempts at Taylorite innovation, but these were not 
carried out in a concerted fashion, and their cumulative effect was a 
gradual redefinition of tasks and intensification of effort, rather 
than a dramatic move to task degradation. 
Direct control strategies also continued through this period. There 
was continued use of fines and strict supervision, and continued struggle 
against them. For example, in 1915 at Johnson and Barnes' factory in 
Kibworth, Leicestershire, the workpeople refused to clock in as a result 
of long-standing grievances about fines for lateness (LAHU A October 30th 
1915). A dispute at Morleys in 1924 displays the continued concern of 
1 In one case men were reported as coming to blows after one caLLed 
the other "scab etc."; "AU this has been going on in public houses 
for some time and much ill-feeling is the resuU" (LAHU A December 
1st 189?). 
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management with irregular timekeeping: "It isn't fines we want, it's 
keeping time we desire" they claimed (LAHU B October 9th 1924). At 
'Stitchco', clocking in and fines for lateness continued through the 
1950s and were only stopped in 1960 (Westwood, 1984, p 17). Rows over 
foremen were recorded on several occasions in LAHU minutes 1 and the 
accounts of dismissals show a continued concern with producing an 
orderly work environment: dismissals are recorded for bad work, tempor-
arily leaving the work station, bad language, "having a sleep and taking 
it easy", fighting, talking, gambling and creating litter. 2 
Direct control continued to involve women 1n particular. In 1931 
it was recorded that at Corahs one manager was "bullying his girls and 
keeping them at work for hours on end when they had nothing to do" (LAHU 
A February 15th 1931). Two years before in a dispute at another Leices-
ter firm the women alleged that "the manager's attitude towards them was 
tyrannical" (LAHU A May 1st 1929). Leicester women, remembering their 
work experiences in the first decades of the century, describe the strict 
discipline; one woman recalled being sent back to her bench when she left 
it to fetch a drink of water, and another how she was reprimanded for 
talking to her neighbours when working and thus moved "to be placed under 
3 the stern eye of the forelady". A comprehensive account of a manager's 
disciplinary struggles with the female workforce is given by Eric Pasold 
1 See~ for exampZe~ June 16th 191?~ November 6th 1929. 
2 See LAHU A October 26th 191?~ August 18th 1920~ December 17th 1924~ 
March 16th~ JuZy 21st 192?~ ApriZ lOth 1929~ LAHU B March 29th 1920~ 
HU November 23rd 1932~ JuZy 5th 1933. 
From a coZZection of competition essays by pensioners describing their 
past Zives~ fiZed in LRO DE 1313. 
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1n 'Ladybird, Ladybird', describing the establishment of a hosiery fac-
tory in the South of England (near Slough) in the 1930s. 1 He had 
difficulty in attracting girls to the job: 
Those sent by the Labour Exchange don't want to work. They 
only make a show of taking the job and leave again after a 
day or two to go back on the dole. 
If they stayed, it was difficult to instil them with "a sense of respon-
sibility" and "regular work habits"; he had to provide strict supervision, 
either personally, or through forewomen: 
As long as I helped with the cutting and watched the sewing 
machinists~ checking the sleeves there~ the pockets there ... 
and generally kept an eye on everything the shirts were all 
right~ but whenever I was called away to the office~ or to 
some other part of the factory~ something went wrong. 
(Pasold~ 19??~ pp 391-3) 
That Pasold, along with owners and managers elsewhere, sought to 
control this irregularity by supervision, rather than technical innova-
tion, is significant. If, as will be argued later, women's skills are 
downgraded, the possession of those skills cannot be viewed as a threat 
by management and yet it is clear that, especially among young women, 
indiscipline and irregularity of work are common. The solution in the 
hosiery industry has been to continue to subject women to constant sur-
veillance, so that in effect a dualistic control structure has emerged 
in the modern period, as several researchers have reported (Edwards and 
Scullion, 1982; Strumik, 1978; Westwood, 1984). Thus Westwood describes 
how at 'Stitchco' 
1 Pasold revealingly explains that he chose not to manufacture in the 
Midlands because "the natives would~ no doubt, uant us to adopt 
their old-fashioned ways" (Pasold, 19??, p 2?5). 
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The direct-controZ strategy was cZearZy in evidence ... among 
women~ who were cLassified as semi-skiUed worke1•s~ whereas 
the responsibLe-autonomy strategy was in evidence with the 
skiZZed maZe workers3 the knitters. 
Male workers were not subject to direct supervision; the women described 
them as "a law unto themselves. They don't have supervisors looking over 
them the whole time" (Westwood, 1984, pp 41, 60). 
Exactly the same arrangement was reported by Strumik, describing the 
role of supervisors in the industry. With knitters, supervision appeared 
to be "general and not close". In contrast, supervisors in the making-up 
departments spent most of their time with their subordinates in inspection 
work: 
Subordinates appeared to have Zess discretion in their work3 
whiZe subordinates in the knitting departments appeared to 
have more discretion ... The knitters are seen as skiZZed 
craftsmen3 who know their own machines better than anyone 
eZse. On the other hand~ the making up work is ZargeZy rep-
etitive. 
(Strumik3 19?83 pp 120-1) 
Thus, with the knitters, supervisors would only intervene if anything went 
wrong, while the close supervision of women involved giving detailed 
instructions on how to perform the work. 
Such accounts reveal the complex interplay of notions of skill, res-
ponsibility and control. I shall argue that such arrangements were the 
result of the truce achieved after World War Two between unions and 
employers, whereby knitters recaptured their skills, and managed to 
retain a degree of autonomy. The women, however, are still treated with 
'low trust' 1 and submitted to close supervision. 
1 See Fox (19?4) for the eLaboration of a distinction between Zow and 
high trust situations at work. 
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The male 'skilled' workers, paradoxically, are thus more vulnerable 
to further degradation than the 'semi-skilled' women, as experience has 
shown. Cutting techniques have been mechanised, sewing-machines have 
become more sophisticated but on the whole the technology of female 
factory jobs in the twentieth century differs little from the nineteenth-
century version. 1 Such work already often took the form of subdivided, 
routinised sewing tasks. A more drastic form of degradation, however, 
faced the knitters: the integration of technical and operative knowledge 
which characterised their tasks continued to be endangered (and continues 
so today). 
As Chapter 3 records, the substitution of female labour for male in 
World War One, and also the initiating of coupling procedures (one man, 
one helper to two machines) was carried out under strict agreement between 
employers and unions. 2 However, the agreements were for the duration of 
the war only, and after the war some employers, particularly in Leicester-
shire, carried on with their policy of unregulated feminisation. For 
example, at a Bedworth factory, it was reported that women did everything 
except dyeing, including the male jobs of countering and trimming (LAHU B 
3 May 14th 1923). What the manufacturers hoped to achieve by this policy 
is indicated by accounts of a Tottenham hosiery firm, Klingers, which the 
Midlands organisers visited: 
1 An exception perhaps was the machine for 'Linking' nyLon stockings~ 
the operation of which is discussed Later. 
2 SimiLar agreements were attached to the other maLe monopoLy~ counter-
ing: one firm's countermen agreed to a diLution with 'Lads' in a 5 to 
1 ratio for the war period (LAHU A January Bth 1916). 
3 Resistance to female labour was stronger and more fuLLy organised 
among the dyers and trirroners. Their records for May 22nd 1907 state 
"No female labour shaU be allowed to be introduced into any branch 
of our trade". 
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AU the machines are worked by women., mechanics do aU the 
altering and repairs etc. Girls straight from school are 
put with another female for two or three weeks., then put on 
a set of heads. Klir.ger is often in the factory., any person 
not suitable is dismissed at once. No week's notice. 
In this factory, they claimed, girls worked a 49! hour week for less 
than £2 (LAHU B November 3rd 1926). 
The slide towards this kind of arrangement was halted by World War 
Two. Once again the unions concluded temporary substitution agreements 
with the employers, but at the end of the war the emergence of the 
National Union brought a new dimension. The NUHW appears to have been 
determined to resist feminisation. One of the original package of prop-
osals for the first annual national agreement in 1946 was a clause 
demanding that "male persons only should operate knitting machines" 
(Leicester Mercury, May 13th 1946). This demand became obscured ~n the 
dispute over pay, limitation of hours and the abolition of night shifts, 
the latter being taken by NUHW as its main platform. This period of 
conflict, when a national strike was narrowly averted, was a crucial one 
for the union, as it marked a decisive (and reasonably successful) bid 
for joint control ~n the industry. As Horace Moulden, by now NUHW pres-
ident, stated, "The issues were more fundamental than a mere wages 
question" (Leicester Mercury, May 31st 1946). Union leaders 
Attached more importance to acknowledgement of their right to 
take part in the control of the industry's working hours and 
conditions than to matters arising from the divergence of 
opinion on the guaranteed rate and the minimum wage rate. 
(Leicester Mail., May 30th 1946) 
Moulden told a mass meeting of 1,200 hosiery workers in Leicester 
We are fighting for a place in the sun ... We are fighting to 
establish negotiating machinery with the other side which will 
ensure that whatever decisions are made will be honoured through-
out the whole of the trade throughout the whole country. 
(Leicester f.Jail., June 1st 1946) 
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Although what the Leicester Mail labelled "the union's claim for 
participation in control of the industry'' was resisted by the employers 
(Leicester Mail, June 22nd 1946), in the next ten years they seem in the 
main to have abandoned the feminisation strategy. It is difficult from 
the information available to reconstruct satisfactorily the motivation 
for this policy change. When Hinckley Union leader, Chamberlain, com-
mented "in the past female labour was cheaper than men could compete 
with", he pointed to one key factor (Hinckley Times, December 13th 1946, 
my emphasis). With the postwar shortage of female labour and the pushing 
up of female minimum rates by NUHW, employing women was no longer so 
economically attractive. In addition, despite initial success by NUHW 
in restricting the three-shift system to the fully-fashioned sector1, 
three shifts gradually became standard for knitting, and this has effect-
ively operated to bar women from many knitting jobs. 2 But also important 
was the fact that, at the same time, trainee schemes were agreed by the 
NJIC for several key jobs, such as fully-fashioned knitting, seamless 
3 hose knitting and Cotton's Patents. These schemes, either explicitly or 
implicitly, were limited to males. For example, the seamless hose scheme, 
whereby a trainee would work for at least six weeks under a qualified 
knitter, applied solely to adult males under 45. The fully-fashioned 
scheme, involving four distinct statuses (probationer, trainee, improver, 
knitter) refers to "payment by the men to the boys". These exclusionary 
1 In 1949, onZy ? firms were granted a three-shift Ziaenae by the NJIC. 
2 See Westwood, 1984, p 60 for aonfi~ation: women explained that they 
would not wish to work awkward shift hours, even if ZegaZly permittee 
to do so. 
3 Details of the sahemes are in Board of Trade, 1946~ and NEC reports 
to Annual Conferenae of NUHW, 1948-9. 
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schemes would have made it difficult for employers to recruit females 
without generating disputes. In the 1950 National Executive Committee's 
report to the Annual Conference there is mention of expenses and tool 
allowances for knitters both "males and females", but it is likely that 
by this date remaining female knitters were those taken on during the war 
h '11 . d h . . b 1 w o st~ reta~ne t e~r JO s. 
This was not entirely the end of the feminisation strategy. There 
are odd references to female knitters in NUHW Leicester District Minutes 
up till 1960, including an objection registered on August 20th 1946 to 
women being trained as knitters. In addition, a crucial and revealing 
campaign was waged to keep counterwork a male monopoly. A resolution was 
passed in 1951, and reaffirmed in 1958, to the effect that the union should 
"endeavour to keep countering as a male job in the county of Leicester" 
(LD, June 25th 1951, January 15th 1958). However, five months later, six 
girls were working on the counter at Corahs (LD, June 2nd 1958). Smith 
describes the way this struggle was shaped: automatic machines for pairing 
were introduced to replace the element in the task which required the 
greatest skill and experience. The task was then subdivided into three 
operations, pairing, folding and packaging, with different workers used 
for each stage. Although the union resisted the change, because of its 
removal of skill, and the employment of women to do the new tasks, by 1962 
it was forced to concede to women's employment and the triumph of automa-
tion (Smith, 1969, p 84). In short, this was a classic example of task 
1 Such women were mentioned as constituting the few exceptionaL femaLe 
knitters by the Stitchco workers (Westwood3 19843 p 60). The onLy female knitters I traced in my interviews with managers we1•e in two 
firms which worked a two-shift onLy system. In one case3 they were 
described to me as being older women. 
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degradation combined with feminisation. Interviews with managers 1n 
1933-5 indicate that countering 1s currently a mixed job. 
My interviews also show, as does the work of other researchers into 
the industry1, that from the 1960s onward knitting has been retained as 
a virtual male monopoly. However, there still remains the possibility 
that the operative and mechanic functions of the knitting task may be 
separated in the future. In 1969, Smith suggested that a twofold struc-
ture of machine operators and specialist mechanics might soon emerge 
(Smith, 1969, p 29). In 1971, it was noted that "the care of modern 
knitting machines is an engineering task" (Briscoe, 1971, p 175). This 
point was made by several managers interviewed in 1983-5. One at least 
was considering the option of employing a handful of engineering mainten-
ance workers, and using unskilled married workers as operatives on the 
11 d k . . h' 2 new computer-contra e n1tt1ng mac 1nes. But at present many knitters 
still perform the integrated task. 
The other major drive towards task degradation in the modernisation 
period was the attempt to introduce a more wholesale Taylorite reorganisa-
tion or rationalisation of the factory environment. The first example of 
this I have been able to trace was in 1920, when Mr. Palfreyman, of the 
fleecy fabric firm, Hall and Earl, was recorded as "putting his American 
ideas into operation" (LAHU A November 25th, 1920). This firm had a very 
bad industrial relations record, as did another similar firm, Swanns, which 
1 Smith~ 1969; Boraston et al.~ 1975; Strumik~ 19?8; Edwards and 
Scullion~ 1982; Westwood~ 1984. 
2 Electronically-controlled machines are slowly being introduced into 
the industry in the 1980s. Their high cost, however, {over £10,000 
per machine) puts them beyond the .reach of the small firms which 
are still the majority in the industry. 
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initiated a similar rationalisation scheme in 1927-8. A handbill records 
Uany alterations have recentl-y taken pl-ace 1.-n the works which 
in a number of instances have not resul-ted in benefits for 
the workers. 
(LAHU B January 31st 1927) 
At the end of the year Swanns shut down operations altogether as they 
wanted to reorganise their machinery "for more and cheaper production". 
When the workpeople returned they were asked to go on set wages, and work 
six machines instead of four (LAHU B February 16th 1928). A strike was 
called and meetings held with the Manufacturers' Association, but unfor-
tunately the outcome is not recorded in the minutes. The worries facing 
LAHU at this time, however, are reflected in the following 
We are stil-l- meeting with a great handicap through members 
accepting prices for new machinery and operations without 
consul-ting our office3 and when these new operations become 
a common fashion throughout the industry we are in a quandary. 
(LAHU B Jul-y 21st 1928) 
In 1929 the union was concerned over the Anglo-Saxon Finishing 
Company, whose "business methods seem likely to upset all our trade unton 
regulations" (LAHU A November 20th 1929). This firm was abandoning the 
use of males on counterwork and getting female menders to also do the 
countering task, an unusual example of reintegrating tasks in order to 
lower wages and break craft control. However, the major onslaught against 
rationalisation before World War Two was the battle against the introduc-
tion of the Bedaux system at Wolsey. 
The Bedaux plan for Wolsey 1s fully described by Craig Littler in 
'The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies' (Littler, 
l 1982, pp 118-20). The main features of the plan were as follows: for 
1 Unfortunatel-y LAHU minutes for 1931-5 are not avail-abl-e at the 
Leicester Records Office. 
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non-machine-paced tasks (female), direct and indirect labour were to be 
1 
separated , knitters were to have heavier loads, manning levels would be 
reduced and instructions for all tasks were to be written on cards, 
including relevant B values (effort norms). Instructively, the Bedaux 
report referred to "very liberal piece-rates" having been common in Leic-
ester in the past among men working in what were, essentially, degraded 
tasks, such as the operation of half-hose machines, which supports the 
account I have given of the resegmentation of the previous period. At 
the same time, surveillance and vetting of female workers were to be 
increased (Littler, 1982, pp 120-2). 
The reaction of LAHU to these developments had initially been one of 
incomprehension and panic. There was a flurry of activity, as officers 
consulted with other unions with experience of Bedaux techniques, with 
the TUC and with Wolsey management (LAHU A December lOth, 31st 1930). 
Moulden and his executive struggled to comprehend the "complexities" of 
the system. A series of stoppages, go-slows and short strikes culminated 
in a sit-in at Wolsey's Coalville plant, and in December 1931 a full strike 
was called. After eight months a settlement was reached, whereby a diluted 
version of the scheme was adopted and applied under conditions of joint 
consultation. 
Littler concludes that the strike ended in the "modified installation 
of the Bedaux, neo-Taylorite system" and that the efforts of the union to 
resist it were ambiguous and half-hearted: 
1 This meant that tasks of preparation and servicing would be performed 
by 'less skiZled3 cheaper' labour. 
147 
MouLden ... accepted the given framework of capitaList and 
manageriaL power and had LittLe conception that neo-TayLorite 
schemes wouLd aLter the structure of controL over the Labour 
process. 
(LittLer3 1982~ p 128) 
However, the event was definitely experienced by LAHU and its NHF allies 
as a victory (LAHU B March 22nd 1932). For a small union to have forced 
concessions from the giant Wolsey firm, receiving solid support from the 
other unions, was no mean feat at this date. Although Moulden did indeed 
have an accommodative approach to. management 1, the behaviour of LAHU in 
this and the aforementioned cases seems to me to demonstrate that they 
were only too well aware of the implications of Taylorism in terms of the 
restructuring of control, and its threat to craft customs; LAHU objectives 
went far beyond the simple maintenance of existing wage rates, and involved 
the retention of customary manning levels and of elements of control over 
the performance and contents of task. 
A similar approach was taken by NUHW in handling post-war rationalisa-
tion schemes. The Board of Trade 1946 report reflects the fashion for 
these schemes, in recommending time and motion study, "breaking down cer-
tain making-up processes" to allow the use of less skilled labour, and 
reducing the apprenticeship period by modern training methods (Board of 
Trade, 1946, pp 45, 65, 95). Union members, including Moulden, were 
included in the working party, but, despite the apparent lack of dissent 
to these suggestions, the joint monitoring which NUHW favoured in these 
cases 1s demonstrated 1n an interesting National Executive report for 1950. 
Nine firms were currently investigating rationalisation possibilities. 
Eight of these were doing so through joint consultation procedures, such 
1 See Chapters ? and 9. 
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as joint meetings, departmental committees, works councils and so forth. 
The principle had been agreed at the NJIC that 
Before the introduction of any scheme involving changes in 
methods of production through Time and Motion study n:cthods 
together with redeployment of labour, Joint Consultation 
shall take place between Management and Employees in order 
that the workers shall be fully informed. 
This was not, as it may appear, merely lip-service to consultation, for 
in two cases schemes were scrapped, one being found "unacceptable" to 
the "girls"; in the other case a new rate-fixing system was accepted, 
but a redeployment scheme for seamless knitting was rejected because of 
union "apprehension" (NEC Report to NUHW Annual Conference, 1950, pp 17-
18). 
I am not claiming that the un1on was fully able to resist neo-
Taylorite rationalisation schemes; but the evidence suggests that such 
schemes were introduced slowly, after considerable negotiating, and were 
applied piecemeal by individual firms. As a result, as the work of West-
wood and Strumik shows, such schemes had limited detrimental effects on 
the position of the elite male knitters. It could, however, be argued 
that gains were made at the expense of the female operatives. 
The whole question of skills and women's jobs is certainly more 
difficult to assess. In part this is because of ambiguity as to whether 
there were distinct skills possessed by women workers at any time in the 
industry's development. It was certainly clear that performance varied 
greatly between operatives. In 1892 William Tyler had spoken of good pay 
being attained by female "expert hands who have been at the work for a 
considerable time" (PP 1892 xxxvi Pt 2 p 90). In 1951 one firm made 
exactly the same point about seamers and linkers: 
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These quiet jobs are highly skilled, demanding sharp eyes 
and deft fingers- women's work. They become adept at them 
and earn good money. 
(Johnson and Barnes, 1951) 
In the intervening period, quite a myth had grown up about the 'inherited' 
or 'natural' talents of Midlands' operatives. Thus in the 1940s the 
Leicester Corporation Handbook stated 
Skilled hosiery workers cannot be trained in a week or two, 
nor is there any other area of the country where girls and 
women have that intangible something which makes them not 
just operatives but good operatives. Employers lmve argued 
the pros and cons of heredity for years, but they are faced 
with the indisputable fact that in the Leicester area hos-
iery workers, particularly women, have nimble fingers, sure 
hands and adaptability. 
(Leicester Corporation, undated, p 43) 1 
The local tradition, for example, alleged that "either you are a born 
linker or you aren't", and also that girls with relatives in the trade 
were more likely to have it "in the blood" (King, 1948, p 379). 
Such judgements often seem to reflect a concern with speed and 
experience rather than a precise technical competence or irreplaceable 
knowledge. Yet at least some of the female skills were considered by 
observers to involve levels of expertise which are hard to acquire, and 
which many may never master. The Board of Trade report acknowledged that 
in many female jobs in the industry skill levels were not reflected 1n 
relative earning capacity (Board of Trade, 1946, pp 51-3, 66). For example, 
glove fingering was a female job which it had proved impossible to train 
men to do adequately. The most notable example, though, was linking, which 
is fully discussed in studies by King and by Scott and Lynton. This job is 
1 The same idea appears ~n Leicester Corporation~ 1921 {p 43) and 
Byford, 1969. 
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part of the finishing process for stockings and socks; it involves the 
closing of toes. The actual closing is done by machine, but the linker 
has to transfer or 'run on' the tiny loops of the stocking on to points 
on the machine, keeping them in correct sequence. It requires consider-
able expertise and experience to link the miniscule loops successfully. 
King describes the job as representing 
A point in the process of production where ... the skill of 
the machine breaks down; the continuation of the flow then 
depends on a highly developed but narrowly delineated human 
skill, possessed by a special class of operatives who attain 
proficiency only after a long period of training. 
It involved an eighteen-month to three-year training period, and n~ne out 
of ten recruits failed to master the skill (King, 1948, pp 122-3). Scott 
and Lynton, following King, see it as a skilled job, but one which was 
considered within the industry as involving a great deal of 'dexterity', 
rather than skill (Scott and Lynton, 1952, p 75). 
It seems indisputable that linking is a job demanding attributes 
which few possess, yet it could be argued that there·is a crucial differ-
ence between the skill of the linker and the skill of the knitter. The 
knitter's skill, at its highest, involves knowledge of the whole process 
of knitting and its technology; the linker's skill is that of the highly 
expert operative, and involves no understanding of the way the machinery 
1 
works. The difference lies in the possession of technical knowledge, and 
it is this, I have argued, which lies at the heart of the degradation 
1 One of the Stitchco women made clear to Westwood her awareness of 
women's exclusion from mechanical knowledge: 
They never train the girls for that kind of work. 
men keep it to themselves. I would really like to 
aU about the technical side of things. 
The 
know 
(Westwood, 1984, p 23) 
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struggle. The linker's skill is a dependent one. Yet even such dependent 
skills may be a source of bargaining power, for they are not easy to attain, 
and the wastage involved in getting recruits up to an acceptable standard 
is high. Pasold, for example, describes the high percentage of 'seconds' 
produced when he was striving to establish production with a largely un-
skilled labour force. Garments came out each slightly different, some 
with one short and one long leg (Pasold, 1977, p 326). 
During the modernisation period, then, a truce between employers and 
unions brought a new structure of control to the industry, through modern 
procedures of collective bargaining and joint negotiation, which the knit-
ters used to maintain their privileged position in the industry. This 
adoption of modern union procedures, however, did not entirely put an end 
to the more old-fashioned tactics of craft control. 
The maintenance of control by the defence of apprenticeship and 
'custom and practice' perhaps dwindled in importance in this period, but 
still remained a factor. Some of the postwar apprenticeship schemes have 
already been described .. In the earlier years, too, attempts had been made 
to maintain such schemes. Wells describes the system operated by the 
Nottingham Union in 1935: no boys aged 14-19 were to be taken on without 
union consent, and numbers were to be limited to one per four men. No 
journeyman could take on an apprenticeship until he was 21, and the men 
paid the boys' wages out of their joint earnings. Similar rules applied 
to the Leicester Trimmers' Association (Wells, 1935, p 234). 1 The Hinckley 
1 Dyeing and trimming had always had a stronger craft tradition. PasoZd 
observed that 
It was more of a craft than an industry. 
shroud their activities in mystery. They 
secret recipes on from father to son. 
Dyers Ziked to 
passed their 
(PasoZd~ 1977~ p 192) 
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Warehousemen's Association. formed in 1911, had established a five-year 
apprenticeship scheme (Pickering, 1940, p 116). LAHU apprenticeship 
rules seem to have been less coherent and more patchy, but their records 
cover two disputes over limitation of entry. In one case, a new appren-
ticeship procedure had been instituted by one firm for Cotton's Patents, 
which was stopped when only one boy had been recruited, as the union 
believed no new operatives were needed (LAHU A June 5th, 19th 1929). 
Secondly, there was a long negotiation with a firm in Rothley, near 
Leicester, where many young people were employed. The firm's workpeople 
had just joined the union, and a plan was adopted for a four-year transi-
tion scheme to union rules. No new helpers would be taken on, and at the 
end of the four years knitters would switch from set wages to union sane-
tioned piece-rates (LAHU A December 21st 1929). 
Apprenticeship and entry limitation rules, as these examples show, 
were linked to key jobs, and must have helped to maintain the status of 
the knitters' elite until the postwar truce gave it confirmation. 
The other major 'traditionalist' effort was the maintaining of 
agreed conditions and manning levels. Interestingly, a LAHU minute of 
1918 records that "we cannot dictate as to what machines persons work" 
concerning a case of a woman being switched to a new job, which repres-
ents a climbing down from previous policy (LAHU A February 23rd 1918). 
However, the Board of Trade report testified to the efficacy of other 
aspects of union policy; the number of machines per operative was deter-
mined, it was stated, by "traditional practice" and "trade union agree-
ments" (Board of Trade, 1946, p 44). The one man per machine rule had 
1 been preserved for Cotton's Patents. Wells confirms that in 1935 manning 
1 However3 LAHU fears of the danger of permitting 'coupLing' during 
the war had been justified; in 1919 it was reported that WaLkers 
were continuing the practice at their Shepshed factory (LAHU B 
August 31st 1919). 
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levels in Nottingham were agreed by un~ons and employers: the rule was 
one man to six or eight machines on circulars, one to one on flats (Wells, 
1935, p 235). 
Controlling machine loads seems to have been the major area of 
endeavour, but one LAHU minute is revealing, showing that not only skilled 
men sought to maintain hard-won privileges. It was reported that Hinckley 
women were fighting "to have their custom continued" of starting work at 
nine a.m., not eight (LAHU B May 17th 1919). 
There are also var~ous ways ~n which workers can express their re-
sistance to management control on an individual basis. Edwards and Scullion 
in their study of industrial conflict report that, in the hosiery factory 
they observed, resistance essentially took individual not collective forms. 
Notably, absenteeism and turnover rates were very high (Edwards and Scullion, 
1982). This seems to have become the prevailing pattern after World War 
Two, and has characterised the industry ever since. Many of the managers 
interviewed in 1983-5 acknowledged high turnover rates, and three considered 
1 it a major problem. 
Although under the factory system embezzlement ceased to be a maJor 
worry for management, theft cannot ever be totally eradicated. In 1952 
Scott and Lynton reported that 'Acorn', one of the factories they studied, 
had sought to stop stealing by setting up a factory shop with cheap goods, 
1 Scott and Lynton report on the probLem of turnover after the war 
(Scott and Lynton~ 1952~ p ?5). Smith's survey carried out in 1964 
indicated that 50% of firms had turnover LeveLs of at Least 20% per 
annum (Smith~ 1969~ p 9?). Turnover during Westwood's study period 
at 'Stitchco' was 40% per year (Westwood~ 1984~ p 16). At Corahs~ 
turnover has been as high as 50%. Edwards and ScuUion recorded 
about 20% turnover at the hosiery factory they studied in 19?8~ and 
one manager I spoke to estimated his firm's turnover at from 20 to 
25% (Edwards and SculLion~ 1982~ p 56). 
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while in the 1980s Westwood's study of 'Stitchco' suggests that levels 
of stealing (cotton, clothes, needles, etc.) may be high (Scott and 
Lynton, 1952, p 142; Westwood, 1984, p 99). It seems likely that minor 
thefts and fiddles are viewed by workers as 'perks' of the job 1, as 
something they are entitled to by custom, if not by law. This attitude, 
clearly, was held by a woman fined in 1924 for 'notching a bit on' 
(recording more work done than she had actually produced). She claimed 
that this was common practice, but the minutes maintain a discreet silence 
as to the truth of her claim (LAHU A October 1st 1924)! 
Finally, there is little information available on the incidence of 
output restriction in the industry. The issue is only referred to once 
in the union records, when in 1944 the Hinckley President was accused of 
inciting women workers to practise 'ca canny' (HU July 5th 1944). He took 
pains to deny it. Wells saw the limitation of workloads as in itself a 
kind of output restriction (Wells, 1935, p 235). That, of course, would 
not affect women workers, but King maintained that in the factory she 
studied after the war collective output norms were firmly specified and 
hostility shown to anyone who exceeded them (King, 1948, p 402). Her 
findings contradict those of Edwards and Scullion who claimed that in 
their studied factory there were no norms of output, and no attempt to 
control the setting of rates; workers responded in a competitive, individ-
ualistic way to the piece-rate system (Edwards and Scullion, 1982, pp 169-
71). This, of course, concurs with the findings of Lupton (1963) and 
Cunnison (1966) that women workers do not attempt to practise this form 
of collective control. Certainly, managers in hosiery have manipulated 
1 See~ for examp~e~ Ditton~ 1977. 
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piece-rates and other payment systems (such as Corahs' 'graded minutes' 
measured daywork scheme) to produce an individualistic approach to wage 
earning; nonetheless, it may well be, as has been suggested to me, that 
women take care to see that the initial rates are set at levels they 
consider 'fair'. 
However that may be, it is clear that neither individual nor collec-
tive informal resistance of this kind was seen as much of a problem by 
management during the modernisation period. The ability of the industry 
to exploit the postwar consumer boom brought a share of prosperity to all 
within it. The truce established in 1946 was thus readily adhered to. 
For a time, at least, no major problems of control existed to push manage-
ment into further attempts at restructuring the labour process. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have traced the complex interworkings of processes 
of degradation and resegmentation in the industry since 1800, and the 
strategies adopted, with varying success, by unions, to resist the erosion 
of their position and the loss of skill, knowledge and autonomy. I have 
described the evolution of a dualistic structure of control: direct control 
techniques have been used with the female majority, while the male elite 
have been allowed a considerable level of autonomy, within the constraints 
of machine pacing. There has always been the potential for the knitting 
task to be further degraded into a 'semi-skilled' task, subjected to direct 
control, but this has not yet occurred, because of the postwar truce; this 
heralded a long period of stability, during which the technological and 
organisational structure of the industry remained virtually unchanged. 
My study, then, gives some support to the idea of a long-term tend-
ency to 'deskilling', or degradation of the labour process, as described 
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by Braverman~ but also shows how processes of resegmentation restrain that 
tendency. Also, I would argue that the opposition of 'direct control' and 
degradation is not supportable, logically or historically. In this industry 
the more degraded the job, the more subject to direct control. 
However, as argued in Chapter 1, the processes of degradation and re-
segmentation do not exhaust the possibilities for control struggles 1n the 
workplace. Many other strategies have been employed 1n this industry, as 
in others, tn the attempt to alter the effort/reward bargain 1n capital's 
favour, to heighten profits and efficiency, and to resist the demands of 
organised labour. These strategies will be dealt with in the next three 
chapters. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
"We don't have union people at our firm~ we have only got 
trimmers who belong to a union and we should not have tlzem 
if we could get anyone else." 
Mr. Foster~ Leicester hosiery employer 
(LAHU A September 21st 192?) 
"In spite of our good intentions and the mutual good feeling 
between the union and the employers we are still looked upon 
in some quarters as veritable knights of evil." 
Horace Moulden~ LAHU Secretary 
(LAHU B January 19th 1929) 
"~le took upon ourselves the role of Daniel enteY'ing the Lion's 
den by attempting to test the feeling of another great concern, 
the Hosiery Trust Ltd . •.. Directly our identity was communicated 
to them~ they clammed up like an oyster and would not reply to 
our phone cal Z." 
Horace Moulden 
(LAHU B Janual'Y 19th 1929) 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
REPRESSIVE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE HOSIERY INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
One of the maJor criticisms of Braverman's 'Labor and Monopoly 
Capitalism' is that it presents a unilinear account of the development 
of management strategies, from ineffective primitive forms of control 
through to Taylorite control; this account ignores the existence of 
many other forms of control strategy used by management, and runs the 
danger of committing what Littler calls the 'panacea fallacy' (Littler, 
1982, p 3), that is, seeing any single strategy as the ultimate cure 
for labour control problems. Several major contributors to the 'labour 
process debate' have tried to remedy this by providing alternative 
accounts of the historical development of control strategies, notably 
Friedman (1977a), Burawoy (1979) and Edwards (1979). In addition, many 
researchers within a different discipline and using a different perspec-
tive, that of the 'new social history', have given accounts of the variety 
of control strategies used in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
notably Pollard (1965), Nelson (1975) and Joyce (1980). Taken together, 
these studies provide ample proof of the existence of a wide repertoire 
of control strategies. I shall start this chapter with a brief survey of 
this literature, and, on the basis of this, attempt to construct a typology 
of strategies, categorising them as 'repressive' or 'pacificatory'. In 
the remainder of the chapter, I shall consider the chief forms of repres-
sive strategy used by hosiery management, and in the following two chapters 
I shall consider the two most notable forms of pacificatory strategy 
prevalent in the industry, paternalism and joint consultation. 
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Section 1 Varieties of Control Strategy 
Three of Braverman's critics, Burawoy, Edwards and Friedman, have 
developed alternative typologies of control strategy, with at least some 
suggestion of an historical shift from one type to the other. Thus, 
Burawoy outlines a move from 'despotic' to 'hegemonic' control, linked 
with the evolution of monopoly forms of capital. The 'securing and 
obscuring' of the extraction of surplus value is now achieved by mechan-
isms of control directed at 'manufacturing consent', notably by the 
development of internal labour markets and of the 'internal state' 
(collective bargaining, institutionalised grievance procedures, provision 
of industrial 'citizen' rights), and also by the elaboration of behav-
ioural patterns which transform work into a game (the least convincingly 
demonstrated aspect of the argument) (Burawoy, 1979). Edwards also, like 
Braverman and Burawoy, links change to the development of monopoly 
capitalism: in his model, early forms of direct control are followed by 
an experimental period of 'failed strategies' (including Taylorism, 
narrowly defined by Edwards, and welfare paternalism), and then by two 
forms of structurally-based control, 'technical control' (by which he 
appears primarily to mean machine-pacing, although it clearly bears some 
resemblance to what Braverman labels 'scientific management'), and 
'bureaucratic control' (close to what Burawoy labels internal labour 
markets, including promotion structures, hierarchies and long-service 
rewards) (Edwards, 1979). Finally, Friedman has contrasted what he calls 
'direct control' (including not only coercive supervision but also 
Taylorism) with a growing tendency to invoke 'responsible autonomy' 
strategies. Here, direct control is loosened, either as a way to maintain 
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control, or to handle aggressive resistance to coercive techniques. 1 
Responsible autonomy strategies, such as perks and rewards for merit, 
welfarism, participatory schemes and job enrichment programmes, are 
often used when dealing with groups of 'core' or primary labour, while 
secondary labour, especially where unorganised, is more likely to be 
subjected to direct control (Friedman, 1977a). 
These three accounts have common features, ln particular the con-
trasting of variously labelled coercive tactics with some kind of 
persuasive technique, again variously labelled; the latter relate to 
the need to procure co-operation from at least some sections of the 
labour force. This need, I have argued in Chapter 1, relates to what 
I have called the 'double indeterminacy' of the capitalist labour 
process. Capitalists need to overcome not only the indeterminacy 
created by the value/surplus value distinction but also the indeterminacy 
generated by the use/exchange distinction, the need for the co-operation 
of the workforce in order to produce good-quality goods which people want 
2 to use, when they want them. Indisputably, Braverman has ignored this 
second aspect, and thus neglects the important area of consent-inducing 
strategies. 
Although the authors of these studies have performed a valuable 
service in drawing attention to the issue of consent, I would argue that 
the historical accounts they present are no more credible than that of 
Braverman. They have replaced one unilinear account with models equally 
1 See Goodrich (1975) and Cressey and Macinnes (1980) for simiLar 
arguments. 
2 See Chapter 1 section 3. AZso see Cressey and Macinnes (1980) for 
a Vel"]} simi Zar argument. 
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unilinear, and which, in addition, lack firm grounding in any analysis 
of the 'historical logic' of the development of the capitalist mode of 
production. Although Burawoy and Edwards try to do this by linking 
change to the development of monopoly structures, the accounts are not 
persuasive in terms of the historical timing of this shift, nor can 
there be any explanation for continuing tendencies of change. In all 
cases, what is essentially a static analytic distinction (between 
strategy types) has been projected erroneously into a dynamic historical 
distinction (between different epochs). 1 In fact, if we study different 
industries, regions and countries, it is possible to find examples of 
most types of strategy in each historical epoch, even if their precise 
forms have altered over time. This is not surprising if we see strategies 
as based on the two 'indeterminacies' or structural dilemmas mentioned 
above, as I have argued in Chapter 1 we should do: these indeterminacies 
have been inherent in capitalist production since its inception. 
For example, paternalism as a consent-inducing strategy was pract-
ised in factory villages in the eighteenth century, in urban factories 
in the Victorian era, and is still a feature of many hosiery factories 
2 today. Again, machine-paced 'technical control' was not merely a product 
of monopoly capitalism, epitomising itself in Fordist assembly-line 
production, but has been a continuous trend within capitalism. An inter-
1 It is perhaps fair to say that Friedman's claim to be describing an 
historical tendency is tentative~ and balanced by a suggestion that 
changes in economic climate may entail a shift away from responsible-
autonomy strategies. Certainly3 Friedman's model is the one to 
which the hosiery case most closely corresponds empirically3 in 
terms of the dualistic structure of control described in Chapter 4. 
However3 I wou~ claim that Friedman pays insufficient attention to 
the long-term process of degradation. 
2 See Chapter 6. 
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esting paper by Bruland, for example, demonstrates how the inventions of 
the self-acting mule, the automatic woolcomber and the calico printer 
were all expressly developed to counter union power and unblock vital 
bottlenecks in production (Bruland, 1981). 1 In this respect, it ~s not 
helpful to describe strategies as 'failed' as Edwards has done. As 
Cohn argues in his study of railway construction, the fact that strat-
egies have not survived into the twentieth century is no necessary proof 
of ineffectiveness (Cohn, 1981). 2 It may be that structural changes ~n 
society render them redundant (the welfare state replaces employer 
welfarism) or that their form modifies in response to structural change. 
For example, the switch from classic paternalism to nee-paternalism, 
which is described in Chapter 6, results both from the growth of state 
welfare and the decline of religious belief. 
As I have argued ~n Chapter 1, it 1s only in the case of degradation 
processes that we can establish any kind of logic or tendency of histor-
ical development. Where other strategies are concerned, rather than 
developing historically-based typologies we are better advised to conceive 
of them 1n terms of a repertoire from which employers can select existing 
options to deal with specific problems. Strategic choices may then be 
made in terms of a variety of factors: composition of the labour force 
(sex, age, ethnic origin, skill levels etc.), s1ze of enterprise, the 
state of the product and labour markets (both national and local), local 
political and industrial traditions, the precise problem faced, and the 
1 See also Tufnel (1834) for confirmation of the view that control 
elements were acknowledged as a crucial part of the process of 
technical innovation in Britain. 
2 Trucking~ for example~ which Cohn discusses~ fell from use not 
because of ineffectiveness~ but simply because it was made illegal. 
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employers' ideological commitments. In addition, as Tilly and Tilly 
point out, the fact of learning is important: people's choices are 
influenced by their own previous experience and that of others. As 
Tilly and Tilly put it 
The first strike is a mystery, the seaond an outrage, the 
thousandth a problem to be dealt with 
(Tilly and Tilly, 1981, p 19) 1 
What has been successful once in a similar context is likely to be tried 
again, while less successful strategies may be ignored. 
The repertoire available to employers is wide. Many other strat-
egies, apart from those already dealt with, have been documented by 
sociologists and historians, and I shall refer briefly here to some of 
the major ones. Cohn, in an interesting essay, discusses the prevalence 
of what he calls 'extra-mural discipline', that is forms of work discip-
line external to the work situation, such as the use of truck (payment in 
goods) or of religious exhortation, which characterised railway con-
. h . d . 2 struct1on, among ot er 1n ustr1es. Hilton's earlier study had also 
indicated the pervasiveness of truck as a control device in many indus-
tries, including hosiery (Cohn, 1981; Hilton, 1960). Nelson's study of 
American management practice outlines a wide range of persuasive 
strategies, from welfarism, to company unions, to practice of industrial 
psychology (Nelson, 1975). Many of these are aspects of what is commonly 
labelled as paternalism, which is dealt with extensively in Chapter 6. 
Another set of important strategies are those involving the manipul-
ation of the labour market, in particular by creating divisions or 
1 I am also indebted to Tilly and Tilly for the aonaept of a 'reper-
toire' of forms of aation. 
2 Railway aompanies employed alergymen to instruat their employees. 
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exploiting existing ones. Dubois (1981) and Gordon et al. (1982) give 
comprehensive accounts of such strategies in the French and American 
contexts. As Chapter 4 showed, the gender division has frequently been 
exploited by manufacturers. Many studies have demonstrated that the use 
of women as 'secondary' or casual labour or as part of a reserve army of 
labour has played a significant part in weakening worker solidarity and 
trade union power, and these issues are explored further in Chapter 10. 1 
Another way to manipulate the labour market is by the device of relocation, 
or, in Lamphere's graphic phrase, 'runaway shop' (Lamphere, 1979, p 275): 
that is, the moving of machinery, departments, factories or even indus-
tries to areas where cheaper, more docile labour (notably women and 
agricultural workers) is available. Although relocation is most usually 
discussed ~n the context of the current world recession and the restruc-
turing of the international division of labour, it has been a common 
practice for many years, as the hosiery example shows. 
As noted before, machinery can be seen as a control mechanism, 2 as 
indeed can the factory system itself, as Marglin (1974) and Foucault (1977) 
have argued. Pay schemes, too, are used for control purposes; in partie-
ular, payment by results has provided a major solution to the labour/labour 
power indeterminacy, as employers seek to ensure they receive the measured 
amount of labour they consider their payment has purchased. The ability of 
well-organised work groups to collude in fiddling piecerates 3 has led to 
1 For women as secondary labour see Edwards (1979); Stedman Jones (1971). 
For women as reserve army~ see Beechey (1977); Bruegel (1979). 
2 Mechanisation and technological innovation are~ of course~ part of 
the degradation process (see Chapter 1). 
3 See Brown (1977). 
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the elaboration of more complex pay schemes, often combining some elements 
of time-rate and piece-rate by means of a bonus system. The success of 
such schemes relates particularly to their ability to mask their control-
orientated nature by their 'incentive' effects. 
Finally, we should not ignore the role that ideological systems and 
values play in achieving control. For Pollard, nineteenth-century control 
strategies could be classified in terms of 'the stick', 'the carrot' and 
the work ethic (Pollard, 1965). Inculcating values of hard work, self-
discipline and loyalty has been an important part of the control endeavour. 1 
This has often been part of a wider ideological contest, in which both 
sides have used (at various times) handbills, advertisements, petitions, 
the press, books and the mass media to propagate their points of view and 
press for their validity. In the early nineteenth century, this propaganda 
war was a key part of the industrial struggle, as both sides sought to 
discredit the other, capturing public opinion and the support of key poli-
tical groups. 
Over time, then, employers and managers have had recourse to a 
formidable array of strategies and mechanisms of control. If it is 
impossible to construct an historically-based typology, must we abandon 
all attempt at sociological generalisation? The alternative, of course, 
is to view strategic choices as contingent, and simply to detail their 
historical and empirical usages, an approach exemplified, for example, by 
Nelson (1975), and, I would argue, by Gordon et al. (1982): despite their 
attempt to incorporate their account of labour process control with a four-
1 See Thompson (1967) and Bauman (1982). 
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stage model of capitalist development, the listing of strategic options 
in each period seems little more than fortuitous or conjunctural. 1 I 
believe, however, that a categorisation system can be developed, not on 
an historical basis but in terms of the double indeterminacy of labour: 
strategies can be classified according to which of the two structural 
2 dilemmas they address. Thus, strategies addressing the labour/labour 
power indeterminacy can be labelled 'repressive' as they attempt to cut 
down the autonomy and free choices of workers, to prevent them manipula-
ting the reward/effort bargain to their own advantage. Strategies 
addressing the use/exchange value indeterminacy can be labelled 'pacific-
atory' as they apparently broaden the scope for autonomy and choice, in 
order to appease workers and gain their co-operation. 
In addition, strategies can be categorised in terms of their target 
groups. Strategies can be primarily aimed at the mass of workers, or 
alternatively at unions, an important distinction, but one not properly 
drawn out in the literature. Thus, for example, the early use of innov-
ative machinery described by Bruland (1981) was a specific attempt to 
clamp down on un~on resistance. Paternalism, on the other hand, seeks 
characteristically to bypass the union, and to procure the consent of the 
workpeople to capitalist methods and objectives. Repressive strategies 
aimed at the unions seek to exclude them from the workplace. Pacificatory 
strategies aimed at the unions seek to incorporate them into the structure 
1 See Bradley (1983). 
2 Cressey and Macinnes have made the important point that strategies 
can combine coercive and consent-inducing elements3 corresponding 
to capital's conflicting and contradictory objectives. However3 it 
is still possible to see each strategy as slanted primarily to one 
or other dilemma. 
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of the enterprise, or of the capitalist production system as a whole. 
In acknowledging the vital nature of the workforce/union distinction, 
we are recognising that control has political as well as economic 
dimensions, a factor neglected, for example, by Braverman. Both of 
these elements, in turn, are linked to the ideological struggle: 
capitalists want to win hearts and minds, as well as to control and 
regulate bodies. 
This way of categorising control strategies has strong resemblances 
to the distinction between coercive and consent-inducing strategies, 
which underlies so many typologies. 1 It has the additional advantage, 
however, of grounding that distinction in structural cruxes or dilemmas 
inherent ~n capitalist production relations. 
Most of the strategic options I have been discussing here should, 
however, be carefully distinguished from the overall tendency to degrad-
ation described in the preceding chapters. They do not involve the 
material alteration or restructuring of the labour process itself, but 
rather the recasting of its institutional surroundings. In this respect, 
these strategies are more easily reversed, and thus less stable and 
enduring as features of work organisation than is the largely irreversible 
process of degradation. 2 
1 For example~ those of Pollard (1965)~ Friedman (19??a)and Burawoy 
(19?9). 
2 The distinction I am making here is close to that implied by Edwards 
when he refers to the superiority of 'structural' controls~ although 
I would not accept that what he labels 'bureaucratic' control has 
the same impermeability of status (Edwards~ 1979). 
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Section 2 Strategies of repression and exclusion ~n the hosiery industry 
Figure 5.1 represents the range of strategies and devices of control 
which have been employed in the hosiery industry over time, categorised 
in terms of strategic dilemma addressed and target group. Some have 
already been considered, and the remainder will be discussed here and ~n 
the two following chapters. 
The major form of repressive strategy used in the industry has been 
strict supervision or 'driving control', which has already been dealt with 
in Chapter 4. Other widespread forms of repressive strategy have been the 
use of truck, of 'runaway shop' tactics, and the victimisation of un~on 
activists; I will discuss each of these in turn. 
Payment ~n truck acted as a control strategy as it served to bind 
workers into a greater dependency on their employers, as Hilton (1960) and 
Cohn (1981) have argued. Where a backlog of debt had accumulated, it was 
difficult for the workpeople to leave their masters' employment. Even 
where there was no debt, the feeling of being linked to an employer not 
just through the wage system\but through the realisation of those wages ~n 
subsistence goods, seems to have produced a psychological dependence and 
an inability to challenge an employer's decisions or resist impositions. 
However, truck is also a means of increasing profits, which is why it be-
came a major feature of the hosiery industry between 1800 and 1880, ~n 
much the same way as frame-renting did. By trucking, small masters and 
middlemen were enabled to undercut wage rates and still keep a profit 
marg~n, since they could recoup any losses by regaining the wages they 
paid in payment for goods, goods which they often priced above normal shop 
1 levels. 
1 See Aspinall, 1949, p 119, PP 1845 xviq ?143. 
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Forms of employer strategy practised in the hosiery industry 
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Although a Truck Act of 1812 had declared the practice of payment 
1n kind illegal, it was well established at that date and flourished 
subsequently. For example, in 1812 Edward Allen gave evidence of 
extensive personal experience of truck in the Sutton area (PP 1812 11 
pp 30-1). In 1816 the indefatigable Henson brought two successful 
prosecutions under the Truck Act, but these and similar prosecutions 
did not deter the mass of truckmasters (Hammond and Hammond, 1979, p 
191). In 1845 the practice was widespread in the villages, especially 
in North Nottinghamshire and South Leicestershire. It was claimed of 
masters in Skegby, Notts., for example, that "there 1s not one but 
trucks directly or indirectly" (PP 1845 xv II q 3507). It was not common 
in towns: of the 41 Leicestershire witnesses who claimed direct experience 
of truck, 33 were village knitters. 
Payment was made in a variety of forms. Payment in groceries was 
common, chiefly in the form of loaves or flour, but also of sugar, soap, 
candles, bacon and beer. Some operatives had to take clothing, "pieces 
of calico or cotton handkerchiefs", especially, it was claimed, the younger 
operatives. 1 The effects on the local economy are nicely illustrated by 
George Kendall's account: 
I used to pay my coalwoman with meat and I have paid my 
chimney sweeper with a pint of ale and the barber in the 
same way 
(PP 1871 xxxvi q 40773) 
Since trucking enabled bag hosiers and middlemen to undercut price 
levels, it is not surprising that the larger, more reputable firms were 
eager to help in campaigns against truck, while public opinion, too, 
1 PP 1845 XV II qq 1704~ 3315~ 3395~ 3507. 
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condemned the practice. In 1830 in Nottingham 8000 signatures were 
obtained in only four days for an anti-truck petition, including those 
of 100 manufacturers, several JPs and the Mayor (Thomis, 1969, p 107). 
In 1844 an Anti-Truck Committee was established in Leicester. Thomas 
Bell, its secretary, reported that many leading manufacturers were 
involved, but he also pointed out that these were the selfsame people 
who, quite knowingly, employed the trucking middlemen (PP 1845 xv I 
q 1910). The society offered £1 for information leading to prosecution, 
and some prosecutions followed. In Hinckley, Thomas Clewes reported, 
there had been 20 prosecutions since the preceding November, and trucking 
was no longer practised in the town (PP 1845 xv I q 3957). Elsewhere, 
however, operatives were said to be intimidated and too fearful to come 
forward lest they lost their jobs and even their houses, which in many 
cases were rented from the middlemen (PP 1845 xv I q 5011). One witness, 
asked why he submitted to truck, replied 
If I did not submit to them~ I must resist them~ and then I 
should lose all my frames and my work. 
(PP 1845 XV I q 6095) 
Another told how after he gave evidence against two truckmasters nobody 
in his village would employ him, and a middleman himself confirmed that 
an extensive system of blacking was practised among village middlemen 
(PP 1845 xv II qq 1328, 3506). 
For these reasons, Charles Voss, campaigning for the Anti-Truck 
Society around Leicestershire villages, got unfriendly responses. At 
Kibworth he was told they would not lay information. fearing 11 they should 
always have it dinged in their ears 11 , and in Oadby they were burning an 
effigy of a villager who had acted as an informant. Although such behav-
iour led some employers to declare that many villagers preferred the 
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truck system, it seems more likely that it resulted from close village 
relationships, where community loyalties were stronger than trade 
loyalties, and where an act of betrayal against a community member, 
whatever its justification, threatened village solidarity. Thus Voss 
claimed that the villagers, although refusing to help, said that they 
hoped his campaign would succeed; but 
They did not Like the name of being informers3 because 
they have been hissed at so much; that is by the truck-
masters; they gave a treat to others to bLackguard them. 
(PP 1845 XV I qq 1821-24) 
Some of the middlemen interviewed in 1845 quite openly admitted to 
trucking, although some claimed to have been falsely prosecuted by 
'rascals' and agitators. Others maintained that it brought them no 
profit, and some that they had incurred heavy losses, as knitters failed 
to pay off their debts (PP 1845 xv I qq 5414, 7241, II qq 1543, 5405, 
5557). William Cummings, for example, explained 
I Lost a deaL of money by it ... I began to see that the 
men were masters. I had no controL over them; they wouLd 
be £4 or £5 in my debt. 
(PP 1845 xv I q 2339) 
But witnesses on the other side believed that, on the contrary, fortunes 
had been made through trucking (PP 1845 xv II q 858). 
The effect of the Anti-Truck Society, and even more so of the arrival 
of the investigating Commissioners, seems largely to have been to drive 
the truck system underground. One knitter said it was now practised in 
"a low, cunning, undermining kind of way; it is not so public as it was" 
(PP 1845 xv I q 3089). 'Indirect trucking' meant that rather than being 
paid in goods, pressure was put on workpeople 'voluntarily' to exchange 
their wages for goods like flour and beer at shops kept either by the 
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master or, even more safely, by one of his relatives. William Spicer 
explained: 
When we took in the first hose, he said 'ye know my ruLes' 
and so we did; if we did not go and Lay out the best part 
of our money, we shouLdn't have any work the next Satur-
day. 
(PP 1845 XV I q 6233) 
Others put it more subtly: 
If they refuse to take the bread or other commodity the 
mistress waits for them ... says she, 'we do not compeL 
any of our hands to take those things' ... She says, at 
the same time 'we have some to seLL and it wouLd be to 
our interest to dismiss the hands'. 
(PP 1845 XV II q 192?) 
One witness described how one Arnold truckmaster had relatives ~n the 
village who were respectively publican, baker, shoemaker, draper and 
butcher! It was hard to escape such a net (PP 1845 xv II q 1874). 
Trucking, especially indirect trucking, was still prevalent in the 
1850s and 1860s, although the NAB helped to suppress truck in the Notting-
ham district, putting pressure on manufacturers not to allow their middle-
men to practise it (PP1867-8xxxix q 19468). However, in 1871 the Truck 
Commission found that it persisted, although it was largely confined to 
the area around Sutton and Mansfield, plus a few scattered villages in 
Derbyshire and Leicestershire. The report estimated that 1,000 to 2,000 
people fell under its influence. In such places it continued to be "the 
general custom to have flour where you work". One witness described how 
payment in beer had destroyed his marriage, and the Mansfield police 
superintendent confirmed that people were too frightened to lay informa-
tion; he believed there were currently 20 truck shops in Sutton, but there 
had been only one prosecution during his term of office (PP 1871 xxxv~ p 
xxx, qq 41237, 41363-70, 42454-76). 
174 
In Leicester truck had more or less disappeared. although one 
notorious and interesting case involved an attempt to introduce a form 
of truck into a factory. The firm, Odames, had instituted a banking 
system, lending money to workers for drink in advance of wages. This 
not only bound them ~n debt to the firm, but ensured working time was 
wasted in drinking, so that wages fell while Odames raked ~n the full 
level of shop charges. The example shows, of course, how closely frame-
rant and charges and truck were linked (PP 1871 xxxvi q 41673-6). 
This was recognised by the Truck Commission. After the proceedings 
(which were marked by high levels of bitterness, collapsing into accusa-
tions and counter-accusations of falsehood, bribery and intimidation, 
after an incident between masters and operatives at Derby station), it 
recommended the abolition of frame-rent, along with strengthened anti-
truck legislation. The 1871 Payment of Wages (Hosiery) Bill outlawed 
frame-rent, thereby essentially sounding the death-knell of the domestic 
system, which in its turn put paid to trucking, though the practice 
lingered for a while in remote areas. The Commission on Women's Employ-
ment found in the 1890s that women outworkers were still being paid in 
truck: one seamer claimed to have worked for ten years for one firm without 
ever being paid in money (PP 1893-4 xxxvii Pt 1 pp 159-60). 
Truck was a repressive strategy which exploited the low level of 
organisation and relative lack of 'spirit' of workpeople in the villages. 1 
The policy of 'runaway shop' also exploited these weaknesses, although 
unlike truck it was specifically aimed at crushing attempts at union 
organisation among the workpeople. 
1 See PP 1845 xv I q 7478. 
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'Runaway shop' is a policy of moving an enterprise, or part of an 
enterprise to an area where cheaper and less organised labour is available. 
In hosiery, it was often used against the attempts of unions to maintain 
wage-levels which the manufacturers claimed they could not afford. It is 
not really surprising that this was such a common feature in the industry, 
since it had been originally established on the basis of a massive act of 
relocation, the move from London to the East Midlands to cut costs and 
break the power of the Company. Understandably manufacturers might return 
to this practice when in difficulties. Individual employers used the 
strategy when things got rough. Hosier Smith Churchill fled to Shepshed 
from Nottingham after his house was destroyed in the 1779 riots, and 
established a cotton mill there, and similarly John Heathcoat, following 
a Luddite attack on his factory at Loughborough in 1816, moved to Tiverton 
in Devon, and lived to a ripe old age surrounded, according to Felkin, by 
admiring workpeople (Lacey et al., 1969; Felkin, 1867, p 270). 
Runaway shop tactics began to be used more systematically 1n the 
1840s and 1850s, in response to the unions' use of strikes as a weapon. 
Francis Warner, a Leicester glove manufacturer, described how during a 
current strike frames were being sent into the country, especially to 
Loughborough, where the glove branch was unorganised (PP 1845 xv I q 2770). 
A knitter reported that during a strike at Derby in 1849 60 to 70 frames 
were sent away, and this led to the defeat of the strike (PP 1854-5 x1v 
q 8153). Hosiers were anyway attracted to the country where it was said 
that hands would work for less, as rents were lower, and many knitters 
still used the produce of gardens and allotments to help provide household 
subsistence needs. Samuel Tomlinson described a concerted attempt by 
Nottingham hosiers in the 1830s to shift production to Hansfield as wages 
were lower, but an alliance between the two groups of workpeople defeated 
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the campaign (PP 1845 xv II q 817). But in 1845 moves from Nottingham 
to Basford and Spondon were being reported (PP 1845 xv II qq 4109, 4112). 
Relocation, however, really became a significant force in the 1870s 
and 1880s, when the two Nottingham Unions and the LAHU faced manufacturers 
with the prospect of a more formal and permanent union opposition. There 
was considerable anti-union feeling, and the result was a steady exodus 
from Nottingham and Leicester to unorganised country areas. Figure 5.2 
shows the proportion of firms located in the town and the country areas, 
between 1864 and 1957. The sharp rise of number of firms in Leicester 
county areas in 1891 and 1899 indicates the extent of that exodus, though 
the effect is less marked for Nottingham.· Percentage figures show the 
fall-off of firms located in the towns, again most marked in Leicester 
between 1891 and 1912, with a recovery in 1922. 
Coalmining areas were especially attractive, with their lack of 
alternative employment for women. Moving to the country meant savings on 
rents and rates, as well as labour costs, and helped minimtse industrial 
relations problems; with small-sized businesses, which characterised the 
industry, the move was not too laborious or expensive. Between 1879 and 
1884, in particular, there was extensive movement of machinery to Arnold, 
Sutton, Mansfield, Heanor, Ruddington and Ilkeston from Nottingham; by 
1908 only one fifth of all hosiery manufacture nationwide was carried out 
in Nottingham and Leicester (Church, 1966, pp 277-8). In 1892 it was 
reported that for the last 15 years one firm per year had been moving out 
of Leicester to the rural areas (Gurnham, 1976, p 51). 
LAHU Minutes for June 3rd, 1908 record that 14 or 15 firms had left 
Leicester "altogether or partly so, because we have refused to compromise". 
The union's assertion that the move was to "be away from our dictates" 
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Location of Hosiery Firms·l864-1957. Leicestershire and Nottinghamshire 
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receives confirmation from LAHU records of the 1886-1914 period: what 
Holmes described as a game of 11 shuttlecock and battledore - playing off 
town and county workers 11 was a major preoccupation for the officers, as 
it threatened to undermine any wage advances they made (LAHU A February 
12th 1897, PP 1892 xxxvi Pt 2 p 57). As Chaplin explained, it was 
difficult to persuade members to stay with the union when they were un-
able to maintain wage lists 
In consequence of so much country labour ... and also through 
girls going to this work straight from school, regardless of 
wages. 
(LAHU A December 12th 1895) 
Between 1895 and 1900 the union was involved in prolonged struggles with 
at least six of the major employers over the sending of frames to the 
county. This served as a disciplinary threat to individual members, and 
was also used to force workers to accept reductions on union-agreed 
prices. The union's policy was to compensate members whose frames were 
removed, but some workers wished to follow 11 their11 frames into the vil-
lages, a response LAHU tried to discourage. In one case at least the 
employer himself forbade this, declaring triumphantly 
I am afraid you would not work well together, you cannot 
follow them! 
(LAHU A October 20th 1896, November 21st 1900) 
Frames were often moved out one or two at a time, but sometimes there 
was a more dramatic confrontation. Such was the case with Rowleys factory, 
following a violent strike in Leicester in 1885: 
To escape the anger of the mob, people engaged in the 
factory were forced to leave the premises concealed in 
large work hampers. The situation became worse ... and it 
was decided to establish the mill at Fleckney. This was 
built on Saddington Road and soon became known as Rowleys' 
Jail, owing to the fact that there were no windows to the 
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roadway, thus affording no provocation to the rioters. 
(Badcock, 1980 p 30) 
The machinery had been smuggled out from Leicester at night. 
Another major confrontation was with Walkers, later to become Wolsey 
after an amalgamation in 1920. It was an extremely paternalistic firm, 
with a history of anti-union behaviour. In 1913 it started to move mach-
inery to Derby, later shifting 16 or 17 Cotton's Patents to Shepshed. 
Finally ~n December a strike broke out over the moving of machinery, the 
refusal of seamers to accept a cut in piece-rates and the whole issue of 
union recognition. Walkers affirmed their refusal to join the Employers' 
Federation or to allow workers to belong to a union (LAHU A January 11th, 
December lOth 1913). The long and bitter strike ended in a sullen recog-
nition of union rights, but in 1914 management at Walkers' Abbey Mill 
plant in Leicester were declaring ''If the trade had beat them at Fleckney 
they would not do so in Leicester" (LAHU A December 13th 1914). 
The growing rapprochement between workers and employers, under the 
influence of the NJIC, had some effect in diminishing anti-union feeling 
among the manufacturers, and after World War One runaway shop was less of 
a threat to the unions (see Figure 5.2). Chaplin announced in 1918 that 
the county factories were as anxious to fight for advances as the town 
factories (LAHU B February 5th 1918). However, individual employers still 
attempted relocation sporadically: for example, in 1922 Johnson and Barnes 
threatened to send linking work to a village called Stapleford to be done 
more cheaply, in 1928 Wolsey sent cardigans and pullovers to Shepshed for 
cheaper labour, in 1930 Myhills sacked all their linkers and sent work to 
the country, and in 1937 Rowleys "retaliated" against union action by 
moving machines from Fleckney to Hinckley (LAHU A May 13th 1922, March 28th 
1928, April 9th 1930, March 17th 1937). In this period, too, expansion of 
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hosiery production in the 'new areas' occurred, involving the utilisation 
l 
of non-union labour and low wages. But after the formation of NUHW, the 
Hinckley Secretary, Chamberlain, was able to retort to an employer who was 
threatening to move away to where "he would be assisted instead of hinder-
ed" (knitters were on strike after the dismissal of four workmates) that 
No matter what part of the country Mr. Simpson may move to., 
the National Union of Hosiery Workers will be there also! 
(Leicester Mercury., 2nd October 1946) 
Relocation strategies by the 1940s and 1950s had ceased to be con-
cerned with control issues. Many factories in this era started up branch 
factories outside the Midlands: for example, Corahs, Byfords, and Johnson 
and Barnes built factories in parts of Lincolnshire and Yorkshire, where 
there were plentiful supplies of 'green labour', especially the wives and 
daughters in mining and agricultural communities (Jopp, 1965, p 38; Byfords, 
1969; Johnson and Barnes, 1951). These moves were necessitated by the post-
war shortage; Byfords explained "We were obliged to go as far as Maltby ~n 
order to find more willing hands to make our products" (Byfords 1969). 
Relocation here was in no way an attempt to bring workers to heel or stamp 
out unionism. 
Another major exclusionary tactic was the victimisation of noted 
union activists. In the early period, this was closely associated with 
the use of repressive legislation against unions, including prosecutions 
under the Combinations Acts and tightening up legislation protecting mach-
inery to ward off Luddism. 2 As early as 1779 the leaders of the committee 
responsible for the petitions to Parliament were being victimisPd. One of 
1 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
2 See Chapter 3. 
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them, Caleb Herring, had to flee from Nottingham to Leicester, where the 
Mayor gave him protection (Henson, 1831, pp 414-69). Possibly the sym-
pathy the stockingers of this period received from some magistrates and 
members of the gentry pushed the hosiers into more informal means of 
persecution. Henson wrote 
EvePy committee OP active man amongst them was PegaPded as 
a tuPbuZent dangePous instigatoP~ whom it was necessaPy to 
watch and cpush if possible. 
(Thompson, 1968, p 556) 
Coldham, the Nottingham Town Clerk, hired a spy to infiltrate radical and 
unionist circles in 1814, and in the same year a secret committee set up 
by the hosiers t;old the Home Secretary that they intended to "blackball" 
all strikers, since unions were "fatal to the true interests of hosiers 
and framework knitters" (Hammond and Hammond, 1979, p 191; Aspinall, 1949, 
p 178). Many hosiers became committed to the destruction of unions. 
Leaders were obviously vulnerable. Gravenor Henson was among several 
imprisoned in the early years (for over a year, in his case). William 
Chawner and his father, who brought a test case against William Cummings 
in 1831 to establish whether the Truck Act would extend to frame rent, were 
subsequently victimised, as were several Chartist leaders: George Buckby 
and Joseph Elliott were blacklisted and forced to emigrate to America, John 
Sketchley of Hinckley was refused work by the leading manufacturer Thomas 
Payne, and in Nottingham knitters George Black and James Woodhouse lost 
their jobs, one becoming a lecturer and the other opening a co-operative 
store, with union support (Church, 1966, p 46; Patterson, 1954, p 387, PP 
1854-5 XLV q 5854; Epstein, 1982, p 245). The hosiers expressed a naked 
hatred of the Chartist leaders: Buckby and Elliott were described as 
professional, paid agitators, Sketchley and his colleague Ginns as unwilling 
to work when they could "live without" and as being men "who endeavour to 
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make the stocking-makers dissatisfied with their masters", while a 
Nottingham hosier spoke of 
Birken and his delegates~ sitting as they do almost like a 
Parliament at the Rainbow and Dove. 
(PP 1854-5 xiv qq 2281~ 5983~ 6191) 
Anyone arousing the hosiers' displeasure risked rough treatment. 
Men were blacklisted for giving information on truck or patronising 
co-operative stores (PP 1871 xxxvi q 40844). Witnesses to the 1871 
Truck Commission were labelled as "rogues, thieves and vagabonds" and 
"Mr. Mundella's tools" and were warned "We will serve them out after". 
It was easy for manufacturers to band together and pressurise their 
workpeople to stay away from committees and meetings and to refuse to 
sign petitions (PP 1854-5 xiv q 1721, PP 1871 xxxvi qq 42224-5). 
From the 1880s onwards victimisation techniques were applied more 
generally to any union members, as part of the employers' anti-union 
campaigns in the factories. In 1892, Holmes held a meeting at Earl 
Shilton, after which eight men were locked out of their jobs, and twenty-
one women who had joined up were sacked. Another firm had issued an anti-
union document, which three men had agreed to sign (PP 1892 xxxvi Pt 2 
p 56). LAHU Minutes of this period record many cases of victimisation, 
involving both men and women. Union members were dismissed, or threatened 
with dismissal, unless agreeing to give up membership; one activist was 
set up in a fish shop by the union, having, it was believed, "no hope of 
a job". Others were given inferior jobs, or put on short-time work while 
non-members worked full time. Many firms refused to allow canvassing or 
. . . 1 
collect1ng on the1r prem1ses. 
1 LAHU A October 30th 1895, April 2?th 1898~ February 27th 1905, 
February 11th 1911, April 11th, July 22nd 1913, June 19th 1914. 
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Opposition to unions often reached fantastic heights. Ernest Walker 
declared "he would sooner die than have trade union interference" (LAHU A 
January 26th 1914). The cases of Buchlers, where two daughters of a well-
known activist were blacklisted after trying to organise their workmates, 
and of Skevingtons, where the whole workforce were dismissed, were notable, 
and led to vigorous campaigns by the union. At Skevingtons, cards were 
laid on the table: 
Mr. Skevington had made it absolutely clear that he's fighting 
trade unionism ... He will never employ trade unionists again 
... He has not had control of his own place before and means 
to have it now - and he can't have that control he wants un-
less the workers are out of the union ... Since his people 
joined the union he could not control them3 they did as they 
liked. 
(LAHU A March 21st3 April lst3 May 19th 1914) 
These policies often had a powerful effect; in many cases where the 
union attempted to recruit, especially in the county, feelings of anxiety 
and fear were revealed. At Sileby, for example, the officers found 
A feeling of mistrust amongst each other3 wondering whether 
they should get the sack3 if so would others do their work. 
(LAHU A October 25th 1905) 
LAHU acknowledged the validity of such doubts: there was a reluctance to 
accept single members at unorganised firms, for fear of the consequences 
(LAHU A June 15th 1910). 
If anything, the situation deteriorated after World War One. Many 
firms refused to follow the NJIC in recognising unions as legitimate. The 
manager of one, Lawries, declared that neither the un1on or the NJIC meant 
anything to him: he could get on very well without them. It was reported 
that Hayes and Harrison had used "every means in their power to turn the 
people against the union". Towl and Cursley called their people together 
and told them that if they joined LAHU "there was no room for them", and 
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at Byfords "there was apparently an unusual amount of fear of the firm", 
prompting the verdict that to organise there would be a prohibitive task. 
Anti-union propaganda was used to good effect. It was noted in 1926 that 
"trade unionism is not wanted at the firms in the North'' of Leicester, 
and in 1913 a man who met Chaplin "at the baths" told him that he and his 
workmates resented LAHU attempts to organise Rowleys: "They have got a 
good employer and don't want interfering with". 1 
Similar problems faced the Hinckley Union, whose officers received 
"anything but a courteous reception" from managers. The foreman at Atkins 
(whose Chairman was President of the Manufacturers' Federation) declared 
that he preferred to negotiate with his own workpeople rather than the 
union representatives. It was the union's proud boast that in Hinckley 
95% of hosiery workers were members, but they had problems in the surround-
ing villages. Firms there would do anything, including giving wage rises, 
to forestall unionism (HU November 9th 1932, June 21st 1933, April 18th 
1939). Particularly sensational was the case of Woods, a factory with a 
history of anti-unionism, whose manager on one occasion led his workpeople 
out to break up a union meeting; they sang and chanted "We don't want to 
join the union" and "Down with the Labour Party", and Wood threatened to 
hit the Hinckley Union secretary. The union claimed that the employees' 
response resulted from intimidation, the firm having conducted indoctrin-
atory meetings, posted anti-union posters and issued threats. Many 
employees were young school-leavers, who would no doubt be susceptible to 
anti-union propaganda. The final 1rony was that Wood, like many Hinckley 
manufacturers, had risen from the ranks and was himself an ex-member of 
the Hinckley Union (Hinckley Tribune, June 25th, 26th 1936). 
1 LAHU A May 16th 19133 September 29th 19283 February 13th 19293 Sept-
ember 17th 19303 LAHU B November 30th 1926~ January 19th 1929. 
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After World War Two anti-union feeling muted, but did not disappear. 
Not all employers came to see unions as a good thing or even as acceptable, 
despite the industrial relations truce, and many continued quietly to 
practise exclusionary tactics. The NUHW had particular difficulty ~n 
organising the 'new areas', especially ~n the South. Harold Gibson, one 
of the national organisers, claimed that economic prosperity, lack of 
tradition, and identification as factory rather than hosiery workers led 
to disinterest and hostility in the London area, while his partner, Betty 
Macintyre, spoke of employers in the Home Counties putting up wage rates 
to prove the union unnecessary (AC Reports 1950 p 32, 1952 p 39). 
Leicester District records show that employer hostility continued ~n 
the East Midlands as well. Collectors were often victimised, and many 
firms succeeded in keeping the union out. In 1952 173 non-union firms were 
reported, and in 1958 17 factories refused permission for meetings, while 
11 were described as "evasive" (LD April 7th, 17th 1952, June 2nd 1958, 
August 22nd 1960). In many other firms workers simply refused to JO~n. 
Some of the ways in which such firms woo the workforce are discussed in 
Chapter 6. It is clear, however, that victimisation and anti-union prop-
aganda had a lasting effect on the minds of the workpeople. 
Finally, it is necessary to consider briefly the role of piece-rates, 
which I have tentatively categorised as a repressive strategy. For some 
commentators (Brown et al., 1964; Edwards and Scullion, 1982), piece-rates 
represent a key mechanism of control in the industry. Brown describes 
them as "the chief means of social control in the work situation" and 
asserts that married women were especially "effcct~_ve·:y disciplined" by 
them, because of a greater need and desire for high wages than that of 
single girls (Brown et al., 1964, p 329). Wells also considers payment by 
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results to be a very effective way to achieve high output, although 
considering that payment schemes, while "doing much to assist the manage-
ment in its control of a factory" must be accompanied by careful planning 
of work flows and task organisation, so that workers are seen to be getting 
"a square deal"; otherwise the schemes may be counter-productive (Wells, 
1968, p 201, 1972, p 213). As well as encouraging effort, piece-rates 
seem 1n hosiery to have promoted an individualistic spirit among the work-
force. It was for reasons like these that the Nottingham Secretary of the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) declared that piecework was "the 
curse of every trade that had to do with it" (Ward, 1874, p 36). Employers 
I interviewed saw piece-rates as effective and necessary forms of discipline. 
"You can't do it any other way" said Manager C, while Manager P regretted 
the system but saw it as "practically inevitable" to get people to work 
hard in work of this kind. This accords with their own individualistic 
value system, whereby talent and hard work are s~en as deserving extra 
rewards. 
However, as Chapter 4 revealed, the idea of piece-rates appeals as 
much to the workforce as to the employers. It is believed in the industry 
that measured daywork (MDW) and mixed schemes (such as Corahs' 'graded 
minutes') are unpopular with workers. Westwood, describing 'Stitchco's 
MDW scheme, reports that the women disliked it believing that "you could 
see your children more" under the old piece-rate scheme, as workers could 
go home when work ran out (Westwood, 1984, p 43). Gurnham states that 
NUHKW now wishes to abolish piecework and move to MDW (Gurnham, 1976, p 
195). This policy was confirmed to me by union officials, but any efforts 
they may have made in this direction have been singularly ineffectual. 
Piece-rates have become part of the culture of the hosiery industry, and 
workers, rightly or wrongly, prefer to retain a system which gives them, 
in King's phrase, "some semblance of independence" (King, 1948, p 378). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has described some of the more notable repressive and 
exclusionary strategies used by hosiery management. Truck is an inter-
esting example of a control device which, once much used, has become 
redundant because of social development. The hostility it provoked among 
both workpeople and the general public caused it to be made illegal, but 
this alone was insufficient to destroy the practice until the ending of 
the domestic system made it impracticable. Truck as a control device 
depended upon the individualising and fragmenting of the workforce. 
Runaway shop and victimisation, however, are practices still relevant 
today. Surprisingly, relocation policies have not been widely employed 
during the recession to push down wages, as might have been expected. Two 
factors may account for this. First, the strongly localistic orientations 
of East Midlands manufacturers may predispose them against moving too far 
afield. The reverse, of course, is true of firms taken over by national 
conglomerates, and, as we might expect, relocation strategies have been 
used by them. Courtaulds, for example, has dramatically reduced production 
levels in its British hosiery outlets, shedding 50% of jobs between 1975 
and 1983, and ~n its own phrase has increased "sourcing from overseas", 
including countries such as Portugal and Tunisia (NUHKW Journal August 
1 1983; Courtauld Annual Report 1982-3). The other inhibitory factor is 
that in Leicester employers are able to tap a source of cheaper labour 
within the city itself~ many smaller firms employ Asian labour at very low 
wage rates. 
As long as there are un~ons, victimisation will continue. Since 1945 
Midlands hosiery manufacturers have learned to live with the unions, but 
1 82.4% of the remaining UK jobs were for women. 
188 
they do not all love them. Where the power balance shifts in the employers' 
favour, there is likely to be an upsurge of anti-union feeling; this example 
reminds us of the important role of ideologies and value commitments, which 
continue to play a part alongside more purely economic factors in influencing 
strategic choices. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
"Tis that thou with Zove parentaZ 
Dost to aZZ they aid extend; 
Both the moraZ and the mentaZ 
Owning thee their generous friend." 
WiZZiam Jones~ framework knitter 
(Tribute to Duke of RutZand~ 1853) 
"Our number we count Seven Hun<h>ed or more, 
AZZ cZoathed and fed from his bountifuZ store~ 
Then Envy don't fZout us nor say any's poor. 
Ye Hungry and naked, aZZ hither repair 
No Zanger in want don't remain in despair 
You'ZZ meet with empZoyment and each get a share. 
Ye Crafts and Mechanics, if you wiZZ <h>aw nigh 
No Zanger you need to Zack an empZoy 
And each duZy paid which is a great joy. 
To our nobZe Master~ a Bumper then fiZZ 
The matchZess inventor of this cotton miZZ, 
Each toss off his gZass with a hearty good»JiU." 
Chorus of Sir Richard Arkwright's workers~ 1778 
(Fitton and Wadsworth~ 1958~ p 100) 
'~ common cause hath bound us 
In one rejoicing band -
Hath mingZed men and masters 
Wise Head and Working Hand." 
Ruth WiZZs~ Corahs' employee 
('The Warehouse Opening' 1868) 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PACIFICATORY STRATEGIES THE TRADITIONAL OPTION - PATERNALISM 
Introduction 
The last two chapters have detailed the methods whereby hosiery 
manufacturers sought to impose work discipline on a workforce steeped 
in the traditions of craft independence and household autonomy, and to 
produce a new breed of obedient and hard-working labourers, fit servants 
to the new machines. However, power and authority are more effectively 
exercised on subjects who accept their legitimacy. Thus, wielders of 
economic power habitually strive to mould willing minds as well as non-
resistant bodies. As argued in Chapter 1, under capitalism this relates 
specifically to the ambiguity of work relationships which are character-
ised both by antagonism and interdependence; management thus must have 
recourse to pacificatory as well as repressive strategies. The major 
form of pacificatory strategy employed in the hosiery industry in the 
nineteenth century was the use of a management style we may label as 
'paternalism'. 
There has been a longstanding tradition of paternalism in the East 
Midlands, and it is still common today. In this chapter I shall trace 
the development of this tradition, examine the changing forms that 
paternalism has taken between 1800 and 1960, and assess its effectiveness 
as a control strategy. As the concept of paternalism presents certain 
definitional problems, I shall start with a brief discussion of Lhe liter-
ature concerning it. 
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Section 1 Conceptualisations of 2aternalism 
The term paternalism has been much used by both social historians 
and sociologists. For example, Edwards and Scullion speak of a "pater-
nalist/autocratic management style" in the hosiery factory they studied, 
and Westwood describes the Stitchco management as "paternalistic" (Edwards 
and Scullion, 1982, p 44; Westwood, 1984, p 1). However, the term is not 
always clearly defined, and there is a degree of imprecision in its use. 
Is paternalism essentially an ideology, or is there a distinct set of 
practices we can designate by the term? Is welfare provision the kernel 
of paternalism? Such uncertainties have led to disagreements over the 
prevalence of paternalism in various time periods. In this section I 
want to examine some of the more fully elaborated accounts of paternalism, 
in order to reach a more precise definition. 
Roberts, in his authoritative study 'Paternalism in Early Victorian 
England', defines paternalism essentially as an ideology or vision of 
society, which had been in decline throughout the eighteenth century, but 
which was revived, to some extent consciously, to deal with the social 
dislocation brought about by the Industrial revolution. The paternalist 
vision, according to Roberts, is of an orderly, hierarchical, authoritarian 
society, characterised by a nexus of interdependent, organic social 
relationships, in which all have clearly-defined positions, with specified 
rights and duties. The duty of the rich is to guide, help and rule the 
poor, the duty of the poor to obey and offer deference (Roberts, 1978). 
In return, in J.S. Mill's classic statement, they will be "properly fed, 
clothed, housed, spiritually edified and innocently amused" (quoted 
Bendixp 1956, p 47). Such a vision was the inheritance of the old aris-
tocratic feudal order. It was backward-looking, nostalgic for a largely 
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mythical 'Golden Age', deeply rooted in localism and custom, hostile to 
commercialism and asserted the importance of moral responsibility. In 
these respects, as the work of E.P. Thompson has so amply demonstrated, 
it found a response in the values of the dispossessed working classes 
as they struggled to defend traditions of craft and household autonomy 
against the inroads of the new entrepreneurial morality, individualistic 
1 
utilitarianism and the political economy of the 'free' market. 
This classic form of paternalism was enshrined in countryside 
relationships, as Roberts shows, but it was also adopted by certain 
industrialists, despite the apparent clash with the principles of polit-
. 1 2 ~ca economy. With regard to this, Roberts makes three important points. 
First, the paternalist vision was more suited to the rural than the urban 
environment, as the paternalist landlord or employer sought to deal with 
his workpeople as the 'whole man', on a social, moral and religious level, 
refusing to reduce the employer-worker bond to a purely economic one, 
limited to working hours. Second, the great paternalist practice which 
typified the early factory villages was financially impracticable for the 
majority of employers. Roberts calculates that only 40 out of 500 
employers extant in the early Victorian period turned to paternalist 
techniques. Thirdly, in towns, paternalist provision tended to become 
generalised, aimed at the community as a whole, not merely at workpeople. 
Urban philanthropists endowed schools, chapels and libraries to be used 
1 See Thompson, 1969, 1971, 1978; Bendix, 1956. 
2 See Chapman, 1967, pp 195-9 for discussion of attempts by industriaL-
ists to combine pubZic benevolence, radicaZ politics and non-conformist 
devoutness ~ith doctrinaire attachment to Zaissez-faire and ruthLess 
business methods. See aLso Patterson, 1954~ pp 384-5. 
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1 by everybody. Again, such provision was beyond the resources of small 
and medium masters, such as were~ for example, the majority of hosiers. 
Paternalism could only be the privilege of a successful business elite. 
All these factors, Roberts argues, led to a decline of paternalism in 
the 1850s when, in any case, a new social equilibrium was emerging. 
For Roberts, then, paternalism was essentially a system of values, 
which in turn led to a particular pattern of social relationships, based 
round the exchange of deference for welfare provision. A similar view 
2 
of paternalism at the societal level emerges from the work of Thompson. 
An account tied much more specifically to industrial relations is given 
by Joyce in 'Work, Society and Politics', his study of Lancashire factory 
life, and this account disagrees fundamentally with that of Roberts in 
important respects. Joyce claims that, rather than dying out in the 1850s, 
paternalism was extended and strengthened at that time, as a response to 
the challenge and failure of Chartism (Joyce, 1980, p 54). It represented 
an attempt to recreate a sense of community in the bleak industrial land-
scape of urban Lancashire, and to attach workpeople to. their employers 
by more than an economic dependence, playing on religion and on neighbour-
hood, family and patriotic loyalties. This was done by incorporating the 
family and community into factory life, through various means: family-
based employment systems, welfare provision, making the factory a centre 
of recreational activity, and creating social rituals. Thus a whole 
mythology sprung up surrounding the employer's family, with elaborate 
celebrations serving as rites de passage. 
1 The cynic might point to the vote-catching potential of such char-
itable activity. Certainly a formidable number of philanthropic 
hosiers in Leicester and Nottingham became councillors and aldermen. 
In Leicester six of them became Mayors. 
2 For example~ Thompson~ 1978. 
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The resulting deference among workers, especially women, already 
habituated to patriarchal control in the home, was accompanied by a 
commitment to work as a positive good, and to individual masters who 
were considered good masters and who maintained close personal contacts 
with their workpeople. Thus, claims Joyce, "industrial paternalism was 
both pervasive and successful"; rather than the urban setting being 
antipathetic to paternalism, as Roberts argues, it becomes its "chief 
seat" in the late Victorian period (Joyce, 1980, pp 136, 154). 
Joyce's vtew of paternalism roots it in social practices rather 
than ideology. Like Roberts, he sees these practices as involving the 
exchange of deference for welfare provision, but he extends this by noting 
the link between paternalism and the celebration of family and community 
(as opposed to class) relationships. He has been criticised for assuming, 
rather than demonstrating, the deferential response, as well as for 
generalising from the specific and possibly unique case of Lancashire1; 
but, while accepting these criticisms, I hope to demonstrate that the 
hosiery case provides substantial support for his argument. In particular, 
Joyce should be applauded for drawing our attention to the family dimension 
1n paternalism. 
Both these accounts deal with Victorian England. Can it be argued 
that paternalism rematns a feature of industrial life, or was it an his-
torically unique phenomenon? As stated, industrial sociologists frequently 
use the word, while failing to define it~ an exception is the work of 
Abercrombie and Hill (1976) who, rightly criticising the often unthinking 
1 ~n a subsequent paper~ Joyee has himself admitted that the response 
and adaptation of workers to paternalism needs to be studied more 
closely (Joyee~ 1984a~ p 74). 
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use of the word by their fellows, seek to construct an ideal type of 
paternalism. The notion of the 'whole man' is again crucial in this 
model, and they see paternalism as a form of social organisation involv-
ing the ideology of personal care which goes beyond the cash nexus. 
In this they agree with Newby, who argues, like Roberts, that 
paternalism is unlikely to outlast the earlier stages of industrial 
development, involving as it does the necessity for face-to-face, non-
bureaucratic relationships. Increased enterprise size, too, is a threat 
to the continuation of paternalism. In the conditions of late capitalism, 
the factory-owner cannot influence the lives of workers once they leave 
the factory gates (Newby, 1977, pp 72-3). 
Abercrombie and Hill, however, believe that a continuation of pater-
nalism in an impersonal and institutionalised form is possible: the 
language of personal care can act successfully to conceal impersonal and 
collectivised relationships, and can even take an institutionalised form 
which goes beyond the level of any single firm. Japanese industrial 
relations are instanced as an example. Such situations may involve a 
contradiction, but it is one that has been embodied in industrial forms 
of paternalism from the start: the tension between the impersonal needs 
of the capitalist market and the desire for successful personal inter-
action in the enterprise. 
Their stress on the 'whole man' leads Abercrombie and Hill to declare 
that most organisations (outside Japan) which are labelled paternalist on 
account of the ideology of their managements rarely fulfil the criteria 
they have laid down; relations ~n these firms do not go beyond the level 
of the cash nexus. Here, I contend, they are defining paternalism too 
narrowly. It is not necessary to interfere with the external lives of 
workers in order to practise a successful paternalism in the work sphere. 
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Following Abercrombie and Hill and Joyce rather than Roberts and 
Newby, I shall argue that paternalism continues well beyond the 1850s; 
unlike Abercrombie and Hill, I believe that paternalism is a useful 
label for a distinctive management style and practice still found in 
Britain. My definition of paternalism in many ways resembles that of 
Joyce. By paternalism, I mean a form of social relationship which 
emphasises the notion of personal care, and does so by transposing the 
idealised relationships of families and community into the factory. 
Paternalists seek to recreate in the employer/employee relationship the 
family relationship between father and child, and to constitute the 
factory as 'one big family'. Although this may well be accompanied by 
welfarist provision, I do not see this as the core of paternalist manage-
ment. Such an approach is better labelled 'industrial welfarism' and 
can be practised by companies which are otherwise committed to a bureau-
cratic and impersonal style of management. 1 
Although there has been a continuity of paternalism (as defined 
above) within the hosiery industry, its exact form has varied over the 
period, in response to the changing social context, as Roberts and Newby 
have confirmed. What I will call the 'classic paternalism' of the factory 
village dies away by the 1850s, to be succeeded by the muted version des-
cribed by Roberts, which I shall call ~actory paternalism'. With the 
decline of face-to-face relationships paternalism again undergoes a change, 
and two new forms emerge which I label 'neo-paternalism' and 'pseudo-
paternalism' (see Section 4). 
1 CourtauZds wouZd present a prime exampZe in the textiZe sector. 
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Finally, Fox (1964) has pointed to the link between paternalist 
practice and a unitarist ideology, that is the belief in the identity 
of interests of employers and employed. For Fox, traditional paternalism 
involves the commitment of both sides to unitarism, while what he labels 
'modern' or 'sophisticated' paternalism involves unitarist views among 
workers while the management espouse a pluralist perspective. Such tight 
correspondences cannot, I think, be maintained. The work of Mann (1970) 
has shown how ideas and values, especially among subordinate strata, are 
riven with contradictions and inconsistencies. It is dangerous, then, to 
define social relations solely in terms of a directing ideology especially 
if that involves imputing shared values to a large and disparate body of 
people. However, there is a clear link, if not a correspondence, between 
paternalism and unitarism: paternalist practices are often used to 'sell' 
a unitarist line to workers, and paternalists (as will be demonstrated) 
often hold unitarist v~ews. Unitarist ideology may also be internalised 
by the workforce, and this may be seen as another form of pacificatory 
strategy. It will be referred to in the following pages. 
Section 2 Classic paternalism 
When the factory owners turned to paternalism as a pacificatory 
strategy, they had two clear local traditions to draw upon: a tradition 
of aristocratic paternalism in the rural environment similar to that des-
cribed by Roberts, and, in Derbyshire, some remarkable instances of 
successful factory village paternalism, such as the developments of 
Arkwright at Cromford, Hollins at Pleasley and Via Gellia, and the Strutts 
at Belper. Many of these cotton barons had links with hosiery beyond the 
supply of yarns. Some had been hosiers formerly, some were 1n partnership 
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with hosiers and some continued to employ framework knitters as out-
workers, using their wives and children in the mills (Chapman, 1967, pp 
161-2, 188). More importantly perhaps, these millowners, along with the 
landowners, had established a reputation for community involvement and 
philanthropy, which their would-be social and political successors sought 
to emulate. 
Aristocratic patrons were frequently involved in providing back-up 
community help when the hosiery industry fell into recession. Local 
landowners, such as the Dukes of Newcastle, Rutland and Portland, Lady 
Byron and Earl Howe, aided destitute framework knitters in various ways. 
During the Luddite period, the Duke of Newcastle headed various charitable 
efforts in Nottingham along with a committee of hosiers and magistrates: 
an emigration scheme was started for 300 families to go to the Cape of 
Good Hope, £6-7,000 was collected in charitable donations, and men were 
provided with labouring work (Bailey, 1853, pp 309-10). Correspondence 
between Newcastle and the stockingers refers to his role as their "friend" 
and "well-wisher" as long as they remained "patient under misfortunes" 
(Aspinall, 1949, p 326). To the Home Secretary Newcastle wrote that the 
crisis had been resolved because 
The attention and kindness which has been shown to the Zower 
by the higher orders here3 has made a great impression on the 
minds of the former. 
(AspinaU, 19493 p 32?) 
This did not, however, prevent the mob burning down his castle in 1831! 
Earl Howe and Lady Byron were among many landowners who supplied land 
for allotments, supported village friendly societies and provided labouring 
work in times of need (PP 1845 xv I qq 4981, 7324, PP 1854-5 xiv q 1922). 
The Duke of Portland, who, according to Felkin, had always "shown great 
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desire to improve the social position of the stockingers in his neighbour-
hood" had given 500-600 gardens for their use (Felkin, 1845, p 22). The 
Church was also involved: Moses Furlong, a Catholic curate in Loughborough, 
provided soup and bread daily for sixty stockingers' children, while the 
Anglican vicar of Newton Linstead provided allotment land. Educational 
provision was also made: Lady Byron endowed schools in Market Bosworth 
and Newbold Verdon (PP 1845 xv I qq 3236, 7373, 7459, 7870). 
The example of the aristocrats seems to have fired others to similar 
efforts. Thomis' studies of Nottingham note the "paternalist protection" 
afforded by the magistracy and corporation in the late eighteenth century, 
for example buying large stocks of butter to sell cheaply, providing loaves 
to the poor at Christmas and issuing food tickets in times of need (Thomis, 
1968, p 81; 1969, p 59). There was widespread public support during the 
early period for the framework knitters' campaigns and sympathy for their 
plight. Magistrates, as well as regulating market activities in the towns, 
used their powers sparingly where the Combination Acts were concerned. As 
Thomis says, this reluctance to intervene in industrial disputes was partly 
the result of a desire to maintain law and order, but also reflects the 
widespread belief ~n a duty to support the poor (Thomis, 1968, p 81; 1969, 
pp 52, 65). 
This spirit of aristocratic paternalism continued through the nineteenth 
century. A tribute to local social leaders in 1895 praised the philanthropic 
behaviour of the contemporary Dukes of Rutland and Portland, and spoke of 
local landowners as~ although belonging to the "classes", nevertheless 
acknowledging their duty to the "masses"~ 
Many of them act up to the belief that each class should promote 
the other's weal3 the great man helping the poor and the poor man 
loving the great. 
(Anon, 1895, p 65) 
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An important aspect of all this was the example it set to the 
emergent bourgeoisie. If local industrialists such as Samuel Morley, 
A.J. Mundella, the Corahs and the Atkins, wished to supplant the gentry 
as local leaders, they had to show they could fulfil their responsibil-
ities. An even more spectacular example was set for them by the 
Derbyshire magnates. Their achievements have been fully documented ~n 
1 
several valuable accounts, but will be briefly discussed here. 
Abercrombie and Hill claim that early industrial paternalism was a 
response to problems of labour recruitment, underdeveloped labour markets 
and labou~ discipline. This was certainly the case for the East Midland 
spinning mills. As we have seen, workers in the traditional sector shunned 
the factories. For many, such as the Hollins and the Strutts, the solution 
was to use child labour, including pauper children. 2 The employment of 
children in turn raised further problems. Strutts' labour records between 
1801 and 1804 afford a rare illumination into labour relations at this 
time: among the 1665 fines levied in these years were some for such heinous 
crimes as telling lies to Mr. Jedidiah, throwing bobbins, making T. Ride's 
nose bleed, riding on each other's backs, striking T. Hall with a brush, 
throwing water on Ann Gregory very frequently, throwing tea on Josh Bridnosh, 
and frightening S. Pearson with her ugly face! (Fitton and Wadsworth, 1958, 
p 236). In addition, there was a public relations problem, as the eyes of 
the world, and especially of government inspectors, turned to these new 
experiments in work organisation, showing concern over the well-being of 
these young workers. Scandals, such as that of Hollins' Walker children, 
1 See Wells, 1968; Piggott, 1949, on Hollins; Fitton and Wadsworth~ 
1958, on the Strutts and the Arkwrights; and Chapman, 196?. 
2 See Piggott, 1949~ Chapter VI. 
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d . d d . . . 1 rna e w1n ow- ress1ng 1mperat1ve. All these pressures pushed the mill-
owners towards paternalism. 
To produce a suitable environment for children, and also to attract 
adult labour to the mills, a wealth of inducements and incentives were 
provided: cottages, allotments, schools, chapels, sick clubs and provid-
ential schemes were laid on in the villages. Whole families were employed 
within the mills (Chapman, 1967, p 166). Hollins, for example, was noted 
in 1843 as providing a children's playground with equipment for athletics 
for "both sexes and all ages", penny baths, a provident society, a Mech-
anics' Institute, a reading room and a farm shop (Wells, 1968, pp 68-71). 
Another feature was the lavish provision of feasts and entertainments to 
mark important events, such as coronations and military victories. For 
example the Whig and Unitarian Strutt family celebrated the passing of the 
Reform Bill with a party at their home at which 4,800 lbs of beef, 3,184 
lbs of plum pudding, 7,000 penny loaves and 2,550 quarts of ale were con-
sumed: entertainment was provided by the works'Musical Society (Fitton 
and Wadsworth, 1958, pp 259-60). 
Regular festivities, such as works outings and annual balls, were 
particularly interesting strategically, as an attempt to make redundant 
the autonomous local festivals and wakes which urban employers so deprec-
2 
ated. For example, at Arkwrights' there was established an annual 
'candlelighting' festival, a parade round the village with music, dancing 
and gifts. Twice-yearly balls, one observer commented, made the workpeople 
"industrious and sober all the rest of the year" (Fitton and Wadsworth, 1958, 
1 This notorious case, involving the imprisoning of children for breach 
of contract, is described by Wells, 1968, and Piggott, 1949. 
2 See Chapter 4. 
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pp 99, 101). Arkwright's repertoire of paternalist devices especially 
demonstrated, 1n another observer's words, his "prudence and cunning": 
gifts were given to induce tradesmen to the area, good workers were 
marked with "distinguishing dress", "milch cows" donated to outstanding 
workmen, and a pub and market were provided, showing Arkwright's under-
standing of his workers' indigenous culture (Chapman, 1967, pp 160-2; 
Fitton and Wadsworth, 1958, pp 100-1). 
One must not assume that such activity automatically evoked responses 
of deference and commitment. Strutts' records indicate a severe problem 
of labour turnover, running at 16% annually between 1805 and 1812 (Fitton 
and Wadsworth, 1958, p 240). Gardiner provides an amusing example of how 
paternalist policies could be counter-productive; John Strutt, to "give a 
higher taste" to the Belper workpeople, had formed a choir and band of 
over 40 workers. Such was its success that 
The proficients were liable to be enticed away and to commence 
as teachers of music. To remedy this, the members of the 
orchestra are bound to remain at the works for seven years. 
(Gardiner, 1838, pp 512-3) 
Nonetheless, evidence suggests a growing positive response to pater-
nalism by at least some of the workpeople. There are many instances of 
tributes, expressing gratitude and affection. For example, on the occasion 
of William Hollins' marriage, his workpeople presented him with a silver 
salver and salts, with a letter praising his kindness. A later tribute to 
Edward Hollins in 1849 demonstrates both a deferential response and an 
acceptance of the unitarist viewpoint: 
In you, sir, the master is blended with the friend ... You have 
laboured with unwearied energy in raising us in the scale of 
intelligence - in proving to us by personal argument that the 
interests of master and servant are identical - that class 
interests are opposed to the welfare of the community - and 
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that the prosperity of a nation must depend upon a harmonious 
union and reciprocity of interests between the sons of toil 
and th~ wealthy capitalists. But~ sir~ more than this~ we 
have ever witnessed in you the tender sympathiser in afflic-
tion~ the secret benefactor in seasons of distress~ the 
anxious designer of our comforts~ the encouraging enquirer 
into our wants. 
If it is objected that this 1s the language of public rhetoric, a simpler, 
more modest tribute equally emphasises the daily success of the personal 
care ethic: 
It was Mr. William himself who came round the mill almost 
daily ... If you had an idea for an improvement you could teU 
him so and hear what he thought of it ... The personal note 
was dominant. 
(Wells~ 1968~ p ?0) 
Comments such as these are indicators of the success of paternalism 
1n attaching to the firm a core group of loyal workers. Whatever contra-
dictions and conflicts such public tributes may conceal, to observers the 
econom1c and social successes of the Arkwrights and the Strutts were good 
reasons for adopting their employment policies when faced with similar 
problems of labour recruitment and discipline. 
Section 3 Factory Paternalism 
Possibly the first factory paternalist 1n Leicestershire was John 
Heathcoat, whose Loughborough lace factory was attacked by Luddites. In 
1813 he was noted as giving twenty gu1neas to his hands and five to their 
wives to "make merry" at Christmas. When he decamped to Tiverton after 
the attack he took with him many of his Leicestershire workpeople, and 
set up a paternalist regime there~ Felkin reports that his workers "loved 
him like a father" (Thomis, 1968, p 132; Felkin, 1867, p 245). 
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When, much later, hosiery manufacturers built factories in Leicester 
and Nottingham, some of them, too, adopted the paternalist mould. Like 
the village paternalists they had worries over recruitment and discipline 1; 
they, too, had to handle a workforce which was seen as in need of protec-
tion (women and young children), they, too, faced moral panics, as scandals 
over prostitution and debauchery among factory girls succeeded to those 
over ill-treatment of pauper children, and they, too, wished to create a 
respectable public image for their enterprises, which would be consonant 
with the leading role they hoped to play in local political and social 
life. Paternalism, again, offered a solution to these problems. 
Before the consolidation of the factory system, one or two large 
hosiery firms had already gained a reputation for charity and benevolence, 
notably the Morleys in Nottingham (who were to carry paternalism into 
their factories) and the Biggs brothers and Richard Harris, the major 
L . 2 entrepreneurs 1n e1cester. A commentator writing in 1891 described 
John Biggs as 
A man of great abiZities~ generous and free-handed to a fauZt. 
His purse was ever open and he was a great friend to aZZ in 
distress. 
(Jones~ 1891~ p 10) 
Anecdotes are then recounted of the personal help he gave to his workmen. 
Even Chartist Thomas Cooper, no friend to privilege, praised Biggs as an 
exemplary master affording "English treatment" and "real philanthropy" to 
his hands (Biggs LRO). Similarly, Harris' biographer described him as a 
"kind master and a real friend", and illustrative anecdotes tell of his 
concern over his operatives' wages and conditions, and of a "benevolent 
1 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
2 The Biggs faiZed to make the transfer to factory production succes-
sfuZZy. Their business faiZed in 1861. 
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arrangement" to keep workers too old to adapt to new machines on their 
old-fashioned frames~ thereby losing the firm money. At his funeral in 
1854, among the 1,500-3,000 spectators were 
Great numbers of operatives, besides those belonging to his 
own firm, who were drawn to the spot by respect. 
(Lomas, 1855, pp ?8-9, 1?3) 
The charity of these great manufacturers and civic leaders was, 
however, directed more generally to the whole community. Factory pater-
nalism in its subsequent form was a much more specifically control-oriented 
strategy, aimed at the problems listed above. Devices used by the hosiers 
in the 1880s and 1890s were strikingly similar to those of the classic 
paternalists, but on a less lavish scale. Even so, they required levels 
1 
of expenditure which put them beyond the reach of small employers. 
A first priority was to set up a tolerable factory environment. Lace 
and hosiery factories in Nottingham were equipped with dining-rooms, washing 
facilities, libraries and chapels (Church, 1966, pp 290-2). Samuel Morley's 
factories were described as clean, light, airy and well-ventilated, and 
workers always received the top current prices. Morleys also set up a 
pension scheme for long-serving workers, which cost the firm £2,000 per 
annum (Hodder, 1887, pp 140-2). Hine and Mundella's Nottingham Manufact-
uring Company (NMC) had by 1868 a benefit club, a sports club with 
facilities for skittles, draughts and bagatelle, brass bands and sports 
teams (Church, 1966, p 268). Walkers' hosiery factory in the Leicestershire 
village of Fleckney provided "good wages, clean working conditions, a 
Mission Hall and a fine recreation ground" (Badcock, 1980, p 35). Walkers 
1 Contrast with the analysis of Newby ( 19??) which ties paternalism 
to small firms. 
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also endowed a hall and schools in Leicester (Wrights, 1888, p xxvii). 
Those setting up factories in the villages, such as Rowleys 1n Fleckney, 
and Morleys 1n Heanor, provided cottages for the workpeople (Thomas, 
1900, p 44; Badcock, 1980, p 30). 
Factory social rituals were also adopted, if on a more modest scale 
than the potlatches of the cotton magnates. Hine and Mundella instituted 
the practice of an annual factory excursion, as did other firms. One, 
Donningtons, arranged a weekend 'gypsy party' with tents, campfires, 
singing, dancing, dinner and a cricket match (Church, 1966, p 219). 
Similar outings were arranged by some of the larger Leicester firms 
(Lancaster, 1982, pp 115-6). Corahs of Leicester staged a series of 
spectacular parties to celebrate the extension of their premises in 1866, 
1882 and 1886, with dancing, feasting and entertainments (Webb, 1948). 
More humbly, Nottingham hosier James Allen simply invited his knitters to 
tea at his warehouse (PP 1854-5 xiv q 7005). 
Such entertainments altered in nature as cultural fashions changed. 
In 1907 the NMC gave a party when an employee at its Loughborough factory 
became the town's first Labour mayor. 750 employees were among the 900 
guests at the town hall, and "a popular feature •.. was a beauty contest 
among the girls employed by the company" (Deakin, 1979, p 102). Mundella 
must have turned in his grave! 
Another Loughborough hosier, Warner, enlivened the annual flower show 
he held in his park with a hot air balloon (Wix et al., 1973). This must 
have been more exciting than the delights served up by Adams of Nottingham 
in the 1860s; every morning in a special room a clergyman delivered "a 
short and interesting sermon" before everybody entered upon their "secular 
207 
duties". 1 The same gentleman made visits to workers who were sick or 
"otherwise afflicted" (Felkin, 1867, p 555). 
Describing these developments, Felkin, himself a manufacturer, 
makes explicit the connection with a unitarist stance: 
Other houses are using various means having the same end in 
view. These are steps in the right direction~ tending as 
they do to identify more clearly and plainly the true inter-
ests of the employers and employed. 
(Felkin~ 1867~ p 555) 
Samuel Morley had a similar policy and philosophy: 
The fullest and freest fraternity was established between 
capital and labour~ between master and workmen ... He 
always sought to make the interest of his workpeople iden-
tical with his own. 
(Hodder~ 1887~ pp 142-3) 
The use of the word 'fraternity' is significant. A key aspect of 
factory paternalism was encouragement of family links. Obviously, the 
domestic system had encouraged a work/family identification, and the 
parallels between family and employment relations had been drawn from 
early on. Robert Scott told the Committee on Artisans and Machinery how, 
before the advent of the Combinations Acts, "The man considered his master 
as his father, and the master considered his man as his child" (PP 1824 
v p 368). Thomas Corah in his evidence in 1854 made repeated reference 
to the trade being "family work", having a "family connection", and this 
tradition carried itself into the factories (PP 1854-5 xiv q 2892; Cassells, 
1873, p 63). Paternalists played up this aspect in their propaganda 
materi~l, and encouraged a family recruitment policy, along with a linked 
1 At one lace factory in the 1890s which continued the morning service 
tradition~ workers lost half an hour's wages for non-attendance.' 
(PP 1893-4 xxxvii Pt I p 169). 
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stress on long service, both of which policies emphasised notions of 
commitment and personal links within the factory. For example. a cent-
enary publication by Halls of Earl Shilton, Leicestershire, details the 
tradition of family employment ~n the factory. A Mrs. Quining was among 
the sixteen original employees ~n 1882 and Charlie Quining, who worked 
there from 1917 to 1973, is said to often visit the factory to "see old 
friends", including, no doubt, the four family members still working for 
Halls. The grand-daughter of the firm's driver of the 1890s was working 
there in the 1970s. 1 These details, however, pale in comparison with the 
history of the Shipman family, employed by Atkins of Hinckley from 1844 
on: twelve family members contributed a total of 377 years of service, 
including nine who served for over 25 years! Many similar "old families" 
and long-servers are mentioned in the firm's 150-year celebratory publica-
tion (Halls, 1982; Atkins, 1972). 
In addition to fostering actual family links, paternalists drew upon 
the imagery of the family as the model for industrial relations. The 
ideal 'good master' was kind and stern, firm but fair, keeping a watchful 
eye on both the behaviour and the welfare of his workpeople, exactly mirror-
ing the role of the Victorian paterfamilias. Thus, we are told of Samuel 
Morley that "beneath the somewhat stern exterior there dwelt a generously 
kind and loving heart" which extended "kind and even fatherLy treatment" 
(Hodder, 1887, p 150, my emphasis). Similarly of Colonel Atkins we read 
that beneath "this almost Victorian military bearing" lay "a wonderfully 
understanding and sympathetic character" to which the workpeople responded 
1 Of a Later driver~ we are toLd that a primitive tachograph instaLLed 
in his truck was a "paternaL" not a "punitive" check (HaUs~ 1982~ 
my emphasis). 
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with "great affection"; while his Victorian father, Arthur Atkins, "be-
loved by his workpeople", advised them "as a father would a son" according 
to their tribute on his death (Atkins, 1972, pp 10, 19). The Leicester 
Chronicle, describing Corahs' 1866 fete, spoke of 
The cordiality and good feeling which exists between employers 
and employed ... of that aZmost parental interest which the 
fir.m takes in their 'hands' 3 and of the devoted attachment of 
the latter to the interests of those with whom they have been 
fortunate enough to secure an engagement. 
(Webb3 19483 p 24) 
In 1886 John Cooper, the current head of the firm, stated that 
He looked upon all the workpeople as brothers and sisters and 
took it as a matter for congratulation that unity existed so 
much among them. 
(Webb 3 19483 p 48) 
Corahs was the outstanding example of successful paternalism in the 
industry. After its early switch to steam power, the firm went from 
strength to strength, ousting Biggs as the major Leicester employer and 
perpetually extending the size and range of its operations. The firm was 
the first to instal electric light and to provide a week's paid holiday, 
in 1885 and 1883 respectively. Corahs provided treats and gifts for the 
"aged poor", built homes for old framework knitters and instituted a 
charitable fund in memory of a family member who died in World War One. 
Gold watches were presented to long-serving employees: in 1886 there were 
170-80 who had served over ten years. On that occasion, a local newspaper 
described the operatives as "young men and women whose countenances beamed 
with intelligence and good humour", and praised the tastefulness of the 
women's dress: "of such a body of workpeople the firm ... may well be 
proud". It seems that the workpeople, in turn, were proud of the firm; 
among the decorations they made for the 1866 and 1886 festivities were 
mottoes such as "Success to the Firm", "May Unity ever exist between our 
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Employers and Employed" and "May commerce flourish and wealth increase. 
And Britons keep their homes in peace". A speech attacking trade unions 
was applauded at the 1866 ceremony: 
They were all union men and women - that was they were strongly 
and kindly united - (hear~ hear) to their kind and enterprising 
employers (loud cheers). He was glad to hear that was the only 
union~ which they as men of common sense believed in.l 
A strand of anti-union practice and ideology was common among pater-
nalist firms. The cases of Rowleys, Walkers and Byfords have already been 
referred to in Chapter 5. Walkers' paternalist wings extended as far as 
Hawick in Scotland, where Chaplin of LAHU was told when visiting the 
workers that "It's a good firm, considerate with their workpeople, pay 
old age pensions and maintain four cottages": Chaplin's curt reply was 
"History shows that some of the greatest thieves have been also very 
charitable men" (LAHU A December 15th 1913). Something of a feud had 
developed between Ernest Walker and the union leaders; in 1891 Holmes of 
LAHU went so far as to chase the firm to Nailsworth, Gloucestershire, 
where it had moved some machinery. The villagers, however, took Walkers' 
side, greeting Holmes with hostile jeers and howls. According to Holmes 
this was the result of Walkers' paternalism, blinding the workpeople with 
"benefactions of tracts, soup and blankets" (Lancaster, 1982, p 59). Those 
who joined the union were fined. Although Badcock claims that the 1886 
strike in Fleckney destroyed for ever by its bitterness the "traditional 
friendship" of workers and masters (Badcock, 1980, p 34), Walkers clung to 
a paternalist style right up to the takeover of the firm (by then Wolsey) 
in 1967 by Courtaulds. 
1 Material on Corahs comes from the interesting factory histories by 
Webb (1948) and Jopp (1965). See especially Webb pp 23-?, 46-8. 
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Such paternalist firms presented the unions with some of their 
fiercest struggles. Atkins were involved 1n a long confrontation with 
the Hinckley Union in the 1930s (HU July 8th 1935). Chaplin's comment 
on a Wigston factory neatly encapsulates the problems the unions faced: 
"There's a family influence about the place that will not be helpful to 
us" (LAHU A May 19th 1920). However, there was not an automatic link 
between paternalism and exclusionary policies. Despite the earlier 
opposition of Corahs to unions, by 1886 the progressive John Cooper was 
making conciliatory speeches, supporting the spread of unionism, and 1n 
Nottingham the paternalist leaders Morley and Mundella took the same line. 
The contribution of these men will be dealt with in Chapter 7. 
In the main, however, the exclusionary approach of firms like 
Walkers and Atkins seems to have been more common. As I tried to demon-
strate in Chapter 5, exclusionary policies had some lasting effect. It 
is harder, perhaps, to assess the pacificatory effects of paternalism on 
the rank-and-file workers. We must beware of simply assuming, as does 
Joyce, that a deferential response was evoked, especially if we use the 
word deference in its strong sense, that is denote the acceptance by the 
workpeople of their own inferior status and of their superordinates' 
superiority and right to exercise authority. 1 
Although it has been reported that in the 1920s Atkins' workpeople 
would doff their hats when they met their bosses in the streets, such 
customary trappings of deference may conceal a much more complex set of 
motivations. 2 Comments made by stockingers in 1845 shed a revealing 
1 See the account of deferential working-class imagery in Lockwood, 
1966. 
2 See Newby, 1979, pp 110-12, for a similar view of the ambiguity of 
deferential behaviour. 
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light on such deferential demeanour. One knitter explained that, when 
taking work in to a master 
If you do not bridle in3 and be very mute3 you suffer the 
worse: so that3 while undergoing these hardships3 you have 
to stand silent3 for if you say anything it must be either 
'Yes Sir' or 'No Sir'. 
(PP 1845 XV I q 7736) 
Another spoke of having to pray for work "for we more generally go like 
petitioners than defenders" (PP 1845 xv II q 359). The 'Framework 
Knitter' poem quoted from in Chapter 4 includes an instructive analogy 
in describing the same phenomenon: 
The word of command was brought forth to appear3 
Which I quickly obeyed with great rev'rence and fear3 
For we always assume the identical grace 
That a culprit displays to a justice of peace. 
(Sutton3 18523 p 93) 
In fact, I have found very scanty evidence of a true deferential 
acceptance of hierarchy on the part of the hosiery operatives. Occasional 
letters to masters and patrons are couched in the terminology of respect, 
d h . . 1 awe an um~l~ty. One 1845 witness spoke of how he and his fellows 
"looked up" to Richard Morley (PP 1845 xv II q 190). However, these few 
demonstrations of a deferential spirit are far outnumbered by statements 
manifesting a sense of injured human dignity, or pride in craft status and 
independence. 2 There is, however, considerable evidence of a positive 
response to paternalist management if we take deference in a rather weaker 
sense, to denote gratitude, affection, a sense of being looked after and 
of commitment to a 'good master'. Tributes of this kind were frequently 
paid to the paternalist employers, and are strikingly reminiscent of the 
1 For example, see AspinaZZ3 19493 p 324; Pickering3 19403 p 119. 
2 A sample of these can be found in Chapter 8. 
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tributes made to the classic paternalists of the earlier period. A 
selection are quoted here. 
A letter from Thomas Bent, secretary of the Straight-down Hose 
Branch to John Biggs spoke of "deep and heartfelt thanks for your un-
bounded philanthropy and benevolence" and concluded with a hope that the 
letter would not be read as "flattery and ostentatious display, but as 
the homage of grateful hearts for benefits received" (Biggs LRO). When 
Samuel Morley lost his Parliamentary seat on a charge of election mal-
practice, he received an unsigned letter, along with a bible and hand-
worked bookmark, from "the females in your employ" who spoke of their 
"great esteem" and "the great love and respect we feel towards you" 
(Hodder, 1887, pp 168-9). A funeral oration spoke of Morley's frequent 
presence in "very lowly gatherings and with very humble workers" whom he 
hoped to strengthen with "personal co-operation" as well as helping them 
with "some substantial donation11 (Harrison, 1886). Numerous comments show 
that Mundella, "The Poor Man's Friend 11 , was well thought of by his employees 
(Church, 1966, p 332). When Arthur Atkins died, 300 workpeople voluntarily 
attended his funeral, an event unprecedented in Hinckley; the newspaper 
tribute written by his operatives recorded that during his illness the 
constant enquiry had been "Have you heard how the Master is?", and the 
response to his death was "We had lost our best friend 11 • Why? Atkins had 
cultivated philanthropy and a personal link with them: 
If he met any of the workpeople he knew them, from the oldest 
to the youngest, and he never allowed them to pass without 
speaking in a kindly way to them. 
(Atkins, 1972, p 10) 
A portrait of Robert Walker was commissioned by his workpeople and pres-
ented to his sons in 1884 as a "mark of the esteem in which he was held 
by them as an employer" (Badcock, 1980, p 28). 
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Tributes to Corahs were numerous. A letter signed by seventeen 
employees, sent to Thomas Corah's widow in 1870, spoke of their cherish-
1ng his memory with 
The greatest respect ••• We remember that whenever we have met 
with him he always expressed great pleasure at the sight of 
old faces and we ever found him kind and friendly. 
(Webb., 1948., p 32) 
One of the seventeen was Ruth Wills, who had started work for the firm 
aged about ten, and subsequently wrote two volumes of poetry. An ode 
written by her for the 1866 "Warehouse Opening" demonstrates that she 
had internalised the unitarist viewpoint: 
Here may the hand that's willing 
Find ever work to do., 
Here may the earnest-hearted 
Work on with purpose true. 
May workers and employers 
Each for the other care., 
And in a generous spirit 
Each other's burdens bear. 
Another poem, celebrating a day spent by the workpeople at the Corah 
family's Scraptoft Hall, expresses a similar idea: 
Still may they prosper3 and we with them ever 
In mutual dependence bravely striVe3 
And win our way through earnest true endeavour 
To all the good that industry can give. 
(Wills 3 1861 3 p 60) 
The more intimate aspects of the paternalist personal-care ethic are 
symbolised by a poem "A Thank-Offering", recording the gift of "flowers 
m March" from John Cooper, her employer (Wills, 1868, p 104). 
Another group of employees presented John Cooper with an illuminated 
address, expressing "sincere regard and respect for you" and trusting 
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That the good feeling which has hitherto existed (as evinced 
by the fact that no less than 90 of the present workpeople 
have been in the service of your firm for periods ranging 
from 20 to 40 years) may continue. 
(Webb~ 1948~ p 50) 
A simpler but eloquent tribute is the story of Amos Barton, a knitter 
who spent 54 of his 70 working years with the firm; formerly he had had 
three masters, two of whom he quit because of the low wages they paid. 
At his death his son wrote 
He has been drawing a pension of 10/- a week from the firm 
for a matter of twelve years~ and I and the rest of the 
family wish you to accept our thanks for the same~ as it 
has been a means of him enjoying his oLd age. 
(Webb~ 1948~ p ?6) 
The successes of Corahs may be seen as a thorough vindication of 
paternalist management style. It seems that a considerable proportion 
of their workforce responded with gratitude, and with acceptance of the 
firm's values. It 1s notable that the paternalist firms (Corahs, Atkins, 
Walkers, Morley, NMC) were also the most economically successful in the 
industry: as opinion leaders, they set a tone and style which others might 
at least aspire to follow. 
Section 4 Paternalism and modernisation 
As has been indicated, the paternalist firms often continued their 
policies into the modernisation period. A tradition of paternalism had 
been set up, and while the firms retained, as most of them did, their 
pattern of family ownership and their pride in the established personal-
care style of management, it tended to remain. This spirit is well summed 
up by Guy Paget, himself a member of one of Leicester's leading industrial 
families (in banking): 
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It is the family firm, often now in its third or fourth gener-
ation, which has enabled the personal touch to be maintained 
between employers and employed, so that the latter are far 
more than 'hands'; and this has helped to keep Leicester 
similarly free from the strikes which have been so rife else-
where. A few years back I was talking to a middle-aged woman 
and asked her where she worked. She named the firm. 'Oh' 
said I 'I know Mr. So-and-So very well', mentioning the head 
of it. 'Isn't he a lovely gaffer' was her enthusiastic reply 
•.. Walk through a factory with the head of it and notice how 
he addresses all and sundry by their Christian names, and makes 
familiar enquiries as to a mother's health or the progress of 
a wife with a new baby ... the value of such personal relation-
ships needs no labouring. 
(Paget and Irvine, 1950, p 162) 
This personal rapport seems to have been particularly valued by 
female employees, as previously suggested. Some flavour of their res-
ponse can be gained from the depositions of pensioners remembering their 
work lives, held in Leicester Record Office (LRO DE 1313). Mrs. Birkin 
of Barrow-on-Soar recalled that in the strictly-disciplined factory where 
she started work 
The owner of the factory, a fine-looking gentleman, would visit 
once a week, and everywhere had to be cleaned; his wife often 
came too, we loved to see her, she would smile and talk to us 
as she moved down the alleys. 
Apart from the deferential tone of the description, this seems to indicate 
that the workpeople felt drawn into the family life of the employer by his 
wife's presence; a similar impression is gained from Mrs. Dennis' recollec-
tions of her time at Chilprufe Mills1 
Our boss was a real gentleman. In the Summer-time he would come 
round the factory, and all the shafting would be stopped and he 
would take about 36 girls to his big house and garden and we 
would go picking fruit. It was marvellous, very, very happy 
hours. I reaUy enjoyed every minute of it. 
1 Chilprufe have now ceased to be a family firm, and their new manage-
ment refused to let me interview them. 
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At all holiday times wages were doubled and Chilprufe she erroneously 
recalls as being one of the first firms to have a works outing; 18 
buses headed for Skegness. 
Facilities provided by the paternalist firms show both continuity 
with the past and a response to a changing social environment. For 
example, by the early 1960s Corahs was offering its employees canteen 
facilities (from 1936), medical and dental services (from 1946), social 
clubs, sports facilities, an 'Evergreen Club' for pensioners, a chaplain, 
a manicure service, and various pension and sick pay schemes, including 
a long-service award scheme 'Security through Service' (Jopp, 1965, pp 
57-8). 'Encore News', its house journal in the 1960s, makes mention of 
a suggestion scheme, a savings scheme and works advisory committees at 
the various branches. Parties emphasised the same themes of long-service 
and tradition, though sometimes tinged with traces of modernity. In 1965, 
560 out of a possible 680 employees with 25 years' service attended a 
dinner at Leicester's De Montfort Hall. In the same year at an 150-year 
celebration for the firm, fourteen of the female workers danced the can-
can, while the annual dance featured a Miss Corah competition! 
Hollins, now Viyella International, revamped its labour policy ~n 
1935, appointing a Welfare Officer: as well as welfare schemes, sporting 
and social clubs, pensions and long-service awards, it had a suggestion 
scheme, offering prizes of £1-25. A house magazine was instituted to 
improve communication, this being one way such firms attempted to get over 
the problem of increasing numbers of employees and maintain the personal 
link (Wells, 1968, pp 186, 239-30). Johnson and Barnes, a newer Leicester-
shire firm which adopted the paternalist style, had in 1951 "bright and 
cheerful canteens", an on-site clinic and a pension scheme; 150 of their 
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current workforce had over 25 years' service with the firm (Johnson and 
Barnes, 1951). 
With continued expansion, it was obviously hard to maintain the 
personal links with employees in the style of Arthur Atkins and Samuel 
Morley. Here, however, an institutionalised form of paternalism, as 
Abercrombie and Hill indicate, may evolve. The 'good master' gives way 
to the 'good firm'. Newby and Roberts in their accounts have overlooked 
this possibility and have thus underestimated the immense staying-power 
of paternalism once a tradition has been established. Only some major 
upheaval, in location perhaps, or more commonly in ownership, will rupture 
that tradition. For example, NMC passed out of the ownership of Mundella, 
and seems to have latterly abandoned the policy of progressive paternalism 
he established there. At two firms I visited which had recently been taken 
over by large corporations varied results were reported by the managers. 
In one case old traditions of family recruitment and keeping on 'policy 
cases' (old employees no longer able to achieve maximum productivity) 1 had 
been scrapped and a more ruthless dedication to profitability had been 
instituted. In the other case, it was reported that existing management 
staff who had been retained by the firm tried to preserve the old "family 
firm feeling" and "happy atmosphere". 
If anything, the use of family symbolism became more marked as the 
personal bonds actually weakened. A Christmas message to Hollins' employees 
spoke of "our great and growing family" (Wells, 1968, p 230). Johnson and 
Barnes recorded 
1 Note the parallel with the policy of Robert Harris ~n the 1840s. 
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A friendly atmosphere about the works ... fathers~ sons and 
cousins chatting together and with older employees who were 
grown workmen when the others were children ... The indefin-
able sense that it is a family firm ..• policies are probably 
formulated and decisions taken in the old-fashioned way. 
(Johnson and Barnes~ 1951) 
A publicity handout for Corahs states "Above all Corah cares, as it has 
always cared ••. The loyalty of our employees .•. is handed down from 
father to son". Jopp in his history of 1965 explains the firm's success 
and ability to survive recessions in terms of "their employees' co-
operation and goodwill" which firms that went under lacked. In 1965, he 
claimed, no other firm had so little sense of "We" and "They" or 
So much of a feeling of progress towards a real industrial 
partnership ... The family atmosphere~ and~ indeed~ the 
family Link in its most ZiteraZ sense has been preserved. 
(Jopp~ 1965~ pp 14~ 4?~ 54) 
'Encore News' too, emphasises the family theme. Its pages give details 
of marriages, engagements and births among employees. Pictures of 
employees are supplemented with personal details, especially stressing 
family contacts. One woman is described as follows: 
Very much a family woman~ she has three sons~ two grand-
daughters and a grandson. Her home is her hobby~ she takes 
a keen interest in this and her family. 
The Chairman, in his 1966 Christmas message, re-emphasises the importance 
of 
The homelife that begins and ends a day at work 
with our family that we renew our zest for life 
thanks for the joy of our family life. 
It is 
We give 
Finally, Halls in their centenary brochure encapsulate the paternalist 
ethic 
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HaLL and Son is stiLL a famiLy business. No smaLL achievement 
in this age of merger and takeovers.' But this famiLy of ours 
extends beyond the HaLLs - father and sons - to incLude the 
generations of workpeopLe and customers to whose LoyaLty we 
owe the greater part of our success. 
(HaUs~ 1982) 
While stressing the continuities of paternalist practice and manage-
ment style~ I also want to make it clear that it modifies in form, in 
response to a changing social milieu. On that basis we might distinguish 
from the 'classic' or 'factory' versions two 'mutant' forms~ which have 
evolved during the postwar period, 'nee-paternalism' and 'pseudo-
paternalism'. 
'Nee-paternalism' is the full flowering of the trends I have described 
~n this section. The case of 'Chemco', described by Nichols and Beynon 
(1977) could stand as a model. This is an institutionalised version of 
paternalism which differs from the early forms in seeking to incorporate 
the union, rather than excluding it or making it redundant. In this, it 
resembles what Fox called 'sophisticated paternalism' (Fox, 1974). 
Corahs as it is now is the single example of a nee-paternalist firm 
I have details of within the industry. In the 1880s its progressive head, 
1 John Cooper , started to promote union development in the industry. Since 
then the firm has, in the main, followed a policy of co-operating with the 
union. Jopp describes the firm's approach to unionism as "sensible": 
"Corahs encourage, but they do not compel, their employees to join, the 
appropriate union" (Jopp, 1965, p 57). Despite the lack of 'compulsion', 
union membership is notably high. 2 Currently Corahs pay the wages of two 
1 John Cooper was the onLy nineteenth-century head of the firm who was 
not a famiLy member. He was a protegJ of Thomas Corah; his origins 
are obscure~ but possibLy having 'risen from the ranks' made him 
more sympathetic to workers' organisations. 
2 92% in 1978. 
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full-time union representatives who have their own office and are welded 
into the personnel service of the firm. They deal with workers' personal 
problems, as well as union matters such as grading and pay adjustments 
and so on. Much of their attention apparently centres on the young women 
who represent something of a problem of management to the firm. Thus, 
paternalism continues to be associated with management of a female work-
1 force which can be seen as still needing 'parental care'. 
Neo-paternalism combines traditional welfarism with the incorporation 
of the union, building it, too, into the 'factory family' and allowing it 
to operate only within clearly specified limits. 2 Though it seems to work 
fairly well for Corahs 3 it is too expens1ve a strategy for smaller firms, 
which predominate numerically in the industry, to adopt. Such firms, by 
contrast, practise what I call 'pseudo-paternalism'. Many are strongly 
opposed to unions, often refusing access to officials. 4 Unable to afford 
welfarist provision, their personal-care strategy is limited to the attempt 
to recreate family patterns in the factory, by use of family symbolism, 
family recruitment, and in some cases an extremely genu1ne concern for 
employee well-being. Of one such firm, the local official 1n 1948 reluct-
antly confessed "The workers were so well looked after he had made no 
progress", while another told the union firmly 1n 1967 "The company is a 
family concern in which there is no place for a union" (LD October 25th 
1 There are many very young girls in the industry. A 1964 study of 
7 making-up departments found that 59% of single employees were 
aged 15-19 (about 1/4 of the whole female workforce) (Brown et al.~ 
1964~ p 27). 
2 See Nichols and Beynon~ 1977. 
3 Leicester District minutes reveal that post-war industrial relations 
at Corahs have been by no means easy; nevertheless3 the numerous 
small disputes that arise there are normally resolved with speed. 
4 See Chapter 5. 
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1948; NEC October 20th 1967). One manager I interviewed in 1984 described 
his firm as "a happy, friendly, family business"; he believed that many 
people preferred to seek out this sort of working atmosphere. 
These small firms put stress on family ties. Many of them 1n the 
industry today are Asian-owned, utilising kin- and family-based recruitment 
networks. An important strand of the small firms' policy is allowing fe-
1 
male workers flexible hours and time off to fit with family needs. The 
factory representative of one such firm described to me the easy atmosphere 
in the factory, the good treatment and understanding of the boss towards 
his female employees. At this firm, the workers showed their gratitude by 
voluntarily waiving a union-agreed 15% pay rise. At least two other small 
firms reported the same occurrence in 1980 (Leicester Trader, March 12th 
1980; Financial Times, April 18th 1980). Recession is seen as a joint 
problem for the 'factory family'. 
Although evidence is still scanty, it may well be that this is the 
typical pattern of employment relations 1n the 1980s in small firms with 
largely female workforces. Evidence of similar patterns in firms within 
the garment industry is provided, for example, by Chapkis and Enloe (1983, 
pp 25-36, 107-13), Coyle (1984, Chapter 2) and Sharpe (1984, pp 60-2). 
Certainly 'pseudo-paternalism' is widespread in the contemporary hosiery 
. d 2 1n ustry. 
1 Large paternaZist firms aZso practise this strategy. A study of one 
such firm in the 1960s reveaZed that~ whiZe onZy 7% of women worked 
pu.rt-time ~ 2 5% had 'conces sions'.from the firm~ i. e. were a Uowed to 
start sZightZy Zater or change Zunchbreak times to fit with domestic 
needs (University of Leicester SocioZogy Department~ 1961). 
2 Of the 16 firms in my sampZe~ three had under 50 empZoyees~ two under 
100. Four of these might have been described as 'pseudo-paternaZist'. 
Three aZZowed the femaZe empZoyees fZexibZe hours~ as did the non-
paternaZist smaZZ firm. In 50% of the 16 firms famiZy recruitment was~ 
or had been~ common. 
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Conclusion 
In the nineteenth century 9 paternalism was the ma1n pacificatory 
. h . d 1 strategy 1n t e 1n ustry. It was adopted to help labour recruitment 
and discipline, to encourage long-service and commitment, and to present 
an acceptable image to the public at a time when the industry was under 
considerable scrutiny. Once adopted, paternalism tends to endure unless 
some major upheaval breaks the continuity with tradition. It can be 
practised by both large and small firms, although the form and content 
of paternalist practice will vary between them. 
Certain circumstances, present in the hosiery case, seem to foster 
paternalism. First, it is often adopted where the workforce is defined 
as in need of guidance and protection, and thus is commonly associated 
with the employment of women. Second, it is more likely to prosper where 
there is a continuance over time of a family firm structure. Ownership, 
in fact, seems to me a much more significant factor than size. 2 In family-
owned firms, the idea of the family and the framework of paternal obliga-
tions and expectations has a more than merely symbolic importance. His 
own family's prospects will matter to the director as the workpeople's 
families do to them. Family priorities can then be transferred succes-
sfully to the industrial arena. Where family ownership is lost, the 
symbolism may still be used, but in a more manipulative fashion, and it 
may well lose its efficacy. 3 Thirdly, paternalism is more likely to 
1 Other pacificatory strategies, such as worker participation or job 
enrichment schemes have been rare in the industry. I have come 
across two examples of profit-sharing schemes, but they are defin-
itely the exception. 
2 The non-paternalist small firm I visited (32 employees) was the only 
non-family-owned firm of the 5. It was owned by a holding company, 
the original family having pulled out. 
Arguably, this has been the case at Corahs. 
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persist where there is a strong link between an industry and the commun-
ity. In such a context, industrial relations will be a matter of local 
public concern and debate. This was particularly the case in the hosiery 
villages, where paternalist power like that of Walkers was long hard to 
resist. Gurnham cites the examples of Pasolds at Langley, in Buckingham-
h . 1 s ~re. Pasolds were violently anti-union and employed the whole para-
phernalia of welfarist paternalism. An ex-employee recalled the "loyalty" 
between workers and management: "a sense of their common interest pervaded 
management-worker relations" (Gurnham, 1976, p 113). Close-knit village 
relations fostered such a spirit; but a town such as Leicester with a 
strong local tradition in a dominant industry, could equally nurture it. 
Here civic pride and identity may pressurise employers to consider their 
workpeople's welfare, and promote a sense of identification which over-
rides class interests. Thus, a local newspaper commented on the occasion 
of Corahs' 1886 festivities 
Eve~J Leicester man has reason to be proud of the Town whose 
merchants enunciate and act upon such principles. 
2 (Webb 3 19483 p 46) 
In his interesting and scholarly study of class politics in Leicester, 
Lancaster argues that paternalism, though attempted, was a failure. He 
claims that only Corahs succeeded in establishing a successful factory 
paternalist regime by 1885, and argues that paternalism failed because of 
the late persistence of the workshop system, and the resistance of a 
strongly independent craft-based work culture (Lancaster, 1982, pp 113, 
120). 
1 See Chapter 4. 
2 The role of tlze local authorities in arbitration procedures wiU be 
dealt with in Chapter 7. 
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Although Lancaster ~s right to stress the persistence of tradit-
ional craft culture 1 9 I believe he seriously underestimates the 
significance of paternalism, for several reasons. First, while it may 
be true that in Leicester in the 1880s only Corahs had achieved a fully-
established paternalist style, other firms in the region as a whole (in 
Nottingham, Hinckley and Fleckney) were adopting similar approaches, and, 
as I have argued, the influence of these major firms set a pattern which 
was later followed by other firms, such as Byfords, Halls, and Johnson 
and Barnes. A full-blown paternalism, being expensive, will only be 
feasible for a minority of firms, but these may exercise a pervasive and 
disproportionate influence on industrial life in the area, as happened in 
this case. Secondly, the focus of Lancaster's research, on radical and 
socialist politics, leads him to overestimate the influence of trade 
union activists. Certainly the leaders of LAHU, as I have shown, struggled 
against paternalism and resisted any kind of 'bourgeois hegemony'. 2 But 
paternalist practice ~s not directed at union leaders. Like many others, 
Lancaster has failed to note the vital distinction between un~ons and rank-
and-file workers as targets of management strategy. Thirdly, Lancaster 
largely ignores the role of women workers, at whom paternalism ~s so often 
aimed, and who seem more responsive to it. Finally, Lancaster ~s using 
the term paternalism very much in the sense of welfare provision, and makes 
no reference to the important role of family symbolism. 
I am not claiming that paternalist factory management resulted in the 
imposition of a cultural hegemony on the Leicester working classes. Studies 
have amply demonstrated the imperviousness of the working classes in the 
1 See Chapters 4 and 8. 
2 See also Chapter B. 
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nineteenth century to bourgeois morality and the campaign for 'rational 
recreation' . 1 My argument is that paternalism achieved its limited 
objecti.ves. that is the securing, among at least a section of the \vork-
force, of responses of gratitude, commitment and acceptance of the 
management view of industrial relations, if not of deference. In doing 
so, it made a major contribution in shifting the tone of industrial 
relations in hosiery away from confrontation to co-operation. 
1 See Bailey~ 19?8; Cunningha~~ 1980. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
"That is the rock on which too many of the employers spUt3 
and so long as we wish to make a world to please ourselves 
and wiZZ not take it as we find it3 I believe that we shall. 
have these strikes and lockouts •.. The Board is thoroughly 
convinced that in a free country where the workers and cap-
italists have a perfect right to enter into combinations3 
the simpZest3 most humane and rational. method of settling 
aZZ disputes betwixt employer and employed is arbitration 
and conciliation. 11 
A.J. MundeUa 
(PP 1867-8 xxxix qq 19372-7) 
11Their only object had been to bring together the employers 
and employees - believing that by the interchange of thought-
ful. opinion upon this important subject3 a broader basis 
might be Zaid3 and a truer recognition secured of the rights 
and responsibilities of capital. and labour. He hoped that 
interest would not subside that night3 but that some practical. 
good would be the result •.. ~n the formation of a union 
between 1capitaZ and labour' to discuss trade questions3 not 
in the storm of strikes3 but ~n the calm harbour of industrial. 
toil. II 
E. KiZZingZey 3 Secretary of 
Nottingham Liberal. Society 
(Ward3 18743 p 200) 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PACIFICATORY STRATEGIES: THE PROGRESSIVE OPTION -
JOINT CONSULTATION 
Introduction 
As a pacificatory system, paternalism could be described as backward-
looking: it is an attempt to recreate and reaffirm traditional values and 
relationships. Other pacificatory strategies could be seen as more 
forward-looking, anticipating and creating new values and relationships. 
What I shall refer to in this chapter as 'joint consultation' has been 
the major progressive pacificatory strategy used by hosiery employers. 
By joint consultation, I mean the whole array of negotiating prac-
tices, processes of consultation, arbitration and conciliation, along with 
the relevant institutions and services, which have come to typify post-war 
British industrial relations. 1 Such strategies work through and are 
directed at unions, rather than rank-and-file workers. In this, they are 
both pacificatory and incorporative, providing a role for trade unions 
within a harmonious model of industrial relations. 
1 This is a broader definition than that commonly found in industrial 
relations and industrial sociology texts~ where the term is more 
nar1~owly used to refer to the type of committees recommended in the 
Whitley Report. I have used it more broadly to cover not just these~ 
but the whole array of negotiating practices used in the industry: 
arbitration~ conciliation~ employee participation and~ indeed~ any 
centralised form of collective bargaining. I have chosen this term 
because the central characteristic of these strategies~ in this 
industry~ was talk~ what A.J. MundeUa called a "long jaw". The 
image of joint consultation is of men getting together round a table 
to talk things out sensibly and rationally. The more commonly-used 
term~ 'participation'~ seems to me to convey too great a sense of 
active involvement. The more active forms of involvement in decision-
making~ such as appointment of worker directors~ have not been tried 
in hosiery. The other alternative~ 'industrial democracy'~ seems to 
me emotive and misleading; no privately-owned hosiery firm is anything 
like a democracy~ in any meaningful sense of that word. The power 
imbalance is too great. 
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Although joint consultation may be seen as an alternative to pater-
nalism, it is in no way diametrically opposed to it. In fact, ~n the 
hosiery case, the initiators of joint consultation among the employers 
were often successful paternalists such as Mundella, Morley and Cooper. 1 
Other paternalists, however, remained committed to an exclusionary 
approach; equally it would be possible to find examples of those who 
espouse joint consultation but do not combine it with paternalism towards 
their workers. 
In this chapter I shall trace the history of joint consultation in 
the industry, concentrating particularly on two important institutions, 
the Nottingham Arbitration Board (NAB) and the National Joint Industrial 
Council (NJIC). I shall also consider the link of these with an ideology 
of industrial co-operation. 
Section 1 Early Experiments in Joint Consultation 
In his absorbing study of the building industry 'Masters, Men and 
Unions', Price claims that the development of institutionalised bargaining 
procedures and the modern industrial relations system represented a defeat 
for the workers, inhibiting the growth of a strong union and destroying the 
spirit of craft control. This, he argues, is because the new industrial 
relations were imposed by the masters on the men on terms which were bene-
ficial to themselves, for example, by limiting bargaining relationships to 
what they defined as valid issues, such as pay and conditions, and excluding 
negotiation over issues they defined as illegitimate, such as issues of 
control. In this way, institutionalised bargaining produced the economistic 
orientation characteristic of modern unions (Price, 1980). 
1 See Chapter 6. 
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Although it may indeed be the case that institutionalised industrial 
relations did ~n.the long term produce a more economistic and accommoda-
tive unionism, thus fostering the incorporation of un~ons into capitalism, 
the hosiery case provides clear evidence that this was not achieved by 
employers imposing such a system on unwilling union leaders. On the 
contrary, many of the initiatives for joint consultation came from the 
workpeople, and they consistently supported joint consultation schemes 
through the period under study, while the majority of employers only 
slowly and reluctantly came to accept them. It is true that it was the 
initiative of progressive employers which led to the formation of arbit-
ration boards in the 1860s, but when these collapsed it was the unions 
who campaigned for their revival. In fact, it could be argued that 
achieving joint control was the prime objective of the workforce in the 
early period. 
Some of the early forms of joint action have already been mentioned. 
The most rudimentary form was the meeting of delegates from both sides to 
draw up joint statements. Some of these attempts were successful (the 
Hammonds claim that the 1787 statement was honoured for twenty years), 
but, as we have seen, the majority quickly fell into disarray (Hammonds, 
1979, p 183). During the Luddite period, the Duke of Newcastle informed 
the Home Secretary that a "sort of negotiation" was going on between 
delegates of both sides, although the climate was hardly conducive to co-
operation (Aspinall, 1949, p 116). On some occasions both sides did work 
together, but this was almost always on an ad hoc basis, when they per-
ceived some course of action as in their common interest. The Derby 
alliance in 1812, the Leicester joint petition against cut-ups and the 
. d 1 1843 Anti-Truck Association have already been ment~one . Other examples 
1 See Chapters 4 and 5. 
231 
were the joint campaign against the employment of paupers as stocking-
makers by the parish overseers in 1817, and a joint campaign in the 
relaterl lace industry against foreign imports, led by Felkin and Henson 
in 1833 (Aspinall, 1949, p 235; Church, 1966, p 99). 
But such campaigns were a far cry from the establishment of regular 
consultative procedures, and approaches by the operatives to their masters 
concerning such procedures were generally rejected. In 1823, Benjamin 
Taylor, Nottingham knitters' leader, addressed the hosiers in the Notting-
ham Review: 
Call a meeting of your own body~ and three of the most intel-
ligent persons shall attend it on the part of the trade to 
consider the great claim of abuses. 
(Church3 19663 p 50) 
This met with no more enthusiastic response than did a similar appeal of 
the Leicester operatives in 1838, who declared they did not wish to start 
a union on "former principles" since such an organisation "must ever prove 
abortive" while the hosiers remained disunited and committed to principles 
of free competition, "that monster which has injured you and ruined us". 
Reminding the hosiers that they had never organised themselves except in 
opposition to the workpeople, they called on them to act "upon more 
enlightened principles, believing that the interests of employers and 
employed are identical". But this conciliatory language left the employers 
unmoved; only 6 attended the subsequent meeting, though 140 circulars had 
been sent out. The operatives had reluctantly to conclude that the manu-
facturers' indisposition to talk had "thrown them upon their own resources" 
1 (Wells, 1972, p ll5). 
1 Richard Harris was one of the few hosiers who supported the scheme 
throughout. The men had proposed a committee of equal numbers from 
both sides3 plus six arbiters 3 three chosen by each side. This plan 
the hosiers considered unworkable (Patterson3 19543 p 300). 
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There are only two examples of a successful 'joint union' during 
this period. The first was a brief experiment in the bobbin-net trade 
~n 1829, supported by Felkin, one of the few employers wholeheartedly 
to espouse the idea of arbitration. He claimed that 7/8 of the employers 
had agreed to support the scheme, which lasted ten months, and fizzled 
out because the trade position was "vastly improved". Felkin considered 
this body had tried to regulate conditions too vigorously, but neverthe-
less saw it as a successful pilot (PP 1856 xiii q ll25). A longer-lasting 
experiment was the Hinckley Joint Union, which lasted from about 1831 to 
1838. This had financial support from local tradesmen and was managed by 
a committee of 21 principal townspeople (Wells, 1972, p 115). 1 The reasons 
for its collapse are not clear, but by 1845 Hinckley knitters' representa-
tives were urging the establishment of a new joint union. One, John Brooks, 
alleged "We do not want to be arrayed against the masters, we want them to 
come and reason with us". A similar scheme had been suggested at a meeting 
in 1843 at the Hinckley Mechanics' Institute, which called for a "union of 
all classes" to promote peace while securing for the operative "the just 
price for his labour". The planned committee would consist of six opera-
tives, three hosiers and three "gentlemen"; funds would come from middle-
class subscribers and operatives' contributions. But this, too, failed to 
gain sufficient support (PP 1845 xv I qq 3837, 4049). 
Despite the lack of response, the operatives continued to favour the 
joint union approach and gave support to Felkin ~n his campaigns for local 
arbitration boards to be set up on the model of the French Conseils de 
Prudhommes. Felkin spoke consistently in favour of these bodies in his 
1 PossibZy this demonstrates the power of community spirit &n a smaZZer 
town Zike HinckZey. 
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evidence to various Parliamentary Commissions. In 1844 he conducted a 
survey of opinion on the issue~ once again, most employers rejected the 
proposals, saying "It wouldn't work in England", but bodies of workmen 
welcomed them. For example, a Leicester meeting, claiming to represent 
1800 hands, considered their situation such as ''to call aloud for inter-
ference from some quarter or other" to protect them from the "mere whim 
or caprice" of two or three manufacturers. Other groups considered it 
essential that there should be equal numbers of representatives from both 
sides and criticised the French model as only men owning four looms could 
stand: in England, such men "are what we call middle masters". They 
suggested separate bodies for the three counties, demonstrating the strong 
local orientation of trade unionism in this era. A petition from the 
Leicester hands called for local boards to be established on these lines 
Having for their object the conciliation of differences, the 
adjudication of small su~s in dispute, and vindicating the 
lai.J in local matters of trade. 
(Felkin, 1845, pp 4?-8, 186?, p 4?3) 
Thomas Winters, a Leicester knitters' leader who later became Secretary 
of the National Association of United Trades and the Protection of Industry, 
was another determined advocate of arbitration boards. He reported that 
in 1849 the operatives had memorialised the Board of Trade on the issue, 
and that both in Nottingham and in Leicester they had drawn up draft consti-
tutions. Strikes, he considered, were "equally injurious" to operatives and 
masters, and he described how one strike in Nottingham had been settled on 
his advice by setting up a temporary conciliation committee, consisting of 
1 
a clergyman and "three or four other gentlemen" (PP 1856 xiii qq 376, 466). 
1 The idea of "gentlemen" and local dignitaries such as magistrates 
acting as arbitrators see.'~zs to have appealed particularly to the 
knitters in rural areas, UJhere there UJas a stronger response to 
traditional paternal is~r;. 
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Again in 1960 he reported that there were currently campaigns going on 
for arbitration in Leicester and Nottingham (PP 1860 xxii qq 364, 378). 
In 1854 John Sketchley, Hinckley knitters' leader, reported yet another 
attempt to establish a tripartite "conunittee of arbitration" which was 
rejected, yet again, by the employers (PP 1854-5 xiv q 3866). 
However, by 1860 the Hinckley workpeople had gained an important 
ally, in the shape of John Atkins, who supported the idea of the boards, 
although expressing doubts as to whether many of his colleagues would 
agree. In his view anything was welcome that "would tend to better the 
relations between masters and men". He rejected the idea of each side 
choosing representatives from the other as this would tend to encourage 
the election of moderates, and he foresaw difficulties over finding a 
chairman: it must be s'omeone who knew the trade (PP 1860 xxii qq 738-50, 
783). 
Such support from a manufacturer was rare; apart from Felkin and 
Harris, few helped the operatives to campaign for arbitration boards. It 
was noticeably the larger and more successful employers, such as the afore-
mentioned, who supported the arbitration schemes; they stood to gain more 
than their smaller competitors from the stabilisation of prices. However, 
their motivation was not purely economic, for these men were the philan-
thropic leaders of the local conununities: Felkin and Harris both became 
mayors, as did John Biggs, who is also recorded as favouring arbitration 
(Leicester Museums, undated). Other masters might give support in a less 
specific way. For example, Leicester union leaders spoke of some manufac-
turers "who have been our friends at all times" encouraging them in their 
union activities in 1819 and 1820 (PP 1824 v p 270). William Preston, 
praised by Thomas Winters as one of the best employers, is recorded as 
having taken the initiative in instituting "gatherings" which 
235 
During the last two years have been productive of so much 
good in removing the unhappy misunderstandings which have 
caused such acerbity and antagonism between employer and 
employed. 
(Jones~ 1853 p vii) 
But these were the exceptions. The majority of hosiers opposed the 
idea of joint consultation. They did so, it was claimed, because they 
believed arbitration to be Utopian and impractical, because they felt it 
would lead to prying into their businesses and because it was "derogatory 
to their position and independence" (Felkin, 1867, pp 485-6). This last 
was linked to an ideological attachment to laissez-faire individualism. 
Mundella, describing his campaign for arbitration boards to the 1868 Trade 
Unions Commission, explained that 
My obstacle ... wherever I go to get a board formed~ is that 
masters have that old feudal notion they will deal with men 
one at a time ... The masters are~ as a rule~ opposed to any 
inroad upon their old-established notions; they have not yet 
realised the new order of things. 
(PP 1867-8 xxxix qq 19474~ 19480) 
In addition to this conservatism, the Nottingham situation was impaired 
by the state of hostility and mutual distrust which prevailed as a result 
of the industrial conflicts of the past sixty years. Mundella told the 
Commission of this, describing the "bad" feeling held by some employers 
towards working people, and the reciprocal feeling that 
It was impossible for a manufacturer to be a just and honest 
man ... He must be an oppressor from his position. 1 
Hostility was enflamed by the war of propaganda: 
S-ince I was a child~ I do not know that I ever walked the 
streets without seeing some of those handbills. 
1 Note that oppression is related by Mundella to the manufacturers' 
structural position (class)~ not to personal characteristics or ill 
disposition (see Chapter 8). 
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As a result, when he finally instituted the Nottingham Arbitration Board, 
The men were very suspicious at first; indeed it is impossib~e 
to describe to you how suspicious~y we ~ooked at each other. 
Some of the manufacturers a~so deprecated our proceedings and 
said that we were degrading them and humi~iating them. 
(PP 186?-8 xxxix qq 1934?~ 193?6-?~ 19480~ 19682~ 19690) 
This climate of hate was unlikely to promote a spirit of co-operation. 
However, the men, as Mundella affirmed, clung to the idea as a possibility; 
the majority of masters saw no reason to alter old habits. 
Section 2 The Nottingham Arbitration Board 
Mundella took over from Felkin as the major campaigner for institutions 
of joint consultation. In v~ew of the climate described above, it is a 
remarkable tribute to his energy, persistence and high-standing that he 
succeeded in establishing the NAB ~n 1860. Following a series of four 
strikes in that year, with a lockout threatened in return, Mundella called 
a meeting of a dozen union representatives and two other leading hosiers; 
from this meeting sprang the NAB which stayed in existence until 1884. 
The objectives of the NAB were, according to Mundella, 
To arrange for a unifo~ rate of wages and to produce a good 
understanding between masters and workmen without strikes.l 
Trade was good at this time, and anxiety to avoid strikes must have motiv-
ated the previously reluctant employers in this attempt at arbitration. 
Originally the Board consisted of seven members from each side: numbers 
were later increased to nine, then ten. Workers proposed a manufacturer 
1 Detai~s of the NAB throughout this section are taken from PP 186?-8 
xxxix pp ?3-83; Fe~kin~ 1867~ pp 483-9; Church~ 1966~ pp 269-?; 
We~~s~ 19?2~ Chapter 9. 
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as President (Hundella was inevitably elected), and manufacturers a work-
nlan as Vice-President. The workers' side was elected by ballot, organised 
by the unions, one representative coming from each branch. The unlon-
linked nature of the scheme reflected the ideology of Mundella, who was 
firmly pro-union, and declared that the scheme would be inoperable without 
union co-operation. Meetings were quarterly, with provision for special 
meetings at seven days' notice. In 1886-7, for example, eight meetings 
were held. In that year seven of the employers were from Nottingham, one 
from Loughborough and two from Belper, covering the area represented by the 
Board. 
Specific disputes and grievances were dealt with prior to the general 
meetings by a committee of enquiry, consisting of four members, annually 
elected. Mundella stated that the meetings were conducted in an "exceed-
ingly informal way" and that workmen and manufacturers often sat inter-
mingled. Originally the President had a casting vote, but on the two 
occasions Mundella used it it caused bitterness, so 1n 1864 voting was 
abolished. Decisions were to be obtained by reaching consensus, by what 
the operatives, according to Mundella, called "a long jaw". In 18i0, 
however, a neutral referee was appointed, making the Board rather more like 
a body of arbitration in the modern sense than the joint consultative body 
it actually was. The men insisted, according to Mundella, on having a 
secretary of their own in attendance, to facilitate reporting back to the 
members. In Mundella's account of these arrangements, the noticeable thing 
is the flexibility with which this pioneer consultative body worked: it was 
not bound by its bureaucratic arrangements, and modifications were made to 
get the best possible degree of harmony in its functioning. 
At first only half of Nottingham's forty hosiers joined it, but 
Mundella and the workmen gradually worked on the rest, so that by 1868 only 
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two or three stayed outside it. This was crucial to the Board's success; 
but even before 1868 it was apparently managing to get the hosiers to 
abide by its rulings. Its successes in this early period were considerable. 
It played a strong role in suppressing truck in Nottinghamshire1 , it helped 
achieve a reduction in frame-rent, and it stopped the practice of middlemen 
taking an extra charge as part of the rent. It ended the practice of paying 
wages late on Saturday or even on Sunday morning. To a large extent it 
succeeded in establishing agreed piece rates in most branches. There was 
also an immediate decline in strikes, although in the latter stages of the 
Board's existence this new industrial harmony somewhat collapsed. 
There were also less tangible effects. In Mundella's opinion, at 
least, the NAB helped develop a conciliatory spirit between the two sides, 
putting an end to "chronic warfare .•. betwixt labour and capital". It 
fostered "free and honest" exchange of views, which brought a greater under-
standing on both sides. For the operatives, it had been "a complete 
educational process", making them familiar with the "laws" of the trade 
and the requirements of supply and demand; trained in political economy, 
they could then appreciate the "justice" of the manufacturers' wages 
policies (Felkin, 1867, p 486; PP 1867-8 xxxix q 19358, 19377). The masters, 
for their part, were said to have learned to appreciate the workpeople's 
difficulties and struggles to earn a living, thus ceasing to "regard them 
as their natural enemy" (Felkin, 1867, p 486). In Hundella's v~ew 
The feeling at the present moment is more cordial and more 
loyal and friendly than I could ever have believed it possible 
•.. We learn what the workman's position is and he learns 
what ours is. 
(PP 1867-8 xxxix qq 193773 19715) 2 
1 See Chapter 5. 
2 These are3 of course3 the views of the Board's strongest advocates. 
But unfavourable comments on the Board are not reported. 
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Mundella's 1868 evidence provides some interesting examples of the 
type of issue the NAB handled, and illustrates the improved relationship 
between the two sides. Discussions were going on over hours: the opera-
tives wished to reduce the working day from 14 to 10 hours, explaining 
to the hosiers the adverse effects of long hours (illness, exhaustion, 
exposure to gas and high temperatures). In another case, two manufacturers 
had been deputed to reason with a colleague threatening a price reduction. 
A wages claim had been received, signed by 800 of the Drawer, Pantaloon 
and Shirt Branch members, who expressed a belief in the NAB's "desire to 
promote our mental and social welfare". Recent resolutions passed by the 
workers' side had praised Samuel Morley's annuity scheme for "strengthening 
the hands of the Board in its efforts to promote a good understanding bet-
ween employers and employed", and expressed sympathy for two hosiers whose 
factory had burned down. 
Despite these initial successes, the NAB ran into trouble in the 1870s. 
The reasons for its decline and eventual demise are far from clear. In 
1872, after dissension between the unions representing circular, rotary and 
hand-frame operatives, the latter two sections seceded. The hand-frame 
workers appear to have felt that the NAB paid insufficient attention to 
their special problems, and the rotary workers were angry about the rejection 
of a pay claim (Church, 1966, pp 275-6). Strikes which erupted during this 
period are also likely to have revived the employers' doubts as to the 
feasibility and efficacy of joint consultation. Mundella's departure to 
1 higher planes was without doubt another factor. At the 1892 Labour 
Commission sessions, with Mundella now serving on the committee of enquiry, 
1 Mundella was elected to Parliament in 1868, and gave up his manufact-
uring connections in 1871. The latest reference to him as President 
of the NAB I have traced is for 186?. 
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both sides blamed the other for the collapse. Mundella ascribed it to 
the inter-union disputes, but the knitters' representatives, Samuel Bower 
and, more particularly, Bonser and Oscroft of the hand-frame section, were 
adamant that "it was broken up by the manufacturers; they smashed it up". 
All three regretted its decline and Bower described his efforts over the 
past three years to get it revived. Letters had been sent to employers, 
but only n~ne out of fifty had replied, with only one writing in favour 
and the other four firmly opposed (PP 1892 xxxvi pp 66, 88-9). Other 
campaigns to revive it were mounted by the workpeople in 1889 and 1894, 
but met with no success (Church, 1966, pp 278-9). 
Church argues that the collapse was the inevitable result of market 
pressures in a highly competitive industry (Church, 1966, pp 276-7); 
certainly the centrifugal forces in the 1870s seem to have eventually 
outweighed the centripetal impetus provided by Mundella. Nonetheless, 
this early attempt at institutionalising collective bargaining procedures 
was influential, not only as a model for similar projects in other indus-
tries like boot and shoe, but also as a pattern for later developments ~n 
hosiery. Its effect upon the unions, and its role in tightening the 
employers' control are hard to assess. Church believes that it retarded 
union development and modernisation by keeping subscriptions low (members 
paid 1/- a year instead of 1/- a week), so that the unions could not develop 
upon 'new-model' lines, and by making them too reliant on the NAB in a 
period when, because of the favourable economic climate, they could have 
consolidated their bargaining strength and procedures in an autonomous 
fashion (Church, 1966, p 273). Bythell agrees, maintaining that by relying 
on the NAB rather than the unions to solve their problems the operatives 
were, in effect, accepting a pattern of industrial relations on the employers' 
terms (Bythell, 1978, p 211). Such interpretations would lend support to 
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the v1ew that joint consultation acts to tighten employers' control, 
whether or not this result is consciously intended. Wells, however, 
believes that, far from weakening trade unionism, the NAB strengthened 
it, and helped to foster the development of the inter-union MCHF (Wells, 
1972, p 140). Gurnham, too, rejects the argument that arbitration boards 
in general threatened union militancy by curbing development at a vital 
1 
stage. He argues that the hosiery unions were too weak to make any 
gains without the NAB's help (Gurnham, 1976, pp 28-9). 
As Gurnham says, these assessments must remain essentially specula-
tive, especially in an industry where unionism was comparatively weak. 
However, it is worth noting the case of Leicester, which provides us with 
a kind of counterfactual example. Here the Arbitration Board established 
in 1866 was notably less dominant and effective, while at the same time 
the Leicester operatives sustained the most successful un1on of this epoch 
h . 2 1n OS1ery. On the other hand, the development of a strong arbitration 
board in another Leicester industry, boot and shoe, arguably played a part 
in defusing a highly volatile and militant union tradition. 3 Local observers 
4 
noted the pacificatory role of the boot and shoe board. 
As Lancaster argues, since Mundella arbitration had come to bear a 
symbolic importance beyond its role as a device for settling disputes; it 
1 See Price~ 1980; Allen~ 1964~ for the view that arbitration boards 
acted to deradicalise unionism. 
2 See Figure 3.2 for evidence of the subsequent weakness of the Notting-
ham Union. 
3 See Goodmanet al., 197?. 
4 George Thorpe, a Leicester shoemaker, in an autobiographical statement~ 
paid tribute to his fellows for "their outstanding and proud record of 
arbitration between master and man which has held the peace for them 
all this century" (Thorpe, LRO); while a local historian spoke of their 
board enabling employers and workers to co-exist peacefully for 40 years~ 
holding it up as an example of how to settle disputes without resort to 
"the disastrous method of strike and lockout" (Waddington, 1931~ pp. 115-
6). 
242 
was part of a new political ideology (Lancaster, 1982, p 204). A s1ncere 
commitment to this essentially pluralist ideology would surely have conseq-
uences for trade union politics and strategies, but it remains uncertain 
how far that ideology was accepted by the unions, who still seemed 
reluctant to abandon the strike weapon in favour of compromise and an 
acceptance of mutual interests in capitalist development. What men like 
Hundella may have hoped to achieve by way of control may be illustrated 
by a comment from an observer who believed that arbitration boards 
WouLd have the saLutary effect of rendering nugatory the 
Labours of those cLever but unscrupuLous adventurers who 
use their arts to misrepresent facts and infLame their 
feLLow workmen against their masters. 
(Nottingham Review_, quoted Armytage_, 1951_, p 33) 
The Leicester comparison is interesting. The Leicester board was 
1 
not influential and rarely met. John Lamb, secretary of the NAB, des-
cribed the Leicester Board as "not a very lively thing", maintaining that 
it had not been well organised (PP 1871 xxxvi q 42520). Benjamin Wates, 
Leicester manufacturer, also had a low opinion of it, speaking of its 
"laxity and indifference"; he explained that it had faced a problem of 
deadlock, due to lack of an umpire (PP 1892 xxxvi p 51). Holmes described 
it as "in such a state of decomposition" that it had proved impossible to 
convene it as required. His explanation for this was that both sides had 
lost confidence in themselves and each other; but he also maintained that 
the board was redundant in Leicester, as relations between the two sides 
were "fairly friendly" so that if any dispute arose there was "no diffic-
ulty whatever" in the two sides meeting (PP 1892 xxxvi pp 53-4). This 
1 It did_, however_, have at Least a List of members_, nine manufacturers 
and nine workers_, in 1888_, incLuding DanieL Merrick among the work-
men (Wrights Directory .. 1888). 
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rosy picture of industrial relations was echoed by the Leicester Chamber 
of Commerce in 1911, when its yearbook spoke of the town's "remarkable 
immunity from serious industrial trouble" (Leicester Chamber of Commerce, 
1911, p 35). 
A rather different picture 1s gained from the LAHU minutes of indust-
rial relations up to 1914, which might lead us to question Holmes' "official 
version" of things. A revealing discussion took place at the 1891 AGM, 
when a motion not to recognise the Arbitration Board was tabled, although 
it was then amended to allow recognition on condition that rule 9 was 
altered 
To allow the Chairman to be elected from the workmen's side 
equally with the employers ... as the hosiery trade cannot 
recognise inequality where only equality ought to exist. 
(LAHU A March 26th 1891) 
This surely indicates not only a considerable opposition 1n the union to 
arbitration at any price, but also a stronger spirit of independence than 
displayed by the Nottingham operatives. As the early leaders of LAHU were 
a group of ILP socialists 1, Holmes, Chaplin, Barclay and Warner, it may be 
that there was some ideological resistance here to the notion of arbitration 
and the "political ideology" it represented. Warner, certainly, spoke 
against it at the AGM. 
2 On the employers' side, John Cooper, the progressive opinion leader , 
shared Mundella's pro-union views, but did not display the same tenacious 
commitment to arbitration, although it 1s reported that 1n 1894 he organ-
ised a visit by the Lord Mayor of London 
1 See Chapter B. 
2 See Chapter 6. 
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With a view to promote good will and friendly feelings between 
the hosiery workers and their employers~ and further to consider 
the inauguration of a scheme whereby all disputes should be 
settled by arbitration. 
(Webb~ 1948~ p 49) 
On the whole, though, he concentrated his efforts on dealing with the 
union on an enterprise basis~ as a result of the policy he initiated, 
Corahs could reasonably claim ~n 1910 that they had always tried to work 
with the union (LAHU A October 17th 1910). There was also a tendency in 
Leicester to use more ad hoc methods of arbitration in severe disputes. 
Mayors were called in as conciliators in disputes in 1886 and 1914, and 
at Wolsey in 1932 (PP 1892 xxxvi q 12713; LAHU A May 19th 1914; Littler, 
1982, p 125). Industrial troubles were still seen as a problem for the 
community. 
In relation to this, it should be emphasised that these moves, 
ambiguous and only partly successful as they were, towards joint consulta-
tion, took place in a general climate of debate, both local and national, 
about the handling of industrial relations, given the fact of a now fully 
legal and stabilising trade union movement. Nationally the official view 
is perhaps epitomised in this declaration by Factory Inspector, Alexander 
Redgrave: 
The harmonious co-operation of employers of all classes and 
the increasing feeling that the interests of employers and 
employed are bound together have greatly contributed to this 
end ... The whole country is now of one mind ... Labour should 
be moderate~ workrooms and factories should be made healthy ... 
(PP 1871 xiv p 9) 
A new creed of co-operation was being formulated, and Mundella was 
one of its prophets. Its ministrations were strongly felt in Nottingham 
and Leicester. An interesting document 'Capital and Labour' describes a 
series of meetings between trade union leaders and local employers, 
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organised by the Nottingham Liberal Club in 1874 to discuss industrial 
relations. Unfortunately no hosiery operatives were involved, but the 
ideas expressed no doubt held wider currency in the Nottingham manufact-
uring community. Manufacturers spoke of trade unions as a "necessity", 
of the "great benefit" they could offer to the cormnunity and nation, and 
of the desirability of forming a un1on of both capital and labour to 
further the "general welfare" of all classes (Ward, 1874, pp 107, 125, 
200). 
These v1ews were not the norm 1n this period, as the last two chap-
ters have shown, but the local men who voiced them were powerful community 
leaders. Mundella, Morley, Cooper and the Atkins were clever businessmen, 
who realised that the stabilisation of industrial relations was in the 
interest of their firms; but their lives also suggest a sincere cormnitment 
to promoting the well-being of the working classes. Mundella, for example, 
fought consistently not only for arbitration boards but also for legal 
recognition of trade union rights. It is hard to reject the verdict of 
his biographer, Armytage, that this was no simple move to incorporate the 
working classes, but a genuine collectivist altruism (Armytage, 1951, p 
318). Morley, too, was a staunch advocate of arbitration and defender of 
trade unions, believing that "employers have often benefitted by their 
existence" (Hodder, 1887, pp 272, 300). John Cooper reversed Corahs' 
anti-union policy, speaking strongly in favour of unions in 1886: 
The future was not far distant when the workpeople of the county 
would be sufficiently wise to form a strong union amongst them-
selves ... and he was quite sure that all of them- and he hoped 
they belonged to one or other of the unions in Leicester - would 
receive them with open arms. 
(Webb, 1948, p 46) 
Cooper believed that only strong un1ons could solve the problem of perpe-
tual price undercutting by county manufacturers, and thenceforward Corahs 
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combined their paternalism with a positive attitude to unions. 1 
As a result of the actions and statements of these men, there slowly 
came into being what the Victoria County History refers to as "a spirit 
of confidence between employer and employee" (VCH, 1955, p 19), although 
this spirit was still frail. The next period was to see its consolidation. 
Section 3 Co-operation and Whitleyism 
The war threw both sides willy-nilly into closer contact with each 
other, as work on government contracts got under way. The unions' first 
responses to their improved bargaining position were, however, not concil-
iatory but aggressive. In May 1915, backed by unprecedently strong rank-
and-file support, LAHU threatened a strike unless war bonus was paid on 
contract work. The union had been advised that, despite wartime agree-
ments, it would be legal to strike. The membership vehemently rejected 
all compromise, sticking to a demand for a penny 1n the shilling bonus. 
After Government intervention, settlement was reached with astonishing 
rapidity, and the union gained its demands. The resultant negotiating 
meeting was the first of many between the two sides during the next three 
years. Noting the presence of two manufacturers who employed non-union 
labour, LAHU leaders commented acidly, "We do not object to their presence, 
but we are a little surprised" (LAHU A June 2nd, 1915). The other unions 
all had similar successes (Gurnham, 1976, p 76). 
This initial confrontation was the base for regular meetings of rep-
resentatives of both sides. On December 5th, 1915, 25 manufacturers and 
14 union representatives met to agree substitution rules; the meeting was 
1 See Chapte1• 6. 
lh..l 
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"harmonious", and LAHU noted the "fix" the employers were in, as the 
Government were pressing on them both to increase output and to release 
male labour for military service (LAHU A December 8th 1915). In the 
intervening months the unions had gained self-confidence from involvement 
in meetings with Government, and from the Government's call for TUC co-
operation in the war effort. Further demands for increased bonus were 
met without the necessity for strike action by means of Government arbit-
ration procedures, although the results were not perceived as wholly 
satisfactory by the unions. 1 However, the relatively smooth settlements 
may have convinced the manufacturers that arbitration was useful. In 1917 
there was talk of establishing a joint consultation board, and in 1918 
firmer moves were made to institute procedures in line with the Whitley 
recommendations. On one occasion Frank Moore, Secretary of Leicester 
Manufacturers' Association, approached Chaplin, saying that he considered 
it time that "labour and capital carne closer together" and suggested 
working together for a national government (LAHU A July 28th 1917, March 
8th 1918). 
The first meeting of the National Joint Industrial Council (NJIC) 
was held on May 21st 1918. Prior to this, a meeting of 150 manufacturers 
had agreed to participate in the experiment. Their favourable response, 
according to Gurnharn, reflects a change of heart over the war years. This 
was partly a reaction to increased union strength (membership had quadrupled 
over the war), partly to wartime conditions; increased contact with un1ons 
had led to better personal relationships. In addition, there was a desire 
1 Bassford of the Nottingham Union shocked the respectable Chaplin by 
declaring that they should go to arbitration but "if it ZJas against 
us ZJe could refuse to abide by it"! (LAHU A April ?th 191?). 
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to show the Government that the industry was capable of responsible self-
government, thus assuring a return to autonomy (Gurnham, 1976, pp 84-5, 
87). In these circumstances the larger, more progressive employers, such 
as Corahs and Atkins, were able to take the lead in pressing their 
colleagues into action, as Mundella had done ~n the 1860s. 
The original NJIC consisted of 16 members from each side, representing 
Leicester, Nottingham, Hinckley, Mansfield, Loughborough and Sutton. As 
one would expect, the manufacturing representatives tended to be from the 
larger, more established firms: two of the Leicester members were J. Corah 
and Ernest Walker of Wolsey. Meetings were held quarterly. The Chairman 
and Vice-Chairman were to be from opposite sides. There would be no 
casting vote (Gurnham, 1976, pp 88-9). The objective was "to bring about 
a better understanding and as far as possible prevent strikes and lockouts 
1 ~n our trade". By 1940 the objectives were stated in a more abstract way 
~n the constitution: 
To secure the highest possible measure of joint action between 
employers and workpeople for the development of the industry 
as a part of national life and for the improvement of the con-
ditions of all employed in that industry. 
In the intervening period the NJIC had been steadily active, and was 
considered to have been reasonably successful. The unions attempted to 
use it as a forum to gain greater recognition of their rights. At the 
second meeting, Chaplin raised the question of allowing facilities for 
collectors in factories (LAHU B October lOth 1918). The unions tried, 
with limited success, to get the manufacturers to endorse the principle 
of complete organisation. For example, a motion was raised at NJIC 
1 Note the similarity to the stated objective of the NAB (p 236). 
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declaring that successful enforcement of agreements depended on both 
sides' organisations being as "numerically strong and fully representative 
as possible", and that it was in the ''best interests of the industry" to 
persuade all employers and operatives to join their respective organisa-
tions. Although "useful discussion" followed, the manufacturers rejected 
the motion (LAHU A July 3rd, October 9th 1929, LAHU B July 2nd 1929). By 
1940, however, the constitutional objectives of the NJIC had come to 
include a clause supporting measures designed to ensure that "all employers 
and workpeople are encouraged to join their respective associations". 
In return, the unions seem to have espoused a policy of encouraging 
negotiation rather than strikes. In 1919, for example, Chaplin and LAHU 
campaigned fiercely for compulsory arbitration in the local dyers' strike. 
By 1927, LAHU was claiming that "the same risks of a long ·strike do not 
exist as they did before we had an industrial council" (LAHU A July 16th 
1919, March 22nd 1927). Where bitter conflicts did arise, the NJIC was 
often asked to intervene. For example in a dispute at Lawries, a firm 
with a long history of low pay for women workers, the NJIC interceded and 
pledged "moral support" to LAHU (LAHU A October lOth 1928). Hinckley 
Union minutes also acknowledge NJIC help, for example in settling a strik.e 
in 1932; in 1938 the NJIC was investigating means of ensuring greater 
uniformity of rates in the Hinckley area (HU November 18th 1932, December 
14th 1938). 
Activities such as these seem to have convinced both sides that the 
NJIC was having a beneficial effect and should be continued. In the first 
year of its existence the LAHU AGM was told that it had already achieved 
some good results and "if rightly managed by both sides, much good must 
follow", a verdict repeated the following year (LAHU B October 29th 1918, 
February 28th 1919). 
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In 1922 the Chairman, a manufacturer, spoke of three requirements 
for its successful functioning~ "courtesy and consideration" on both 
sides, no point scoring, and a realisation by employers that workers had 
"similar ambitions to their own", namely a desire for a share of the 
"amenities of life" and for security and comfort in old age, while workers 
must accept that firms had to operate under "stern economic laws" (LAHU B 
January 14th 1922). A sign that these conditions were being fulfilled was 
that the inflexible Ernest Walker conceded that "his views had been some-
what modified regarding trade unionism" as a result of his NJIC experience. 
In 1926, the Chairman acknowledged the help given by the unions to the 
employers in petitioning the Government for protectionist measures, and 
in 1927 the unions were campaigning for JICs to have statutory powers, a 
measure of their own commitment to joint consultation (LAHU B January 9th 
1919, July 15th 1926, July 16th 1927). 
Observers also registered favourable responses. In his 1940 history 
of Hinckley, Pickering, while acknowledging the NJIC's shortcomings, 
considered it had contributed much "useful work" and commented that 
The seeds of collective bargaining sown one hundred years ago 
have borne fruit 3 resulting in the confidence that exists bet-
ween the manufacturers and workers of Hinckley at the present 
time. 
(Pickering3 19403 pp 1143 120) 
In 1935 Wells believed that, though subjected to severe stress, "its 
continued success must be attributed largely to mutual goodwill" (Wells, 
1 1935, p 242). Thomas Morley, President of Leicester Manufacturers' 
Association, praised it in glowing terms, referring to the "splendid spirit 
of co-operation" between employers and employees. At the NJIC, he claimed 
1 Wells' later verdict3 in the 19?2 rev&s&on of his text3 was that 
regular NJIC meetings had helped foster "the generally good relations 
between management and labour that now exist" (f-!eUs3 19?23 p 212). 
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All matters of importance to the general benefit are freely 
and amicably discussed ... it is a tribute to the goodwill 
that prevails between the representatives of employers and 
employees that there has been no serious dispute in the 
trade for the past thirty years. 
(Howes~ 1927~ p 312) 
The formation of the NUHW in 1945 and the formulation of the first 
national agreement, despite the tensions involved1 , in the long run 
strengthened the NJIC. It ~s likely that the threat of the NUHW's new 
power, along with the fear of nationalisation and dislike of Government 
intervention, encouraged the employers to persevere with the NJIC. They 
were prepared to offer strengthened bargaining procedures and financial 
benefits if the union would give up its support for a Government-sponsored 
development council in the industry. 
New conciliation procedures were laid down in 1949. A conciliation 
committee was to be established of three representatives from either side. 
Every effort was to be made to settle disputes by direct negotiation, but 
if that failed a meeting of local Manufacturers' Association and union 
representatives was to be called within seven days; if that failed, a 
conciliation meeting would be called in the next week. The 1949 constitu-
tion concluded 
All disputes shall be settled by the constitutional machinery 
of the industry~ and no stoppage of work~ either of a partial 
or general nature~ shall take place as the result of a dispute. 
Not surprisingly, this virtual no-strike agreement was amended in 1950 to 
read that no stoppage should take place until the conciliation machinery 
was exhausted. 
If the verdict of the conciliation committee was unanimous, the 
decision was binding; if not, it would be referred back to the NJIC. In 
1 See Chapter 4. 
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1950, for example, five disputes were settled by unanimous decision 
(three in the workers' favour) and two referred back (AC Reports, 1949, 
pp 19-20; 1950, pp 7-12). Some disputes then proceeded to the National 
Arbitration Tribunal, though on several occasions it was noted that its 
lengthy procedures produced "a deep sense of frustration" among the 
membership (AC Report, 1952, p 53; NEC March 4th 1950). 
Although it may seem strange that a un~on which had experienced such 
l 
recent demonstrations of its own potential pmver should submit with 
apparent eagerness to such restrictive agreements, it must be remembered 
that this awareness of strength was balanced by a much more longstanding 
awareness of weakness and insecurity. As Neale argues, it was often the 
weaker unions which persisted with Whitley arrangements after the war 
(Neale, 1983, p 53). 
The part of the Whitley scheme relating to committees at factory 
level, however, was not adopted to a significant degree in the industry. 
There was a short period after the war, when the influence of Human 
Relations theory on personnel management was strong, when plant committees 
became fashionable. The 1950 Annual Conference Report, for example, 
records a dispute surrounding the Works Committee at Foister, Clay and 
Ward, where the firm were demanding a three-year service requirement for 
2 
membership, and in the same year the report on innovation procedures 
noted four firms setting up works committees, as well as one firm (possibly 
Corahs?) with a long-standing works advisory committee (AC Report 1950 
pp 11, 17-8). Certainly Corahs had such committees in the 1950s and 1960s, 
although by 1971 they were declaring opposition to them, as they claimed 
1 See Chapter> 4. 
2 See Chapter> 4. 
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"existing arrangements" for representation and negotiation sufficient 
(LD February 23rd 1953, March 8th 1971). Hollins had established a 
works committee in 1946, and Wolsey instituted one after the Bedaux 
strike (Wells, 1968, p 230; Littler, 1982, p 126). There was also the 
curious case of Tylers of Leicester, who claimed to have anticipated 
Whitley by instituting a successful committee, although the workpeople 
"laughed" at the idea, telling LAHU they had never heard of it! (LAHU B 
March 25th 1918). 
In the main, as Wells notes, these committees were initiated only 
by the larger firms, often as a means to improved communication; they 
were not always integrated, as recommended by Whitley, into the collective 
bargaining structure and workers were not elected to them through the 
union (Wells, 1935, p 242; Gurnham, 1976, p 91). Such schemes seem to 
have petered out in the 1950s and 1960s, and had little strong support 
f . h "d 1 rom e~t er s~ e. NEC minutes for 1968 record the lack of enthusiasm 
for shop committees (NEC July 17th 1968). Gurnham suggests that the 
moderate union leaders tended to associate them with left-wing policies 
and workers' control (Gurnham, 1976, p 929). In an industry with so many 
small firms, officials may have seen them as unnecessary, even as a threat 
to their own power. As Boraston et al note, NUHKW in the contemporary 
period is highly centralised with officials playing the major role, and 
shopfloor representatives having less significance (Boraston, 1975, pp 117-
27). 
1 A manager in 1983 said his firm had no shop committee as it was "not 
relevant to our problems"~ and would tend to attract "the wrong sort 
of people ... loudmouths, brainless". This firm was, however~ exper-
imenting with Japanese-style quality circles. These are also being 
instituted by Corahs~ who had 11 QCs in 1984~ with an increase to 20 
scheduled (Knitting International~ June 1985). Only 3 of the 16 
sample firms had committees~ including two recently "rationalised" 
firms. 
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Despite the shifting attitude to works committees, Corahs rematns a 
prime example of a firm committed to the joint consultation principle at 
plant level. As described in Chapter 6, the firm cultivated a 'sensible' 
attitude to the union, developing an almost symbiotic relationship with 
it, whereby, in return for the representatives acting as an extension to 
the personnel department and helping to solve day-to-day problems, Corahs 
acts to ensure maximum unton membership. In 1949, NUHW was being aided 
1n a campaign for 100% union membership; there were only seven non-members. 
In 1953 the firm was providing an office for the two representatives and 
plans were afoot for granting check-off facilities (LD October 17th 1949, 
1 May 18th, June 15th 1953). Although these arrangements did not lead to 
trouble-free workplace relations 2 , conflict was channelled and confined 
in a way which avoided serious confrontation, and this pleased the union, 
which affirmed tn 1939 that in every case where there had been a complaint 
"satisfaction had been received" (LAHU A August 30th 1939). An amusing 
example of this nee-paternalist industrial relations system in operation 
1s described tn Leicester District minutes for April 24th 1939: 
The Manager stopped the plant for the Secretary to address 
the whole of the girls. After making it quite clear to the 
girls that curling pins were not to be worn at work~ the 
girls accepted the situation. 
In recompense the 'girls' got improved toilet facilities! 
The importance of these developments between 1914 and 1950 cannot be 
overestimated. They completely transformed industrial relations: an 
industry once notorious for unrest and confrontations became a byword for 
1 See also Chapter 6. 
2 Leicester District minutes record~ for example, 20 disputes there ~n 
1946, 13 in 1953. 
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industrial harmony. In 1886 a hosiery buyer had written 
While radical ruffianism is rampant in your midst~ I cannot 
afford to risk my life in your disorderly town. 
(Leicester Advertiser~ February 20th 1886) 
Whereas in 1955 the Leicester Mercury might justly proclaim 
The hosiery industry in the present century has for the most 
part been peaceful and prosperous. There has been no strike 
of hosiery workers in the borough for over 40 years and good 
relations exist between management and employees. 
(Leicester Mercury~ March 8th 1955) 
During this period not only was the machinery for modern industrial 
relations established with some rapidity, it was also used in practice as 
the key site of negotiation and dispute-settling. Shop stewards have 
played no notable part in bargaining in hosiery, as they have done in so 
many other areas of British industry. 1 Centralised national and district 
collective bargaining has been the major mechanism of industrial relations 
since World War Two. 
I have spoken earlier of the postwar truce which established indust-
rial relations on a peaceful basis. In many respects, however, this 
transcended a mere cessation of hostilities and involved a genuine 
commitment by leaders on both sides to the idea of industrial co-operation. 
As Gurnham notes, the postwar NUHW leaders believed in the principles of 
Whitleyism and prided themselves on friendly relations with the employers 
(Gurnharn, 1976, pp 123, 159). The Board of Trade in 1946 commented that 
Relations between managements and workpeople have been main-
tained on a high and cordial level: trade organisations on 
both sides have added to their sense of collective responsib-
ility. 
(Board of Trade~ 1946~ p 10) 
1 See for example Batstone et al., 19??; Hyman~ 19?9, for discussion of 
the dominant role of shop stewards in many industries. 
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Although the un1on at the 1947 Annual Conference accused the Board of 
Trade of presenting too rosy a picture, which. it was declared, rested 
solely on the restraint of the unions during the war tn not pressing 
for wage claims, there is no doubt that the NUHW leaders took a pacific-
atory line. Horace Moulden, while LAHU Secretary, had declared his 
preference for peaceful negotiation rather than strikes (LAHU A July 21st 
1937). Even his predecessor, Chaplin, a much more fiery character, had 
been described as "pre-eminently a peacemaker" and at his death in 1927 
a series of tributes poured 1n from manufacturers, including one from 
Rowleys which described him as 
One who reaZised3 and strove to teach others to realise that 
the onZy way to restore prosperity to the industry was to 
bring about a mutual feeling of goodwiZZ and confidence be-
tween employers and employed 
while the LHMA declared that the manufacturers would "miss him more than 
1 they can say" (LAHU A November 11th 1919, September 3rd 1927). 
Among the manufacturers, too, there was espousal of the tradition of 
co-operation instituted by Mundella. Johnson and Barnes' tribute to the 
"spiritual debt owing to the staff and workers" reflects the paternalist 
version of this tradition, while the managing director of Atkins summarised 
a prevailing mood: 
We as an industry have a good record of Zabour relations and 
I see no reason why this should not be maintained. 
(Johnson and Barnes3 1951; Atkins~ 19?2~ p 50) 
Organisational leaders on both sides committed to these principles 
set the style for the industry and built up close personal links, as the 
1 See Chapter 9 for an extended discussion of the raZe of moderate 
leaders. 
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Leicester District minutes of the 1950s show. On the retirement of Cook, 
Secretary of the LHMA, he sent a message thanking the Leicester Secretary 
and District Committee "for vital co-operation shown to him during the 
past three years"; fruit was sent by the DC to Cook's successor, Joseph, 
when he was confined to hospital; when the personnel manager of Pecks 
died, the DC placed on record its appreciation of his help and "enlightened 
approach" to labour problems (LD November 3rd 1952, January lOth 1955, 
January 9th 1956). Co-operation had replaced the confrontation of 1845. 1 
Conclusion 
While some manufacturers tried to keep workers in line and keep unions 
out, by employing repress~ve strategies, the pacificatory strategies of 
paternalism and joint consultation practised by some of the larger firms 
set a new style of industrial relations which came to typify the industry 
as a whole. These strategies were initiated by enlightened Victorian 
employers both to produce a more congenial and thus more effective working 
environment and also because of genuine beliefs in human rights and the 
possibility of class harmony. Their initiatives were eagerly taken up by 
union leaders who saw in joint consultation a means of retaining some 
measure of control amidst the anarchy of a free-market industry. In no 
way were they foist with a system deliberately constructed to further the 
1 This is reflected today in management attitudes to NUHKfl. Managers 
described it as "sensible"., "very good union"., "excellent" and the 
officers and representatives as "reasonable people", even in one 
case "too nice".' Six of the sample firms expressed attitudes towards 
it which could be characterised as strongly positive., seven appeared 
to regard it neutrally., and only three (including two very small firms) 
expressed negative feelings. While these expressions may not, of 
course, reflect real opinions in a sensitive area., they appear to 
indicate that acceptance of NUHKW is seen as the normal attitude in 
the industry. · 
258 
employers' interests. These new procedures were then institutionalised, 
and are viewed by most contemporary managers in a manner more pragmatic 
than idealistic. Just under half of the sample of managers expressed 
1 positive support for the NJIC though the majority said they followed its 
rulings: several commented that "it made life easier", forestalling endless 
plant-level bargaining over rates. One who was less enthusiastic said it 
was not working so well at present and explained "the industry ~s very much 
individual". 
This comment points to the limits of co-operation. As conflict 
remains endemic in capitalist industry, the pacificatory skin is thin, and 
can easily tear, especially if employers abandon their commitment to 
collective bargaining. Although the hosiery NJIC must be seen as one of 
the most successful in existence, that existence remains insecure. Three 
of the leading companies (Corahs, Courtaulds and NMC) have dropped out of 
it, conducting separate company agreements. The half-yearly national 
agreements ratified by the NJIC are difficult to enforce and are not main-
tained by many manufacturers who formally are pledged to support it, 
2 
according to the LHMA Secretary. The Leicester employers' apathy reached 
a peak ~n 1981, when the LH}~ officially stopped advising its members to 
honour the agreement. Pressure from NUHKW brought them back into the fold 
in 1982, but many would endorse the LHMA Secretary's view that "marketplace 
determines wages, not collective bargaining". In turn, the union is be-
coming disillusioned with the NJIC. At the 1982 Conference, a motion 
deplored the "negative approach" of the manufacturers' side; and at one 
1 Three firms disregarded the NJIC. Seven approved of it. The rest 
had no comment to make on it. 
2 From personaZ interview~ 1983. 
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NJIC meeting ~n that year a spontaneous demonstration of nearly 800 
members protested at the attitude of the employers, who sought a reduc-
tion of wages. Thus the recession of the 1980s is putting strain on the 
fragile structure built up by progressive elements in past, more prosperous 
times, and exposing the weaknesses of the industrial truce. 
Nevertheless, in the period under study, the initiation of joint 
consultative structures played an important part in the appeasement of 
the union and in the establishing, at times, of a genuine spirit of 
conciliation, at other times, of at least a truce between the combatants. 
0 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
That his Labour is free! . . . Free! Can any chain be imagined 
more galling than such freedom? The knowledge in the sufferer's 
heart that he is accounted free must be his crown of thorns and 
accounts for a Large part of that bitterness that pervades the 
working classes. Here, side by side, we have civil freedom and 
social bondage. 
J.W. Hancock, hosiery factory manager 
(PP 1845 XV II q 4817) 
We need not go to the European continent to Look for oppression, 
nor to the wilds of Africa to Look for slavery - we have them 
both in the heart of British society.' ... Why in the name of 
suffering humanity should their privations be rendered more 
keen? Oh ye oppressors! are tears and blood when coined into 
gold so precious? Are the Low murmurings of discontent and 
the cries of the widow and the fatherless but as music in your 
ears? 
Hinckley Union HandbiLL 1859 
(Pickering, 1940, p 101) 
Say is it Life? from year to year 
Mid cares that come increasingly, 
To plod the same duLL round, and hear 
The same dire din unceasingly? 
From fevered sleep to rise each morn, 
Retrace the scene of sorrow; 
Retire at night pale, haggard, worn 
Then breathe again each morrow 
The same polluted atmosphere, 
Uncleared by ventilation -
It is (if ye have ears to hear) 
Terrestial damnation! -
It is not life. 
WiUiam Jones, framework knitter 
(Jones, 1853, p 39) 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
WORKER RESPONSES~ THE PERIOD OF CONFRONTATION 
Introduction 
Thus far the focus of this study has been on employer objectives, 
strategy and choices. However, I hope that, by describing the inter-
action between employers and workpeople and the negotiations consequent 
upon employers' strategic choices, I have avoided portraying the working 
people as purely passive, as Braverman has been accused of doing. None-
theless, taking employer strategy as my starting point is indicative of 
my view of the employer/worker relationship; as I see it, the causal 
sequence is employer action, followed by worker response, with the final 
outcome a compromise (or even an unintended consequence) negotiated on 
the basis of the former positions. The privilege I accord to employers' 
actions relates to the ultimate power they hold over labour: the power of 
dismissal, or of closing down an enterprise. In this respect they are 
usually the initiators of change, and workers' actions must be seen as 
essentially reactive, a response to the employers' initial moves. It 
does not follow that such responses are inevitably defensive, rather than 
offensive, to use the distinction made by Price (1980), as I hope this 
chapter will show. Worker responses may sometimes take the form of attack, 
in the sense of attempting to go beyond the existing status quo. 
Worker actions, therefore, are worthy of study both in respect of 
their role 1n influencing final outcomes, and also in their own right. 
Such study 1s necessary for an informed theoretical understanding of class 
formation, class consc1ousness and class action. In these two chapters I 
262 
examine worker responses 1n more detail. 1 Chapter 8 deals with worker 
actions between 1800 and 1860, a period I characterise as one of confront-
ation. Chapter 9 is intended to show how the processes of pacification 
described in Chapters 6 and 7 evoked a more accommodative response, which 
evolved gradually between 1860 and 1960. 
Section 1 Worker collective actions 1800-1860 
Worker actions 1n this period fall loosely into five categories: 
first, attempts to gain Parliamentary redress for grievances by means of 
appeals and petitions; secondly, the switch to trade union organisation 
and its characteristic weapon of strikes and stoppages; thirdly, attempts 
at co-operative production; fourthly, an involvement in more explicitly 
'political' movements, such as Chartism, in an attempt to fight economic 
oppression, and finally, when any or all of these methods failed, a re-
course to violence. 
Full-scale petitions to Parliament were presented by the framework 
knitters in 1778, 1779, 1812, 1816, 1818, 1819, 1833, 1843 and 1854, the 
last but one leading to the Royal Commission of 1845. 2 The petitions 
sought Government 'interference' to regulate the trade in a variety of 
ways: eliminating truck, regulating or abolishing frame-rent, making 
'cut-ups' illegal, reinstating the Charter and its apprenticeship controls, 
agreeing some system of 'tickets' or merchandise marks to standardise 
products, and regulating wage levels by the legal enforcement of 'state-
1 Constraints of space forbid a thorough exploration of worker actions~ 
which would fill a volume on their own. These two chapters are a 
summation~ based on a nmch larger accumulation of material than can 
be presented in fuU here. 
2 Knitter Benjamin Humphries claimed that 2/3 of aU knitters had signed 
it (PP 1845 XV II q 350). 
263 
ments'. In addition, the knitters were frequently involved in smaller-
scale attempts to pressurise the authorities over various aspects of 
industrial organisation. For example, memorials were presented to the 
Board of Trade on cut-ups in 1827 and arbitration boards in 1849 (Patterson, 
1954, p 177; PP 1856 xiii q 263). On one occasion men from the village of 
Hathern marched to London bearing a petition against cut-ups (PP 1854-5 
x1v q 6253). Sometimes these campaigns involved considerable support from 
the employers, or even joint organisation: joint campaigns on truck were 
described in Chapter 5, and another example was the join·t campaign against 
the export of machinery, run by Henson in 1833 (Felkin, 1867, p 352). 
This strand of action can be seen as essentially backward-looking, 1n 
that it represented, as Walton argues, an evocation of the old Tory pater-
nalist ethos, seeking the protection of the ruling classes who were 
1 
considered responsible for the lower classes' welfare. The outrage felt 
2 
when the tenets of this 'moral economy' were violated is demonstrated by 
the extraordinary scenes of violence which followed the rejection of the 
1779 petition. The old moral order was only gradually being superseded, 
however, and in their campaigns the stockingers often had support from its 
representatives, the clergy and local gentry, shocked by the apparently 
callous behaviour of the hosiers. But these attempts repeatedly failed, 
partly because of the stronger muscle of the hosiers in raising support 
within Parliament, but also because these demands for intervention and 
protection ran against the spirit of the times. Parliament was becoming 
steadily more committed to laissez-faire liberalism and non-intervention, 
and even an investigator as sympathetic and humane as Muggeridge, who 
1 See Walton3 19523 p 323 and also Chapter 6. 
2 See Thompson3 1971. 
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headed the 1845 Commission, believed that in the long run the 'laws' of 
supply and demand would inevitably lead to a fall-off in the supply of 
labour and a consequent stabilisation of the trade (PP 1845 xv pp 129-30). 
When the petitions failed, the operatives' leaders turned to the more 
forward-looking techniques of trade un1on1sm, using their 'societies' to 
put pressure directly on the manufacturers to maintain the statement 
prices, and using demonstrations and strikes, or the threat of them, to 
intensify the pressure. 
The history of union organisation 1n this period was outlined 1n 
Chapter 3. As stated, there has been a tendency to portray these early, 
short-lived trade organisations as failures. Simmons, for example, des-
cribes them as "poorly organised", with insufficient funds. 1 Such 
judgements, however, spring from a restricted conception of what a trade 
union may, and ought to, look like, a conception circumscribed by the 
famous Webb definition of a union as a "continuous association of wage-
earners" (Webb, 1894, p 1). There is no evidence that the pioneer 
unionists operated with such a definition of what they hoped to achieve, 
and thus it is more useful to view these fluid, ad-hoc organisations as 
extensions of work-groups, spontaneous expressions of a common work 
identity. In Price's phrase, such organisations were a "symbolic and 
practical expression of the collective cohesion of the work group" (Price, 
1980, p 71). As Chartist knitter Henry Dorman explained, journeymen 1n 
the same branch when they got together "invariably talk of what work they 
are doing and what prices they are getting" (PP 1845 xv II q 919). It 
1 Sirrunons, 1974, Vol.. I, p 136. See aZ.so, Head, 1960, Chapter 12; 
WeZ.Z.s, 1972, p 105, for simiZ.ar judgements. 
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1s no coincidence that early union meetings were so often held in pubs 1 
Behind this "habit of association" lay the idea of common experience; 
Joseph Chawner, Leicester fancy branch secretary in 1845, explained that 
he spoke for the whole branch as "there is no difference; it is one 
general complaint" (PP 1845 xv I q 1731). With such homogeneity of 
experience it was easy to move to forms of collective organisation 
embodying, 1n Rev. Hall's words, the principle of "mutual assistance" 
(Humanus, 1821, p 119). 
The details available about some of the unions demonstrate the pr1n-
ciples behind them, and also help refute the charge of poor organisation. 
Indeed, to contemporary observers these "formidable societies", far from 
being poorly organised, seemed astonishingly and frighteningly effective, 
1n their ability to monitor the movements "of all persons evidently acting 
1n opposition to them", in their capacity to communicate with other unions 
in other areas, and in their strict control of strikes, involving daily 
mustering and parades to ensure all strikers kept out of work (Aspinall, 
1949, pp 169-70, 241, 321). 
These unions were based on a delegate system. In 1778, when funds 
were sought for the petition, "every street, lane and highway as well as 
each village had its collectors" (Henson, 1831, p 398). This was the 
ideal pattern followed by later unions. During the Combination Acts 
period, district delegates kept in touch with a central committee; work-
ing from a register of all frames and operatives they endeavoured to 
ensure that no frame was engaged on "fraudulent" work (Aspinall, 1949, 
p 241). Delegates also acted as convenors, informing those in their area 
1 See Thomis~ 1968~ Chapter 10. 
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when the secret meetings of this era were held (PP 1824 v p 263). When 
unions became legal, another duty of the delegates was to go round as 
deputations to the masters, trying to persuade them to pay statement 
prices and, 1n time of strikes, to visit workshops to rally support (PP 
1845 XV I q 2359; pp 1867-8 XXX1X q 19343). 
Henson's 1812-14 union was a more elaborate affair, but still con-
structed on a delegate basis. At a conference in 1814 delegates from 
33 different societies attended (Wells, 1972, p 97). Hall's Seven Years' 
Union in Leicester, which, like Henson's, had its constitution drafted 
upon legal advice, divided the town into 13 districts, each with treasurer 
and stewards, and the 1824 union which followed its collapse had a similar 
structure; in each case the man paid as secretary was to use his house as 
a 'house of call' (Patterson, 1954, pp 126, 135). 
Thomas Winters provided some interesting details of the 1843 Glove 
Hands' Union. This had a committee of five, three of whom were elected 
one month, two the next; a secretary was elected monthly. Cheques issued 
for funds placed in the bank were cut in four and the pieces distributed 
to different individuals to guard against embezzlement or misuse of funds, 
a problem faced by some of the earlier unions (PP 1845 xv I q 97; Patterson, 
1954, pp 136, 299). The rotation of officers served to share around the 
burden of responsibility and to prevent the emergence of any single indiv-
idual as dominant; it was also a safeguard against allegations that 'paid 
agitators' were controlling the un1ons. Accusations of this kind were 
frequently made by the hosiers, against, for example, Buckby and Elliott, 
the organisers of the 1854 petition against frame-rents (PP 1854-5 xiv q 
2281). 1 
1 Buckby himself conceded that he was "employed by the working man to 
agitate 113 but other knitters claimed that the sum paid to the two 
organisers was negligible (PP 1854-5 xiv pp 933 318). 
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These organisations were formed, then~ on less institutional, less 
centralised, more democratic and more fluid principles than those envis-
aged by the Webbs. Inevitably this caused some problems. The un1ons 
were plagued by lack of funds, which were stretched to the limit by 
frequent strikes. Hall's Union, for example, had to pay out £6,000 
during 1817 (Hammonds, 1979, p 201). Although this union, like others, 
was aided by donations from aristocratic and middle-class sympathisers, 
it could hardly cope with this demand. Smaller unions, such as those in 
villages, suffered even more' from lack of funds. Knitter John Woodward 
explained graphically "sometimes there is a little un1on, but it gets 
smashed when they turn out" (PP 1845 xv I q 2054). Although unions like 
Henson's, or the 1819 Hinckley society whose handbill proposed that 
"separate Unions be formed in each Town and Village", attempted to organ-
ise the county operatives, the isolation and scattering of villages made 
this difficult (Pickering, 1940, p 115). It was more usual for village 
knitters to form friendly societies (VCR, 1955, p 14). Hany of these were 
supported by local gentry or clergy. The 1833 rules of a society at Ratby 
village are probably typical. This society had 50 members, 29 men and 21 
women; its committee was elected annually, and it paid unemployment and 
sickness benefits. 1 Although such societies existed for mutual insurance 
purposes and not to pursue industrial action, they would nevertheless 
provide an organisational infrastructure which could be activated when 
strike activity did spread to the country areas. 
1 Friendly societies seem to have differed from unions in including 
women. Evidence is scanty3 but seems to suggest that most town 
unions did not organise women. Hall's Union (organised~ anyway~ 
on friendly society lines) and Winters' Glove Union were exceptions 
(Patterson~ 19543 p 126; PP 1845 xv I q 9?}. 
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Many of these un~ons received substantial support from the middle 
and upper classes 0 for example, Jackson's 1833 Leicester union backed by 
some enlightened hosiers, such as Richard Harris, and by local MPs, with 
Earl Howe as an aristocratic patron. This reflects the strong degree of 
sympathy for the knitters' plight shown by the local communities. Leic-
ester delegates Rowlett and Thorpe, for example, described how the strike 
of 1818 had been funded by voluntary contributions, especially from aris-
tocracy and gentry. Some of the larger manufacturers had supported them, 
and they had received aid from the parish authorities, from the theatres 
and from the clergy, both Anglican and Non-conformist, who prayed publicly 
for their success (PP 1824 v p 266). What made the mass of employers 
hostile to the unions, however, including at times even progressives like 
the Biggs brothers, was the frequency of strikes. 
Figure 8.1 illustrates the incidence of strikes ~n this period. As 
can be seen, strikes were common from 1810 onwards: ~n peak decades such 
as the 20s and 40s the industry experienced a strike nearly every year. 
Many, especially in the early years, were general strikes; some involved 
a single branch, although other branches might give financial or practical 
support. For example, the 1845 glove hands' strike was backed by "the 
remainder (who conceive that we cannot do without them)", who struck in 
sympathy to help in "starving us into compliance" according to Joseph Biggs 
(PP 1845 xv I q 958). 
Wells claims that the knitters were slow to learn the technique of 
striking on a rising market (Wells, 1972, p 92). Thomis, however, believes 
that the Nottingham strikers in 1813 had achieved some success by mastering 
what he calls "this novel tactic" (Thomis, 1968, p 184). Thomis' v~ew ~s 
substantiated by the evidence of hosiers Warner and Hannay ~n 1845: in 
Hannay's words 
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Figure 8.1 
Number of strikes in the East Midland Hosiery Industry 1800~1860 1 
Nottirl{]hcon Leicester Derby Hinckley Other 2 Total 
1800- 1 1810 1 
1811- 6 5 1820 1 1 1 14 
1821- 7 6 18303 2 1 1 17 
1831- 4 4 1 18403 9 
1841- 5 7 1850 1 2 1 16 
1851- 4 3 3 10 1860 
Total 27 22 5 7 6 67 
1 This table is compiled on the basis of references to strikes found 
in a wide variety of sources during the course of the research. It 
does not3 therefore 3 represent a statement of the total incidence of 
strikes but of reports of them. It is likely that it underrepresents 
strikes in the later period3 especially as partial strikes3 less 
likely to be reported3 became more common. 
2 Earl Shilton3 Arnold3 Sutton3 Loughborough. 
3 Figures for these two periods are almost certainly under-estimates. 
Felkin reports a series of short strikes which "succeeded each other 
almost every second year tiU 1833" (Fe lkin3 18??3 p 32). 
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The men lwve always the wisdom to strike when they know the trade 
is best. 
(PP 1845 XV I q 2?683 II q 519) 
Probably the maJor change over the period was the switch from general 
to partial strikes. General strikes were often on a scale which proved 
immensely costly; the 1819 strike involved 14,000 operatives in the three 
counties, and continued for nine weeks, in 1822 operatives were locked out 
for 28 weeks, and the traumatic 1824 strike, which caused the collapse of 
Hall's union, lasted 13 to 18 weeks in different counties. From 1824 the 
general strike faded out, though partial strikes, according to Felkin, 
continued to be very common. These sometimes involved many operatives, 
and might be of a particular branch, or against particular masters; for 
example, there were four strikes in Nottingham in 1827 against four of the 
principal hosiers. Thomas Winters even declared that in Leicestershire 
somebody was on strike each week in the year (PP 1845 xv II q 36; Thomis, 
1969, p 68; PP 1856 x111 q 463). A clear statement of the rationale behind 
this tactical switch was provided by Robert Bindley of Leicester in 1871, 
describing a strike over shop charges at one factory: 
When we have one or two in hand we can overcome them3 but if we 
had the whole body coming with their capital against us at once 
we would have no chance. 
(PP 18?1 xxxvi q 41?12) 
The knitters had adopted the manufacturers' principle of 'divide-and-rule'~ 
Most strikes were over wages and charges, both when reductions were 
threatened or advances desired. An exception was a Derby strike, which 
occurred when the manufacturers wanted to terminate the practice of opera-
tives marking their work with eyelet holes as a sign of quality, thus 1n 
one man's words "controlling the manufacturer" (PP 1845 xv II q 361). This 
is the only example I have found of a strike directly revolving on an issue 
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of control, although the struggle to maintain craft independence, des-
cribed in Chapter 4, provides the context for all industrial struggles 
of this period. Strikes were tightly organised, with groups going round 
to 'turn out' the others. Daniel Merrick, Leicester leader, describes 
how, during the Chartist strikes, bands toured round workshops at meal-
times or after work, using every means "to persuade or overawe them into 
compliance"; nightly progress meetings were held (Merrick, 1876, p 20). 
Edward Sansome, Leicester Sock Branch secretary, described how in 1830 
the strikers paraded through Leicester with bands of musicians; in his 
words: 
We stood out three weeks~ Lived on music and air~ begged at 
the farmhouses and drank at the brooks. 
(PP 1833 XX p 9) 
They won an advance of 6d per dozen. Since strikes often depended on 
public donations, efforts were made to promote a good public image and 
avoid violence, especially 1n Leicester. Rowlett claimed of the 1818 
strike: 
Never was known~ in the case of our country's history~ so 
general a turnout and so peaceably conducted; no violence 
took place~ nor was a pane of glass broken; though hundreds 
paraded the streets. 
(PP 1824 v pp 236-?) 
This was confirmed by some manufacturers, whil~ the tributes of pamphlet-
eers on the 1819 and 1825 strikes give a similar picture (Anon, 1825; 
Humanus, 1820, p 19). 
Demonstrations and parades were aimed at stirring the public 
conscience. It was common for the knitters and their families to drag 
wagonloads of frames into the warehouses, dumping them there, or to draw 
empty wagons in the hope of getting them filled with food (Co-operative 
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Congress, 1915, p 102; Church, 1966, p 49). Sometimes these activities 
did spill over into violence. In 1825 a mob of 2,000 led by women 
attacked frames being taken to Nottingham and Hinckley at Wigston near 
Leicester; four arrests were made. Most violence was directed at black-
legs, 'knobsticks' or 'blacksheep' in the vernacular parlance. Frames 
belonging to village blacklegs were frequently attacked during the 1825 
strike (Patterson, 1954, p 138). On occas~ons offenders were 'assed', 
paraded round set back to front on a donkey, a public humiliation no 
doubt designed 'pour encourager les autres' (PP 1845 xv II q 389; Church, 
1966, p 48). Houses of all workpeople were systematically watched to 
spot any blacklegs at work, and then at night "all kinds of missiles" 
would be lobbed at their houses (Aspinall, 1949, p 354). The extent of 
such "outrages" ~s not clear. Only one 1845 witness claimed personal 
experience of victimisation, but, despite the reputation gained by the 
Leicester operatives for peaceable conduct, Thomas Winters in 1860 looked 
back to the 1810s as times when people "were led more by impulse" and as 
a result arrests for "outrage on persons or property" were quite common 
(PP 1845 xv I q 2244; PP 1860 xxii q 374). 
Considerable disagreement existed among the participants as to the 
success or otherwise of strike tactics. In terms of immediate gains, 
the 1817, 1819 and 1821 strikes all resulted ~n price advances in Leicester, 
but the 1824 strike did not (Biggs, LRO). According to a Derbyshire 
knitter the 1819 strike brought a 20% price increase, maintained for a 
year, and in his area the 1824 strike gained a 30% advance, lasting for 
six months only (PP 1845 xv II q 3697). \.Jilliam Emmerson of Arnold con-
sidered the 1849 strike over bagmen's charges to be a victory, resulting 
in a drop from 6d to 4d, but Thomas Greaves saw the same strike as fatal 
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for Derby, leading to an adoption of 'runaway shop' tactics (PP 1854-5 
xiv 1 qq 7681, 8153). William Hannay, hosier and JP, alleged that strikes 
frequently ended 1n victory for the workpeople, but that these victories 
were shortlived, a position, however, which contrasts with some of the 
more extreme pronouncements of his colleagues, who asserted that strikes 
never benefited the operatives; Thomas Corah, for example, stated "I never 
knew a turnout do any good in my life" (PP 1845 xv II qq 392, 519-21; PP 
1854-5 xiv q 3310). 
Whatever the truth of this, there was a growing tendency on both 
sides to see strikes as of doubtful value. By 1845, Felkin was stating 
that the operatives were less drawn than 1n the past to this particular 
method of seeking redress for gr1evances (PP 1845 xv II p 28). Some 
prominent leaders of the operatives, themselves earlier instigators of 
strikes, came to share his v1ew. Thomas Winters by 1856 was calling 
strikes "equally injurious to the operatives and to the masters" and was, 
like Felkin, campaigning for arbitration, while Henson declared that 
despite his earlier strike involvement he had shifted to the policy "of 
endeavouring to bring both parties together" (PP 1856 xiii q 3766; Thomis, 
1969, p 73). In this, they shared the opinion of local progressives among 
the clergy, who, while conceding the right of the working classes to 
strike, believed that strikes only aggravated class bitterness and in the 
long term led to greater oppression, ''defeat and humiliation" of the \vork-
people (Lomas, 1855, p 67; Tower, 1869, p 18). A handbill from Hinckley 
1n 1850 neatly encapsulates the evolving mood: 
Strikes are undoubted eviLs and ought to be avoided as far 
as possibLe~ but circ~~stances sometimes render them necessary. 
1 See Chapter 5. 
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This raises some interesting questions about the status of strikes 
as a working-class weapon. Sociologists have tended to see them as the 
prime expression of industrial conflict, and use them as a measure of 
working-class militancy or class consciousness. 1 This in turn may lead 
to the judgement, in my v~ew erroneous, that lack of strikes indicates 
lack of militancy. It might be more reasonable to accept the line of 
Henson and Winters, both champions of the working-class cause, that 
strikes involved so much financial risk and hardship that they should 
be used only as a last resort: thus avoidance of strikes does not 
necessarily imply a diminution of class identity or commitment. There 
was, however, in the course the knitters' leaders came to prefer, the 
resort to arbitration, a possibility of being co-opted into an accept-
ance of the manufacturers' beliefs about work organisation and class 
. 2 
~nterests. 
As well as strikes, and the quest for joint regulation described ~n 
Chapter 7, the unions from time to time employed a third tactic: co-
operative production. The Nottingham union made an attempt to finance 
the production of hose on a co-operative basis in 1814, and subsequently 
on a larger scale in 1817-8. In Leicester there were similar experiments 
~n 1817 and in 1822-3. There was also a revival of this tactic in the 
GNCTU period (Wells, 1972, pp 98-9; Patterson, 1954, pp 121, 134, 288). 
Three strands of motivation can be descried in these attempts. 
First, the unions saw it as a logical extension of their policy of seeking 
employn1ent for their members when out of work, on strike or blacklisted 
by manufacturers. This seems to have been a major objective of the 1817-8 
1 See for example3 Goldthorpe et al3 19683 p 72; Mann3 19733 Chapter 6. 
2 See Chapter 7. 
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experiment. Secondly, there was a more ideological imput, which rose 
from the strong local influence of Owenism. Co-operative societies 
were fuunded at Nottingham, Derby, Loughborough, Belper and Leicester 
ln 1829. At the third conference of the co-operative movement, in 1832, 
it was reported that the Leicester 'Third Society' and the Loughborough 
group were engaged in the co-operative manufacture of stockings. The 
Leicester society had 103 members, funds of £233, and 12 members were 
involved in the stocking production, trading with Nottingham co-operators. 
John Skevington of Loughborough (later a Chartist leader) hoped that 
they "would speedily be independent of the control of capitalists and 
masters". The Leicester society had sent no delegate to the congress, 
explaining ''every shilling we can spare is devoted to manufacture'', but 
sent a message of support: 
Through the media of the collective wisdom of these assem-
blies ..• we expect the downfall of oppression ... As 
brethren we are bound in one common bond and we must not 
suffer that bond to be broken. 
(Co-operative Congress 3 18323 pp 503 122-3) 
The same beliefs inspired the Leicester GNCTU co-operative experiment 1n 
1833-4, which produced hose and socks along with "beautiful white cotton 
gloves for the ladies in union •.. the letter U in the middle of the 
hand". Goods were advertised in the GNCTU journal, the Pioneer, and 
exchanges were made with Nottingham (Pioneer, March 1st, 1834). The co-
operative ideal continued into the Chartist era, when a co-operative 
store was opened in Nottingham by the victimised Chartist knitter, James 
Woodhouse (Epstein, 1982, p 245). 
The Owenite belief that co-operative reorganisation of production 
would bring an end to the exploitation of labour by capital lay behind 
William Jackson's ambitious 1833 scheme for the acquisition of 500 to 
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2,000 frames to be worked co-operatively, producing an income of £2,000 
per annum and providing a basis for regulation of the whole industry. 
Jacksou argued that as capital was "nothing more than the fruits of the 
industry of the working class collected together" the working class must 
combine to protect it: 
Every man cannot become a separate capitalist as3 if every 
man had the means of being an employer3 there would be no 
workmen3 but every man can become a joint capitalist. 
The proceeds would be used "for the good of the whole body" (Jackson, 
1833, pp 4-6). 
Jackson's polemic clearly demonstrates an Owenite influence, as 
well as his own familiarity with Riccardian political economy, but 
arguably also his scheme owed something to the third motivating force, 
the drive for upward mobility among some of the 'respectable' artisans. 
This was the reason for the existence of 'frame clubs' in the early part 
of the century, whereby operatives clubbed together and bought up frames 
by "industrious and frugal means" (PP 1845 xv I pp 179-80). Similar 
aspirations may also have been involved in the co-operative allotment 
schemes which proliferated 1n the villages in the 1840s, such as the 
Artizans' and Labourers' Joint Stock Company of Hountsorrel, Leicestershire 
(PP 1845 xv I q 8196), although these, too, may have been influenced by 
Owenism and by O'Connor's Chartist land scheme. According to Dr. Wright 
Allen, agent for one such scheme, its original aims included employing men 
on strike on a temporary basis, but this was abandoned because of heavy 
costs (PP 1845 xv II p 135). This example shows, perhaps, how all three 
motives were intertwined, and, as we shall see, this was markedly the case 
in the late Victorian period. 
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These early schemes all failed for one reason or another. According 
to J.W. Hancock, manager of Wards of Belper, this was through "disunion, 
dishonesty and ignorance", though he personally espoused co-operation as 
a means of uniting labour and capital, and thought it would succeed if 
managed properly (PP 1845 xv II q 4894). Evidence of the problems faced 
by later co-operatives 1 suggests that lack of capital, poor management, 
insufficient co-ordination and failure to locate a market are likely to 
have jointly hampered these attempts. Certainly the GNCTU co-operatives 
failed to get enough orders, while Wells claims that the 1817-8 scheme 
never produced an output above £1,000 a week (Wells, 1972, p 99). But an 
important factor would have been the hosiers' opposition. Significantly, 
a meeting of hosiers in 1819, which agreed to support statement pr1ces, 
laid down among conditions of settlement for the current strike that 
"stocking-makers do not manufacture for themselves" (PP 1845 xv II p 61). 
In such circumstances co-operative schemes were unlikely to flourish. 
When these various types of union-based activity failed, the work-
people often turned to political solutions. For example, after the 
collapse of the GNCTU the knitters' leaders invested most of their effort· 
in the reform movement and Chartism, and union activity slumped; while 
the collapse of Chartism after 1845 brought a return to trade union 
tactics and Parliamentary appeals. Wells, thus, comments on the "unfail-
ing vigour and resource" of the leaders: 
Repelled at one point by the economic and political forces of 
oppression~ they were ever willing to resume the struggle on 
sc:>me other front. 
(Wells~ 19?2~ pp 99-100) 
1 See Chapter 9. 
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Wells' assessment, acknowledging the interlinking of economic and 
political grievances, seems more apt than Thomis' assertion that the 
~ottingham knitters never learned to use their political muscle, while 
their obsession with the economics of their situation blocked a firm 
political commitment (Thomis, 1969, pp 108-10). This verdict seems to 
depend upon a narrow equation of political action and party affiliation. 
The political activities of the knitters were mainly on the fringe of 
the party system, working as a pressure group attempting to influence 
established political groupings or being drawn into the great contemporary 
political movements like reformism and Chartism. Rightly, they retained 
some suspicion of the blandishments of the traditional parties: 
To the working man we beg to say~ do not be Zed astray by the 
triaks of any party 
was the advice offered on one Hinckley handbill (Pickering, 1940, p 101). 
Yet at times they did become involved with more narrowly defined party 
politics. 
On several occas1ons they offered their support to those, mainly the 
Whigs and the Radicals, but not always, who offered to promote their 
interests in Parliament. Thus, in 1778-9 the Nottingham stockingers 
campaigned for the Whig, Abel Smith, who presented their petitions to 
Parliament; according to Henson, they had at this time "complete control" 
over returning the local MP (Henson, 1831, p 383). In 1798 a knitter 
stood as Radical candidate, and in 1802-3 the Nottingham operatives gave 
fairly strong support to the Whig, Birch, against the Tory, Coke 1 (Thomis, 
1968, p 95, 1969, p 118). Electioneering propaganda for this campaign 1s 
interesting in demonstrating how strongly campaigns were directed at 
1 In 1802 knitters voted 524 for Birah~ 2?9 for Coke~ and in 1803 615 
for Birah~ 454 for Coke. 
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1 
occupational groups. Imagery from framework knitting was used by both 
parties:. "May the frame of our British Constitution be kept clear from 
the Rust of Jacobinism"; "A recruit2 given to the frame of our constitu-
tion"; "Frames, houses, farms are all commuted into instruments of 
compulsion in the iron hands of oppression", the posters claimed. A 
Whig squib exulted: 
The 'Sons of the Tredle' their virtue have shown 
The men of the turnscrew have dar'd to make known 
That oppression m1d Dan3 they will firmly oppose ... 
(Anon, 1803, pp 32, 120, 178, 181) 
Analysis of the Leicester pollbooks shows an even stronger degree of 
support for Whig and Radical candidates. Fig 8.2 shows the considerable 
proportions of them who voted for Whig candidates in two elections. Part-
icularly noticeable was the support g~ven in a later election in 1857 to 
Sir Joshua Walmsley. Walmsley was an extreme Radical candidate, pledged to 
fight for their cause, in an election in which he and John Biggs stood 
4 
against Richard Harris, reputedly popular with the working-class mass. 
73.6% of the stockingers cast votes for Walmsley (62.1% voting for the 
pairing of the two Radical candidates, and 5.4% voting for Walmsley alone), 
as compared with 39.6% of the hosiers (only 0.7% voting for Walmsley alone). 
At an earlier election involving Walmsley (in 1847), it was reported that, 
at "mob meetings" held in the town, knitters' leader George Buckby had 
stated that six non-electors were strong enough to coerce an elector and 
prevent him voting for Walmsley's opponents (Biggs, LRO). 
1 Many knitters were enfranchised and constituted a significant part 
of the electorate. In 1857 they comprised 10% of the Leicester 
electorate, as compared with the hosiers' 4.3%. 
2 Technical term for repair and maintenance of the frame. 
3 Daniel Coke, Tory candidate. 
4 See Chapter 6. Harris was a Whig, but a moderate. There was no 
Tory candidate. 
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Figure 8.2 
Recorded Whig and Tory voters, Leicester Pollbooks, 
1832 and 1835 
1832 Whig Tory Mixed Votes2 
Framework knitters 1 75.5% 22% 2.5% 
(resident voters only) 
Framework knitters 75.7% 21.3% 3% 
(including non-residents) 
Hosiers 63.5% 31.7% 4.8% 
1835 
Framework knitters 62.5% 37.5% 
(resident) 
Framework knitters 62% 38% 
(including non-residents) 
Hosiers 62% 38% 
Source: calculated from Leicester Borough Pollbooks~ 
1832~ 1835. 
(N=355) 
(N=518) 
(N=l67) 
(N=452) 
(N=471) 
(N=l55) 
1 The granting of suffrage to people living outside the borough was a 
great political scandal of these decades. It was largely the result 
of manoeuvring by the Tory Corporation officers~ although.~ as these 
figures sh~~ it did not always act to their advantage. 
2 Voters who voted for one Tory~ one Whig candidate. 
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Such reports might be exaggerated, but certainly the knitters' 
leaders did try to marshall votes for the favoured candidates. More 
sociologically interesting, perhaps, is their involvement with extra-
Parliamentary political movements which sought to change the existing 
political structure; since none of the parties (not even the Radicals) 
had been specifically formed to represent the political interests of the 
new- or old - working class groups, it is not surprising that the vartous 
reformist and radical movements attracted the support of the stockingers. 
The Reverend Becker, a Nottingham JP, was not alone in imputing Luddite 
disturbances to 
Those Jacobinical principles with which the inferior orders 
have been sedulously innoculated by our Nottingham reformers. 
(AspinaU_, 1949_, p 1 ?4) 
At a later date, William Shaw and William Smith were among many manufac-
turers who lamented "the spirit of levelling and Chartisrn" among their 
operatives who 
Wish to level everything; they do not care who they level_, if 
they could raise themselves - they would level today and be 
levelled tomorrow. 
(PP 1845 xv II qq 1331_, 1665) 
While the Reverend Furlong of Loughborough, a man sympathetic to working-
class sufferings, reported the rapid corning together of numerous men 
Ripe for rebellion_, and ready to do anything indurious to the 
common wealth. 
(PP 1845 XV I q ?8??) 
Leicester knitters were active 1n Hampden Clubs and in the reform 
movement (Thornis, 1969, p 199; Patterson, 1954, p 107, Chapter 10). 
Doubtless a considerable proportion of the crowd in the 1831 reform riots 
(in which Nottingham Castle and Colwick Hall were burned and pillaged, 
accompanied by substantial other looting and destruction) were knitters. 
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Certainly Henson led the campaign for the release of those arrested: 
17,000 signed the petition against their execution (compared with 9,000 
who had signed the original reform petition) (Thomis, 1969, p 233). But 
the most extensive involvement of the stockingers was in Chartism. 
Simmons rightly points to the distinctive nature of Leicester 
Chartism as "fulfilment of the long, fruitless search for some effective 
way of expressing the peculiar misery of the hosiery workers" (Simmons, 
1974, I, p 161). The excellent studies by Harrison (1959) and Epstein 
(1982) document the extent of the stockingers' involvement ~n Chartism 
~n Leicester and Nottingham respectively. In Nottingham, not only did 
the knitters predominate among the membership, but also many became 
leaders, such as George Kendall, Benjamin Humphries, George Black, James 
Woodhouse, Jacob Bostock, George Woodward, Thomas Emmerson and Jonathan 
Barber. Even some of the leaders who were apparently of lower-middle-
class status were ex-stockingers, such as Henry Dorman, who ran a 
Temperance hotel, or Elmer Rollett, newsagent. Of 176 Nottingham nom-
inees to the Chartist National Council 34% were stockingers, and 77.6% 
of Chartist members in Sutton and Mansfield were stockingers (Epstein, 
1982, pp 230-1). 
No similarly detailed research into Chartist membership in Leicester 
has been carried out, but it is likely that the figures would be compar-
able, if not higher. Thomas Cooper's account of his Chartist activities 
in Leicester portrays his followers as largely knitters, and Daniel 
Merrick's novel about Leicester stockingers confirms their role as a 
maJor element in the Chartist rank-and-file (Cooper, 1872; Merrick, 1876). 
Apart from Cooper himself, many of the local leaders had hosiery back-
grounds: Swain, Finn, Buckby and Elliott in Leicester, Jarratt and Turner 
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~n Loughborough, Ginns and Sketchley in Hinckley. An interesting docu-
ment indicating the significance of Chartism to the rank-and-file ~s 
reproduced by Harrison: William Corah, glove-hand, wrote to his father 
during the 1842 Chartist strike as follows: 
They assembZed at night to the tune of 20~000 men or upwards~ 
and swore by the ghost of many a murdered EngZishman and 
EngZish woman that they wouZd work no more tiZZ the PeopZe's 
Charter becomes the clzarter of the land; they are assembled 
this moment in the marketplace~ and before the day is over 
they mean to fetch the Bread and beef where it is to be had. 
The letter, which opens with a line from William Jones' Chartist hymn 
'Spread the Charter through the land', closes ~vith the postscript "they 
are all Chartists here" (Harrison, 1959, p 113). 
Involvement in such movements was possibly one of the factors 
encouraging the spill over into violence1 , which occurred at times when, 
ostensibly, all legitimate political and economic tactics had failed. 
Violent actions ~n which the hosiery operatives were involved can be 
grouped into four categories: full-scale rioting, which occurred, for 
example, after the rejection of the 1779 petition, machine-breaking, a 
sporadic occurrence in the industry which peaked as Luddism, acts of 
violence and intimidation against individuals, and more general criminal 
acts, such as looting, theft or poaching. 
These apparently extreme forms of expressing econom~c grievances 
must be understood in a context \vhere violence, if not exactly 'normal' 
or willingly condoned, was an accepted fact of economic and political 
life, and a well-known, often successful, way of seeking redress for 
grievances. Figures 8.3 and 8.4 give an indication of the prevalence of 
1 A local vicar's wife~ Mary Kirby~ wrote that the Chartist leaders' 
speeches were calculated to urge the crowd on to "acts of violence" 
(Kirby~ 1887~ p 49). 
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Figure 8.3 
ReEorted Riots in Leicestershire·and 
Not qnghamshire 1750-1900, by . type1 
Food Industrial Po Zi tical 2 Other3 Total 
1750- 23 11 9 11 54 
17994 
1800- 8 10 11 6 35 1849 
1850- 1 4 7 2 14 1900 
:ota1 32 25 27 19 103 
:ource: collated from a wide variety of sources. 
Figures represent i'eportage of riots rather than incidence. Since 
riots were easily identified by the reading of the riot act in the 
pre-1850 period3 it is likely that this is a fairly comprehensive 
list of major public disturbances in the first two periods. In the 
final period it is likely that the extent of such disturbances is 
downplayed. 
Including election riots3 riots between rival political factors and 
riots arising from political movements. 
Including enclosure riots 3 anti-military riots 3 riots against the 
police and Poor Law riots. 
The great majority of these reported riots occurred in the period 
17?5-1799. 
Figure 8.4 
Reported Riots in Leicesterand _NiJttingham J.JJ_q-~1_900_, by type and place 1• 2 
Leicester Nottingham 
----
Food Indus- PoUt- Other Total Food Indus- PoUt- Other trial ical trial ical 
1750- 6 3 4 3 16 9 8 5 3 1799 
1800- 1 - 5 3 9 I 4 4 6 -1849 
1850-
- 2 1 - ~ 2 3 -1900 Total 7 5 10 6 ~ 14 14 3 
1 See Note 1., Figure B. 3. 
2 Riots in other places than Leicester and Nottingham: 
Hinckley: 6 Food3 4 Industrial, 1 Political = 11 
Loughborough: 2 Industrial3 2 Political = 4 
Food riots at Barrow (2) 3 Mountsorrel 3 Earl Shilton, Donington (all Leics.) = 5 
Recruiting riots at Mansfield3 Sutton (Notts.) = 2 
Enclosure riots at Charnswood (Leics.) = 3 
Miscellaneous riots at Ashby, Kibworth3 Melton3 Shepshed (all Leics.) and Arnold (Notts.)= 5 
Total other places = 30 
Total 73 + 30 = 103. 
Total Grand Total 
25 41 
14 23 
6 9 N 
C1J 
V1 
45 73 
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rioting ~n Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire over the period 1750-1900. 
As shown, food riots were very common in the late eighteenth century and 
there had been established a tradition of taking to the streets to pres-
surise local authorities to act to remedy perceived social injustices. 1 
In the food riots, as also in a series of enclosure riots ~n Leicester, 
the crowd often succeeded ~n getting its will enacted by the town auth-
orities; also, after the 1787 riot ~n Leicester over the introduction of 
spinning machinery, the Corporation forbade the operation of such machinery 
within a 50-mile radius of the town. Violence at elections, which took a 
more ritualistic, even celebratory, form, had also become common during 
the eighteenth century. Thus models for violent collective action were 
freely available to the knitters when no legal means of redress was forth-
coming. As figures 8.3 and 8.4 show, rioting had become a common feature 
of East Midlands public life, and although they were not quite so frequent 
during the first half of the nineteenth century as formerly, they did not 
significantly diminish until after 1850. 
There were ten industrial riots between 1800 and 1849 (Fig. 8.3), 
four in Nottingham, two ~n Loughborough and four in Hinckley, apart from 
the Chartist riots (three in Leicester, two ~n Nottingham), which involved 
large numbers of knitters and were accompanied by strikes. Many of these 
started as demonstrations, which then developed into riots with stone-
throwing, attacks on hosiers' property, clashes with police and militia 
and fights to free prisoners (often successful): some degenerated into 
general looting and damage. None reached the climactic scale of the 1779 
Nottingham riots after the rejection of the petition; these lasted for 
nearly a week, while the mob, led initially by women and boys, attacked 
1 See Thompson (1971). 
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homes of 11 obnoxious" hosiers (completely demolishing one), fired mills 
and warehouses and threw frames out of windows, then smashing them or 
tipping them down wells (Henson, 1831, pp 401-420). This riot, however, 
resembled later events in that damage was done to property but not to 
people. An interesting feature of many riots was that action triggered 
by one grievance spilled over into expressions of anger over others. For 
example, 1n a Hinckley riot of 1826, over wage cuts in the villages, the 
rioters, encountering the poor-rate collector, attacked him and seized 
his books, tearing them to shreds, and then pulled down the workhouse 
gates, expressing their hatred of the Poor Law; and in 1791 a disturbance 
springing from a strike led to a brawl with the regiment brought in to 
quell the riot, and anti-military feeling was demonstrated when the sol-
diers were pelted with the contents of chamberpots when they left the 
town! (Pickering, 1940, p 88; Blackner, 1815, p 386). 
As stated, frame-breaking had been a long-standing feature of the 
industry. A riot in Leicester in the 1770s1 involved the destruction of 
a \vide frame which it was feared would bring redundancies. But, as 
Hobsbawm has argued, most frame-breaking was not a manifestation of 
hostility to machinery, but an early form of collective bargaining 
(Hobsbawm, 1964, pp 8-9). The Luddite activity of 1811-5 in Nottingham 
and parts of Leicestershire was resorted to by men who felt there \vas no 
other way to force hosiers to raise prices, accept apprenticeship controls 
and prohibit cut-ups. The Hammonds provide a comprehensive account of 
Nottingham Luddism which, they calculate, involved the destruction of over 
1,000 frames (Hammonds, 1979, Chapter 9). One of the most striking aspects 
1 Thompson and NiehaUs give different dates for this event. 
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~s the extraordinary degree of support accorded to the Luddites by the 
community, as manifested in the difficulty experienced by the authorities 
~n getting information or making arrests, the huge and vengeful attendance 
at the funeral of the shot Luddite, John Wesley, and the gathering of an 
armed crowd in the court-room and the surrounding streets at the trial of 
two captured Luddites. Thomas Bailey personally witnessed this event 
The excitement among the working cZasses3 most of whom deepZy 
sympathised with the Luddites in the objects of their associa-
ting3 was most intense. 
"Frantic vociferation" and "exultation" ensued when the court, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, acquitted the prisoners (Bailey, 1853, pp 247, 279-81). 
A third form of violence was intimidation, threats and personal 
attacks on individuals arousing the hostility of the mass. The treatment 
Jf blacklegs has been described. Hosiers, too, were victimised. There 
vere numerous cases of threatening letters, attacks on homes, carriages 
d h d . . 1 1n ware ouses, even one attempte assass~nat~on. Finally, on some 
>ccasions it was claimed that hunger and anger drove men to crime, such 
ts theft or poaching, the latter practised by James Hawker, stockinger and 
ladby 'Poacher' as part of his war against the 'class' of oppressors 
:Hawker, 1904). Although this was essentially an individual response, it 
ometimes could take a collective form, for example in Hinckley in 1829, 
nd during the Chartist period in Leicester, when gangs of men made frequent 
aids on shops or delivery waggons, as described by Merrick, who declared 
hey would "never have stooped to such a crime unless compelled by stern 
cessity" (Merrick, 1876, p 32). 
The picture of this period, then, ~s of men and women seeking to bring 
eir grievances to public notice and gain redress for them using every 
See AspinaZZ3 1949; Chapman3 1967; Hammonds3 19?9. 
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means they could. Like Wells, Bythell commends the "vigour and versat-
ility" of the knitters, as they acted "both politically ... and 
industrially" (Bythell, 1978, p 210). Patterson's judgement is more 
sombre: 
Like animals on a treadmill~ seeking escape~ the men went 
round and round the circle of expedients already tried~ 
resorting again to each in turn. 
(Patterson~ 19543 p 177) 
But both correctly draw attention to the continuous shifting from polit-
ical to economic tactics. Whether expression of versatility or of 
desperation, the significance of this is the way in which no sharp 
distinction was made by the stockingers between the economic and political 
aspects of their subordination. I shall return to this point in the 
following section. 
Section 2 Collective action, class and identity 
As stated in Chapter 2, the prevailing orthodoxy of the 'new' social 
history was that, during the first half of the nineteenth century, faced 
with the experience of industrialisation, urbanisation and the capitalist 
reorganisation of work - in short with proletarianisation the working 
classes 'made' themselves, in terms of the development of a distinctive 
class identity, culture and awareness of shared interests. 1 In a seminal 
article 'The Language of Class', Asa Briggs traces the development in this 
period of the conceptualisation of two major classes, 'labour' and 'capital', 
in confrontation with each other, a conceptualisation which gave way in 
the late Victorian period to more complex imagery of endless gradations of 
1 See Hammonds 3 1979; Thompson~ 1968; Foster> 1974; Tilly and Tilly> 
1981. 
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ranks, and of status groups within classes (Briggs, 1967). Recently, 
however, that orthodoxy has been challenged by what promises to become 
a new one, exemplified ~n the work of Stedman Jones, Joyce and Neale. 
The challenge has two major strands. First, it is stated that, 
rather than economic experience leading to a collective identification 
in class terms, and thus to political action, existing political rhetoric, 
"the language of political rights", provided a frame for understanding 
economic experiences (Stedman Jones, 1983; Joyce, 1984b, p 229). Follow-
~ng from this, it is claimed that the identified enemy or oppressor was 
not an economic class of owners, but a political class of rulers, some-
times named as the 'rich' or the 'idle' classes in the terminology of 
Owenism (Joyce, 1984a, p 72, 1984b, p 230). In essence, this amounts to 
the claim that, in Owenite socialist thought and those circles influenced 
by it, capital equals land rather than capital equals accumulated labour 
and the means of production. On this basis, then, the existence of any 
real "working class consciousness" at this period is challenged. 1 
As I argued ~n Chapter 2, this debate is somewhat less a disagreement 
about historical interpretation than one about the assumptions of Marxist 
theory, which I do not want to pursue here. What I do want to do in the 
remainder of this chapter is to provide some historical evidence which 
supports the position of Thompson rather than that of Stedman Jones and 
Neale. I believe that a clear sense of class identity did emerge in this 
region at this period, that it was based on economic experience even though 
it drew upon the "language of political rights", thus producing a system 
of class rather than populist meanings 2 , and that the opposing class was 
1 See Neale, 1981, pp 188-92. 
2 See Joyce 3 1984b, p 230. 
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clearly identified as the capitalist manufacturers. On the basis of 
this class identification, extensive industrial and political action, 
escalating to violence at times as described above, was seen as legit-
irnate. 
It became a commonplace during this period that the system of work 
organisation, and resulting collective organisation and action, had led 
to a chronic state of hostility between masters and operatives. In 
report after report witnesses from both sides testified to this hosti-
1 . 1 ~ty. It was most strongly expressed in the statements of witnesses 
in 1845. Of the 183 Leicestershire knitter witnesses 32% made (unsol-
icited) comments which expressed hostility, bitterness and resentment 
towards their employers. These were quite apart from the routine 
expressions of suffering and poverty which characterise almost every 
statement; while only a handful of witnesses (10) made any comment 
indicating approval and commitment towards masters. Of these, the bulk 
were praises of individual masters seen as 'good' and thus possibly as 
exceptions. Hostility was more markedly expressed by town knitters (44% 
in Leicester, 46% in Loughborough, as opposed to 22% in Leicestershire): 
rural relationships still showed stronger traces of traditional paternalism, 
which may have inhibited the formation of new ideologies of class and 
exploitation; six out of the ten favourable comments carne from here. 
Those who mentioned trade unions were also more likely to make hostile 
comments (547.) 2 , but the figures suggest no significant link between 
1 See for exampLe~ PP 1824 V pp 281~ 368; PP 1845 xv I qq 1953-4~ 
2422~ II q 1874; PP 1854-5 xiv q 8882; PP 1867-8 xxxix q 19341. 
2 The totaL number is very smaLL. OnLy 26 mentioned unions, which 
does not refLect the extent of membership: specific questions on 
unions were asked onLy of union secretai'ies. 
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location of work (home or workshop) and expression of hostility. 1 
These depositions, and those of the Nottingham operatives, were 
often strongly worded. They made reference to the hosiers as "oppressors", 
"rogues", "tyrants", "villains" and "aggressors". 2 There was a sense of 
fierce indignity at being treated as "negroes", "slaves", "worse than 
beasts", "swine" and "dogs". 3 Sometimes a religious note, characteristic 
of the knitters' culture, creeps in. William Thurman believed that masters 
would "go to hell for being oppressors", and Chartist George Kendall spoke 
of employers having no more compassion for the workpeople than "the lion 
has for the lamb" (PP 1845 xv I q 5625, II q 3414). Many statements pointed 
explicitly to the contrast between the economic conditions of the operatives 
and their "oppressors", identified clearly as the employers: masters and 
middlemen. Thomas Revil declared 
I sometimes feel that I could wish I was out of the world when 
I see those middlemen .•. walking about the streets with their 
canes in their hands, and me to be clothed in rags 
while Joseph Chawner stated that employers 
Live sumptuously everyday and take their rides up by train to 
London, and we poor creatures that make the work cannot take a 
ride from one village to another. 
(PP 1845 XV I qq ?20, 1?22) 
Samuel Kerr believed that the "working classes" were 
Retrograding and their means getting more scanty and their 
deprivations larger while our manufacturers have been getting 
rich, adding land to land and house to house. 
(PP 1845 XV II q 4988) 
1 Of 40 Leicester knitters specifying that they worked in a shop 16 
expressed hostility, as compared with 5 out of 13 working at home 
and ? of the 21 specifying no location. 
2 See PP 1845 xV I qq 5625, 6258, ?314, ?636, II 3430. 
3 See PP 1845 xv I qq 6?8, ?18, 383?, 3990, II q 4329. 
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They strongly rejected the hosiers' claims that trade recessions made 
them suffer too: 
Hou can the trade be bad uhen the masters are accumu~ating 
fortune upon fortune3 riches upon riches3 ~ands upon ~ands3 
and buying uho~e estates? 
(PP 1845 XV I q ?314) 
Another statement confirmed that 1n Loughborough the manufacturers had 
accumulated "great capitals" (PP 1845 xv I q 7477). One or two witnesses 
also stated explicitly that it was not just a question of pernicious 
individuals: it was the whole system of competition which produced profits 
for masters and suffering for workpeople (PP 1845 xv I qq 433, 1732). 
The most concise statement of this sense of class opposition came 
from John Middleton, who declared 
The operatives are the uorking bees. We have fi~~ed your 
hives uith honey3 as far as it can be3 and you wi~~ not ~et 
us even suck the combs. 
(PP 1845 XV I q 65?1) 
Middleton's statement can be located in a well-developed strand of thought 
among the operatives' leaders which incorporated the idea of labour as the 
source of all wealth. As early as 1823, Henson wrote "The value of every 
article arises from the labour or skill bestowed upon it" (Thomis, 1969, 
p 112). William Jackson, as we have seen, used this analysis in explaining 
his 1833 co-operative scheme. Jonathan Barber, Chartist knitter, advised 
the working-classes to ''produce wealth for themselves instead of for those 
who use it to oppress them" and referred to the working man as "the prod-
ucer of all wealth" (Epstein, 1982, pp 257-8). The analysis was accepted 
by some employers. Thomas Woods explained that the radicalism and Chartism 
of the knitters sprung from the knowledge of: 
A vast accumu~ation of comforts principa~~y produced by the~­
se~ves3 of which3 however3 they have no sufficient share. 
(PP 1845 XV I q 1953) 
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The idea was even celebrated ~n verse by William Jones: 
Let none then with averted eye3 
Contemptuous pass his toiling neighbour; 
There's not a blessing 'neath the sky 
But what springs from the hands of Labour. 
Toil's hand3 each hour3 beZOW3 above3 
The stores of nature is unlocking: 
Prince Albert cannot make a glove -
Nor Queen Victoria weave a stocking! 
(Jones 3 18533 pp 191-2) 
In v~ew of the political enthusiasm of the time, it ~s not surpris-
ing that the leaders acquired these ideas, nor that they had widespread 
currency among the rank-and-file. Numerous observers noted the extremely 
vigorous political culture of the knitters and the political fervour of 
the Leicester and Nottingham communities at this time. Merrick and Gent 
both describe the political life of the stockingers' workshops: groups 
clubbed together to buy newspapers (often the Northern Star), delegated 
a member or paid a boy to read it aloud while they worked; at tea-breaks, 
seated on boxes or in their frames they would debate the latest political 
news and ideas. Merrick describes how articles attacking the Chartist line 
were hissed and ceremonially burned (Merrick, 1876, pp 18, 22, 33; Gent, 
1893, pp 2-6; Francis, 1930, p 121). A "noted reformer" is said to have 
declared that a visitor to Leicester might learn more about current poli-
tical and religious debates "in one hour's conversation of starving 
stockingers" than from "ten lectures of a university professor" (Jones, 
1891, p 7). Such a workshop culture, free from the inhibiting presence 
of middle-class supervision, ensured that entrants to the trade would 
quickly learn the political vocabulary of the time, notably that of 
Owenism and Chartism. But their positive response to that vocabulary 
sprang from their own heartfelt experience of economic exploitation. 
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Thus the maintenance of craft culture was deeply interpenetrated 
with espousal of political radicalism. This point is emphasised by 
Lancaster in his study of Leicester political life: working-class organ-
isation, and the associated resistance to the capitalist reorganisation 
of production (steam-powered machinery, factories etc.) as also to 
middle-class cultural indoctrination or hegemony, were, in his view, 
embedded in the deeply-rooted culture of craft independence, defensive 
and backward-looking as that culture may have been. Epstein makes 
similar points about Nottingham (Lancaster, 1982; Epstein, 1982). The 
significance of this is even greater when we consider that this occupa-
tiona! culture was itself deeply embedded 1n a broader working-class 
culture which was also strongly resistant to the erosion of traditional 
forms of leisure, family life and social interaction. It 1s quite fair 
to say that the East Midlands stockingers lived together, worked together 
and played together. 
This was facilitated by a high degree of industrial specialisation. 
It is estimated that in 1841 20-25% of Nottingham's population was depen-
dent upon hosiery (Epstein, 1982, p 223). Census data indicates that in 
1851 38.5% of industrial employment 1n Leicester was in hosiery; for the 
county as a whole the figure was 52.4% (Smith, 1961, Table 26; Lancaster, 
1982, p 378). In many villages the whole community would feel an ident-
ification with the hosiery industry, and the occupational culture would 
be largely co-terminous with the traditional culture, with its distinctive 
patterns of frantic Hork alternating with "sprees" and pursuit of sports 
. . d . 1 such as p1geonn1ng an rac1ng. 
1 See Chapter 4. 
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This culture was not totally homogeneous. Like their masters, the 
stockingers tended to see themselves as divided into two or three groups, 
which later would be labelled "respectable" and "rough". 1 The respectable 
were highly religious, literate, concerned with education, sober, sometimes 
committed to temperance. William Jones the poet was such a man, who de-
plored the "immoral" and drunken behaviour of some of his workmates (PP 
1845 xv I q 289). Cooper's 'Shakespearian' Chartist group sang hymns and 
studied literature (Patterson, 1954, pp 318-9). Hinckley knitters' leaders 
seem to have been such a group. Their handbills were highly literate, 
illustrated with quotations from the classics and the bible, and imbued 
with a strong religious respect for the "all-seeing eye of Him with whom 
we all have to do" (Hinckley, LRO) . 
Merrick in 'The Warp of Life' describes the division in the workshops 
between these "intelligent" workers - often Baptists, Calvinists and 
Primitive Methodists - and the "ignorant" whom he labels "dog fanciers, 
prize fighters, runners and gamblers", whose chief delight was in "dogs 
and wild rabbits"; the hero of the novel drowns when he joins a group of 
these dissolutes on a "spree" of singing and pub-crawling (Merrick, 1876, 
pp 13, 34, 42). The bulk of the stockingers probably preferred such 
traditional sports as rabbiting, coursing hares and foxes, football, 
cricket, cockfighting, racing and gambling to study and religion. 
Another threat to working-class homogeneity was the level of upward 
mobility within the industry. The comparatively low cost of initial 
investment in frames, plus the masters' desire to 'promote' conscientious 
workmen into middlemen, enabled many to rise into the ranks of small masters. 
Inventions and improvements made to the frame also provided a channel of 
1 See Chapter 4. 
297 
escape from proletarian labour. 1 There were several examples of knitters 
or knitters' sons becoming wealthy hosiers, such as Samuel Need and Samuel 
Unwin 1n Nottingham, Richard Harris in Leicester. 2 In 1844, 11 of Notting-
ham's leading hosiers were knitters' sons, although, as an interesting 
study by Erickson demonstrates, entry into this elite became harder as the 
factory system became more established (Thomis, 1969, p 11; Erickson, 1957). 
Nevertheless, the 1845 witnesses provided ample evidence of mobility at 
this period: Earl Shilton middlemen, Richard Wileman, William Cooper and 
Samuel Whiteman.had all started as stockingers: Wileman now employed 400 
hands. A Derbyshire knitter spoke of local bagmen, once knitters, who were 
now worth £2,000 or even £10,000. As Thomas Tillson explained 
If they couZd raise three or four frames 3 they couZd set up 
for a master man3 and shine3 and go on as they Ziked. 
(PP 1845 XV I qq 11343 52363 5399 3 54843 II q 3634) 
Possibly the dominance of the 'respectable' class of knitter ~n 
Leicester and Hinckley may have accounted for the more accommodative, less 
violent pattern of industrial relations in those towns as compared with 
Nottingham, where the record of rioting was highest (Fig. 8.4). Thomas 
Clewes of Hinckley, for example, declared that he and his friends as 
"public men" had tried to avoid all disturbances and to persuade their 
followers 
Never to injure either Zife3 Zimb or property in any shape~ for it would only injure our cause. 
(PP 1845 XV I q 3984) 
1 See discussion ~n Chapman 3 19673 pp 187-8 and aZso Jones 3 1891 3 
pp 9-10. 
2 According to Lomas and Kirby 3 Harris for this reason was something 
of a working-class hero. Kirby described the cheering crowds who 
watched him as Mayor departing in court dress to meet the Queen at 
Belvoir CastZe (Lomas 3 18553 p 173; Kirby 3 18873 p 51). 
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The concern with public image evinced here was combined with deep feelings 
of pride and respectability: Hinckley witnesses repeatedly stressed their 
desire to appear respectable, to maintain self-respect, manliness and 
dignity, whatever poverty and suffering they experienced. 1 
However, neither high mobility chances nor the desire for respectab-
ility appears to have significantly impaired the knitters' sense of 
solidarity. Men who began to "shine" as small masters, as the use of that 
2 
expression denotes, were seen as now belonging to another class. William 
Richmond had failed to succeed as a middleman, ~n his own opinion, because 
"his conscience would not allow" him to charge frame-rent and exploit his 
former workmates, while William Mason refused a job offered him as "a sort 
of foreman and timekeeper" (PP 1854-5 xiv qq 5348-9, 9776). Such men felt 
strong loyalty to their class, and shared experience of deprivation kept 
most who remained operatives united, in a spirit epitomised by a Hinckley 
handbill of 1859: 
Stand firm and united man to man and town to town, aompaat as 
a roak, doing your duty as men and as members of the trade. 
(Pickering, 1940, p 101) 
This sense of unity, encouraged by the leaders, was rooted in shared 
work experience and culture, in the local community and the family enter-
prise. Operatives and their families fought together to improve their 
living standards and defend their way of life. 3 The most striking 
expression of this unity occurred in the GNCTU period. Leicester and 
Derby were particularly committed centres of General Union activity. 
1 See, for example, PP 1845 XV I qq 3817, 3882, 3941. 
2 See Chapter 4 p 115, Chapter 7, p 233. 
3 See Chapter 10 for women's involvement. 
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There were 13 GNCTU lodges ~n Leicester, 17 in Nottingham and 15 in Derby 
(Cole, 1953, Appendix 4). The Pioneer provides a moving record of the 
attempts to maintain the spirit of union' by donations to the Derby strike 
over union recognition. For example, "a few poor framework-knitters of 
Anstey, whose average earnings are not worth more than from 6 to 8 shil-
lings a week" sent £1 lOs 2d to the "distressed and oppressed brothers" 
at Derby, and the "sisters of Earl Shilton" sent £3 4s, with their 
"brothers" contributing £13 19s 6ld. Belper members declared they would 
"prefer death than give up union". Ritual funerals were held for union 
members in Leicester, Hinckley and Burwell, moving occasions of great 
dignity, with parades of ceremonially dressed members, both male and 
female, singing hymns, which attracted large audiences (Pioneer, February 
15th, 22nd, March 1st, 12th, 29th 1834). 
These solemn funerals demonstrate the power of a sense of class 
dignity rooted in the local community and traditional culture, and, for 
once, cutting across sectional interests of different trades. These 
particular demonstrations of class solidarity, however, posed no threat 
to law and order, manifesting as they did the respectability and strong 
religious feeling which was a major element of local culture. 1 Not all 
demonstrations of class solidarity were so pacific, as the early part of 
this chapter showed. Why did they at times turn to violence? 
Middle-class observers provided a variety of explanations for this. 
Economic factors were involved. For Lord Byron, the "absolute want'' of 
the stuckingers and, for Felkin, their "hunger and misery" were the "sub-
1 The 1851 Census of Religious ilorship found religious attendance to 
be higher in Leicester than in any town of similar size, at 62%. 
Nottingham followed close behind with 57,7%. The national average 
for large towns was 49.7%. 
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stratum" on which Luddism was based (Sutton, 1852, p 298; Felkin, 1867, 
p 239). Bailey put more stress on cultural factors, blaming the violence 
of the period on lack of education among the working classes and poor 
communication between classes; these had engendered the erroneous belief 
that wages could be regulated by "acts of violence" rather than the laws 
of supply and demand; the situation was now improving with improved 
education, a position shared by Thomas Winters (Bailey, 1853, p 102; PP 
1860 xxii q 374). Others followed Reverend Becker1 in blaming it on 
political agitators. Mary Kirby believed that Chartist leaders stirred 
the crowd to "acts of violence", and declared that agitators and radicals 
were "rife" in Leicester, while Arthur Morley spoke of the "same men" 
coming to lead any strike that broke out anywhere in the three counties 
(Kirby, 1887, pp 49-50; PP 1854-5 xiv qq 6855-6). Finally, there was a 
growing tendency to blame marginal groups of people, mainly "strangers" 
(i.e. anyone from outside town~), young people and the 'rough' element. 
Local historian James Orange, in his account of the Reform riots, claimed 
that the violence was caused by people coming in from the villages, and 
mobs of "disorderly youths, incited and assisted by ignorant and depraved 
adults", and declared that the Luddites were mainly youths aged 18-22; 
although in fact Bailey tells us that five of the executed Luddites were 
aged over 29, had wives, and three of them had five children apiece: they 
were men of "decent education ••. respectable, well conducted" (Orange, 
1840, pp 878, 888-9; Bailey, 1853, pp 291-2). James Hopkinson, a Notting-
ham cabinet-maker, recalling the riots in 1888 described the Reform rioters 
as "the dregs of society" (Hopkinson, 1888, p 12). 
1 See p 281. 
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These explanations were linked to a growing tendency to condemn 
violence on moral grounds. Comments like that of Thomas Clewes, quoted 
1 
above , show that working-class leaders sometimes came to share that 
view. But another strand of thought saw violence as justified and legit-
imate under certain circumstances. The stockingers told the Duke of 
Newcastle that 11 hungry men know no laws 11 , and thus they could not answer 
for the consequences when their strike fund became exhausted; the Luddites 
declared 11They would not starve whilst there was plenty in the land11 , and 
the 1831 rioters told witnesses 11We may as well die where we are as go 
home and be starved11 (Orange, 1840, p 876; Bailey, 1853, p 380; Aspinall, 
1949, p 324). 
This view, that deprivation beyond a certain level justified violence, 
could lead on to the idea that so, too, did oppression and injustice in 
general. In a row with the hosiers in 1799, knitters' representative 
Thomas Wright declared 
When law and justice were denied, the people had a right to 
resort to the law of nature. 
(Henson, 1831, p 406) 
Thus, even the moderate Merrick in his account of Chartism spoke of how 
the provocative behaviour of the authorities turned a peaceful demonstra-
tion into a riot, thus using 11brute force" to suppress "popular feeling": 
this, in his view, explained the further rioting, disturbance and crime 
that followed (Merrick, 1876, p 22). Chartist George Buckby told an 
enthusiastic audience in Leicester 
I don't want to kill people, but I want to kill this horrid 
system which kills mothers ..• We will use no more physical 
force than this - we go for our rights and we intend to have 
them. (Buckby, LRO) 
1 See p 297. 
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The fullest statement of these ideas comes from John Sketchley, 
Hinckley Chartist, looking back on his past in 1884 and explaining his 
involvement with storage of arms, drilling and military preparation: 
As though the use of physicaZ force couZd never be moraZ; or 
as though the moraZ and the ZegaZ were synonymous terms. The 
fact being that the ZegaZ and the moraZ are generaZZy the 
very opposite of each other, whiZe, as a ruZe, the quickest 
way to put an end to tyranny and oppression is the most moraZ 
and the most legitimate ..• When force is used in defence of 
tyranny the peopZe have a right to use force in defence of 
their liberties. 
(SketchZey, 1884, pp 22, 26) 
Sketchley's statement summates the circumstances in which violence 
becomes legitimate; where suffering was intolerable and "oppression" was 
experienced, violence was viewed as "moral'', so long as it was used to 
defend or pursue the interest of a group, not for individual gain. 1 The 
group could be one's workmates, one's class or one's family: one witness 
explained 
Men with Zarge families are obZiged to go out at night and do 
things they would not do ... They must have something to eat 
from somewhere. 
(PP 1845 XV II q 1849) 
Sketchley's explanation also demonstrates how, as I have argued, 
there was a considerable blurring in the stockingers' perception of econ-
omic and political grievances. The statement quoted above is couched, as 
are the others I have quoted, in the language of traditional politics: 
oppression, tyranny and 'natural law'. In this they are similar to the 
Northern Star passages analysed by Stedman Jones. In concluding from this 
that the grievances expressed are primarily political, Stedman Jones ignores 
1 Thus, 'Captain Ludd' severeZy and publicZy disciplined some of his 
foZZowers caught with some Zoot after a raid (Thompson, 1968, pp 
60?-8). 
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the way econom1c and political issues were fused in the thinking of 
groups of working people like the stockingers; the motor factor which 
led them to support political movements was the experience of economic 
deprivation and struggles at work. When Chartism collapsed, Sketchley, 
like Barber, Kendall, Buckby and the others, returned to trade union 
activity: his statement to the 1854 Commission deals with the oppression 
of frame-rents and charges, dishonest hosiers and so forth. In further-
ing their economic cause, men like Sketchley drew on the political 
language that reading of the Northern Star and the Pioneer had made 
available to them, but, whatever solution they sought, their grievances 
were rooted 1n economic experience: the "system which kills mothers" 
referred to by Buckby was the competitive, profit-oriented capitalistic 
production of hose. 
Conclusion 
During this period, the operatives were driven by their shared 
experience of deprivation to act collectively for their perceived group 
interests. They used every available method, industrial and political, 
and at times resorted to a violence seen as legitimated by the oppression 
of their masters and of the political authorities. These forms of action 
were rooted 1n a collective identity, and in turn served to reinforce it; 
this common identity was one of occupation, of community and also one of 
class, grounded in the daily experience of their place in the system of 
profit-making, competition and deprivation, as I have argued in the pre-
ceding section. 
On the basis of this collective identity, the operatives were able 
to formulate an account of their shared economic role and of oppression 
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by a class of profit-making employers. At times they made a link between 
their economic plight and their political disadvantages, seeking both 
economic and political change to bring redress for their sufferings. To 
express their grievances, they drew on the language to hand, predominantly 
that of the working-class press, which arose from a long tradition of 
popular protest and political radicalism. But their use of that language 
was firmly tied to a strongly contemporary and economic understanding of 
their situation. 
Giddens and Mann have both argued that we should discern different 
levels of class consciousness. Giddens distinguishes between 'class 
awareness' (sense of differentiation), 'conflict consciousness' (percep-
tion of interests opposed to those of another class or classes) and 
'revolutionary class consciousness' (recognition of the possibility of 
reorganising the social and political order through class action) (Giddens, 
1973). Mann uses the terms 'class identity' and 'class opposition' for 
the first two dimensions, and then distinguishes between 'class totality' 
(whereby class becomes seen as the defining characteristic of the social 
order), and the conception of alternative forms of social organisation 
(Mann, 1973). Throughout the 1800-1850 period, the bulk of the operatives 
appeared to attain the two dimensions of class awareness and conflict 
consciousness; at times some of them moved beyond that to a critical con-
sciousness linked to visions of an alternative, juster society and of 
other ways of organising the social production of goods. 
Statements of their leaders reflect both these developments. Their 
words reveal their sense of class identity, deeply embedded in the local 
community and in the family-based system of production. In Chapter 10 I 
shall argue that, as these latter broke down, so too did the collective 
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sense of class identity begin to fragment. In the early period, however, 
the experience and activities of the operatives led them and their leaders 
to evolve a strongly critical view of the existing social structure, and 
towards visions, even if fragmentary and fleeting, of a better social 
order: usually these took the form of a projected ideal 'co-operative 
commonwealth', in which the divergent interests of labour and capital 
would be transformed into an harmonious whole. 
Looking back at these events, an abiding impression is of the strength 
of these ideals and visions, which the continued experience of defeat and 
failure did not dim. 1 "Depend upon it, the day is coming", affirmed Buckby, 
while Jones wrote 
Yet courage3 brothers3 help is near3 
The dawn of reason breaketh. 
Even in 1884 the unrepentant Sketchley spoke of his belief in an imminent 
"resurrection" of Chartism, which would 
Sweep away every form of tyranny and oppression ... and prepare 
the way for the triumph of eternal justice and the brotherhood 
of the human race. 
(Buckby 3 LRO; Jones 3 18533 p 40; Sketchley3 18843 p 29) 
1 See3 Houghton~ 195? 3 for an extended discussion of this strand of 
unquenchable Utopian optimism in Victorian thought. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
I believe in the solidarity of labour founded upon community 
ar~ commonality of interests. The labourer's interest is one 
and undivided, and in that sense I believe in solidarity ... 
All the world over - or any other world, if there is one. 
James Holmes, LAHU Secretary 
(PP 1892,xxxvi Pt 2 p 62) 
How slowly we move! Slavery, serfdom, Diggerism, Chartism, . 
Socialism - how slowly we move! The slave - wage-slave or 
otherwise- does not know he is such ... If he learns that he 
is, and becomes a rebel, what support does he get from his 
fellow-slaves? Some are concentrated on 'the next world', 
saving their souls: some are absorbed by trivialities, Foot-
ball, Cricket and Horse-racing ... and some are breaking their 
hearmand risking their health in desperate efforts to cease 
being proletaires and to rank themselves among the capitalists. 
Thomas Barclay, former LAHU President 
(Barclay, 1934, p 59) 
Time was when our employers were our masters. They ordered 
our hours, wages, and conditions, and often wich much severity, 
but a great change has taken place. We are no longer the poor 
pitiable creatures of bygone days. We demand the right to have 
a say on matters that concern us. So long as the workers stand 
together their right will be respected, but let us become care-
less and indifferent, then the old yoke of bondage may be placed 
upon us again. 
LAHU Handbill, 1919 
(LAHU B August 20th 1919) 
He had the greatest respect and profoundest regard for the 
majority of the employers in the trade, and he thought that 
regard was reciprocated. 
Horace Moulden, LAHU Secretary 
(Leicester Mercuty 15th Nov 1938) 
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CHAPTER ~DlE 
WORKER RESPONSES: THE . SWITCH FRON CONFRONTATION TO ACCOMNODATION 
Introduction 
A new dawn was indeed on its way, even if not quite the one antic-
ipated - or hoped for - by Buckby, Jones and Sketchley. As the factory 
system brought relative security and prosperity to the region's hosiery 
workers, there was a slow change ~n industrial relations away from the 
pattern of confrontation which had been established in the earlier period 
to one of accommodation. 
These events in the East Midlands were, of course, not unlike those 
occurring elsewhere, as I indicated in Chapter 2. This was the period 
when, in Perry Anderson's words "the most insurgent working-class ~n 
Europe became the most numbed and docile" (Anderson, 1964, p 36). Changes 
in society at large, such as the granting of political concessions to the 
working classes, the stabilisation of a centralised trade-union pressure 
group and the growth of mass education, as well as improved pay and cond-
itions at work, resulting from the mid-century economic boom, were bringing 
h . 1 1 . . 'd 1 a new armony ~nto c ass re at~ons nat~onw~ e. But it ~s worthwhile 
considering exactly how that pacification took shape ~n the East Midlands. 
I have already argued in Chapters 6 and 7 that the pacificatory 
strategies of employers, ~n the form of paternalism and joint consultation, 
had a major role to play ~n transforming industrial relations in hosiery. 
This experience of the preferred olive branch, along with the improvement 
in material conditions, was important ~n encouraging a spirit of industrial 
1 See Chapter 2. 
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peace. However, we must beware of reading off worker responses automat-
ically from the employers' initiatives, as I have argued Joyce does 1n 
his Lancashire study (Joyce, 1980). In this chapter, I shall first 
review the forms of collective action prevalent in this period, consider-
ing what changes occurred, and then assess how those changes contributed 
to the process of accommodation. 
However, in studying this period, it is perhaps the continuities 
rather than the changes which strike the researcher; and it must be 
emphasised that, in the East Midlands case, the move to accommodation 
was slow and uneven. Class harmony did not arrive overnight. 
Section l Forms of collective action 1860-1960 
An immediate change from the preceding period was the virtual dis-
appearance of the strategy of appealing to Parliament. There are several 
possible explanations for this. We could see it as an example of a 'failed 
strategy' in Edwards' term. 1 Certainly, the various appeals and petitions 
of the 1800-1860 period had met with little positive response, and possibly 
the operatives came to see them as a waste of time and energy; it could be 
argued that Chartism itself was the manifestation of a growing scepticism 
as to the 'protective' role Parliament was held to assume under the pater-
nalist model. On the other hand, it could be argued that the strategy, 
rather than failing, simply became redundant. 2 In a new political and 
institutional context where local negotiating procedures, such as arbitra-
tion boards, were coming into being, there was no need to appeal to a 
1 See Chapter 5, p 159. 
2 See Chapter 5, p 162. 
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distant, centralised body~ often considered to be ignorant of local 
conditions. At the national level, with the extension of suffrage and 
the growth of working-class political bodies (TUC and subsequently the 
Labour Party), representative democracy became an effective substitute 
for the more primitive democracy of the mass petition. Since I have 
already argued that the experience of failure had as yet apparently 
left undamaged the optimism of the knitters' leaders, I incline to the 
latter explanation, a position supported by the fact that, when appeals 
were no longer a major form of industrial collective action, the hosiery 
workers still occasionally resorted to them when no other form of action 
seemed appropriate for a particular purpose. The alacrity with which the 
leadership took up the Government's arbitration procedure in World War 
One, submitting to it regularly over bonus claims, seems evidence that 
the old faith in Government protection had never entirely died. In 1924, 
LAHU officials visited the Government to try to persuade them to take out 
more contract work, 1n 1926 they were involved jointly with the employers 
through the NJIC in a campaign for protective barriers for the industry, 
and in 1928 there was discussion over launching an appeal for the marking 
of imported hosiery (LAHU A August 27th 1924, June 6th 1928, LAHU B July 
15th 1926). In 1933 there was a joint petition from employers and unions 
for controls over 'alien labour' (HU March 29th 1933). 
The long-standing attachment to the idea of Government protection 
was also demonstrated in the early years of the national union. In 1947 
NUHW wrote to the Board of Trade, expressing its desire for a Wages Council 
or some other body with statutory powers to enforce decisions, since long 
experience had shown that trade agreements were persistently violated by 
individual employers: 
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We cannot too strongly stress that the Hosiery Industry is 
made up of small units of private individuals3 whose world 
all too often revolves within the walls of their own business, 
and nothing short of compulsory powers will ensure observation 
of any code of conduct or practice. 
(AC Report 19473 p 18) 
The 1946 NUHW rules included a clause "to ensure legal enforcement of 
agreements entered into between employers and unions". Despite opposi-
tion from militants like Chamberlain of the Hinckley Union, Moulden and 
his executive were prepared to give up the idea of Government control to 
procure the employers' assent to regular negotiating machinery, and this 
eventually happened (Leicester Mercury, 27th May, 1947). By 1969, the 
"legal enforcement" clause had disappeared from NUHKW rules. Nevertheless, 
the union still occasionally demonstrates a desire for Government protec-
tion, where this does not conflict with the employers' objectives, thus 
. d' . h . d . 1 1 Jeopar 1s1ng t e 1n ustr1a truce. 
In the main, however, there was a clear move away from this type of 
endeavour. The main thrust of policy from the 1870s onward was to improve 
on existing un1on organisation and establish it on a more stable and 
permanent basis. From this period, the major preoccupation of officers 
was the problem of achieving high levels of unionisation and of keeping 
members 1n once recruited, along with the organisation of certain groups 
considered by them to be less responsive to union principles, notably 
women. Organising the country workers also presented a problem before 
2 World War One. Apart from other considerations, in days of limited 
transport services, it was difficult to visit scattered members in small 
villages. LAHU's constitution laid down that each village should receive 
1 A case in point was the 1980-1 campaign (conducted jointly with the 
employers) for import controls3 involving a series of demonstrations. 
2 See Chapters 4 and 5. 
I 
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at least one annual visit, but there were still occasional grumbles about 
neglect (LAHU A September 24th 1920, January 1st 1930). In fact, Holmes 
and Chaplin of LAHU spent much time and energy in visiting villages, some-
times by request, sometimes speculatively. Some meetings were successful, 
but many were poorly attended and failed to attract new members. 
Membership figures for LAHU are shown in Figure 9.1, as well as cen-
sus figures which indicate the potential numbers of members. It can be 
seen how proportionately low membership levels were. As the figures show, 
in 1913 there was an upsurge of interest in the union, and village members 
began to join in greater numbers. It is interesting that this recruitment 
boom preceded the war. However, the bargaining successes of the unions 
during the war served to attract many more recruits; by 1919 LAHU member-
1 
ship had trebled. In December 1917, for example, Chaplin reported two 
to three hundred new members gained in one week although "nearly all seem 
to be thinking only of the war bonus", and 1.n 1918 it was recorded that 
many young people had joined (LAHU A December 8th 1917, February 15th 1918). 
After the war membership fell away as the bonus declined, but county member-
2 
ship was never again such a problem for LAHU. 
Organising women, however, remained a long-term problem in the eyes 
of the officers. Without doubt, this was partly because there was no 
tradition of organising them. They had not been actively involved 1.n the 
formal side of the early uni.ons. 3 In Nottingham, the circular union 
1 All the other unions also experienced a membership boom~ some even 
more dramatically (see Gurnham~ 1976~ p 74). 
2 The membership slump was also a result of the union being forced to 
stop paying unemployment benefit in 1921~ although they started 
paying it again in 1922 at lower rates (LAHU B February 16th 1922). 
See Chapter B. 
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Figure 9.1 
a) Membership of LAHU 1885 ·to 1939 1 
Men Women Total 
TOU)n County Toum County 
1885 600 800 1,400 
1891 3,500 
1893 3,860 
1894 3,604 
1895 3,386 
1896 1,9oo2 
1897 1, 776 
1898 1,734 
1900 1,600 
1908 593 807 1,400 
1911 659 836 1,495 
1912 760 1,223 1,983 
1913 (Apr) 596 267 1,329 316 2,508 
1913(Ju1) 628 517 1,650 605 3,400 
1914 600 606 1,452 772 3,430 
1915 4,417 
1916 3,982 
1917 (Ju1) 5,600 
1917 (Dec) 7,000 
1918(May) 1,094 6,071 7,165 
1918 (Jul) 8,000 
1919 12,000 
1921 3,000 9,000 12,000 
1925 1, 704 6,809 8,513 
1926 8,500 
1933 7,000 
1939 8,000 
Source: Compiled from figures in Head (1960), Friedman (1977b), Gurnham 
(1976), LAHU minute books and PP 1899 xcii. 
1 Many of these figures are obviously approximations. They are 
based either on minute book estimates or on returns made to the 
GFTU. 
2 The early figures, especially the dramatic drop in 1896, reflect 
the success of the 1886 strike and the failure of the 1895 strike3 
and also the secession of the Loughborough and Hinckley branches 
in 1895 and 1897 respectively. 
b) Total Numbers of Hosiery Workers, Leicester and Leicestershire 
Leicester Leicestershire 
Men Women Men ~!omen Total 
1881 3, 391 5,308 6,013 8,913 23,625 
1891 4,286 8,381 5,212 7,685 25,564 
1901 3,282 9,107 4,239 9,230 25,858 
Source: Census figures, from Friedman (1977b), p 170. 
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excluded women and the rotary un1on showed little interest in organising 
them. In 1892 its secretary, Bower, estimated that 11 the great bulk" of 
women were unorganised, probably only 400 out of an approximate 7,000 
being 1n the unions; he explained that no attempt had been made to organ-
1se them before the past eighteen months (PP 1892 xxxvi Pt 2 pp 63, 66). 
As Figure 9.1 indicates, the position was better in Leicester. The 
two all-female unions of the 1870s, the Menders and the Seamers & Stitchers, 
1 had established a base for organising women despite their eventual collapse. 
The Seamers and Stitchers had achieved over 3,000 membership, although one 
of the organisers, Mrs. Fray, recounted that getting them together had 
involved "a deal of trouble" (PP 1876 xxx p 383). The earliest existing 
minute books, (from 1887 onwards) record attempts at organising women, 
including separate meetings for women's branches, although the male officers 
found it heavy going (LAHU A April lOth 1888). Progress was halting. In 
1905 it was noted that, while the majority of male factory operatives were 
organised, only a small percentage of women were in LAHU (LAHU A July 5th 
1905). The figures shown in Figure 9.1 somewhat belie that comment, however, 
and it appears that there was a tendency for officers to downgrade the actual 
level of women's employment. In general, Holmes and Chaplin had a poor v1ew 
of women, complaining of their apathy and inactivity: Holmes complained that 
It is impossible to get a woman to serve on the Executive 
Committee3 so accustomed are they to have everything done for 
them. 
(Gurnham~ 1976~ p 48) 
There is an amus1ng account of a social held by the Ilkeston Union 1n 1923 
when Chaplin was the guest speaker: 
1 See Chapter 3. 
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ProbabLy some ? or BOO were present~ but it was cLear from 
the start that the big majority had come for Dancing and 
SociaL Amusements~ as the order during the speaking was very 
bad indeed~ and it was most diJ;ficuLt to continue ... Most 
of them were young men and women whose object was pLeasure. 
(LAHU B ApriL 20th 1923) 
During the 1920s some signs of a more up-to-date approach to organis-
ing appeared. In 1921 the first collectors' conference was held (although 
only 124 out of an anticipated 200 turned up) and in 1923 a social was 
arranged at Shepshed (LAHU A October 19th 1921, April 18th 1923). In 1925 
the idea of home visits was under consideration while in 1926 a joint 
campaign to recruit women was being conducted with the boot and shoe union 
(LAHU B April 18th 1925, June lOth 1926). 
These new moves were consolidated with the arrival of Horace Moulden 
as LAHU's new leader in 1927. Socially progressive if politically moderate, 
Moulden was determined to modernise the union's approach and "keep in the 
van of progress". "Old customs' 1 must be abandoned and the union should 
follow the example of successful unions like the transport workers who had 
"seen and met the needs of the social side". It was agreed that "trade 
unions functioning as purely such are failures, we have got to make it 
worthwhile for people to join" (LAHU B July 27th 1929, July 31st 1930). 
Accordingly, Moulden started a campaign of visiting firms at dinner 
hour, chatting to workers and staging "impromptu" meetings; he continued 
the policy of holding socials and dances in the various localities, and 
running trips and meetings for collectors, such as the 1938 one to the 
Derbyshire Dales. In 1929 a 'Trade Union' week was staged, with meetings 
and talks (LAHU A February 6th, May 8th 1929, July 6th 1938; B July 2nd 
1929). 
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Moulden gave particular attention to the issue of organising women. 
In 1928 two joint meetings were held with the National Union of Boot and 
Shoe Operatives (NUBSO), although one of these, an all-female dance, met 
with some opposition from the Executive Committee, who would have preferred 
1 it if "male friends" could attend. In 1930 an unofficial women's commit-
tee was formed to "combat the continued backwardness of our women members 
1n active participation" 2 It was hoped that a woman might be appointed 
to the Executive Committee3 (LAHU A November 25th, December 12th 1928; 
B January 19th 1929, July 31st 1930). The suggestion of appointing a 
special women's organiser was at first dismissed as too expensive, but 
with help from the GFTU a woman was appointed temporarily. Following the 
retirement of Bailey, joint secretary with Moulden, it was decided to 
appoint a full-time organiser in his place, and committee member Susan Bird 
was selected, despite some opposition on the grounds of her being not only 
a woman but a married woman (LAHU A January 16th, October 23rd 1929; B 
February 27th, August 28th 1934). 
This long struggle to recruit members contrasts sharply with the 
position at Hinckley. In 1936 the union claimed that 95% of Hinckley 
hosiery workers were organised; there were, however, difficulties at nearby 
Nuneaton and Coventry, and in 1939 a campaign of leafleting, visiting and 
loudhailing was conducted in these towns (HU June 5th 1936, February 7th 
1939). The anomalous success of the Hinckley union may have resulted from 
tightness of the community in this small town where hosiery remained the 
one major industry. For most districts, however, raising membership levels 
was the major problem until NUHW was formed. 
1 1/1.-zzie WiUson of the Leicester tJUBSO vlomen 's Branch was not only a 
militant activist but a strong feminist~ who at one time led a break-
away women's union (Fox, 1958., p 309). 
2 A similar committee established in 1886 had been described by Chaplin 
as an "expensive farce" (Gurnham, 1976, p 48). 
By 1932 there were four women on the executive (LAHU B March 22nd 1932). 
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Even then the problem remained. NUHW appointed three full-time 
organisers in the first four years, but though they met with some success 
they encountered resistance in the 'new' hosiery areas. All reported the 
difficulty of keeping up membership, once gained, and of establishing and 
keeping collectors in organised firms. 1 At local level recruitment re-
mained an obsession. Leicester District minutes record numerous discussions 
about appointing collectors, falling membership and communication problems 
2 between officers and shopfloor workers. It was calculated by one organiser 
that it was necessary to recruit 1,500 people a year merely to maintain 
membership on an even level, in an industry marked by high labour turnover, 
married women dropping in and out of the workforce and considerable switching 
between firms (LD October 9th 1972). 
Apathy worried the District Committee just as it had the LAHU Execu-
tive. In 1925 only 22 members attended the LAHU AGM, the average for the 
past ten meetings having been 59 (LAHU B August 18th 1925). Thirty years 
later, the Leicester District was debating the same issue and running the 
familiar gamut of suggestions for remedying it: newsletters, more shopfloor 
visits by officials, educational activities, compensation for time spent on 
union business. One member criticised the NUHW as "the worst in the country 
as far as organisation was concerned" (LD April 16th 1956, AGM 1952). 
This concentration on recruitment, though typical of institutionalised 
unions, did not indicate that from the 1880s a new type of bureaucratised 
structure had replaced the old spontaneously-run organisations. These 
1 See AC reports 1948-51. By 1950, however, NUHW was organising 31.6% 
of workers in the industry, 32% of femaZes and 30.5% of maZes. The 
figure stayed at around this ZeveZ through the 1950s, but from 1964 a 
fairZy steady rise in density of membership was experienced to reach 
64% in 1978. 
2 For exampZe, reports in LD November 27th 1950, ApriZ 16th 1956. 
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locally-based unions hardly resembled the ASE and other "new model" 
un~ons. Until the 1890s the two Nottingham power unions had no paid 
officials. The 1875 rules of the Circular Union required all officers 
to be re-elected every three years (Gurnham, 1976, p 34). LAHU officers 
also changed frequently in the first few years of its existence, and when 
Holmes and later Chaplin became full-time salaried officials they continued 
to maintain extremely close contact with the membership; members came con-
tinually into the office with problems, and the officers went constantly 
into factories to negotiate and solve disputes. Having two secretaries 
acted, perhaps, as a check to empire-building on the part of the officials. 
It is noteworthy that Moulden, perhaps the first true bureaucrat ~n the 
history of the hosiery un~ons, instigated the abolition of the dual 
secretaryship, thus consolidating his own power (LAHU A October 6th 1930). 
All three un~ons started their careers meeting ~n private houses, inns, 
coffee houses and clubs, like the earlier un~ons (Gurnham, 1976, p 35; LAHU 
A August 5th 1887). LAHU did have an office by 1896, although it was not 
until 1919 that a typist w~s hired (along with a table to put her typewriter 
on!) (LAHU A March 19th 1919). Holmes and Chaplin were experienced opera-
tives, men firmly attached to the old trade traditions and wedded to the 
independent artisan ideal. In no sense had any social distance sprung up 
between them and their members. 1 The suggestion that a "college man" should 
be appointed as organiser met with short shrift from this proudly working-
class group of men (LAHU B August 18th 1921). 
The continuity with the old unions is also highlighted by the continued 
problem of embezzlement. LAHU minutes record several cases of collectors 
1 See Lane~ 19?4~ Chapter ? for discussion of the status gap which often 
arises between officials and rank-and-file. 
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absconding with funds. 1 The most spectacular cases involved officials. 
In 1897 Hartshorn, the man in charge of LNIU's Hinckley section2, was 
sacked after pilfering funds to finance his drinking habits; sadly, Holmes 
himself was forced to resign in 1911, after the discovery that he had used 
at least E7,000 from unLon funds to finance property deals involving 192 
3 houses (LAHU A February 27th 1897, August 14th 1911; Gurnham, 1976, p 65). 
The unions remained, then, small, informal, minimally bureaucratised 
and deeply local in orientation. Discussing amalgamation, for example, 
the local leaders in 1923 expressed strong reservations. Chaplin maintained 
that amalgamation would impede not enhance unity, and the Loughborough 
Secretary stated "they would never agree if local methods were to be sur-
rendered" (LAHU B April 28th 1923). In contrast, the progressive Moulden 
firmly adhered to a policy of amalgamation, starting to campaign for it soon 
after his accession in 1928 and continuing to do so until 1946 (LAHU B 
July 21st 1928, July 27th 1929; Leicester Evening Mail February 9th 1939). 
Moulden brought a new style of leadership to LAHU and was to carry it 
over into the new national union. The minutes change abruptly 1n style 
after his arrival: entries are briefer, more formal, and rows and disputes 
are no longer reported verbatim. As well as new organising tactics, he 
brought to LAHU a spirit of financial and tactical caution, a distrust of 
confrontation and a commitment to conciliatory policies. 
This contrasts with the period of Holmes' and Chaplin's leadership, 
when the level of strikes was fairly high (see Fig. 9.2). The major pre-
occupation of LAHU during their leadership, apart from improving membership, 
1 14 cases are reported in the years I sampled between 1896 and 1930. 
2 Hartshorn's behaviour was a contributory factor in the secession of 
Hinckley later that year. 
He died shortly after of cancer. 
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Figure 9.2 
LAHU stoERa&es ·and strikes, selected years 1895-19301 
a) ~E~E~~~~-E~~~E~ed_~g-~~g~£~~-~~E-~~£~-l~~EL-~~l~cted lears 1895-19302 
----- --------------
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1900 
1905 
1910 
1913 
1895-1898 
1915-1918 
2 
4 
4 
1 
3 
1 
2 
6 
11 
15 
1919-1922 11 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
Source: LAHU Minute Books. 
3 
3 
2 
7 
3 
2 
7 
1 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1923-1926 
1927-1930 
1 No systematic anaZysis was carried out for years 1901-4, 1906-9, 
1911-2. 
1 
2 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
3 
4 
6 
2 Most strikes are ZikeZy to have been recorded in the minutes, but 
very short ones may have been settled before minuting occurred, so 
that the actual occurrence of strikes may have been slightly higher. 
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was the maintenance of the tradition of craft independence. 1 The defence 
of wages was also, of course, a major issue; much time was spent in nego-
tiation and discussion with employers, and strikes were also frequently 
used to combat threatened reductions. In almost every case, however, the 
method used by LAHU was the partial strike. There were general strikes in 
Leicester in 1886 and 1895, in Nottingham ~n 1896 and Hinckley in 1891. 2 
Thereafter there was no general strike in Leicester until the successful 
1915 strike for war bonus. 
The events recorded in Fig. 9.2 might more aptly be labelled stoppages 
than strikes. Some were very brief, lasting only a couple of days. Others, 
such as the major strikes at Walkers in 1913 and Morleys in 1920, lasted 
many months. Of the 62 strikes recorded in Fig. 9.2, the causes of 50 are 
given in the minutes. 28 were over wages, mainly threatened reductions, 
although some concerned non-payment of war bonus, and a few, during the war, 
were for advances. 2 others basically concerned pay, one being over shift 
payments, the other lack of payment for a mending task. The other 20 cases 
covered a variety of grievances: 5 were over dismissals, 3 over foremen and 
fines, 2 over union recognition, 2 over employment of non-unionists and 1 
over members in arrears on union dues. The remaining 7 essentially concerned 
work conditions: 2 over bad yarns, 2 over work organisation (one, in 1896, 
over management assuming the right to allocate machinery), 1 over the use 
of outworkers, 1 over an attempt to introduce day-rates and 1 over machines 
being placed too close together. A significant number, then, were not simply 
about rewards for effort but concerned control issues. The fact that control 
became a more explicit factor in causing strikes in this period than the 
1 See Chapter 4. 
2 Both the 1895 and 1896 strikes resu~ted in wage rises, but proved 
cost~y to the resources of the unions (Gurnham 3 1976, pp 55-7). 
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preceding one 1 can be explained ~n terms of the introduction of the fac-
tory system which took away the control over conditions of work and work 
environment enjoyed by the domestic workers. The 8 strikes over discipline, 
5 upholding union organisation and 7 over conditions are symptomatic of the 
struggle of the operatives to achieve a degree of control in the factory 
environment. 
I have little information on strikes ~n the other areas over this 
period, but it is likely that they follow a similar pattern of short strikes 
against individual employers. Figures given by Phillips Bevan for the 1870s 
record 14 strikes in hosiery, including a Nottingham strike over the employ-
2 
ment of women. Another Nottingham strike lasted 14 weeks, involved 700 
operatives and cost the employers £9,800 (Phillips Bevan, 1880, pp 38, 40, 
49). Most were probably shorter. Hinckley Union minutes show exactly the 
same pattern of strikes over the same range of issues: pay, discipline and 
union recognition. In the final stages before the Second World War one new 
element crept in, the strike involving members in the 'new' areas; major-
strikes occurred at St. Albans (1930), Elstree (1936) and Bear Brand, Liver-
pool (1939). This last strike, lasting nine months, cost the unions over 
£7,000; the brunt was borne by Leicester, while Hinckley contributed £700 
(HU December 6th 1939). 
Not all strikes ended in defeat. The LAHU minutes record victories, 
great and small. Strikes over sackings and non-unionists were particularly 
likely to be settled in the union's favour. For example, sacked workpeople 
were reinstated at Corahs in 1913 and Krenton and Almond in 1917, and a 
non-unionist forced to leave Beehive in 1917 (LAHU A February 5th 1913, 
1 See Chapter 8~ p 2?0-?1. 
2 I have found no reference to any strikes during the 1860-?0 period~ 
when the infLuence of the NAB was at its height. FoLLowing MUndeLLa's 
departure in 18?1~ that moderating infLuence decLined. 
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April 17th, September 14th 1917). Threatened strikes over these issues 
. 1 
were often avoided by quick settlements. Some notable victories were 
gained, too, in longer disputes, such as the victory after a month's 
strike at Wills and Hutchinson in 1910, an advance gained at a newly 
organised village factory in 1913, and a strike over non-payment of bonus 
~n 1917 (LAHU A September 26th 1910, May 25th 1913, December 8th 1917). 
There were, however, some painful defeats. In 1900, men at Rowleys 
returned to work at old prices after a long strike, also accepting a set 
wages system, which incensed the officers so much that they expelled them 
from the un~on. At another strike in 1920 over wages, 20 out of 100 girls 
returned to work, arousing Chaplin's wrath: 
A number of you have been mean and cowardZy enough to go 
cringing into the boss and from what we have heard you have 
promised to Zeave the union ... I hope MYhiZZ and ShortZand 
wiZZ make you suffer ... He can grind you as he Zikes and 
serve you right~ it's the worst case I have ever known. 
(LAHU A March 28th~ June 13th 1900~ LAHU B JuZy 30th 1920) 
In the same year a long dispute with Morleys, over the sacking of 70 girls 
who had joined the union, also ended in defeat, because of the employment 
of blacklegs (LAHU A December 8th 1920). 
Although victories possibly outweighed defeats in this period, the 
wariness about strikes that had evolved during the previous decades was 
still evinced by the leaders. Strikes continued to be seen as a necessary 
evil. Thus, disputatious winders at one firm were told 
Under no consideration must strikes take pZace untiZ every 
possibLe means has been tried to come to terms. 
(LAHU A June 24th 1914) 
1 See LAHU A March 2nd 1921~ June 28th 1922~ for exampZe. 
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Unofficial strikes were not popular with leaders (LAHU A February 5th 
1913, November 27th 1915). Sometimes it was possible to use alternative 
tactics; for example, at one firm where the collector had been sacked men 
refused to work shifts rather than strike, and at another firm girls were 
told not to accept money for a disputed job unless the official union 
price was given (LAHU A November lOth 1897, August 19th 1914). Officials 
were cautious about entering on strikes they might lose: a strike at 
Sileby, a Leicestershire village, was avoided because the last attempted 
strike there had been a "costly failure", and at the onset of the postwar 
depression it was noted that 
Nobody was satisfied with the employers' lists but everyone 
agreed that a strike would be useless at the present time. 
(LAHV A October 13th 1905~ B April 29th 1921) 
Figure 9.2 shows the pattern of strike activity of LAHU up to 1930. 
Before the war strikes were fairly frequent, during the war they peaked, 
and from 1921 there was a clear decline. Undoubtedly a maJor cause of 
this decline was the establishment of the NJIC, which, like the NAB before 
it, was intended to replace strikes with negotiation, and which repeated 
some of the NAB's initial success. Another contributory factor was the 
r~se to power of Moulden, who avowed his opposition to strikes more firmly 
than his predecessors had done, keeping the union on the path indicated 
by the NJIC. In 1928 he told the AGM that while there had been 16 disputes 
in his first half-year ~n office 
In every instance we have avoided drastic action~ although in 
t~...,.-; cases we came very near the mark. 
(LAHU B July 21st 1928) 
This set the tone for his secretaryship. Later in his career he told the 
executive that 
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If onLy the same resuLts wouLd accrue from the two methods ... 
negotiations shouLd be put forward every time. 
(LAHU A JuLy 21st 193?) 
In 1938 he told a packed mass meeting that he disliked using the strike 
weapon (Leicester Mercury November 15th 1938). 
Although Moulden's moderate attitudes were not the initial cause of 
the decline of strikes, his espousal of arbitration procedures helped to 
maintain the new industrial harmony, and under his leadership NUHW started 
1 its career committed to settling disputes by conciliation procedure. 
This did not entirely bring an end to strikes. For example in 1947, while 
three disputes had been brought to conciliation without strike action (in 
each case the union's claims being upheld), four strikes had occurred, 
three over dismissals, which then went to arbitration. Strikes, thus, 
continued to break out in difficult situations, especially over un1on 
recognition, where clearly NJIC procedures were inapplicable. 2 Neverthe-
less, NUHW upheld its cautious attitude to striking, despite its increased 
numerical strength and financial resources. There has only been one general 
strike in its history, in 1976. 
Strike activities, then, showed some marked continuities with the 
pre-1860 period, although the espousal of arbitration by the manufacturers 
had an important effect in diminishing them. Another marked continuity, 
at least up to World War One, was the continued espousal of experiments in 
co-operative production. 
Leicester in particular was a leading centre in the co-operative 
revival of the 1870s and 1880s. In terms of consumer co-operation, Acland 
and Jones calculated that in 1881 17.6% of the Leicestershire population, 
1 See Chapter ?. 
2 See AC Reports 194?, 1949, 1950. 
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15% of ~ottinghamshire and 19.6% of Derbyshire were shareholders of the 
CWS; by 1891, this had increased to 26.3%, 20.4% and 36.9% respectively 
(Acland and Jones, 1884, p 31, 1898, p 35). Only five English counties 
showed higher levels of shareholding. In the field of producer co-
operation, one third of the Co-operative Production Federation (CPF) co-
ops were in the East Midlands. In 1898, there were nine producer co-ops 
in Leicester (four in boot and shoe where the independent artisan ideal 
was even stronger than in hosiery) (CPF, 1900, p 82). By 1927, there 
were three more boot and shoe co-ops .. In hosiery, nine co-ops were formed 
in the East Midlands between 1850 and 1880, although the majority failed: 
these were in Leicester, Hinckley, Shepshed, Loughborough, Nottingham, 
Arnold, Mansfield and Ruddington; there was also one at Hawick (Jones, 
1888, p 41, 1894, pp 371-4). 
The Shepshed co-op, founded l.n 1881 struggled on until 1891 making a 
continual loss, and the Hinckley co-op, founded in 1884 with 90 members, 
was only making a profit of E30 by 1891. The only two really successful 
ones were the Leicester Co-operative Hosiery Hanufacturing Society (LCHHS), 
founded in 1867, but reconstituted in 1876 with union backing, and the 
later Wigston Hosiers, formed in 1897. 
. h . 1 The story of the LCHMS is instructJ.ve and rat er trag1c. The first 
society, with 60 members, floundered, like its predecessors for lack of 
initial capital and commercial knowhow. In 1875, a LAHU general meeting 
voted to take it over. This decision was soon reversed, partly for ideo-
logical reasons and partly because the enterprise continued to make a loss. 
But a new committee was then formed, including Holmes and George Newell, 
1 MateriaL on LCHMS is taken from BLandford and NeweLL~ 18983 and its 
own 1891 publication. 
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at that time the LAHU secretary and a workmate of Thomas Barclay's at 
Corahs, who was subsequently appointed manager. From then on the co-op 
started to build itself up slowly but steadily, as is shown in Figure 9.3. 
By 1896 it had the 4th highest profit of the 84 extant societies. In 1898, 
all employees were reported as being shareholders: according to Newell, 
"Workers come here and do not go away" (Lloyd, 1898, p 116). The links 
with the union had been maintained, and union rates were paid; the co-
operative sought to guarantee security of employment, and there was a 
profit-sharing scheme. 
Visitors to LCHMS were favourably impressed. Beatrice Webb, later 
an implacable opponent of producer co-ops, corrunented on the "contented, 
happy faces, bright appearances and friendly manners" of the workpeople 
(Blandford and Newell, 1898, p 72). A journalist from the Workmen's Times, 
conducted round by Holmes, was told of a "great list of names" waiting to 
be "set on". It was described as a "comfortable shop", free from "humbug", 
and, because of the kindness and consideration of Newell, the workpeople 
"are quite a happy family". The regularity of employment contrasted with 
the seasonality of much hosiery work; production was for the C\.JS, so that 
there was always a stock of orders. The journalist was especially pleased 
to see the women singing at the work, which he considered an infallible 
sign that "the iron has not entered into the soul" (LCHMS, 1891, pp 10-2). 
This undoubted success story, however, came to an abrupt end when the co-
operative was taken over by the CWS in 1904; shortly afterwards it was 
relocated by the CWS in Huthwaite, Derbyshire. With a profit of £3,875 in 
1898 (see Figure 9.3), it is not surprising the CWS considered it a tasty 
morsel. Unfortunately the LCHMS's dependence on the CWS as a customer 
made it powerlesg in face of such attentions. 
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Figure 9. 3 
Progress of Leicester Co-operative Hosiery 
Manufacturing Society, 1876-98 
Loan/share Trade (£s) Profits ( £s) Capital ( £s) 
130 938 26 
303 
2,378 
783 
4,493 129 
5,415 
6,273 133 
2,865 
4,861 9,097 300 
10,345 
7,549 
13,332 17,079 
14,349 21,440 628 
1,125 
19,418 1,504 
1,829 
2,214 
31,785 48,885 2,802 
39,808 53,595 
43,032 57,753 3,875 
1 Sources : Acland and Jones~ 1884 
Blandford., 1892 
Blandford and Newell., 1898 
CPF., 1900 
Jones~ 1888., 1894 
LCHMS., 1891 
Statistics of Co-operative 
Societies~ 1898 
No. of 
Employees 
91 
100 
290 
1 There are some discrepancies in the figures given in these various 
sources. Where these occur~ I have taken the figures from the most 
direct source. 
328 
Wigston Hosiers, set up with advice from Newell, was also a financial 
success, as described by Edward Greening in his history of it, 'A Demo-
cratic Co-partnership'. This also had union support, although the links 
were less direct. In 1914 LAHU took out £20 worth of shares, not because 
the co-op lacked capital, but to strengthen the bonds with trade unionism, 
and more shares were taken up 1n 1918 and 1920 (LAHU A June 19th 1914, 
March 8th 1918, September 1st 1920). At the 'coming of age' party, Chaplin, 
a guest speaker as current Mayor of Leicester, praised the "co-partnership 
solution for the problem of strikes and class bitterness••~ there had never 
1 been a strike at the co-op (Greening, 1921, p 120). Greening, describing 
the co-op as being under 11 a reign of industrial peace and content•• 
applauded the 11happy-looking•• workpeople and the clean bright surroundings. 
He spoke to an audience of 100 shareholding workpeople, including many 
women, and complimented them on their intelligent understanding of the co-
partnership ideal: 
Men and women alike responded to the suggestion that the 
emancipation of the workers implied industry~ thrift •.. and 
sharing in responsibilities as weZZ as sharing in profits. 
(Greening~ 1921~ pp 101-2~ 121) 
The spirit of this enterprise was close to that of the Christian 
Socialist strand in co-operative thought, and it could be argued that, 
like others of its type and time, it was not very different from an ordinary 
2 joint stock company. However, the stress on good employment conditions, 
security of employment and friendly, trusting management relations marked 
it out from the average hosiery factory of the 1920s. 
1 He neglected to mention an incident in 1916 when the co-op had been 
reprimanded for having non-unionists on its committee! (LAHU A Feb-
ruary 26th 1916). 
2 This view is expressed~ for example~ in Kirkham's account of Equity 
Shoes~ the most successful and Long-running of the Leicester CPF 
co-ops (Kirkham~ 19?3). 
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Many un~on activists were strongly committed to the co-operative 
ideal. Early LAHU leaders, Holmes, Bindley and Newell were strongly in 
favour, as later was Chaplin. As Newell stated: 
For some years before the starting of the above company efforts 
had been made by trade union officiaLs to estabLish co-operative 
production. They saw tlwt trade unions might heLp, but couLd 
not soLve, the probLem of Labour and capitaL. 
(LCHMS, 1891 3 p 1) 
Bonser and Oscroft, Nottingham hand-frame leaders, spoke in 1892 of co-
operative production as a possible solution to their problems, which they 
were currently considering, although it was difficult for the low-paid 
hand-workers to accumulate sufficient starting capital. In the same year 
LAHU, in addition to its involvement with LCHMS, had started a self-
employment scheme to help unemployed older members (PP 1892 xxxvi Pt 2, 
pp 59, 88). Earlier, at the 'Capital and Labour' discussions many 
Nottingham labour leaders, from the ASE, the joiners, the carpenters and 
the stonemasons, for example, had spoken of co-operation as the way forward. 
One workman, Matthias Mather, saw it as the "only true solution" to the 
labour/capital conflict (Ward, 1874, p 51). 1 
The motivations of these men were much the same as those of their 
predecessors, Henson, Jackson and Merrick2 : the desire for security of 
employment and for social advancement through self-help, along with an 
ideological commitment to the notion of the 'co-operative commonwealth' 
whereby co-operative production was seen as the first step in the socialisa-
tion of production. Newell described the LClL11S as an attempt at "better 
organisation" of industry, where the old methods had led to unemployment, 
1 It is curious in view of the enthusiasm expressed, especiaLLy by the 
ASE3 that co-operative production never fLourished in Nottingham. 
2 See Chapter 8. 
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irregular employment and poverty for workpeople; the a1m was to make the 
workers "partners in their own industry, citizens 1.n an industrial com-
munity" (Blandford and Newell, 1898, pp 9, 11). These statements show 
how the desire for independence and security, and the ethic of self-help, 
were combined with a bolder view of a new social order, one we might per-
haps describe as 'co-operative democratic' rather than 'socialist'. 
This Utopian strand 1.n the East Midlands' co-operators' thinking was 
epitomised by statements made at the Co-operative Congress held in 
Leicester in 1915. One local speaker defended local co-operators against 
the charge of being merely "a host of dividend hunters". They were seeking 
"a real genuine socialism that has been well tested and that gives over-
whelming evidence of its practicability and beneficence". Co-operation 
would bring to an end the bitter struggles between capital and labour, 
and he believed that the experience of war was wakening in many people an 
interest in the "moral grandeur and economic liberality" of co-operation, 
in the "brotherhood of social helpfulness" and "an altruistic social 
environment"; so that the day was near when 
Society shall have outgrown the old social and economic systems 
and be ready to acclaim the glorious advent of a co-operative 
corrorzonwealth. 
On a more mundane note, Chaplin told the congress that co-operation was 
the best of any industrial systems currently being practised (Co-operative 
Congress, 1915, pp 181-6, 224). 
Not all the union radicals shared this viewpoint. What Newell des-
cribed as "a minority" in LAHU had opposed co-operation "often and loud 
and strong", and succeeded in severing the union the LCHMS 1.n 1877. This 
'minority' believed co-operation to be "bad in theory and evil in practice" 
(Blandford and Newell, 1898, p 11). They were led by Barclay, perhaps the 
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most strongly socialist of the group, who may well have seen co-operation 
1 
as a diversion from the true proletarian struggle. If so, he was perhaps 
right, as co-ops obviously did not provide a lasting solution to the 
2 
capital and labour problem. It can be argued that the interest ~n co-
operation diverted attention from other radical alternatives; however, 
this should not detract from the fact that the LAHU leaders espoused co-
operation in the progressive and Utopian spirit of their predecessors. 
If the use of partial strikes and the commitment to co-operation are 
signs of continuity between the factory and the pre-factory epochs, there 
is considerable discontinuity if we turn to political activities. This 
period was marked by a growing separation, in the leaders' minds, between 
the industrial and political spheres, in strong contrast to the shifting 
between political and industrial activities which was described in Chapter 
8. 
It would be too simplistic to interpret this purely in terms of the 
depoliticisation of the union leadership. The leaders of LAHU, as we have 
seen, were men committed to radical politics of various sorts - socialism, 
anarchism, co-operation - such as Holmes, Barclay, Warner, Newell and 
Bindley. 3 Holmes and Barclay were founder members of the Leicester ILP 
in 1888, and Chaplin soon joined them. Holmes' monthly reports for LAHU 
are said to have been very "socialistic" in tone (Gurnham, 1976, p 45). 
Chaplin, with due permission from the members, was elected councillor for 
the Lib/Labs in 1898 (Howes, 1927, p 59; LAHU A June 30th 1897); he became 
an alderman in 1909, and Mayor in 1919, again with permission from the 
LAHU AGM. A TUC programme said of him that 
1 See Lancaster3 19823 p 195. 
2 The last reference I have found to Wigston Hosiers was in 1930. It 
does not exist now. 
3 See Lancaster3 19823 for discussion of the political beliefs of these 
men. 
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He joined the ranks of the rebels against a selfish capitalism 
and the tyranny of the machine. 
(TUC, 1903, p 51) 
Although I have no information on the political lives of leaders ~n other 
districts in the late nineteenth century, there is no indication ~n reports 
of MCHF meetings of serious political disagreements: certainly Chamberlain, 
who led the Hinckley Union in the 1930s and 1940s, was a militant Labour 
activist and councillor. 
However, there are important changes to note, many of them relating 
to changes in the wider political context. The age of mass working-class 
movements was past, and the age of representative democracy was dawning. 
The hosiery unions sent delegates to the TUC, were actively involved in 
the GFTU, and had links with the local Trades' Councils: in Leicester, 
Merrick, Chaplin and four other LAHU activists were presidents of the 
Trades' Council between 1872 and 1921 (Leicester and District Trades' 
Council, 1930). Centralised pressure group action, rather than direct 
action, was the order of the day. There was also change in the political 
affiliations of the mass of workers. If LAHU's leaders inclined to 
socialism, there is no evidence that many of the rank-and-file did; they 
were no longer prepared to follow their leaders down the radical road. 1 
In addition, there was a tendency over time for leaders to draw a more 
rigid distinction as to how much 'political' issues, whatever their own 
loyalties, were legitimate trade union business. In this sense, it could 
be said that they did slowly become, as unionists at least, 'depoliticised'. 
By 1949 the Leicester District Committee was complaining that the Trades' 
Council was a waste of time ''as most of the discussions were centred on 
political arguments" (LD October 31st 1949). 
1 See Lancaster, 1982, p 196. 
333 
Both these latter elements are nicely demonstrated in the saga 
1 
surrounding the Lssue of affiliation to the Labour Party. LAHU was 
originally affiliated to the Labour Representation Committee (LRC), 
probably as a direct consequence of Holmes' and Chaplin's ILP involve-
ments. In 1910 they were paying contributions to the LRC, while facing 
complaints about the use of union funds for political purposes. In 1913 
£8 6s 8d was paid over to represent 2,000 members, but shortly afterwards, 
following the prosecution of other unions for misuse of funds, LAHU dis-
affiliated. A ballot was then held in 1914, resulting in 756 votes for 
affiliation, 961 against. 2 At the insistence of two strongly socialist 
committee members (Newcombe and Baum) another ballot was held, after a 
resolution was passed that 
In view of the deplorable condition of the Working Classes 
due to unemployment~ high cost of living etc.~ and the 
failure of our Capitalist government to remedy these evils 
... the Hosiery Union should fall into line with other trade 
unions for the purpose of Political Action. 
In 1921 the membership voted for affiliation by 2835 votes to 1778, but 
the ballot was declared invalid, and when it was repeated in 1922 affilia-
tion was rejected by 2822 votes to 1253. 3 
The left-wingers continued to raise the issue, and when the NUHW was 
formed one of its objectives was "to promote political action through 
4 
affiliation to the Labour Party". A ballot in 1948 again brought rejec-
tion, by 12,049 to 9,394. Another ballot in 1953 followed unsuccessful 
1 The minutes give a sometimes confused picture on this issue. As far 
as I can ascertain~ the main facts are as set out here. 
2 3~500 papers had been sent out. 
3 See LAHU A June 3rd3 July 20th 19103 December 4th 19133 November 9th 
1921~ December 13th 1922; LAHU B June 28th 1921). 
4 By 1969 3 this clause had disappeared from the rule-book. 
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attempts to explain the importance of affiliation to the membership: 
Leicester District Committee reported difficulty in putting across the 
"union's point of view" to members, and even to collectors; though the 
DC had itself voted 6 to 4 (with 3 abstentions) for affiliation, the 
ballot was again lost (LD October 15th 1951, October 5th, September 21st 
1953). Other ballots have been held since1 , but the membership has con-
tinued to reject affiliation, and officials have come to see the ballots 
as detrimental to unity (LD March 19th 1959). 
The ballot issue clearly demonstrates that the un~on leaders have 
consistently been more radical than the rank-and-file. Chaplin's role 
in this is also significant. Despite his ILP involvement, there was a 
rift between him and the Labour Party. This seems partly to have been 
due to his disapproval of their anti-war stance in World War One: a 
pronounced patriot, he was expelled from the local party, so that in 1919 
he became the town's "first Labour Mayor" only in the more general sense 
(Gurnham, 1976, p 79). But his disagreements with the Party may have been 
more wholesale than this one issue, as the tone of his reports from TUC 
meetings in the 1920s suggests a suspicion of the Marxist or "red element" 
~n the Party, and a growing anti-communist stance. He claimed he was proud 
to support a Labour Party as long as it was a "Trade Union party, not a 
society like the present Labour Party". 2 He told the left-wingers that he 
had no objection to the union taking part ~n politics, "we are compelled 
~n self-defence to do so", but he could not "support the present so-called 
Labour Party which had altered its constitution to embrace anyone" (LAHU A 
1 The latest was in 1981~ resulting in rejection by 1?~054 to 13~414. 
Another is to be held in 1986. 
2 At least one member agreed with him~ arguing that "some were looking 
out for soft dobs and wanted the ~lorking Man to pay for them" (LAHU 
B October 29th 1918). 
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September 23rd 1925, LAHU B July 24th 1918, October 29th 1918). Chaplin 
seems to have drifted away from the original socialism he learned from 
Holmes and Barclay into a centrist position, which clearly reflects some 
idea that the furthering of the working man's interests through trade 
unionist pressure group activity should be kept separate from more gener-
alised political activity. 
A much more marked moderation, however, was shown by Moulden. Des-
pite Chaplin's doubts about the Labour Party he remained attached to the 
Labour Movement in general; there was a strong tradition of support by 
LAHU under his leadership for strikes and similar activities. Chaplin 
made clear his strong support for the miners in 1926, and a total of over 
£500 was sent to them in the course of the strike (LAHU 1926, especially 
LAHU B August 24th). After Moulden's accession, many such appeals were 
rejected. Moulden seems to have had little interest in party politics, 
and rows broke out frequently between him and the socialist Newcombe over, 
for example, the lack of active support given to the Jarrow marchers on 
their way through Leicester (LD September 30th 1936). In comparison to 
Chaplin, Moulden seems to have espoused a narrowly sectarian and econo-
mistic brand of trade unionism. 
The formation of a 'left opposition' within the executive seems to 
have dated from around 1911, significantly following after the demise of 
the strongly socialist Holmes, and can be taken as a sign of the slowly 
growing moderacy of the leadership. It was led by Newcombe, of the large 
Johnson and Barnes factory at Kibworth, who had some substantial rank-and-
file support. The group kept up pressure for more militant and politically-
oriented policy. Newcombe had frequent clashes with Chaplin, accusing him 
of inactivity, spinelessness and collusion with the employers, claiming 
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to have heard "not once but a hundred times that Johnson's got Chaplin 
round his finger ends" (LAHU A July 9th, December 19th 1914). He sue-
ceeded in rousing the Kibworth workers to voice discontent with the 
leadership. Chaplin reported facing "complaints and suspicions" from 
them, and on another occasion "fault-finding and grumbling" (LAHU A 
October 13th 1915, April 8th 1916). In 1924 members grumbled "the 
committee are asleep and the officials dead"! (LAHU B January lOth 1924). 
The left-wingers opposed the arbitration policies of the war period: 
Newcombe made his attitude to Whitleyism quite clear, when he told Chaplin 
it was a "step in the wrong direction", and that they would be better 
advised to appoint an organiser to "preach discontent and show that the 
capitalists are the workers' enemies" (LAHU B February 28th 1919). On 
one occasion they tried to change the rules so that the officials and 
Committee should be appointed by the trade meeting, not by ballot, on the 
grounds that "it would be more democratic" 1 (LAHU B April 7th 1917, LAHU 
B August 22nd 1922). 
Moulden defeated two of the left opposition group, Newcombe and Black, 
~n the 1927 election for Secretary, polling 2,222 votes to their 636 and 
2,110 respectively. Black resigned, but Newcombe remained to be a thorn 
in Moulden's flesh. Vitriolic rows continued until Newcombe lost his job 
and resigned from the union in 1942, declaring that "more than one party" 
2 
would be glad of his departure (LD January 29th 1942). 
1 A statement that raises interesting questions about competing views 
of what "democracy" consists of~ in light of Government policy on 
unions in the 1980s. 
2 Not only moderate leaders faced such criticisms. Chamberlain~ Labour 
Party activist of the Hinckley Union~ was criticised by a member for 
conducting "a game of chess" with the employers' leader, using "delay-
ing tactics", and warned that not only dockers could move against 
their leaders (HU April 4th 194?). 
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After the formation of the National Union, left oppositional tactics 
were continued. A motion raised by the Nottingham delegation at the 1947 
Annual Conference called for three-yearly ballots for President and Sec-
retary. The proposer declared 
There is a tendency for the trade union leader to become just 
another gaffer ... I want to get the trade union leaders on 
the same level as the workers. 
(Hinckley Times 3 May 30th 194?) 1 
Leicester District minutes record the activities of a group of Labour and 
Communist party militants on the DC, who agitated for political action and 
affiliation, support of left-wing causes, closer links with the shopfloor, 
educational programmes and so on. At the 1952 AGM members raised the issue 
of holding monthly branch meetings; an attempt to do so failed, as much 
through members' apathy as the officials' opposition (LD AGM 1952). 
The declining radicalism of the mass of workers, shown in the ballot 
issue, is also reflected in the decline of violent activity during this 
period. Figure 8.3 indicates the decline of violent collective events 
after 1850. Although election disturbances continued late into the century 
(there were riots in Nottingham in 1870 and 1885) other forms of rioting 
declined sharply. Of the four industrial riots recorded in Figure 8.3, 
one only concerned hosiery. The others were two lacemakers' riots ~n 
Nottingham in 1865 and 1875 and a bricklayers' riot ~n Leicester in 1899. 
The last hosiery disturbance was occasioned by the 1886 strike in Leicester: 
a mob took to the streets, uttering threats and execrations against the 
employers, besieging factories and smashing windows. Women were said to be 
active among the rioters (Leicester Advertiser, February 13th 1886). 
1 It was defeated. 
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From then on~ violence ceased to be a significant feature of the 
industrial scene. The only violent incidents occurred during strikes, 
when feelings against 'scabs' ran high, leading to confrontation on the 
street. For example, there were clashes between pickets and police ~n 
1914, during the strike at Skevingtons over union recognition; s~x girls 
were prosecuted, for yelling "dirty scabs" at blacklegs, and in one case 
for physical assault. Women were often involved in picketing incidents, 
and during another strike at Bedworth, near Coventry, where there were 
several violent scenes, a woman was again prosecuted for assault (LAHU A 
April 24th 1914, LAHU B April 9th 1925). These incidents, however, were 
small-scale, and involved few people. They could hardly be seen as a 
major threat to public order, and it was no longer possible for the East 
Midlands to be seen as the site of "radical ruffianism". 1 
Section 2 Pacification and the diminution of class identity 
It might be argued that the deradicalisation of the hosiery workers 
and the decline of industrial violence occurred because the grievances 
which had inspired radicalism and violence had vanished; hosiery workers 
and their families no longer lived in poverty, and they were assured of 
reasonable wages and more secure employment. Yet study of LAHU minute 
books shows that grievances remained; unemployment was still a threat, 
especially in the twenties; there were still cases of low wages and poor 
conditions, especially among women workers; operatives could face dismissal, 
harsh discipline, and victimisation over union membership. However, these 
experiences no longer pushed them into the formulation of more radical 
demands. A working-class population notable for its volatility, interest 
1 See Chapter 7~ p 255. 
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~n politics, and outbreaks of unrest, was in process of becoming equally 
notable for its pacific industrial and social behaviour. This was not, 
after all, a period free from social unrest, but the industrial upheavals 
of World War One and the General Strike, for example, had little impact in 
the East Midlands. 1 What brought about this change? 
Undoubtedly improved material conditions and the experience of pros-
perity had an important impact; but a simple equation between poverty and 
unrest, prosperity and harmony, cannot generally be made. Indeed, many 
have argued that it is in times of economic expansion, when rising expect-
ations are generated and unfavourable comparisons with the improving lot 
of others drawn, that subordinate classes become sufficiently aware of 
2 injustices to organise and seek to change the status quo. Material 
conditions cannot be ignored, but the role of perceptions and strategic 
choices must also be examined. 
As argued in Chapter 7, I believe that a maJor factor in achieving 
class pacification was the changing behaviour of the employers. This 
chapter has pointed to many continuities between this period and the 
earlier one in terms of union policies and strategies: strikes remained 
frequent, organisation remained informal, and bureaucratisation and a 
spirit of moderacy among leaders only gradually made their appearance. 
Leaders continued to be involved in local radical politics and to hold 
visions of an alternative social order. Up till the twenties at least, 
the major change was the switch by the more progressive employers to 
acceptance of union rights and promotion of joint consultation; this 
1 There were some disturbances in Nottingham during the General Strike~ 
and a few arrests were made~ but the militants failed to persuade 
hosiery workers to stop work (British Gazette~ May lOth 1926). 
2 See the arguments of Moore~ 1979~ and Piven and Cloward~ 19?9~ for 
example. 
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tended to push un1on leaders into an accommodative response, not so much 
because of any instant conversion to an ideology of shared interests, but 
because it seemed the best way to promote their members' interests. 
Naturally, hostility between the two sides did not completely vanish. 
There were continued instances of bitter fights between manufacturers and 
un10ns. 1 Chaplin, despite his growing reputation as a peacemaker could 
be irascible, obstinate and aggressive when his temper was roused. There 
was, for example, a series of furious confrontations between him and 
employer J. Morley during the 1921 strike, when threats and insults were 
exchanged between the two adversaries (LAHU B January 6th 1921). Another 
notable case was the confrontation between Chamberlain and Wood, a Nuneaton 
manufacturer: the protagonists nearly came to blows, while Wood marshalled 
a procession of his workpeople to bust up a un1on meeting, leading them in 
shouting anti-union and anti-Labour Party slogans (another example of the 
deradicalisation of the rank-and-file) (Hinckley Tribune, June 25th, 26th 
1936). In individual disputes, feelings of hostility and bitterness were 
often aroused. Even Moulden was at times led to question the sincerity of 
the manufacturers: "We know the full measure of their insincerity as far 
as our labour problems are concerned" he declared during the 1946 National 
agreement negotiations; later he spoke of the employers' "deliberate attempt 
to place every obstacle 1n the way of organised labour taking its rightful 
place 1n the councils of industrial development" (Leicester Mail, June 1st 
1946, AC Report 1947 p 20). 
Nonetheless, as Chapter 7 showed, there was growing use by both sides 
of the language of 'conciliation', 'respect' and 'harmony'. The hostility 
engendered in disputes rarely became generalised into the class-based 
critique of the employers' behaviour that the 1845 witnesses' statements 
1 See comments ~n Greening~ 1921, p 120 and Armitage, 1933~ p 101. 
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had displayed. 1 
The change in employer strategy was, then, a key factor, but other 
contriLutory factors must be considered, some of which have been dealt 
with in this chapter. The absorption of the leaders in the co-operative 
movement, progressive as it was, helped divert them from other kinds of 
radical endeavour, and in addition the co-operative ideal was explicitly 
opposed to strikes, seeing co-operation as a way to avoid them and to put 
an end to labour-capital confrontations and conflicts. Also important was 
the way in which definitions of the 'political' changed, so that it became 
more sharply identified with party politics; a clear divide was seen bet-
ween what could legitimately be described as 'industrial relations' and 
political relations in general. Alongside this separation of the political 
and the economic, there was a growing tendency for the union leadership to 
espouse 'moderate' positions on the party political spectrum, and eventually 
even an 'apolitical' stance. However, to stress this growing moderation is 
not to accept the rank-and-filist thesis, that the mass of workers were 'sold 
out' by the growing conservatism and personal ambitions of their elected 
representatives. In the hosiery case, even the moderate leaders were often 
more politically radical than the mass of their followers: the Leicester 
operatives, for example, chose (if quite narrowly) to vote for Moulden ~n 
1927, rather than his radical opponents. What, then, were the factors lead-
ing to the deradicalisation of the rank-and-file? 
This question is not easily answered. One possible factor could be 
the growing feminisation of the workforce, which more or less coincided with 
the switch to accommodative responses. Certainly women in the industry, now 
in a majority, had always been excluded from many aspects of formal organisa-
1 See Chapter B. 
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tion, though evidence suggests that in the preceding period they played 
an important, if supporting, role in many forms of political action 
(demonstrations, riots, Chartist parades etc). However, it can be 
argued that they filled this role by virtue of their family relation to 
the male knitters, for whom they·often acted as subsidiary workers, so 
that their seaming and mending tasks would automatically be stopped if 
there was a strike. 1 In the 1880s, it was increasingly likely that 
female hosiery workers would have husbands and fathers 1n other indus-
tries, such as boot and shoe or engineering. 2 Indeed, by the 1950s it 
was common wisdom 1n Leicester that the 'typical' family consisted of 
wife and daughters in hosiery, husband and son in engineering, or possibly 
3 
self-employed. Thus many of the female recruits 1n this period may have 
been detached from the traditions and history of the industry, and indeed 
might bring to the work quite different traditions learned from their 
families of origin. 
However, not all hosiery workers are women. There were still suffic-
ient male operatives to give a radical lead, had they so wished. The 
idea that women are less militant is used by contemporary officials to 
explain the union's moderate profile, but there is no real evidence to 
support this claim. Accounts of strikes in LAHU minutes show that on 
specific issues women were as militant as men. Since 1960, union density 
1 See Chapter 10 and Bradley~ 1986 . 
2 Oslerad (1986) argues that from mid-century the pattern of wives and 
hu;;bands working in the same industry was lostJ and the shoe opera-
tives commonly had wives employed in hosiery. 
3 Tais ideaJ expressed to me by union officers) remains at the 'folk-
loric 1 level. I have no evidence to support itJ though interesting 
data could clearly be obtained on the issue either by study of census 
returns or through research based round operatives' work and family 
histories. 
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has been higher among women than men, despite officials' beliefs: in 
1978 68.9% of women were organised as opposed to 54.6% of men. 
Two other factors seem to me at least as important as feminisation. 
One is the decline of the strongly political work culture described in 
Chapter 8. This was, of course, a markedly male culture, and feminisa-
tion may have hastened its decline. But also important was the growing 
split in working-class culture between work and leisure. 1 Chaplin, one 
of the last survivors of the old school, declared that he had never 
attended a football or cricket match in his life: what leisure time he 
had which was not absorbed by his political and union work was devoted 
to education ("books and music") and to the temperance cause, secularism 
and spiritualism (LAHU A November 5th 1919; Lancaster, 1982, p 161). By 
contrast, Barclay in the 1930s perceived the working man as "absorbed by 
2 trivialities, football, cricket and ho~se-racing" (Barclay, 1934, p 59). 
Chaplin must have had little sympathy for the workers who threatened to 
leave LAHU because they (mistakenly) believed that an officer had critic-
ised employers for giving workpeople time off to watch a Leicester/Newcastle 
football match. As he exhorted members on another occasion 
Recreation and Amusements are aZZ very weZZ in their way but 
sureZy Labour questions 'the means by which we Live' shouZd 
have some share of attention Jrom every worker. 
(LAHU A February 4th 1925~ LAHU B February 20th 1933) 
In actuality, work was assuming less importance in working people's lives 
than in the days when Holmes had explained that a substantial number of 
hosiery operatives "would sooner work than have a pension" (PP 1892 xxxvi 
1 See Stedman Jones~ 19?4~ and discussion in Chapter 2. 
2 A similar lament had been earlier made by Thomas Cooper (Cooper~ 
18?2~ p 394). 
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Pt 2 p 58). The spread of mass culture, especially among young workers 
who, as we have seen, preferred dancing to political speeches, broke up 
the tight old industrial and political culture of the workshops. 
Another related factor was the changing nature of working-class 
identity in this period. As I argued in Chapter 8, ~n earlier days, 
when a knitter took to the streets, he/she did so in the interests of 
his/her family, trade, community and class: family identity, occupational 
identity, community identity and class identity came together. From 1880 
on, this was no longer the case. Although in the initial stages of 
factory organisation some family-based employment continued, this soon 
began to die out. Husbands and wives were less likely to work in the 
same industry. Also, with growing industrial diversification in the area, 
the identification between the community and the hosiery trade was weakened. 
This was especially true in Nottingham, but in Leicester, too, hosiery 
ceased to be the major form of industrial employment. Figure 9.4 shows 
the rise to dominance ~n Leicester of the boot and shoe industry, which 
had overtaken hosiery as maJor employer in 1871, setting up a situation ~n 
which men commonly worked in the shoe industry, with w~ves and daughters 
working in hosiery. In Nottingham, hosiery and lace were still the major 
employers of males in 1871, but by 1881 engineering and construction had 
started to dominate the male employment scene (Church, 1966, pp 236-7). 
Overall, the proportion of the population of the East Midlands employed 
in hosiery fell from 15% in 1851 to 6.5% in 1911 (Smith, 1961, Fig. 49). 
Family, community and occupational identity were thus split, and this 
produced a more fragmented, less definite sense of class experience and 
1 . 1 c ass ~nterests. 
1 In Hinckley~ however~ industrial employment remain concentrated in 
hosiery: in 1964 26-30.9% of Hinckley males in paid employment 
worked in hosiery~ and over 36% of women (Smith~ 1969, Figs 18~ 19). 
This may account for the much higher level of union membership in 
the town. 
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Figure 9.4 
Industrial Employment in Leicester 1851-1901 
1851 1861 1871 1881 1891 
Percentage of 
industrial 
workers 38.5 26.4 20.7 22.2 21.5 
employed in 
hosiery 
Percentage of 
industrial 
workers 6.2 10.9 21.6 33.4 41.0 
employed l.n 
footwear 
Source: W. Lancaster3 Radicalism to Socialism: the Leicester Working 
Class 1860-1906~ unpub~ished PhD 1982 p 378. 
1901 
17.1 
36.8 
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In addition, as described in Chapter 6, a new kind of identity 
became available, that of member of the factory community, which the 
peternalist employers sought to oppose to class identity, playing at 
the same time on family and community loyalties. Although they did not 
meet with absolute success, it is probable that the 11 young men and women 
whose countenances beamed with intelligence and good humour 11 observed 
at Corahs' extension celebrations (Webb, 1948, p 24), formed part of the 
core of the new deradicalised Leicester working-class. 
The notion of changing class identity seems to me a more useful way 
of understanding class pacification than the concept of the labour aris-
tocracy1 which seems largely inapplicable here. Although Hobsbawm cites 
male hosiery workers ~n the list of highly-paid workers he suggests formed 
the aristocracy, the knitters did not fill such a role in Leicester or in 
Nottingham in relation to other workers, although they could be seen as 
an aristocratic group within the industry. 2 Although in the 1880s and 
1890s some knitters did earn, as Hobsbawm claims, 40/- to 45/-, as he 
himself argues 11Workers who earned good but irregular or fluctuating wages 
were not normally regarded as labour aristocrats 11 , and the knitters fell 
into precisely that category (Hobsbawm, 1964, pp 273, 286). Nor did these 
workers display any of the other characteristics associated with the labour 
aristocracy: they had no strong links with the middle class, nor do they 
seem to have aspired to middle-class status. On the contrary, during the 
pre-war period they were fighting to defend the old independent artisan 
3 
status, as argued in Chapter 4. Nor can it be claimed that they acted 
1 See Chapter 2. 
2 Lancaster also argues that there was no clearly identifiable labour 
aristocracy in Leicester (Lancaster, 1982, p 112). 
See also Lancaster, 1982. 
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to deradicalise the rest of the working-class, or to discipline and con-
trol them within the workplace, as pacemakers and setters, as alleged, 
for example, by Foster (1974) and Holbrook-Jones (1982), in their studies 
of textile and engineering workers. The knitters, in fact, remained 
firmly rooted in the wider working-class culture, and it is the changes 
in that wider culture which are reflected in their changing attitudes 
and practices, rather than the other way round. 
Another commonly-argued position has been that of a growing fragment-
ation of the working-class into different competing status groups some 
time between 1860 and 1930, as is claimed, for example, in the work of 
Dahrendorf (1959), and Gordon et al (1982). Again, this does not apply 
in the hosiery case. It is true that sectional interests did cause con-
flicts at times between different occupational subgroupings 1, but as 
recounted ~n Chapter 3 sectionalism had been a feature of hosiery union 
organisation since the beginning of the nineteenth century; this was not 
a new development. Indeed, it could be argued that the consolidation of 
the factory system to some extent actually diminished sectionalism. Nor 
did sectionalism prevent operatives of all branches from working together 
in unity in times of crisis, as for example during the 1915 strike or the 
1946 negotiations: on both these occasions, the degree of rank-and-file 
solidarity and militancy exceeded that of the surprised officials. At 
such times the force of the local working-class culture was to unify 
rather than to fragment. 
Finally, an explanation popularly prevalent in Leicester, and offered 
by some observers 2 is that the high level of upward mobility chances in 
1 Such conflicts are described~ for example~ in LAHU A October 1st 1930~ 
May 25th 1944. 
2 See Boraston~ Clegg and Rimmer, 1975~ p 119. 
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the industry promotes peaceful industrial relations, as a community like 
Hinckley, for example, is characterised by close relations between knitters 
and small employers (many of whom have risen from the ranks), who share 
the same social and cultural background. If this is true of Hinckley, it 
still will not serve overall to explain the development of the accommoda-
tive response. As demonstrated in Chapter 8, upward mobility had been 
common in the early period. Certainly, this continued to be the case: the 
Board of Trade reported the frequency with which operatives managed to 
accumulate the resources to become ''neighbours and competitors of their 
former masters", and the Leicester Chamber of Commerce reported of Hinckley 
in 1960 that half the seamless hose factories had directors who had formerly 
been factory employees (Board of Trade, 1946, p 7; Leicester Chamber of 
Commerce, 1960, p 102). To take individual examples, Halls of Stoke Golding, 
Leicestershire, was formed in 1882 by an ex-foreman, Towles of Loughborough 
in 1906 by two young knitters from a Leicester firm, and large manufacturer 
F.A. Toone had started as an operative at the age of ten (Halls, 1982; 
Towles, 1956; Howes, 1927 p 93). However, just as in the earlier period, 
those who rose were seen as now being ~n a different class position, with 
different interests. Union activists promoted to management or supervisory 
posts left the union (LAHU A September 7th 1921; HU February 17th 1932). 
Men who rose to become owners were seen as employers and acted as such: the 
Nuneaton manufacturer, Wood, who displayed the strongest possible anti-
union spirit, had, as we have seen, been a union member in the past. 1 
Although friendly relationships between managers and workers are aimed for 
by many firms, of all sizes, these are more characteristically paternalist 
than egalitarian. Westwood's study of one such paternalist firm, for 
1 See Chapter 5. 
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example, emphasises the social gulf between the 'girls' and the company-
car owning management, middle and top level alike (Westwood, 1984). 
Mobility continues to be a feature of this industry, but it affects only 
a few and has a limited effect on shopfloor relations. 1 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that there were marked continuities 
between forms of collective action practised 1n this and the earlier 
period. However, there was also a slow move to a more accommodative 
response to employer strategies. On the micro-level, major factors were 
the increasingly conciliatory approach of the employers, the channelling 
of radical visions into the co-operative movement and a tendency to sep-
arate political issues from industrial ones, leading in the long run to 
political moderacy among the leadership. On the macro-level, the 
deradicalisation of the mass of hosiery workers was related to cultural 
and social changes in working-class experience: the changing patterns of 
factory employment and the breaking up of family-based employment, the 
growth of the leisure culture, and alterations in the way working-class 
identity is constructed. 
There is some similarity between my arguments and those of Dahrendorf 
1n 'Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society', although, as I have 
1 My interviews confirmed that a clear sense of social distance is in 
most cases maintained between management and workers. Very few of 
th~ managers could have been mistaken for operatives~ all displayed 
attitudes demonstrating their loyalty to 'capital'~ and three explic-
itly referred to the difficulty of relating personally to their female 
operatives~ whom they clearly saw as creatures of a different species. 
Only in two very small firms (one with 11 employees~ one with 35)~ 
both headed by ex-operatives~ did a markedly different spirit seem to 
pertain. In both cases~ the firms were non-unionised. This suggests 
that social mobility may foster closer manager/work relations~ but 
at the same time will hamper accommodation with unions. 
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1ed, I believe that neither class fragmentation nor social mobility 
~ially affected class consciousness in the late nineteenth century. 
the other hand, like Dahrendorf, I have stressed the importance of 
separation of political and economic spheres and of what he calls the 
stitutionalisation of conflict'. Where I differ from him is in denying 
t these structural changes automatically affect class action and con-
ousness. It is not the mere fact of the institutionalisation of 
·gaining and dispute-settling procedures which brings accommodative 
1ponses: responses are mediated by how structural changes are perceived 
the involved parties. In this respect, the concept of identity forms 
~rucial bridge between structural environment and actors' responses: 
~breakdown of the old 'stockingers'' identity is the key to under-
anding the emergence of the accommodative, response. 
"' 
The exact relation between objective structural locati.on (class 
~bership) and class consciousness and action has long been recognised 
a problematic one. I am suggesting that the concept of identity can 
useful in understanding why in some cases class groupings move towards 
subjective appreciation of their class position and participate as a 
~sult in class-based forms of action, and why in other cases they fail 
. 
) make the transition from class 'in itself' to class 'for itself'. 
ientity is a crucial mediating factor between structural conditions and 
he development of a critical class consciousness. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
"It's very hard work, Sir, but there's many has to do it" 
Sarah Mabe, knitter's wife 
(PP 1863 xviii p 284) 
"I believe that a married woman that goes out to work has 
more spirit and energy than one that always stays at home; 
and when she does work and she has no Lace work to do at 
home she can devote her time to her home and famiLy." 
Harriet Ford, Lace overLooker 
(PP 18?6 XXX p 411) 
"The women of Leicester have marked characteristics, too. 
They have been aLready described as weLL-dressed; they are 
cLever and industrious, and cheerfuLLy shouLder the work 
of a home and the work in the famiLy as their aLLotted 
task ... Most return after marriage, often because of 
economic pressure, but often because they get there some 
kind of sociaL Life, pLeasant occupation and cheerfuL 
corrrpany. 'It's too dozy at home' they decLare." 
Co-operative Congress,(Leicester 
1915, pp 119, 129) 
352 
CHAPTER TEN 
GENDER RELATIONS AND THE LABOUR.PROCESS 
Introduction 
So far, the narrative focus of this study has been on the actions 
of groups of men: the employers and the union leaders and activists. 
This has inevitably been the case, since strategic choices with regard 
to political and industrial action in this period were, in the main, 
made by men not women. This does not mean that gender relations have 
had an insignificant role in the development of the hosiery labour 
process; I have already dealt with such important issues as the substit-
ution of women for men, the feminisation of the industry, the family 
nature of production under the domestic system (Chapters 3 and 4), the 
use of paternalism where the labour force is predominantly female 
(Chapter 6), and the role of women in union organisation (Chapters 8 and 
9). In this final chapter I shall give some further consideration to 
these and related issues in order to assess the significance of gender 
relations 1n labour process development. 
Many of.the initial contributors to the labour process debate 1 paid 
minimal attention to the role of women. Beechey argues that Braverman 
himself, although referring to the part played by women in the degradation 
process, has underestimated the importance of their role, tending to see 
them as a reserve source of labour to be drawn on in times of restructur-
ing (Beechey, 1982). 
1 For example, Burawoy, 19?8; Cressey and Macinnes, 1980, and Stark, 
1980. 
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This underestimation of women's role springs partly from the trad-
itional bias in industrial sociology towards the study of groups of male 
1 
workers , partly from the theoretical framework in which the labour 
process debate has evolved. For Braverman, as for Marx, labour (and 
capital) were neutral (or neuter) terms. Labour was not seen as intrin-
sically differentiated by gender. In the same way, conventional economic 
theory examines economic behaviour in terms of the actions of genderless 
individuals. Feminist sociologists, however, have argued that labour and 
labour power are not neutral but gendered. Hartmann, for example, has 
criticised the use of Marxist categories as they cannot tell us who fill 
the empty places: "Gender and racial hierarchies determine who fills the 
empty places" (Hartmann, 1979 , p 13). Similarly, Phillips and Taylor 
have argued that it is only on the most abstract level that capital/labour 
relations can be analysed apart from gender relations (Phillips and Taylor, 
1980, p 88). In any concrete situation, capital is not sex-blind, but 
acts to confront groups of workers differentiated by gender, whose own 
actions in turn are largely affected by the gender hierarchies in which 
their lives are embedded; strategic choices on both sides take place in 
the context of pre-existing gender divisions in the family and in the 
workplace, which act to constrain these choices. 
Consequently, as I have argued elsewhere, developments in the hosiery 
industry, such as attempts at female substitution, the reconstruction of 
the labour process with jobs redesigned specifically as 'female jobs', 
and thl' negotiations between employers and unions leading to male monopol-
isation of the highest-status, highest-paid jobs, cannot be seen as 
1 See BroWn3 19?6; Thompson3 19833 pp 184-?; Dex3 1985. 
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contingent, but as systematic effects of the interaction of capitalist 
work organisation and patriarchal family relations in the eighteenth 
d . h . 1 an n1neteent centur1es. Although~ following the argument of Phillips 
and Taylor, degradation and resegmentation processes might be analysed 
abstractly without reference to gender, in any real historical situation 
these processes are predicated upon existing gender relations; these, in 
the period under consideration, can be legitimately described as 'patri-
archal', that 1s based on the principles of male authority over women, 
and the older male's authority over younger men and women. 
This analysis has been taken one step further by Beechey. In an 
influential article (Beechey, 1977) she has argued that female labour 
power has a lower value than male, in that the cost of its reproduction 
is lower since women are at least partly supported by men. This explains 
the phenomenon, consistently observable in the hosiery case, of women 
being willing and able to work for a wage lower than that acceptable to 
men and defined as being the 'subsistence' wage. Such thinking, of course, 
leads us to consider the emergent social consensus on the desirability of 
the 'family wage'. The inevitability of at least some members of society 
being at least partly dependent on others (infants, old people for example) 
has led Humphries to declare that the family wage system is of benefit to 
the working-class, freeing them from dependence on state income maintenance 
(Humphries, 1977). Certainly, trade unions have argued in favour of it 
since the 1840s. However, in the context of dominant social expectations 
that male operatives will receive a family wage, employers are clearly 
enabled to pay women workers at below 'subsistence' level: 1n this context, 
1 See discussion in Bradley~ 1984~ 1986. 
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at least, female labour power may indeed be considered to have lesser 
value than male. The problem with Beechey's conceptualisation, however, 
is that it is hard to argue for the lower value of female labour power as 
a universal phenomenon, without recourse to biological or physiological 
criteria, that is that women's physical subsistence needs are actually 
lower than men's, a position which seems to me suspect and difficult to 
substantiate. It seems more fruitful to follow Westwood's line, and 
argue that while 
At the most abstract level labour power is not differentiated 
by gender3 in the concrete historical case it is. 
(Westwood3 19843 p 1?) 
In this chapter I shall briefly consider ways in which the hosiery 
labour process, as a "concrete historical case", was affected by gender 
relations. I shall look at the sexual division of labour, the importance 
of family requirements as influences on decision-making, and the influence 
of patriarchal family relationships in the workplace. I have dealt with 
these issues at some length in two previous papers (Bradley, 1984, 1986) 
which present a more fully detailed and illustrated account of historical 
developments in these areas. Here I shall more briefly summarise the 
relevant material and draw out its implications for labour process analysis. 
Section 1 The Sexual Division of Labour 
It is not easy to give an accurate picture of the sexual division of 
labour in the industry in the early part of the nineteenth century. 
Although there is a wealth of evidence provided by contemporary observers, 
much of it is impressionistic and contradictory. Official statistics are 
unreliable, because of the ambiguities involved in recording the occupations 
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1 
of married women. What follows is an attempt to outline changing pat-
terns of female and male labour using the most reliable information 
available; as will be seen, one certain factor ~s that throughout the 
nineteenth century there were consistent attempts by employers to profit 
from the relative cheapness of female labour by employing women in tasks 
2 traditionally defined as male. 
The idealised version of the division of labour under the domestic 
system (the version employers had ~n mind when they referred to its 
3 
"beauty" and "beneficial" effects as a "family work") was that the father 
should operate the frame, with wife and children performing subsidiary 
operations, usually the wife and girls seaming, stitching and mending, 
h b . d' 4 t e oys w~n ~ng. But departures from this 'norm' were common. The 1745 
charter permitted widows "during their widowhood" to practise the "art" of 
knitting (Henson, 1831, pp 178-9). In fact many women other than widows 
knitted. According to Chapman, by 1778 girls were being apprenticed as 
well as boys (Chapman, 1967, p 39). Witnesses in 1845, however, maintained 
1 See ALexander~ 19?5; Rushton~ 1980~ for discussion of the Limitations 
of census materiaZ reLating to women's empZoyment. 
2 Since this chapter was written~ two accounts deaZing in part or 
whoZLy with the same issues have been pubZished. Osterud (1986) 
describes the sexuaZ division of Labour in the Leicester hosiery 
industry in simiZar terms to myseZf~ stressing the importance of 
famiZy traditions and definitions~ aZthough she tends to u1tderpZay 
the trend to de-segregation in the mid-nineteenth century~ and thus 
the extent of competition between men and women for the same job. 
Rose (1986a) deaLs with hosiery as one exampZe in her discussion of 
the significance of gender reZations at work~ and reaches many of 
the same concZusions as myseZf. 
See~ for exampZe~ PP 1845 xv II q 1125~ PP 1854-5 xiv qq 2892~ 6273~ 
656?. 
4 Boys did sometimes do seaming and sewing jobs; for exampZe~ Joseph 
MarZow started work at four years oZd~ seaming socks knitted by his 
uncZe (Newby 3 Groves and Makin~ 1938). 
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that in the early decades of the century there were relatively few women 
working frames. John Geary of Anstey, for example, who saw the practice 
as "det·rimental to the trade 11 as well as "detrimental to domestic comfort 11 
claimed that it started when the invention of spinning jennies took from 
women their previous (more socially acceptable) source of income, hand-
spinning (PP 1845 xv I qq 3215-6). Another knitter claimed that in the 
past women had ceased work on marriage, while nowadays he had seen them 
working "with a baby sucking at the breast" (PP 1845 xv I q 5646). In 
1819, manufacturer James Rawson stated that there were currently mainly 
men working as knitters, although he, in contradiction to other op~n~ons, 
believed there had been more women formerly (PP 1819 v p 18). 
The 1833 Factory Commission provides clear evidence that women, old 
and young, were working in the frame by that date. One witness set his 
daughter knitting when aged 11. This report also gives estimates provided 
by Felkin, of numbers employed in the industry~ 13,000 men, 10,000 women 
and 10,000 children working frames, with 27,000 women and children perform-
ing finishing tasks (PP 1833 xx Cl pp 47, 51, 184, C2 p 8). These figures, 
which would indicate a highly feminised industry, must be viewed with some 
suspicion. A different picture is provided by 1841 Census returns for 
Leicestershire and Nottinghamshire, which show small proportions of females 
employed (see Figure 10.1). These, however, almost certainly under-
represent women's participation, and are anyway of limited value as they 
do not specify the precise task performed. The total number of operatives 
recorded (approximately 28,000) ~s insufficient to account for the operation 
of the 37,243 frames which we know from Felkin's census (fairly reliably 
carried out) to have been in the two counties at that date. 
Leics 
Notts 
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Figure 10.1 
Employment in hose manufacture 1n 
Leicestershire artd'Nottinghamshire 1841 
MaZes MaZes Females Females 
over 20 under 20 over 20 under 20 
10,018 1,526 2,552 987 
9,383 1,550 1,809 671 
Source: Census Figures pp 1844 xxvii 
A more accurate picture can be gained from the figures 
Total 
15,083 
13,413 
given for 
specific localities and employers in the 1845 and 1854-5 reports. For 
example, in 1845 in Enderby, Leicestershire, 26 frames were worked by 
men, 14 by women, at Littlethorpe, Leicestershire, 87 by men, 20 by 
women, and at Alfreton, Nottinghamshire, 104 by men, 40 by women (PP 
1845 xv pp 102, 186). John Homer reported that of the 45 frames he owned 
two thirds were worked by women and children and W.H. Walker's list of 
wrought hose hands included 76 men and 46 women: in the 20-30 age-group 
there were 20 men, 17 women, an indication that feminisation was increasing 
(PP 1845 xv I pp 162-4, q 5419). In 1854, two middlemen owning respect-
ively 100 and 106 frames employed respectively 68 and 66 women on them 
(PP 1854-5 xiv q 4923). These kinds of figures, showing that from one 
fifth to two thirds of frames were being worked by women and children, 
probably give an accurate impression of the situation in the country areas. 
There were probably fewer female knitters in the towns, where workshop 
organisation predominated, but here, too, the evidence is contradictory. 
William Jones reported that no women worked in his master's shop, stating 
"the women generally work at home", but another glove hand spoke of a 
"great many" women working in glove frames, some married but the majority 
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single, and in increasing numbers: he claimed that they aZZ worked 1n 
shops (PP 1845 xv I qq 298, 1262-1266). 
There was further subdivision in that female knitters were concen-
trated in certain branches, doing coarser, lighter, less well-paid work. 
Benjamin Elliott, middleman, explained that when he rented a fine-gauge 
frame to a man the worker would apply for a coarse frame for his wife 
(PP 1854-5 xiv q 7568). A witness from the thread piece branch claimed 
that this work was too heavy for "boys" or "weak persons"; he knew one 
woman on such a frame, but she could only equal half his output (PP 1845 
xv II q 2319). W.H. Walker stated that women and children were "incom-
petent to work the heavier or more skilled machinery", so were concentrated 
in wrought hose, while males took the better-paid work 1n gloves and wide 
frames (PP 1845 xv I q 2831). However, some women did work in these 
branches. Women were reported working wide frames, and a Kibworth knitter 
declared that he and his thirteen-year-old daughter could do as much work 
on a wide frame as three adult males on narrow frames (PP 1845 xv I q 6779, 
II q 3317). Women working in gloves were described as "proficient", but 
not sufficiently so to keep the machinery in repair (PP 1845 xv I qq 186-8). 
The reasons given for the exclusion of women from the better jobs 
were the "heaviness" of the machinery, skill requirements and the women's 
1 ignorance of mechanical matters , along with an assertion of the 'fitness' 
or 'suitability' of certain tasks for either sex. Muggeridge reflected 
this growing Victorian ideology on femininity and masculinity, when he 
condemned knitting as unhealthy for women, but praised seaming as "quite 
a woman's work" (PP 1854-5 xiv q 2723-4). Such arguments were less used 
by the workmen, who put more emphasis on the inefficiency of women: they 
1 See~ for example~ PP 1845 XV I qq 3216-9. 
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imed that frames needed servicing more quickly when operated by women 
children, and that they performed all tasks more slowly (PP 1845 xv 
1 q 568, PP 1854-5 xiv q 9115). 
Even here there was disagreement. One hosier explained 
It does not foZZow that because they are women they are the 
worst hands; they make as good work, but their work is un-
certain. 
other words, women's work was characteristically interrupted by domes-
.c duties, and this accounted for their lower output and earnings (PP 
345 xv I q 7852, PP 1854-5 xiv qq 1883, 1892). Some manufacturers 
:clared that women could equal two thirds of men's output or even, if 
ninterrupted, could equal it (PP 1845 xv I qq 3219, 3479). 
The idea of women's inferior skill and lack of strength to work 
1eavier machines, though echoed by commentators such as Wells (Wells, 
.972, p 156) has to be seen as dubious. The deliberate policy of exclud-
Lng women from the best jobs was clearly expressed in the statement of a 
Leicestershire knitter: 
I shouZd appZy, of course, for the best work for my own hands, 
because I am the most expert in the business and if my wife 
worked she could not work above haZf her time ... They are not 
so much consequence as we, therefore it is in that way that we 
look out for the best jobs for ourselves. 
(PP 1845 XV I q 3448) 
If women were less 'expert' and lacking in mechanical knowledge, it was 
because men, anxious to preserve their superior position, kept them so. 
It is significant that in Hawick, Scotland, women from the beginning of 
the century worked every kind of machine, without this being seen as 
1 See also discussion of skilZ in Chapter 4. 
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unsuitable! hosiery~ in the Scottish context, was completely 'women's 
1 
work'. 
There was no uncertainty surrounding the manufacturer's motives for 
employing women in increasing numbers; as one hosier admitted, his fellows 
"set it to those who do the least work" since their "profit comes from the 
rent" (PP 1845 xv I q 3758). 2 Women's output was less in proportion to 
their fixed payments (frame-rent and shop charges), they would accept 
lower rates, and as was argued in Chapter 4 they were considered less of 
a control problem. Thus pioneers in mechanisation, such as Collins and 
Corah, were eager to use female labour on the new powered machines, leading 
one desperate male employee to declare "this female system was one of the 
greatest evils we had to labour under" (PP 1845 xv I q 2303). The threat 
of feminisation induced leaders like George Buckby and Thomas Winters to 
campaign for the 'family wage' (PP 1854-5 xiv qq 1522, 5156). In the main 
however, the male hosiery operatives were accustomed to their womenfolk 
working and were content to see their wives taking employment to contribute 
3 to the family budget. What they did not want was to compete with them for 
1 This is reflected in the 1841 census figures: female hosiery workers 
outnumbered men in Scotland by 3165 to 1778, whereas in England and 
Wales males outnumbered females by 7:2 (PP 1844 xxvii). Further 
confirmation of the ability of women to work all kinds of knitting 
machines comes from the study of America by Baker (1964) and the 
interesting work being done on the Canadian knitting industry by 
Joy Parr. In America women were originally excluded from operating 
powered machines, but by the 1960s there were more women knitters 
than men. Parr describes how in Canada in the 1930s women knitted 
on the day shift, men on night shift. Men, however, as in Britain, 
performed what I have called the 'integrated task', while women had 
to be assisted by 'fixers'. In examining the British case Parr 
interestingly suggests that the opinions of technicians may have 
confirmed the views on the suitability of certain jobs for men and 
women held by male workers and capitalists: technical handbooks, for 
example, would assign technologically-demanding jobs to men (Parr, 1986). 
2 See also Chapters 3 and 4. 
3 See arguments in Bradley, 1986. 
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the same jobs, and it was that anxiety, and the desire to preserve the 
better-paid jobs as 'men's work' which marked the 1860-1914 period. 
Again, ambiguity surrounds the early stages of the factory system. 
1 As we have seen , the earliest factories used female labour. But some 
commentators, both then and later, assumed that in the early factories 
men operated the knitting machines while women worked at finishing and 
at warehousing tasks, mirroring the idealised form of the division of 
labour under the domestic system2; others, however, described both men 
d . h. 3 an women as operatLng mac Lnes. Wells asserts that rotary machines Ln 
particular required 11 considerable skill11 to operate and that only men 
were able to produce sufficient output on them to repay the manufacturers' 
investments; this also required the working of double shifts. He argues 
that it was some time before a serious attempt was made to introduce women 
on power machines and that this only happened when machines became more 
4 
automatic, calling for less skill (Wells, 1972, p 156). 
It is possible that in the 1860s and 1870s the men were able to use 
their superior mechanical expertise to gain a degree of monopoly on the 
less automatic machines. In this, the Nottingham men at least would have 
had the support of Mundella, who had firm beliefs as to what constituted 
women's work: it would be 11 awful" he declared, 11 to have only women and 
boys employed in a trade" (PP 1867-8 xxxix q 19477). 
1 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
2 See~ for example~ Phillips Bevan~ 1877~ p 106; Wells~ 1972~ p 156. 
3 See Cassells~ 1873~ p 62; Francis~ 1930~ p 143. Francis erroneously 
believed that handframes ~ere monopolised by men and that feminisa-
tion started ~ith the introduction of p~er machines. 
4 For example~ the automatic seamless hose machine~ much ~orked by 
~omen. 
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It is well documented, however, that by the 1880s and 1890s substan-
tial attempts at female substitution were underway, especially in the 
1 
country areas. By this time, as Wells argues, trade union pressure had 
ensured that certain jobs were at least seen as 'men's work': attempts at 
feminisation "provoked strong resistance". Wells admits, however, thereby 
undermining his own previous arguments about skill requirements, that views 
of what constituted 'men's work' varied according to locality. Only in 
Nottingham did men seek to monopolise circulars, while in Hawick women 
were working all kinds of machines including the heavier Cotton's Patents. 
The physical makeup of women, then, can not be seen as a serious disqual-
ification from any type of knitting task (Wells, 1972, p 157; LAHU B 
September 13th 1919). 
The men's fight to retain their chosen jobs was described in Chapter 
4. In 1888 LAHU resolved that jobs "as worked at present by men and women 
rema~n as they are", and that anyone infringing this rule should be expelled 
from the union (LAHU A March 16th 1888). They were favoured in their cam-
paign by the factory legislation, which covered hosiery factories from the 
start, and barred women from working night shifts. However, widespread 
evasion prevented the legislation from being a completely effective barrier 
to women, as was reported by Holmes and Bower (PP 1892 xxxvi Pt 2 pp 58-9, 
66-7). In 1900 the men of LAHU registered strong opposition to proposed 
changes to the Factory Acts which would have legalised the working of 
double shifts by young people and women (LAHU A March 21st 1900). 
In terms of daytime working, the men's attempts were largely ineffec-
tual. Some firms, such as Strettons, persistently used women on knitting 
machines, including Cotton's Patents (LAHU A February 11th 1911, November 
1 See Chapter 4. 
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3rd 1920). During the First World War, men from the three Fleckney 
factories fought persistently against admitting women to Cotton's patents, 
even on the terms negotiated by the unions, but were forced in the end to 
accept the wartime dilution, on condition that one man supervised five 
frames operated by the women. In 1922 it was reported that 47 out of 140 
Cotton's Patents surveyed in Leicester were still being worked by women 
(LAHU A December 11th 1915, March 4th 1917, July 12th 1922). 
The arguments used against women's employment on 'male' tasks were 
mainly economic ones. The unions pointed to the erosion of agreed wage-
levels (LAHU A February 11th 1911); but they also continued to use the 
suspect argument about physical aptitudes, and occasionally questioned 
the 'propriety' of women doing these tasks: "It isn't a proper thing to 
have a woman at such work" argued the countermen (LAHU A December 8th 1915, 
August 15th 1923). 1 The more politically militant the leaders, the more 
likely they were to resort to this type of patriarchal argument; Holmes 
attacked homework as "tending to turn the home into anything but a home" 
and Chamberlain stated firmly that both countering and knitting "are more 
suitable for men". The strong commitment of these men to the craft union 
ideal seems to have pushed them into a traditionalist patriarchalism (PP 
1892 xxxv~ Pt 2 p 55; Hinckley Times December 13th 1952). 
Such views did not move the employers, who continued to exploit the 
2 potential of cheaper female labour , so that by 1931 a local observer 
commented that most hosiery machines merely required to be "minded" by 
1 As Late as 1952~ objections were being made about the propriety of 
a woman working aLone on a night shift with men (LD November 3rd 1952). 
2 The customary LeveL of pay for 'women's work' in the industry seems 
to have stayed stabLe~ for most of its history~ at about haLf the 
average maLe wage. See for exampLe~ VCH 1958 p 311; TleUs~ 19?2~ 
p 163 . 
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women, requiring "very little strength" to operate; in his view, hosiery 
was now largely a female industry (Waddington, 1931, p 108). The 1930 
situation, in fact, reflected that of the 1850s, when William Biggs 
explained: 
The stocking trade as it now exists ... can be so easiZy 
Zearned and carried on by women and chiZdren that it has 
ceased to be a fit business for men. 
(Biggs 3 LRO) 
During both wars, women demonstrated that their physique was no 
impediment to their employment on all types of machine. But after World 
War Two these combined processes of degradation and feminisation were 
halted. The Board of Trade 1946 Report gives an informative account of 
the sexual division of labour ~n the industry at this point, a crucial 
strategic juncture. Seamless and fully-fashioned stockings were knitted 
"principally" by men. Both women and men knitted socks, but although 
women achieved the same output as men per machine they normally only 
operated three quarters of the number of machines. New flat bar outer-
wear machines were operated by men, but it was noted that women could 
operate them successfully, and women worked the hand version of this 
machine. Cotton's Patents and circulars were considered male preserves, 
but women and girls dominated in glove knitting on hand-operated narrow-
width machines. These were said to require ''close attention, good eye-
sight, and nimble fingers" and young girls of 16 were seen as the ideal 
recruits for this work. Interestingly, attempts to train men for this 
task had failed. The report commented that, whereas it had always been 
possible to find women to do 'men's work' it had been found "extremely 
difficult" to replace women with men in operations which were "tradit-
ionally female" (Board of Trade, 1946, pp 16-57). 
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In sum, women were operating the smaller, less advanced machines, 
even though, as with the glove knitting, these might require greater 
skill. This skill, however, was of the kind which, as Westwood among 
others argues, women are believed to possess 'naturally', and which is 
therefore seen as inferior to culturally-acquired male skills (Westwood, 
1984, p 17). These skills were described by the report in terms of the 
"need for nimble fingers" and the "fineness" of much finishing and knit-
ting work, which would ensure numerical female domination in the industry. 
The complexities of the social attitudes and relations involved were 
hinted at in the report, which commented that skill was often not reflec-
ted in relative earnings capacity, but at the same time argued that to 
employ "men at men's rates on women's work" would be too expensive. This 
makes clear the degree to which the division of labour in the industry 
had been structured on the basis of the socially-determined lower value 
of female labour power (Board of Trade, 1946, pp 66, 95, 98). 
After the war the men, although eventually losing the battle to keep 
countering a male job, managed to ensure exclusive access for themselves 
to the major male knitting tasks. 1 They were helped in this by the intro-
duction of the three-shift system in knitting, and by the more effective 
enforcement of protective legislation, but the negotiated truce between 
the unions and the employers was also, I believe, a major factor. Those 
women who had been knitters during the war did not immediately lose their 
jobs: ~n 1968, according to Wells, there were 9380 male and 4270 female 
knitters in the industry (Wells, 1972, p 204). However, by the time 
Westwood carried out her research there were no female knitters at the 
factory she studied, while my interviews revealed that only four out of 
1 See Chapter 4. 
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sixteen firms employed a few women as knitters: significantly, three of 
these factories were on a two-shift-only system; government legislation 
now acts effectively to support the ideas of 'custom' and 'fitness' 
which both employers and workpeople employ in defending the current 
1 division of labour. 
Currently the industry is at the beginning of a new wave of automa-
tion, as advanced electronic and computer-controlled technology penetrates 
not just knitting but finishing operations. 2 This is likely to pose a 
threat to the resegmented division of labour, especially as the NJIC truce 
has been weakened by the pressures of the recession. There may well be a 
new push towards feminisation; one employer I interviewed envisaged the 
future in terms of automatic machines worked by married women, now a 
3 preferred source of labour for many employers. 
It is clear, then, that processes of degradation and resegmentation 
were intimately involved with gender relations. Drives to feminisation, 
as employers sought to exploit low-valued female labour power, were sue-
ceeded by period when male resistance led to the resegmentation of tasks 
and a gender-based occupational segregation. 4 
1 There is no evidence that women have sought to regain the knitting 
job from men3 though women activists have always taken the Lead in 
caLLing for equaL pay principles and a due recognition of the value 
of 'female' skiLLs (see Bradley3 1984; LD3 19593 1963 AGMs). 
2 See Knitting InternationaL3 August 19853 pp 69-?0. 
3 For discussion of the significance of women's position in the reces-
sion3 and their role in the restructuring of the economy3 see3 for 
example3 Massey3 1983; Dex3 19853 Chap. 5; Seabrook3 19853 Chap. 5. 
4 These historicaL swings to and from feminisation are noted by Walby 
who3 however3 explains the phenomenon in terms of switches of motiv-
ation in the relevant groups of males between capitalist rationality 
and patriarchy (Walby3 1983). 
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It is worth considering some of the major frameworks employed to 
explain the position of women in the workforce in the light of the above 
account. Braverman himself saw women as an important source of the 
reserve army of labour, a position taken up and elaborated by Beechey 
(1977) and explored more critically by Bruegel (1979). But the claim 
that women represent a labour reservoir, to be pulled in and out of the 
labour force as capital's need for labour expands and contracts, does 
not find support from the hosiery case. As we have seen, women once 
pulled into jobs tended to stay in them until pushed out not by capital 
but by male labour. Nor is there any evidence that in times of recession 
it is women hosiery workers rather than men who lose jobs. The reserve 
army of labour thesis seems to me to rest on the proposition that jobs, 
like labour power, are neuter; 1n fact, as we have seen, as new jobs are 
created by the constant restructuring of the capitalist labour process 
they rapidly become sex-typed and associated with variably-valued male 
or female labour power. There can, then, be no simple substitution of 
women for men in sex-typed jobs, or vice versa: dilution or feminisation 
almost always involves the redesign of jobs. 
In these respects, the hosiery case apparently g1ves more support to 
the analysis of Humphries, who seeks to reformulate the reserve army 
thesis, arguing that it is more apt to speak of a process of female pro-
letarianisation or female substitution (Humphries, 1983). Women, by this 
argument, represent a preferred source of wage labour, an ideal proletariat, 
1n that their labour power 1s of lower value and they offer less resistance 
to capitalist control than do men. The problem here is that these undoubt-
edly attractive (to capital) features of female labour are only made 
possible by the existence of an alternative proletariat: the higher-valued, 
more resistant men, who subsidise their dependent women and enable them to 
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work below subsistence rates. Thus the potential of female proletarian-
isation is inevitably limited; presumably if a state was reached in which 
all wage labour was female, current power relations between the sexes 
would be dramatically reversed. Possibilities of female substitution, 
then, remain within strict limits, and must be understood in terms of the 
shifting relations between male and female wage labourers. 
Neither of the above theories take sufficient account of the phenom-
enon of gender-based occupational segregation; adequate recognition is 
not given to the fact that, in many cases, women do not take over the 
same jobs that men previously performed, but degraded and technologically-
transformed versions of them. Occupational segregation impedes the easy 
exchanging of male and female labour. In this respect, the alternative 
perspective of dual or segmented labour market theory has more to offer. 
Edwards, for example, argues for the emergence of a dual market structure 
in the 1880s and 1890s, consisting of a core of well-paid skilled jobs 
filled by white adult males, alongside a secondary sector of poorly paid, 
unskilled jobs, filled by females, black workers, young people and other 
less powerful groups, who can be easily hired and fired (Edwards 1979). 
Superficially this appears to fit the hosiery case, in terms of the 
1 division of labour in the industry in the 1980s. However, there are 
many discrepancies: in the first place, labour market dualisation appears 
to pre-date the 1880s; secondly, the thrust towards such a dual structure 
2 has not come from capital as much as from unionised male labour ; nor does 
dual labour market theory satisfactorily explain the persistent attempts 
1 See, for exanrple E'dUJards and ScuUion~ 1982; WestUJood, 1984. 
2 This point is made by Rubery in her useful critical survey of the 
first UJave of dual and segmented labour market theory (Rubery, 1980). 
See also Hartmann 3 1976a 
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of employers to erode the position of the primary 'core' workers by 
restructuring jobs and employing cheaper female labour. Again, it is 
inaccnrate to see the female hosiery jobs as possessing all the charac-
teristics of typical secondary jobs as outlined, for example, by Barron 
and Norris (1976). Although lower-paid than male jobs, these jobs 
require experience and training. They are not casualised jobs which 
can be filled at a moment's notice by untrained labour, and, in fact, 
since 1946 employers have complained almost consistently of a persistent 
shortage of skilled female labour rather than of male labour, the supply 
of which has tended to remain stable at the required levels. 
All these three approaches, then, employing as they do the gender-
blind categories of Marxism and economic theory, ignore the persistent 
realities of gender differentiation. An adequate explanation must take 
into account the relative values of male and female labour power and 
their effect on the behaviour of both capitalists and male labourers; 
it must also acknowledge the persistence, once instituted, of social 
definitions of 'men's' and 'women's work', sanctified by custom and 
tradition, and sanctioned by ideologies which identify idealised versions 
of masculine and feminine personalities. 
Section 2 The Family Project and Family Motivation 
Another way ~n which gender relations strongly influence workplace 
relations is in providing a source of motivation for work other than 
that of the maximising of an individual's own economic resources and 
rewards. As I have argued elsewhere (Bradley, 1986), nineteenth-century 
work relations can only be understood ~n terms of what I have called the 
'family project', that is the concept of the family as a collective which 
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works together to promote its own survival, both as an economic and as an 
emotional entity. The labour of family members should be viewed as an 
essentially joint enterprise, not as a collection of unconnected activ-
ities pursued by individual members in furtherance of their separate 
interests. Family members' labour was deployed in a way likely to 
further the success of the unit as a whole, and, in the nineteenth-
century context, the male head of household, in his role as patriarch, 
acted as co-ordinator and decision-maker for these various initiatives. 
As an Anstey knitter explained: 
We consider every 
head of his work. 
that respect. 
head of a family in our village to be the 
We have always been very independent in 
(PP 1845 XV I q 3149) 1 
To be successful, the family project required considerable flexibility, 
both in terms of who was considered a member of the family unit, and of 
the variety of subsistence activities undertaken by it. 2 There was, for 
example, a wide range of possible household and work structures among 
hosiery workers under the domestic system, since, to function successfully, 
the family unit required sufficient labour to fulfil all the subsidiary 
tasks, as well as possibly to operate several machines. Knitters' house-
holds and work-groups often extended beyond the nuclear family, including 
1 See also discussion of male authority in Rose~ 1986a. 
2 One of the best examples of this I have encountered outside of the 
hosiery industry is described in the autobiography of Fred Boughton~ 
reproduced in John Burnett's collection of extracts from nineteenth-
and early twentieth-century autobiographies. Boughton~ born in 1897~ 
wu.s the son of a Forest of Dean miner. The miners supplemented their 
industrial earnings with a variety of agricultural and subsistence 
activities~ and the boys were taught a wide variety of jobs in the 
home and outside~ ranging from cooking and knitting to farmwork~ 
quarrying and forestry. Boughton's father told him "I shaU not 
leave you much money~ but I will teach you every job~ then you can 
always get work" (Burnett~ 1982~ pp 294-300). 
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parents on both sides, uncles, aunts, grown-up siblings, as well as non-
family members such as lodgers, friends and neighbours. Two families 
1 
might also share a house together. 
As demonstrated by Levine's study (Levine, 1977), early marriage was 
common among the stockingers, who faced a dilemma: the young knitter 
needed the help of a wife and children to become a viable economic unit 
and secure his own independence from his parents, but raising a family 
meant more mouths to feed and more risk of starvation in times of un-
or underemployment. Nonetheless, children were considered an asset, and 
several knitters spoke of adopting or looking after orphans when they had 
no children of their own. 2 Such relationships extended beyond mere 
economic convenience; one knitter said of his boy, whose progress on the 
frame was handicapped by a missing finger, that nevertheless "if he be a 
good boy, I mean to take care of him" (PP 1845 xv II q 1590). The import-
ance of being in either a family or a household is epitomised in the 
simple declaration of Joseph Waplington: 11 I am a lodger, being a widower" 
(PP 1845 xv II q 4366). 
The work of women and children was of vital importance in the knitting 
family. Knitting and finishing tasks were the core of family and house-
hold activity, but to ensure better chances of survival other tasks were 
3 
undertaken. Many village knitters had gardens and allotments, kept pigs 
and hens and grew potatoes, or worked as labourers according to seasonal 
1 See, for example~ PP 1845 xv I qq 4453, 5534~ 6463~ II qq 2825~ 4831~ 
PP 1854-5 xiv qq 3217~ 8978. Further examples are provided in 
Levine, 1977. 
2 See, for example~ PP 1845 xv I q 3945, PP 1854-5 q 7981. This prac-
tice of adopting 'pseudo-kin' to procure sufficient family labour 
was also a feature of Japanese agrarian society (see Smith, 1959). 
J See also Chapter 3 and Bradley, 1986. 
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demand. Children not required to help with hosiery production might be 
sent out as servants or, in rare cases, apprenticed to another trade, 
and young ones were involved in child care, many little girls being sent 
out to 11nuss and seam11 • Not only girls were given this kind of employ-
ment: Thomas Wilcox reported that his daughter was a lace-runner, his 
elder son a winder, while his seven-year-old boy looked after the three 
smallest children (PP 1845 xv II q 4366). 
Despite middle-class disapproval, the stockingers considered it right 
to put children to work at an early age. 11 As soon as ever a female has 
judgement enough to know how to take a stitch to seam11 she was put to 
work, explained one knitter; union leader Mrs. Fray considered it to be 
11 a mother's duty11 to teach girls to work 11 as early as possible after 
school hours 11 (PP 1845 xv I q 4804, PP 1876 xxx p 384). Mary Taylor of 
Nottingham paid her children a high compliment when she said 11They are 
good children for work11 , and one father praised the allotment system on 
the grounds that it helped to train small children for 11 useful labour 11 , 
doing tasks such as pulling up twitch grass and burning it rather than 
11 lying about the streets 11 (PP 1833 xx Ci p 47, PP 1845 xv I q 6986). 
Although children might be sent out to work, parents preferred to 
have them working in the home, partly for control reasons, no doubt. 
Mothers would rather teach daughters sewing skills than send them into 
serv~ce (PP 1845 xv II q 2961). In addition, it was believed that knit-
ting skills were more quickly mastered by children who were 11 about the 
ground" than by 11 utter strangers 11 • Children were supposed to pick up 
skills when they grew up in the work environment; they learned knitting 
sitting alongside their parents, being instructed in the simplest proc-
esses first, and then working up "by degrees 11 (PP 1845 xv II qq 1215, 
1803, 1834). 
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From this family-based system of training has grown up both the 
popular belief that East Midlands people have a 'natural aptitude' for 
hosiery work and also the tradition of recruitment through the family 
which pertains in the industry. In the early factory days it was 
apparently not uncommon for the whole family to work in the same factory 
in different departments ("with one girl left at home to make the beds 
and cook the dinner"), and women were believed to prefer working in 
unhealthy workshops rather than in modern factories because there were 
often "family connexions" (Cassells, 1873, p 63; PP 1876 xxx q 7608). 
Although from the 1870s onward it became less common for husbands and 
WLves both to work in the industry, family-based recruitment continued 
to be normal especially in the villages, with women finding jobs for 
1 their children in their own workplace. Pick's factory history records 
a belief that this tradition was disrupted by World War Two; but during 
the 1950s and 1960s it seems to have been re-established to a consider-
2 
able extent. 
The family, then, acted as a mutual aid group, using every resource 
to support its members; one knitter claimed that he could not have 
survived without the assistance received from "good relations and friends" 
(PP 1845 xv I q 7338). The phenomenon, though, should not be seen in 
purely economic terms, although signs of a rather repellent economic 
rationality sometimes do appear in male knitters' depositions, such as 
1 llu.reven 's interesting study "Family Time and Industrial Time" (1982) 
describes a very similar set-up in the American textile industry. 
2 See Pick 1956, p 35 and also Chapter 6. 8 out of 16 in my interview 
sample· said that family recruitment was common in their firms; in 
two additional cases it had been common in the past but had been 
scrapped as part of a general policy of rationalisation. 
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George Kendall's assertion that his consumptive wife, though formerly 
"a good stout able woman~ and calculated to do household business for a 
large family", was now a "serious expense" keeping him "poor and badly 
off" (PP 1845 xv II q 3414). Expectations about a wife's contributions 
are revealed by comments like this, and that of Edward Nicholson: 
My wife winds a little sometimes3 when she is in the humour 
•.. she goes out of a day sometimes to wash and do those 
sorts of things; my wife is an old woman. 
(PP 1854-5 xiv qq 88133 8832) 
But behind these statements lay a strong emotional attachment to 
family life, underpinning the stockingers' obstinate clinging to the 
domestic system. One knitter believed that a "steady man, if he had any 
spirit "loves his wife's company and that of his little children", while 
another expressed a typical abhorrence for the New Poor Law, claiming 
I would almost sooner choose the gaol than to have my wife 
and children parted from me. 
(PP 1845 XV I qq 1??93 6961) 
The family-based work system offered many attractions, at least in its 
idealised version: "it makes a very comfortable earning for the aggregate", 
enabling knitters to "live as a family", being "independent of anyone 
else" and enjoying family companionship and comfort (PP 1845 xv I q 8045, 
II q 1123). l 
As has been persistently argued in this study, old habits die hard. 
In 1910 Corahs' knitters were still trying to use sons (and daughters) as 
helpers, and ~n 1922 Kibworth schoolchildren were said to be spending 
dinner hours "running on" (loading the knitting frame) for their parents 
1 Studies by Rose of Arnold3 Notts. and Sharpe of Calverton3 Notts. and 
South Normanton3 Derbyshire indicate that in country areas the family-
based system continued into the 1880s and 1890s3 possibly even into 
the early twentieth century (Rose3 1986b; Sharpe3 1986). 
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and taking work to and from the factory for their mothers (LAHU A Septem-
her 21st 1910, September 6th 1922). But the most powerful legacy was the 
tradition, still strong in the East Midlands, of women engaging in paid 
employment, including married women. Figure 10.2 shows the high propor-
tion of women in the area in paid employment in 1891, compared with the 
national average. Leicester, 1n particular was high above the average in 
1 
almost every age-group. 
During the domestic period, stockingers' w1ves worked from necessity, 
and it came to be seen as a woman's duty to contribute her share to the 
2 
"corrnnon fund". This duty was, it seems, willingly accepted: as one 
observer corrnnented, "They are always anxious, if they can work a frame, 
to get into one" (PP 1845 xv II q 2022). The sense of duty and eagerness 
to work continued into the factory era, when it was acknowledged that 
women were prepared to break the law to work as many hours as possible. 
There are reports of them hiding in cellars, lavatories and in baskets to 
evade the factory inspector, and one knitter described how his daughter, 
like all her warehouse workmates, habitually brought work home illegally 
in the evenings to carry on with it after hours (PP 1845 xv I q 7680, PP 
1892 xxxvi Pt 2 pp 58-9, 66-7). Women were said to have a sharper sense 
of "honour" and responsibility over maintaining their children than men, 
which led them to labour long hours in the local sweatshops. A Nottingham 
lace overlooker seems to have epitomised local attitudes when she declared: 
I think married women should be left alone to act for them-
selves. I think if a woman is a thoughtful wife and mother 
1 See Osterud~ 1986~ for other figures confirming this tendency. 
2 See PP 1812 ii p 23; PP 1854-5 xiv q 6273; Nicholson~ 1973, p 6. 
Age group 
10-15 
16-20 
21-25 
26-35 
36-45 
46-55 
56-65 
65+ 
All ages 
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Figure 10.2 
Percentage of women in each age group 
1n P?id employPent in urban areas 1891 
Leicester Nottingham NationaZ Average 
27.9 23.2 16.3 
89.7 82.7 68.6 
75.1 70.8 57.8 
47.5 43.9 33.0 
34.8 34.7 25.0 
31.2 35.3 25.3 
29.0 33.5 24.4 
18.4 21.6 16.0 
48.2 45.5 34.4 
Lancashire 
Average 
25.9 
79.6 
65.8 
40.6 
31.1 
29.6 
26.9 
18.0 
42.3 
Source: PP 1894 Zxxxi Pt II Statistics of EmpZoyment of Women and 
ChiZdren Appendix I. 
NB Lancashire averages have been included for comparison, as Lancashire 
was another area of high female employment. The figures do not distin-
guish between married and single women and no reliable figures for 
married women's employment exist. The same report provides minimum 
estimates for the employment of married women in Leicester in 1881 and 
1891, as follows: 
Age group 20-25 1881 30.6% 1891 22.7% 
Age group 26-45 1881 29.4% 1891 24.9% 
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s;w wiU know how best to arrange ... I believe a married 
woman that goes out to work has more spirit and energy than 
one that always stays at home. 
(pp 1876 XXX pp 361, 378, 411) 
A fascinating insight into such women's lives is provided by the 
autobiographical introduction to her own poems written by Ruth Wills, 
the poetess of Corahs. Her father was killed on army service, and her 
mother, left destitute, was forced to go out to work, leaving Ruth and 
her sister to "keep house" and "setting us our task work of seaming hose 
every morning". At eight Ruth was sent to work in a warehouse, working 
from 7 to 9 for l/6d a week. A short period of unemployment followed, 
during which the girls were sent into the country to gather firewood, 
sustaining themselves by eating "tender shoots of the hawthorn and the 
honeyed petals of the red clover flower". Finally Ruth obtained her job 
at Corahs, where she was to spend the rest of her life; she commented 
that there were to be no more "delightful wanderings" in her life: 
Heneeforth it must be work, woman's work, dreary and mono-
tonous sometimes, yet pleasant withal, as it rewarded me 
with the proud consciousness that I was not only able to 
eat my daily bread but to earn it. 
There could hardly be a better gloss on women's work experience in the 
late nineteenth century (Wills, 1861, pp v-vii). 
This tradition and spirit carried over into the twentieth century. 
Even when improved wages and employment conditions freed wives from the 
absolute necessity of working, they continued to do so, preferring the 
"social life, pleasant occupation and cheerful company" to "isolation at 
home". A commentator observed that in Leicester women cheerfully 
shouldered the burden of the work of a home together with work in a 
factory as being 11 their allotted task11 (Co-operative Congress 1915 pp 
119, 129). When confined to the home with young children they were able 
379 
to carry on with finishing tasks at home~ and, although the male workers 
campaigned against outwork, manufacturers and women workers defended it 
against the charges of exploitation, claiming it was a convenience as much 
to women, who were paid the same rates as they would have received ~n the 
factory, as to manufacturers (Leicester Chamber of Commerce, 1911 p 57; 
Co-operative Congress 1915, p 119). 
Since the industry had come to rely heavily on married women, they 
were able to fix hours to suit their domestic circumstances. 1 Hinckley 
women threatened to strike when their custom of going in at 9 in the 
m~rning, rather than 8, was challenged (LAHU B May 17th 1919). In such 
circumstances a marriage bar could hardly be operable, although apparently 
such a bar existed at a Yorkshire subsidiary to a large Leicester firm 
established after World War Two (Scott and Lynton, 1952, p 115). I have 
found only two references to Leicester factories attempting to ban married 
women (PP 1893-4 xxxvii Pt I p 167; LAHU A October 7th 1925). Although 
the issue was raised at times within the union by males and single women, 
LAHU officers rightly perceived it as such a "thorny question" that no 
official policy on married women's employment was formulated (LAHU A May 
28th 1934, September 4th 1940, LAHU B April 16th 1921). Eventually the 
NUHW resolved that "other things being equal" there should be no discrim-
ination between married and single employees in respect of short-time 
working and redundancies (AC Report, 1952 p 29). 
In fact, the employment of married women became more fully established 
after World War Two. In 1901, there were 9910 single and 3969 married 
women in Leicester working in hosiery, textiles, tailoring and paper trades 
1 See King~ 1948~ p 3?8; Wells~ 19?2~ p 204. 
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(Black, 1983, p 229). By 1964, in the factory studied by Brown and 
associates~ married women predominated over single by 725 to 535, and 
in the 1980s Westwood found that in the departments she studied 60% of 
the women were married, 20% having three or more children (Brown et al., 
1964, p 27; Westwood, 1984, p 16). The continuation of the ethic 
formulated in the nineteenth century by women like Ruth Wills is exem-
plified by the comments made by a Leicester respondent of Sharpe quoted 
in 'Double Identity', her study of working women; a single mother working 
in a hosiery factory, she told Sharpe 
I've been brought up that work is your self-respect ... 
I've aLways been brought up in a family where working is 
a big thing. (Sharpe., 1984., pp 203., 218) 
So far I have only dealt with the working classes, but family 
motivations and the 'family project' were important at all levels of the 
class structure. Women were involved in the activities of middlemen and 
truckers, helping deal with the workpeople, taking in goods and running 
truck shops (PP 1845 xv II q 1927). Those in this intermediate stratum 
sought, just as the working classes did, to increase family well-being 
by undertaking a variety of activities. One middleman, Ralph Ogden, for 
example, was also a shopkeeper, farmer, overseer, constable, assessor 
and tax collector! His brother helped him run the hosiery business (PP 
1845 XV II p 307). 
If we move up the strata again, family motivation assumes, if any-
thing, greater importance, although the part played by women was very 
different. The 1844 census figures record 11 female hosiers in 
Nottingham, 11 in Leicester, out of a total of 672. A notable example 
was Ann Wood, head of the firm in which Robert Walker started his career. 
But such women were in a clear minority, as was Eliza Atkins, who joined 
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1n the family business discussions as she cut out garments on the kitchen 
table, or Perry Gold Symington, of a Market Harborough firm, who became 
its extremely successful personnel manager in the 1890s (Atkins, 1972, 
p 4; Symingtons, 1956, p 37). Perry Symington's career was considered 
unusual, and Freer, in her fascinating study of Leicester business 
families, states that the group norms of this circle decreed the total 
exclusion of women from the world of business: their role was the cement-
ing of alliances between the emergent bourgeois 'dynasties', through 
promoting social interaction and prudent marriages (Freer, 1975, pp 82, 
351). 
Freer's excellent study highlights the crucial importance of family 
motivation among the Leicester bourgeoisie. She argues that previous 
discussions of bourgeois motivation have been distorted, as historians 
were misled by the apparently individualist ideology of the early 
capitalists. In actuality, notions of kinship and inheritance were 
centrally important to Victorian businessmen, and decisions that might 
be highly irrational in terms of conventional economic theory might be 
taken in the interest of family needs. It was important to provide 
employment for family members, in the light of their talents and their 
desires. Many business families preferred to stay in partnerships, and 
there was a reluctance to let enterprises go public, as it was feared 
this would weaken family control. The importance placed by the entre-
preneurs on families also encouraged them to espouse paternalist approaches, 
especi;~lly when faced with worker resistance. The patriarch's rule was 
unchallenged in the home, and "he made every attempt, although not always 
with success, to play a paternal role vis-a-vis his workpeople". In short, 
the system of production was, in Freer's view, as much a system of patri-
archalism as of capitalism (Freer, 1976, pp 12, 17, 139, 218-20). 
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Freer's thesis is confirmed by factory histories, which emphasise 
1 the importance of family participation and family control. Atkins' 
history recalls the reluctance felt by the family to allow the company 
to go public ~n 1950 (Atkins, 1972, p 31). Although Freer believes that 
the dynastic business structure started to break up in the twentieth 
century, small firms in particular are still run on the same family-based 
principles, as a recent study by Strumik shows, despite the penetration 
of conglomerate corporations which introduce new motivations in some 
sectors of the hosiery industry. Strumik found that of 97 small hosiery 
firms 45.4% were private family companies and only 24.6% were fully public 
companies or subsidiaries without any degree of family control. Many firms 
deliberately limited the size of their operations, fearing that any increase 
2 in size would entail the loss of personal control. 10 of the chief 
executives Strumik interviewed believed it their duty to provide employment 
for family members, and decisions were taken in line with family needs and 
family labour supply (Strumik, 1978, pp 107, 129, 141-48). 
The importance of these findings should not be underestimated. The 
old v~ew that the integration of family and work was destroyed as the 
factory system replaced the domestic system is seen to be grossly over-
. l'f' d 3 s~mp ~ ~e . As Freer argues 
The fusion of the financial affairs of family and firm was 
not a characteristic of leading business families only. It 
was a feature of life at all levels of Leicester society. 
(Freer~ 1976~ p 210) 
1 See Pick~ 1956; Byford~ 1969; Atkins~ 1972; Halls~ 1982. 
2 Two managers of small firms I interviewed made exactly the same point. 
3 This view is expressed3 for example~ by Scott and Lynton (1952). 
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At all levels of the social hierarchy, family motivation provided an 
alternative basis for decision-making to conventional economic rationality. 
The significance of such 'irrationality' of motive, and its persistence 
long after the 'traditional' epoch, has been underestimated not only by 
Marx and Weber and the Utilitarian political economists, but also by many 
contemporary sociologists who have absorbed assumptions about actors and 
rationality from these influential sources. 
Section 3 Patriarchy, Power and Gender Relations at Work 
Finally, we must consider the way family power relationships were 
reflected in the workplace. At all levels of the class structure the 
nineteenth-century family was patriarchal, and work organisation hinged 
on this fact. As Arthur Morley explained, the hosier or middleman always 
conducted contractual dealings with the "master of the family" and as long 
as a son remained in his father's household the father alone was answerable 
to the employer (PP 1854-5 xiv qq 6529-30). The only exception was when 
the family had no "master": here a woman might fill the decision-making 
role, as in the case of Sarah Bryan, a widow who took over her husband's 
responsibility for five frames, three worked by male journeymen (including 
her son) (PP 1854-5 xiv pp 514-7). Most women, however, were used to male 
authority, and their greater subservience to control was one of the reasons 
employers favoured female labour. 11The masters are very particular and 
the work" (seaming) "is sent back if not well done", one employer explained 
(O'Brien, undated, p 6). Another hosier reported that women could always 
be found, no matter how short the notice, to do large consignments of work; 
"They always get it done somehow, no-one knows how" (PP 1863 xviii p 211). 
The women were used to sitting up into the small hours as a result of their 
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husband's 'shacking' on Mondays and Tuesdays in order to finish the 
I • 1 • f week s cons~gnment. Th~s acceptance o hard work and long hours, how-
ever, should not simply be ascribed to female docility, but also to the 
sense of family duty which led mothers to risk their own health to main-
tain their children's. 2 Family motivation ~s here, too, a crucial 
determinant of the distinctive pattern of women's work behaviour. 
The continuation of these patterns of behaviour can be seen, ~n the 
present context, in the sharp differentiation managers make between 
unmarried girls, seen as lazy, unreliable and irresponsible, and thus 
presenting considerable discipline problems, and married women, seen as 
docile, hard-working and responsible, and thus particularly responsive 
. f 1" . 1 3 to strateg~es o paterna ~st~c contro . 
The development of behavioural differences between men and women ~s 
also fostered by physical separation within the factory. A Morning 
Chronicle correspondent in the 1840s reported that men worked on the top 
floor of Leicester workshops, women and children on the ground floor 
(Ginswick, 1983, p 168). This no doubt helped allay contemporary 
anxieties over sexual propriety, manifested in the fuss over the provision 
of separate lavatories for the two sexes (PP 1843 xiv f p 3). Physical 
segregation continued in the period of factory development. At Picks men 
knitted on the ground floor, while girls sewed on the floor above (Pick, 
1956, p 10). In contemporary factories, too, women commonly work ~n 
separate departments, developing thereby a "woman's world", in Westwood's 
phrase (Westwood, 1984, p 16). 
1 See Bradley~ 1986. 
2 Thane's work on working-class diets provides another demonstration of 
female altruism and the priority women gave to family well-being 
(Thane~ 19?8). 
3 See also Chapter 4 and Westwood~ 1984~ p 28. 
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In such circumstances~ it is not surprising that women, rather than 
participating in the male workshop culture~ developed their own distinctive 
form of it. The feature which most struck early observers was the concern 
with clothes, "showy dress" and "millinery" (PP 1863 xviii p 270; Co-
operative Congress, 1915, pp 121, 129). But, again, stress on femininity 
did not necessarily mean docility. Francis described the roughness of 
female factory workers in Hinckley: gin-drinking was common ~n factories, 
and when philanthropic middle-class ladies delivered improving talks to 
seamers' groups, they were subjected to rude conunents and "facetious 
remarks" about their clothes (Francis, 1930, p 144). Picks' factory girls 
faced public disapproval when they "kicked up their heels to the barrel 
organ" in lunch-breaks, jostling pedestrians, and 11 sqawking and chattering 
like a flock of starlings" (Pick, 1956, p 13). Leicester factory culture 
in the 1900s was marked by sexual horseplay and flirtations, especially on 
works outings, and males venturing into female territory might get more 
than they bargained for! (Paton and Baldwin, 1948). A county worker, 
looking back to her early factory experience, recalled that new entrants 
were mercilessly teased over sexual matters, but also that life was light-
ened by "fat-ups", when the women shared sausage rolls and cream buns and 
sang songs together (Hind Leys Local History Group, 1982, pp 33-4). The 
female factory culture described by Westwood, with its sharing of food, 
its binges, its bawdy 'bride's rituals' and the stress on marriage and 
the family is the direct descendant of the earlier culture (Westwood, 
1984, especially Chapters 5 and 6). 
The development of these gender-specific factory cultures no doubt 
fostered the splits between male and female workers described in Chapter 
9. Male union leaders never really achieved a sympathetic comprehension 
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of female behaviour without being patronising. For example, there are 
several references to un1on officers visiting the fathers of female 
workers in order to g~t them to persuade the girls to J01n the un1on 
(LAHU A September 2nd 1896; HU April 29th 1931). The group of girls 
who explained their failure to join LAHU in terms of "not being asked 
properly'' were probably being quite accurate (LAHU A October 25th 1905). 
Little interest was shown in problems specific to women. 1 LAHU refused 
to take responsibility for absence from work during "confinements", and 
1n two disputes involving the taking of handbags into the machine room 
and the wearing of curlers, union officials appear to have co-operated 
with management 1n persuading the women to abandon these practices (LAHU 
A January 22nd 1913, February 17th 1944, April 24th 1949). 2 
This tendency to separate development does not mean that women 
offered no help to men in their resistance to capitalist control. The 
history of the industry provides manifold examples of the involvement of 
women in industrial protest, especially in the domestic period. The 
accounts of O'Brien (undated) and Nicholson (1973) chart women's involve-
ment in demonstrations, unemployment parades, strikes, political unions, 
Chartist meetings and so forth. East Midlands women could be notably 
militant: a local paper describing a Chartist rally spoke of "harpies 
whose oaths and blasphemy, groans and yells, really made us blush for the 
feminine sex" (Epstein, 1982, p 241). Women sometimes took the initiative 
1 See flestwood, 1984, p 72, for discussion of this in the contemporary 
context. 
2 Some male activists were more nakedly gynophobic. One Leicester man 
expressed fear of the DC becoming composed entirely of women. Female 
members did not point out how often it had been composed entirely of 
men.' (LD December 18th 1922). 
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~n commencing militant action. Nottingham women in 1839 instituted an 
'exclusive dealing' tactic to foil the 1 shopocracy', refusing to patron-
~se any shops which refused to sign the Chartist petition (Nicholson, 
1973, p 50). In 1843, striking lace-runners called on local male 
unionists to support them, reminding them that they fought for a common 
cause (PP 1843 xiv f 43). The determination of two young Leicester girls, 
the White sisters aged 16 and 19, to become union members led to a fierce 
campaign against the "Russian Tyranny" of Skevingtons in 1910 (LAHU A 
October 26th 1910). LAHU had some notable female activists, such as 
Miss Woolman of Corahs, collector for the union since its formation, and 
Mrs. Bird, the first women's organiser. 
Nevertheless, women's impulses to resistance have to be weighed 
against family motivations, often more strongly developed ~n them than in 
men, and sharpened, as Westwood has shown, by a factory culture which 
emphasises the centrality of femininity and marriage in women's lives. 
Conclusion 
The argument of this chapter has been that gender relations have an 
important influence on workplace behaviour. Historically-defined 
differences between male and female labour power have meant that policies 
of feminisation have been an integral part of the degradation process ~n 
hosiery, while male reaction has resulted in the resegmentation of a 
strict gender-based division of labour. Men and women alike bring family 
experience into the workplace, and are motivated by family as well as 
economic interests, the significance of which has not yet been fully 
realised by sociologists. Everyday interactions between groups of workers 
and with management are also influenced by prevailing patterns of gender 
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relations in the family and at leisure. Gender divisions enter as much 
into work relations as they do into every other area of life ~n industrial 
societies. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the Introduction to this thesis two questions were posed: first, 
how useful was Braverman's work on labour process development for the 
study of any real historical case, and second, in the particular case of 
the hosiery industry, why had there been a move from confrontational to 
co-operative labour relations in the period under study (1800 to 1960). 
This thesis has been an attempt to answer those two questions. 
In Chapter 1, a reformulation of Braverman's theory was proposed. 
It was claimed that Braverman's key concept of degradation provided a 
base for a general theory of labour process development, specifying both 
the reasons for and the direction of change. The characteristic relations 
of capitalist production present a dilemma of control to employers. They 
seek to solve this by policing and constraining the subjectivity and 
autonomy of workers. This involves fragmenting and mechanising the labour 
process, and taking over from the workers the function of planning (pre-
conceptualisation). Taken together, these moves constitute the process of 
'degradation'. At the same time, some degree of consent on the part of 
the workforce is also imperative and this may generate a counter-tendency 
to concede a carefully selected degree of autonomy and subjective involve-
ment to the workers, especially those judged to be particularly indispensible 
to production. This counter-tendency is reinforced by the actions of the 
workers themselves, who, being active subjects rather than passive recip-
ients, can be expected to organise to resist degradation. Thus, the 
progress of degradation is often halting and impeded, its forms responding 
to the resistant pressure of the workforce. This counter-tendency I have 
called 'resegmentation'. 
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Although this analysis provides an account of core tendencies ~n 
labour process change, its focus is inevitably narrow, focusing on material 
alterations to the tasks and tools of labour. Thus it was argued that a 
complete historical account must also deal with other attendant aspects of 
change. 'Local' strategies of control are chosen by employers to address 
particular problems they face. These usually involve alterations not to 
the labour process itself (in Marx's precise definition), but to what I 
have called its institutional surroundings. They can be categorised as 
'repressive' or 'pacificatory' according as to whether they attempt to 
restrict or concede autonomy and subjective involvement. Thus they, too, 
are linked to the structural dilemmas of capitalist production relations 
(the 'double indeterminacy of labour'). 
It is also necessary to look at some of the other social relationships 
in which the labour process is embedded and which provide its context. 
Broader class relations, gender relations and competitive relations between 
firms may all have a part to play in the development of workplace relation-
ships. Thus, the analysis of degradation and resegmentation is only the 
starting place for the analysis of change at work. It is, as it were, the 
clew that leads through the complex maze of interconnecting relations in 
the midst of which patterns of working shift and evolve. 
Chapter 4 looked at degradation and resegmentation ~n the hosiery 
industry. It was argued that a slow process of degradation was observable 
over the period under study. Elements of fragmentation and preconceptual-
isation had been introduced long before steam-powered machinery and the 
factory system were introduced. Action by organised male workers, however, 
had both slowed down the pace of change and also enabled them to rema~n ~n 
less degraded jobs as the move to the factory was consolidated. 
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However, Braverman's historical account of a shift from direct 
control to Taylorite degradation in the 1880s was rejected. In this 
particular case, rather, a dualisation of control was noted. Partly as 
a result of the resegmentation process, two very different work environ-
ments marked by different constellations of control strategy evolved to 
deal with two sectors of labour, distinguished by gender. Women, while 
performing fragmented and preconceptualised tasks, continued to be sub-
jected to direct control; men were allowed more autonomy, performing tasks 
slightly less fragmented and preconceptualised, although subject to machine-
pacing (mechanisation) to a higher degree than the tasks of the women. 
This dualisation of control appears, at first sight, very similar to 
patterns described by the theorists of labour market segmentation, such as 
Barron and Norris (1976), Edwards (1979) and Kreckel (1980). Where my 
analysis departs from theirs is that these differentiated patterns are 
seen as arising from the interplay of relations within the production 
process itself; they then act to fragment the labour market, rather than 
the other way round. Workplace relations, themselves following divisions 
which occur within the family, structure the labour market, which then acts 
back on the workplace as labour market divisions themselves become institu-
tionalised and sanctified by convention. Such patterns of dualisation are 
not unique to the hosiery industry, but have been noted ~n other industries 
where men and women work together, for example printing, tailoring, book-
binding and clerical work. 1 
In Chapters 5 to 7 the range of 'local' control strategies was consid-
ered. Dominant among repressive strategies used by hosiery employers were 
1 See Cockburn~ 1983; Morris~ 1986; Zimmeck~ 1986 and Hunt~ 1986. 
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the use of truck, relocation of plant, and the victimisation of un1on 
members. The chief pacificatory strategies were paternalism, especially 
effective with the female workforce, and the slow development of joint 
consultation procedures, which brought a kind of truce and harmony between 
the unionised male workers and their employers. Once again, a pattern of 
dualisation can be discerned. 
The choice of these strategies, it was argued, was contingent upon 
the particular context, the traditions of the locality being especially 
significant in this case. Nonetheless, other studies might also show the 
central roles played elsewhere by paternalism and joint consultation in 
bringing peace to strife-torn industries, for example textiles (Joyce, 
1980) and boot and shoe (Fox, 1958; Goodman et al., 1977). 
Resistance and resegmentation had already been looked at in Chapter 
4, but worker organisation and responses to employer action were considered 
1n greater depth 1n Chapters 8 and 9. The earlier period, up till about 
1860, was marked by almost continual opposition, more or less effective, 
to the repressive strategies of employers and by struggles to retain 
control. After 1860 the growing dominance of pacificatory strategies 
produced a less confrontational industrial climate, whereby, for example, 
moves to establish joint consultation procedures were often followed by a 
decrease in strikes. However, male workers continued to fight to hang on 
to some elements of traditional craft control, although it could be argued 
that this was at the expense of women workers' interests. 
Chapter 10 picked up the theme of gender relations, which preceding 
chapters had already revealed to be of central importance in the analysis 
of control. Family relationships, it was argued, had a crucial influence 
on work relationships. Three particular aspects of this were considered: 
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the reproduction of family authority divisions in the sexual division of 
labour at work, the involvement of the family as a unit in production 
(which consequently affected local labour market conventions) and the 
differential relationship of men and women to managerial authority. All 
these factors were implicated in the dualisation of control, as gender 
segregation in the factory became more pronounced. In this way, gender 
relations impinge decisively on the work environment. This being the case, 
in any industry in which both sexes are employed, gender relations will 
have an important effect in influencing both the precise form that degrada-
tion takes and the choice of control strategies. 1 
I hope that the above summary illustrates the way that the modified 
degradation model can be used in comprehending the way an individual labour 
process has developed. The researcher undertaking an historical study of 
this sort can find herself overwhelmed by the mass of detail, the sheer 
density of events and the complexity of the networks of relationships. 
Yet the sociological researcher cannot be content, as a historian might be, 
with merely charting the chronology and narrative of these events, complex-
ities and inter-relationships. She must search for regularities, for 
viable generalisations, for signs of the impact of the social structure at 
the local and empirical level. The degradation model, thus, can be used as 
a pathfinder in locating regularities amid the welter and chaos of empirical 
events. 
To say this is, however, to make only a limited claim for the status 
of this model. I have suggested that it can be used as a 'guide to study', 
1 See3 for example3 Cockburn3 19833 1985; Westwood3 1984 and John3 1986 for confirmation of this argument. 
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as Engels explained 1n later life that he and Marx had intended that the 
model of historical materialism set out 1n the Preface to 'A Contribution 
1 to the Critique of Political Economy' should be used. Such an approach 
seeks to move towards the observation of regularities and a general explan-
ation, while respecting the complexities and irregularities of historical 
events. In this way, it bears some resemblance to the 'ideal type' model, 
2 
whose use was formulated by Weber. The Weberian ideal type was to be 
used as an heuristic tool, a yardstick by which to assess historical 
reality, to generate debate, throw up problems and promote the construction 
of further models. This study demonstrates how the degradation model can 
be used in both these ways and in so doing only confirms what has already 
been demonstrated. The proliferation of studies of the labour process and 
contributions to the 'labour process debate' is proof of exactly how power-
ful Braverman's model has been as a stimulant to historical study and a 
generator of debate and of new hypotheses. To claim this use for the model, 
then, is perhaps non-controversial. More controversial 1s the claim that 
I would also like to make that the model does relate to an underlying real 
tendency in labour process development. Under the ebb and flow of surface 
events, a steady current of degradation is empirically discernible. What 
I have offered in this study is, of course, one interpretation of a set of 
1 "Our conception of history is above all a guide to study not a lever 
for construction" (Engels to Schmidt~ 1980). The point is elaborated 
in a letter to Ernst in the SQJ7/e year: "The materialist method turns 
into its opposite if it is not taken as one's guiding principle in 
historical investigation but as a ready pattern according to which 
one shapes the facts of history to suit oneseLf". See aLso Marx to 
'Otechestvenniye Zapiski' 1877, Engels to BLoch~ 1890 (Marx and Engels., 
1956~ pp 379~ 493~ 496~ 498-500). 
2 See discussion in 'The MethodoLogy of the SociaL Sciences'~ 1949, pp 
90-101. Giddens (1973) suggests that the modeLs of capitaLism form-
uLated by both Marx and Weber should be viewed as ideal types. 
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complex events. Many other interpretations, incorporating predictions 
from other models, are clearly possible~ I have suggested in Chapter 1 
that one such interpretation might centre on the concept of competition 
as a generative force. Nevertheless, I have yet to be convinced that any 
alternative interpretation or model would effectively invalidate the 
analysis of degradation I have offered. 
To the second question posed in the Introduction, perhaps a more 
tentative answer must be given. I have already touched in the above 
discussion on some of the factors which contributed to this move from 
confrontation to co-operation; these are fully explored in Chapters 3, 8 
and 9. In Chapter 2 a survey of the literature dealing with similar 
developments at the national level led to the conclusion that no single 
explanatory factor could be isolated to account for the change. Rather, 
an explanation in terms of a number of contributory factors must be 
developed. My study has investigated some key issues at the local level. 
Above all, within the workplace, the growing dominance of pacificatory 
stra.tegies, as practised by a few key pace-setting opinion-leaders among 
the employers, can be seen to have engendered a more accommodative response 
from organised labour and to have induced a stronger sense of commitment 
to a firm among individual workers. But also of major importance were 
changes in the nature of working-class life and culture. The experience 
of family, work and community relationships 1n the early period had been 
tightly integrated; whole communities suffered or prospered according to 
the state of the hosiery trade. As the century progressed these spheres 
of experience diverged; consequently the integrative workshop culture, 
which had fostered the development of political awareness and oppositional 
ideas, gradually broke down, and workers experienced their jobs in a more 
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individualised way. In sum, working-class identity became more fragmented, 
leading to a decline of militant consciousness. At the same time, some of 
the collectivist and oppositional force of the hosiery workers was diverted 
into the co-operative movement, which ultimately proved a dead-end. 
Gender relations also had a part to play~ as the proportion of the 
workforce which was female increased militant solidarity became apparently 
h d h . 1 ar er to ac ~eve. The sense of common interests was lost as gender-based 
task segregation and labour market segmentation became institutionalised. 
Finally, it is indubitable that the growing prosperity of Leicester and 
its staple industries, culminating in the post-war boom of the 1950s, also 
played a part in the pacification of the workforce. Rather than giving 
privilege to any of these strands of explanation, it may be worth saying 
that all these would repay further discussion at the macro-level, partie-
ularly the more neglected ~ssues of gender, employer strategy and the 
co-operative movement. 
A final area which must be discussed ~s to what extent the findings 
of this study can be generalised to other industries. Without doubt, there 
are features of the hosiery industry which appear to make it atypical (the 
concentration in one locality, the important role of married women, the 
late move into the factories). It is therefore not sufficient to simply 
assume typicality. In Burawoy's 'Manufacturing Consent', the claim is made 
that the findings of the study can stand as valid for other industries 
because the workings of the capitalist system as a totality must equally be 
1 Interesting articLes by Mappen~ Bornat and Thom in AngeLa John's 
coLlection of essays 'UnequaL Opportunities' start to confront the 
difficuLt task of expLaining the phenomenon of women's apparent Lack 
of commitment to the aims and practices of the trade union movement 
(,Iohn~ 1986). 
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demonstrated in each of the elements that go to make up that totality. 
To say this ~s to risk tautology, ~n that it assumes that the initial 
formulation of those workings was in fact correct. Equally unconvincing 
~s the claim made by More ~n 'Skill and the English Working Class' that 
the findings of his study may well be generalisable because the engineering 
industry is somehow paradigmatic of British industry in general. That it 
is not so is clearly demonstrated by the obvious contrasts with the hosiery 
industry. 
To pick up Burawoy's point ~n a more constructive way, if degradation 
is a tendency inherent in capitalist production relations, as I have 
claimed, then other studies should provide empirical support for my case, 
demonstrating similar (if not identical) patterns to those described above. 
There is a growing body of studies, large and small, which do provide such 
support, dealing with industries as diverse as printing and bookbinding, 
tailoring and garment-making, pottery, boot and shoe making, electrical 
goods, electro-communications, warehouse retailing, clerical work and 
chemical analysis. 1 Not all these studies are couched in a Bravermanian 
framework, but all show the development of an historical degradation 
tendency; the work of Cockburn, in particular, outlines developments ~n 
printing, garment-making and retailing in a way strikingly similar to my 
own analysis. Perhaps it is notable that ~n all these cases the employment 
1 For printing and bookbinding, see Cockburn~ 1983 3 Hunt 3 1986; for 
tailoring and ga~ent-making, see Morris, 19863 Cockburn, 1985; for pottery, see Jones~ 1961, Sarsby~ 1985; for boot and shoe3 see 
Baker~ 1964 3 Goodman et al., 197?; for electricaL goods and electro-
communications~ see Baker, 1964, Game and Pringle3 19833 and Thompson 
and Bannon3 1985; for retailing, see Game and PringLe3 19833 Cockburn3 
1985; for cLericaL vork, see Crompton and Reid~ 1982~ Game and Pringle 3 
1983J Zimneck3 1986; for chemicaL analysis, see Garson, 1977. The 
list could be extended. 
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of women has played some part (often a major one) in the industry's 
development. The presence of women seems inextricably bound up with 
degradation, either because women are introduced into degraded jobs or 
because the presence of women makes it harder for unions to fight degrad-
ation. This does not mean, of course, that there has been no resistance 
to degradation in these areas; in many of them discernible processes of 
resegmentation are in play, as, for example, 1n the printing industry 
where compositors have put up a century-long fight to retain their skilled 
status (Cockburn, 1983). In many cases this leads to the kind of dualised 
control structure I have described above: Cockburn's recent study of ware-
housing provides a classic example (Cockburn, 1985). 
In opposition, other studies have rejected the degradation process as 
being empirically unverifiable (for example More, 1980; Wood, 1982, espec-
ially papers by Jones, More and Penn, Penn, 1985). Notably these researchers 
have dealt with the more male-dominated traditional skilled industries, like 
textiles and engineering, with a longstanding history of efficient union 
organisation. It has been argued by More, for example, not only that men 
retained their skills but also that management actively participated in 
preservation of skills and opposed degradation. Possibly reappraisal of 
the current state of engineering might reveal a slightly less rosy picture 1 , 
but, granted the accuracy of the studies mentioned above, it may be that 
the apparent discrepancy arises from the particular interpretation of the 
Braverman thesis employed in them. I would argue, for example, that the 
findings of More about the continuance of apprenticeship and skill could be 
1 Cockburn refers to the loss of craft skills in some areas of engin-
eering in Chapter 5 of her recent book (Cockburn3 1985). 
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reinterpreted to be compatible with my account of resegmentation: a 
truce between an exceptionally strong un~on and progressive-minded 
employers may well have resulted in the preservation of skilled jobs 
for male unionists, although a substratum of unskilled jobs developed 
at the base of the industrial hierarchy. 
· In sum, there ~s a considerable body of evidence lending support 
to the case I have made. While each industry pursues its own un~que 
pattern of development, there are clearly observable common patterns. 
Use of 'local' strategies of control will, of course, vary greatly 
between industries; and local labour markets will also be a source of 
variations within the constellation of class and gender relations at 
work, as will the nature of competitive interaction in industries with 
differing structures and operating within different market restraints. 
Therefore, while the findings of my study cannot be generalised in any 
straightforward sense, the model developed in this study can be fruit-
fully used in examining any industry or occupation. Whether or not 
common patterns will emerge from the bulk of such studies, as I have 
suggested may well be the case, is a matter for verification through 
further historical research. 
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APPENDIX 1 
A series of interviews was carried out 1n Leicester between 1982 and 
1985 with representatives of 16 hosiery manufacturing companies. In the 
majority of cases the interviews were with owner/managers or managing 
directors; in two cases I spoke to the son of the managing director. In 
three larger companies, one recently taken over by a large conglomerate, 
I spoke to other representatives of the company: the company secretary, 
the personnel manager and the plant production manager. 
These interviews were part of a longer-running project to interview 
representatives from 53 Leicester firms which I have been able to trace 
back, with the aid of a list provided by the LHMA and of local directories, 
to at least 1960: of these 41 can be traced back to 1951, and some of them 
right back to the nineteenth century. It is thus possible to establish a 
continuity 1n the case of these with the period under study in this thesis. 
The sample was chosen for this reason. It represents then, to the best of 
my knowledge, a total population of such 'survivor' firms in Leicester (some 
survivors may be masked by change of names following takeovers or change of 
ownership, although there is some evidence that firms retain old names to 
trade on established customer loyalties). It does not, however, constitute 
a representative sample of all firms in Leicester in the 1980s; two groups 
of firms are not represented: what we might call 'mushroom' firms as opposed 
to 'survivors', that is small firms which start up to cash in on a new 
fashion trend but do not achieve stable existence, and immigrant-owned 
firms, which have made their influential appearance on the scene since 1960. 
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Of the target 53 firms 29 have been approached, by means first of a 
covering letter and then a personal telephone call~ 8 firms refused to 
grant interviews and 5 had gone out of existence since the sample was 
selected (3 closed down, 2 moved from Leicester); this latter figure pro-
vides a good indication of the unstable and risky nature of the industry. 
16 firms consented to be interviewed, representing 30% of the original 
target group. If constraints of time and place can be overcome, the 
remaining 24 firms will be approached in the next couple of years. 
The interviews were conducted in a fairly informal and unstructured 
way. As some of the topics were of a fairly sensitive nature, I felt it 
best to be able to approach them in a circumspect way and to slide away 
from them if the response was very negative and the respondent appeared 
likely to 'clam up' as a result. An aide-memoire was used to ensure that 
similar material was covered sufficiently to permit coding and a certain 
amount of quantification. It was not, however, always possible or politic 
to cover all the areas on the aide-memoire, which is reproduced at the end 
of the appendix. The interviews were all conducted in the factory, which 
was not always conducive to good interviewing. In many cases there were 
frequent interruptions, both from visitors and from the telephone, and it 
was clear that the pressure of time was making itself felt. Many respondents 
told me on the telephone that they could allow me only a short period of 
time, as they were entirely responsible for the day-to-day management of 
the firm. As a result, the interviews are highly variable in terms of 
quality: their success seemed to depend very largely on the personality of 
the managers, although managers from large firms appeared, on the whole, to 
have more self-confidence and experience of dealing with outsiders, and thus 
to be more sympathetic to the interviewer. 
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The 16 interviews covered a range of types of firms, in terms of s~ze, 
ownership, location in the city (including one firm which had moved out 
from Leicester to the country in the 1880s, as described in Chapter 5), 
range of products and length of existence. The first two factors have been 
treated as particularly important in this thesis in terms of variations ~n 
management strategy. Firms of all sizes were included, though the size 
structure of the interview sample does not correspond to the target sample, 
as firms with under SO employees were underrepresented (see Fig. A). This 
is in part due to the difficulty of contacting small firms and also because 
the great proportion of the firms which had closed down were in this cate-
gory. 
Size of Firm 
(no. of 
employees) 
0- so 
51-100 
101-200 
200-500 
500+ 
TOTAL 
Figure A: Size of Firms 
Target Interviev; 
Group Sampl-e 
20 (38%) 4 (25%) 
7 (13%) 2 (12.5%) 
10 (19%) 4 (25%) 
9 (17%) 4 (25%) 
7 ( 13%) 2 (12.5%) 
53 16 
Refusals 
1 
2 
3 
2 
8 
Moved or 
Cl-osed doum 
4 
1 
5 
Of the 16 firms 13 were private companies, of which 8 were described 
to me as 'family businesses'. 2 were now subsidiaries of large public 
companies, both being large textile groups, one of which is a textile 
industry leader. The final company was also a subsidiary; it \.;ras owned by 
a holding company, but I was unable to ascertain whether this was a private 
or public company. There is a certain reserve in the industry about finan-
cial dealings: several of the refusals came from companies which had recently 
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been taken over or were in a state of being taken over and which were 
apparently reluctant to have their affairs investigated. I have no 
inform:ttion as to the ownership profile of the target group as a whole 
with which to compare these figures. My impression is that they slightly 
underplay the total extent of public ownership in the industry, while 
firmly reflecting the long tradition of private family ownership which is 
discussed in the thesis. 
This sample, then, cannot claim to be totally representative of the 
target group in terms of these two variables. It does, however, include 
examples of each relevant type of firm, which, with such a small sample, 
may be more important than strict representativeness. I am fairly confident 
that my interviews cover the range of situations, practices and strategies 
to be found within the industry in Leicester at the current time. 
Figure B: Interview Topics 
A. History of Firm: Founding date Size when founded Location of plant(s) 
Subsequent relocations Shifts in ownership Original product(s) and 
techniques Memorable events 
B. PersonaZ InvoZvement of Interviewee with the Firm: Present position 
Career Memories 
C. Current State of Firm: Size No of branches Composition of workforce 
(age, sex, nationality) Changes over time in workforce composition 
Sexual division of labour Current products and processes Technology 
in use and innovations Plans for innovation Current ownership Recent 
changes 
D. EmpZoyment PoZicy: Hours Pay (knitters/machinists) Piece rates and 
attitudes to them Recruitment and selection of workers Training 
Skill requirements Turnover problems Long servers Inducements to 
long service Benefits Recent redundancies 
E. Labour ReZations: Relations with union Organisation of union Discip-
linary procedures Supervisory style Stoppages and strikes Bargaining 
and consultative arrangements Dealing with grievances Introduction of 
new technology Pay claims NJIC participation Opinion of NJIC Problems 
concerning women Problems concerning Asians Preference for either sex 
F. Marketing: Main customers Links with chain stores Other outlets New 
products Handling of competition Foreign competition 
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G. General: Greatest current problem Plans/aspirations Anticipated 
changes in industry in next 10 years 
(Although no direct questions were asked on the following three issues, 
I attempted to gain an impression about them from the whole course of the 
interview and how it was conducted: Paternalism General management style 
Informal/formal approach). 
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APPENDIX 2 
In order to gain some rough quantitative material on the extent of 
discontent among framework-knitters in the nineteenth century, I carried 
out a content analysis on the framework-knitters' depositions to the 1845 
Royal Commission on the Condition of the Framework Knitters. This was 
chosen because it contains the greatest volume of depositions, from the 
widest-ranging selection of witnesses, of any of the relevant Parliamentary 
Reports. For reasons of time, and because the focus of my study was on 
Leicester, only the Leicestershire depositions in Volume I of the report 
were analysed; Volume II deals with Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. There 
are 183 knitters' depositions in Volume I, 64 from Leicester, 10 from 
Hinckley, 13 from Loughborough and 96 from the Leicestershire villages. 
These 183 statements vary greatly in length, detail, quality and range 
of topics addressed. The only information given in each and every statement 
was name, job and place of residence. Nevertheless, there was a tendency 
for a standard set of questions to be asked and thus it was possible to gain 
information from the majority of statements under the following headings: 
type of workplace (home, workshop or factory), charges, wages, hours worked, 
complaints made about conditions. A smaller proportion of statements also 
contained information which could be coded under the following headings: age, 
years spent in the trade, marital status, number of children, involvement of 
children in the trade, employer's name and status (middleman or proprietor), 
suggestions for improvements, experience of truck, membership of trade union. 
When dealing with non-standardised interviews of this type, it ~s 
obviously difficult to garner material of a more subjective nature than the 
kind of information I have listed above. However, I also noted the occurrence 
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of expressions of hostility. or conversely of approval, made by the knitters 
concerning their present or past masters or concerning the class of hosiers 
and middlemen in general. The quality of these expressions may be juJged 
from the selection given from them in Chapter 8: obviously, I selected the 
most vividly expressed from the sample, but I think they can fairly be said 
to represent the range of views aired in the statements. 
It is hard to assess whether these 183 statements can be taken to 
represent adequately the experiences and opinions of the body of knitters 
as a whole. It is likely that there was a degree of self-selection among 
the witnesses. Some of them were union leaders, Chartists or other known 
activists. It is likely that those with the strongest opinions and who were 
most articulate and self-confident were chosen to put themselves forward to 
speak (although not all the statements demonstrate the above qualities). 
On the other hand, most witnesses came not as individuals but as represent-
atives of different groups, delegates from trade unions, from particular 
branches or particular workshops. This was especially true of the village 
knitters who had been elected by village meetings to speak for the whole 
body, and who often presented material gathered by the group. In addition, 
most of the collated information is of a factual nature, which accords with 
the accounts given by contemporary observers and with other data gathered 
by historians. Thus I would argue that the picture of the knitters' 
conditions and experiences provided by the analysis 1s likely to be reason-
ably representative. The subjective material on op1n1ons may be treated 
with a little more caution, but if we take into consideration that these 
delegates, if not typical as personalities of the knitter population as a 
whole, almost certainly acted as opinion leaders, it seems not unreasonable 
to let them speak for their fellows. At the very least, those opinions 
provide suggestive qualitative material to be read in conjunction with other 
evidence presented in the thesis. 
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